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 Pref ace  
 This book on freshwater governance contains information that many practitioners in 
the water fi eld will be looking for. The water-related challenges have reached a 
climax with an unoptimistic future expected to feature more competition between 
users. These stresses will be exacerbated by climate change which is likely to 
increase water demand while shrinking water supplies. Intense competition for 
water resources will be experienced not only by private users but will also affect the 
public sector; however, national plans repeatedly fail to show the ability to provide 
a coherent outlook for development in which water needs are adequately projected 
and resources smartly shared. 
 The list of contributors of this book (more than 30 authors from around the 
globe) refl ects a wide range of expertise, and the themes covered will appeal to a 
broad spectrum of readers. These authors, while attempting to provide workable 
solutions, draw on their wealth of experience and in many instances share the les-
sons learnt from what has not worked to what has worked. The tools offered can 
also assist in furthering the thinking around water governance. Although the focus 
is on water, there are many synergies with the governance of many other natural 
resources. 
 The purpose of this book is to illustrate, in broad terms, the general matters of 
freshwater governance, mapping the spectrum of decision-making. The book aspires 
to contribute to the transitioning between techno-centric and eco-centric approaches, 
or a hybrid concept, to people-centric approaches. The set of book chapters pre-
sented in this volume will be based on the existing current knowledge as well as the 
authors’ experience working in the water sector, using nontechnical jargon in order 
to reach a wider audience. The target audience of this volume will range from aca-
demics, technicians, decision-makers, and managers to students; the aim is to target 
not just academia but also policy-makers and deep thinkers. This book has been 
more than 2 years in the making, and for those who know the water sector, many 
changes will have occurred during these years. Some of the information contained 
in this book may therefore be dated as new information may have become available 
in the intervening years; nonetheless, I trust that the content will be of interest to the 
readers. 
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 This book represents the tireless efforts of many dedicated individuals who 
devoted their time and resources to making it a reality. I thank them all, particularly 
our esteemed authors, as well as the reviewers who provided considered comments 
and valuable input to each chapter. This book was initiated and fi nancially sup-
ported by the Water Research Commission of South Africa, which is hereby grate-
fully acknowledged.




 This book was contemplated in late 2012 after the International Conference on 
Fresh Water Governance which was held in South Africa. It was actively pursued 
after the then newly appointed WRC CEO Mr. Dhesigen Naidoo led the initial 
authors’ workshop in Madrid. The premise was that freshwater governance indeed 
needed some serious refl ection and collective wisdom to chart its way forward. This 
is how this book came about. 
 We thank each and every chapter author for investing time in preparing their 
chapters and helping us realise this book. We also wish to thank all the reviewers 
who are listed here by name for providing insightful comments that helped us shape 
the chapters the way they are presented now:
 Mr. Brendan Bromwich (Independent Water and Environment Consultant) 
(reviewed two chapters) 
 Dr. Synne Movik (Senior Researcher, Water and Society Division, Norwegian 
Institute for Water Research (NIVA), Oslo, Norway) 
 Dr. Larry Swatuk (Associate Professor, School of Environment, Enterprise and 
Development (SEED), Faculty of Environment, University of Waterloo, Ontario, 
Canada) 
 Dr. Chad Staddon (Professor in Resource Economics and Policy, Department of 
Geography and Environmental Management, Bristol Group for Water Research, 
University of the West of England, UK) 
 Dr. Vinothan Naidoo (Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies at the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa) 
 Dr. Catherine Sutherland (Lecturer, School of Built Environment and Development 
Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa) 
 Dr. Stefano Burchi (Executive Chairman of the International Association for Water 
Law, Rome, Italy) 
 Dr. Richard Meissner (Senior Researcher: Water Governance, CSIR, Pretoria, 
South Africa) 
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 Dr. Robert Varady (Deputy Director and Research Professor of Environmental 
Policy, Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, The University of Arizona, 
Tucson, Arizona) 
 Dr. Shafi ck Adams (Executive Manager: Water-Linked Ecosystems, Water 
Research Commission, Pretoria, South Africa) 
 Mr. Steve Hedden (Researcher in the African Futures and Innovation Section, 
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 Chapter 1 
 Introduction and Refl ections 
 Eiman  Karar 
 This book explores the challenges most countries face in dealing with governance 
issues and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches to 
achieve effective freshwater governance for the twenty-fi rst century. The idea for 
writing this book was triggered by the successful hosting of the International 
Conference on Fresh Water Governance for Sustainable Development, 5–7 
November 2012, at the Champagne Sports Resort, Drakensberg, KZN, South 
Africa. At that conference, the need to bring together the research communities 
from different disciplines and practitioners at different levels of jurisdictions from 
around the world was tangible. The exchange of experiences and the interrogation 
of frameworks, policies and perceptions around best practice were invigorating. 
This book is not a direct result of that conference, but the exchange of experiences 
provided the impetus to embark on this undertaking. 
 The intention of this book is to pool some salient ideas around the thinking of 
water and its governance, tackling it from a global view to a local reality, from 
within and outside the numerous watersheds that fall under various administrative 
agencies to end users, the private sector and civil society. It can also identify sover-
eign boundaries and regional or transnational boundaries. As fl uid as water is, so is 
the concept of its governance. A striking feature is that the term “governance” 
means different things to different people. The aim of this volume is not to provide 
a universal defi nition of governance; instead, each chapter will frame its own mean-
ing in the context of the specifi c topic covered. 
 But fi rst, one might ask why freshwater governance is of such importance and 
what is so special about the twenty-fi rst century governance to warrant writing a 
book about it. 
 In his closing address at the Fresh Water Governance Conference on 7 November 
2012, the CEO of the WRC , Dhesigen Naidoo , highlighted the fact that the global 
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dialogue on water is generally unanimous that we are moving into a very diffi cult 
water future, on the back of factors including unprecedented population growth 
combined with rapid levels of economic movement, particularly in the developing 
world. The latter has resulted in growing middle classes with the resultant change in 
consumption patterns. This in many ways is starting to defi ne the new Malthusian 
challenge of the twenty-fi rst century. At the same time, years, decades and indeed 
centuries of environmentally insensitive and water-wasteful mining and industrial 
practices have come back to haunt us. This, combined with the newer challenges of 
global climate change, has defi ned the “water challenge” of the twenty-fi rst century. 
We are also clear that developments in water sciences and engineering alone have 
not delivered adequately to engage this challenge, and there is a strong need to con-
sider the social dynamics, culture and heritage issues towards more holistic and 
complete solutions. In fact, we have for a while in our individual corners been 
lamenting the lack of a reasonable dialogue on this very important matter of water 
governance. 
 The challenge of both water quantity and quality has become a sharp focus of our 
time. The global water conversation has taken a new turn on the back of increased 
information access and the world reaching a point where it is now impossible to 
ignore the scarcity of the resource. It is also important that the dialogue now includes 
business partners as the World Economic Forum recognises the availability of good 
quality water as a principal business risk globally. Those countries that have rela-
tively larger successes in meeting the water challenge have done it on the back of 
four principal pillars. Firstly, the water management in these more successful areas 
is informed by high levels of science, technology and innovation. The decision- 
making is highly informed, and water is a critical upfront consideration in any 
development plan. The second is good, well-maintained infrastructure. The third is 
the development and availability of large pools of skilled talent to plan, develop, 
operate and maintain the water management system at all levels. The fourth and in 
many cases differentiating factor in most systems is water-use behaviours across the 
spectrum from large industry and agriculture to the individual at household level. It 
is easy to see that each of these elements and the quartet as a whole depend funda-
mentally on levels of water literacy and consciousness and the model of water 
governance. 
 Freshwater governance, as it has been discussed in the realm of peer-reviewed 
papers and equivalent conferences, has been seized with models of institutional 
arrangements and the critique of the hierarchies of laws. This has certainly been the 
obsession in democratic South Africa over the past 19 years. The most important 
learning in the frustration of insuffi cient implementation of what has been deemed 
the best national water law in the world, the South African National Water Act of 
1998, is that a smartly conceived internationally leading model law is not enough. 
That while such a law represents the apex summary of the governance basket, its 
effective roll-out depends on the building of the various governance building blocks 
using the blueprint of the law as both the design eventuality and an indicative road-
map. Water governance is seen as a multisectoral, dynamic process, a complex 
socioecological system involving continuous learning and the capacity to adapt 
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effectively to unpredictable outcomes, where the results of system interventions are 
not predictable. 
 Three main messages have emerged from the discussions and analyses that are 
summarised in the pages that follow. First, old forms of governance in both the 
public and private sectors are becoming increasingly ineffective. Second, the new 
forms of governance that are likely to be needed over the next few decades will 
involve a much broader range of active players. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, two of the primary attributes of today’s governance systems – the usually 
fi xed and permanent allocations of power that are engraved in the structures and 
constitutions of many organisations and the tendency to vest initiative exclusively 
in the hands of those in senior positions in the hierarchy – look set to undergo fun-
damental changes. 
 The objective of this book is to illustrate, in broad terms, the general matters of 
freshwater governance, mapping the spectrum of decision-making, from a techno-
centric and ecocentric approach, or a hybrid concept, to a people-centric approach, 
mapping the transition. The challenges to water governance models will be consid-
ered as well as examining the multilevel provisions, the integration challenge, the 
hierarchy for decision-making, the emergence of water-sensitive designs in urban as 
well as rural settings, the interdependencies between the stakeholders, the power 
play in inclusive participation and the issue of geographic scales and boundaries. 
This information will be presented in an integrated and a comprehensive way build-
ing on some detailed case studies from around the world. The set of book chapters 
presented in this volume will be based on the existing current knowledge as well as 
the authors’ experience working in the water sector, using non-technical jargon in 
order to reach a wider audience. The target audience of this volume will range from 
academics, technicians, decision-makers and managers to students; the aim is to 
target not just academia but also policy-makers and deep thinkers. 
 There are 12 chapters in this book; in Chaps.  2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8 ,  9 ,  10 ,  11 ,  12 the 
lead authors and their contributing authors share their experiences and introduce 
some novel approaches to freshwater governance, articulated as related issues in 
three main baskets: the fi rst basket includes the framing of water governance issues 
from a water security dimension, a multilevel dimension, the transboundary dimen-
sion, a water integrity dimension and a regional/national dimension; the second 
basket offers some regulatory aspects such as market forces and regulation of 
achieving equity, development and sustainability; while the third basket is around 
governance mechanisms for portfolio-based urban planning and management, for 
inclusive governance, groundwater governance and governance futures in South 
Asia and Africa. 
 The main water governance issues are shared by  Chad Staddon ; the develop-
ment and extension of water services infrastructure has been a key foundational 
element of industrialisation and urbanisation since at least the “Great Sanitary 
Awakening” of the mid-nineteenth century. As urban areas became both larger and 
more densely inhabited, the collective need for better water services (drinking water 
and sanitation in particular) became overwhelming. Cities simply could not grow 
beyond a certain relatively modest size without the simultaneous articulation of an 
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integrated water services infrastructure to replace the piecemeal local arrangements 
then in place. The mid-twentieth century completion (in Europe, North America and 
parts of Australasia) of the resulting “project” of mass provision of standardised 
water supply and sanitation services, explored elsewhere and called “hydromodern-
ism”, was then followed by several waves of restructuring in the water services 
value chain, based particularly on new ideas about the respective roles of the public 
and private sectors, new technologies and water needs of the natural environment. 
Of course, in much of the developing world, even “hydromodernism” is as yet unat-
tained and perhaps unattainable. In addition, rapid urbanisation in many developing 
nations has gone hand in hand with the growth of what are called “peri-urban” areas 
that combine “urban” and “rural” characteristics and present new challenges to 
water (and other) services provision. 
 Fortunately, they claim, there is a way of easily presenting the historical progres-
sion from a low to a higher level of water services provision. More to the point, it is 
possible to indicate the key drivers of water services development or, conversely, 
the key impediments to same. Cities around the world can be understood from the 
point of view of their location within the “urban hydrosocial transition (UHT)”, a 
historical geographical framework that sees cities as manifestations of successive 
“hydrosocial contracts” between agents of economic, political, cultural and techno-
logical change. This concept builds on work undertaken by Brown et al. (2011) on 
“water-sensitive cities”, Lundquist (2001) on the “hydrosocial contract”, 
Swyngedouw (2005) on “urban metabolism” and Thapa, Varady and Scott (2014) 
on “water security indices”. A key innovation offered here is the simplifi ed three- 
part historical geographical schema based on a limited number of readily available 
key indicators and associated drivers. Brief case studies from around the world are 
presented by way of illustration. 
 Aziza Akhmouch offers an analytical framework to assess the impact of stake-
holder engagement on water-related decision-making and policy implementation 
based on interdependent components. Citizens increasingly demand to be more 
engaged in how public policy decisions are made. In this environment, stakeholder 
engagement has emerged as a principle of good water governance. However, despite 
extensive research and case studies on the topic in recent years, the lack of evidence- 
based assessment on how effective engagement processes have proven to be in 
reaching intended objectives of water governance is striking. This chapter presents 
the key fi ndings of an OECD study, which relies mainly on empirical data from a 
survey carried out across 215 stakeholders, within and outside the water sector and 
derived from 69 case studies collected worldwide. It suggests an analytical frame-
work to assess the impact of stakeholder engagement in water-related decision- 
making and policy implementation, based on interdependent components, i.e. 
drivers, obstacles, mechanisms, impacts, costs and benefi ts. 
 Results highlight the need for better understanding of the pressing and emerging 
issues related to stakeholder engagement. These include the external and internal 
drivers that trigger the engagement processes, arrival of new entrants that ought to 
be considered, innovative tools that have emerged to manage the interface between 
multiple players and types of costs and benefi ts incurred by engagement at policy 
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and project levels. This chapter concludes with policy guidance to decision-makers 
and practitioners in the form of overarching principles on how to set up the appro-
priate framework conditions for inclusive water governance. 
 Evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that decision-makers who adopt 
a systemic, inclusive approach to water governance are likely to get a better return 
on the time and resources they invest. They will also be better equipped to handle 
stakeholder issues and risks more effectively. 
 For engagement processes to be relevant, a careful balance is required between 
what they try to achieve, the resources they require and whether they succeed in 
reaching the intended objectives. Decision-makers at all levels have a critical role 
to play in establishing the enabling environment for result-oriented, effective and 
impactful stakeholder engagement. Although engagement processes cannot be eas-
ily replicated from one context to another, the OECD proposes six principles for 
creating the necessary conditions for inclusive water governance. 
 Anton Earle defi nes transboundary watercourses, including rivers, lakes and 
aquifers (confi ned and unconfi ned), shared between two or more countries that are 
home to over 70 % of the world’s population and supply water for roughly 60 % of 
the global food production. It is no surprise that the management of these water-
courses has been entrusted to national states, which have the power to make sover-
eign decisions over their management, use and conservation. State sovereignty is 
mitigated through the existence of a global institutional framework comprised of 
customary international water law (the norms dictating how states behave), global 
and regional conventions, basin-level agreements and basin management organisa-
tions. The good news is that there is a large body of joint institutions between coun-
tries with transboundary watercourses, the UN estimating that around 3 600 exist. 
This in part explains the relative lack of military interstate confl icts. Less good news 
is that despite the existence of international and basin-level agreements and basin 
organisations, the benefi ts to be expected from international cooperation around 
transboundary watercourses have in most cases not materialised. Acute, persistent 
and seemingly intractable problems persist, with ecosystem degradation not being 
reversed, joint investments in water infrastructure not materialising and joint man-
agement organisations failing to attract signifi cant long-term support from the 
respective basin states. Despite at least two decades of concerted support by the 
international development community, the impacts of enhanced interstate coopera-
tion are noticeable through their absence. 
 This chapter investigates why this may be so and introduces a starting point 
which moves beyond the state-centric approach to transboundary water manage-
ment. In doing so it does not challenge the sovereign right of states to manage their 
watercourses; instead it shows how a range of non-state actors do in fact infl uence 
state practice through a variety of mechanisms. As these mechanisms are frequently 
covert, it becomes diffi cult to assess the integrity of the relationships between 
actors, in turn making public engagement and participation diffi cult. Needed is a 
governance paradigm which opens the decision-making arena to non-state actors all 
in support of the national governments and their respective mandates. This chapter 
ends with an indication of what such a governance arrangement might look like 
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across the four success factors identifi ed in the introduction of this book, namely, 
science-informed decision-making, investments in appropriate infrastructure, 
development of skills and talent and the water-use behaviour of stakeholders. 
 Richard Meissner argues that the establishment of a governance institution like 
a river basin organisation is not only a governmental activity. Neither does its estab-
lishment only revolve around the stipulations contained in regulatory mechanisms 
and policies. Establishing a river basin organisation, like a Catchment Management 
Agency (CMA), involves a number of actors or stakeholders from both the govern-
mental and non-governmental spheres. There are practices involved in their estab-
lishment that go beyond regulatory mechanisms and often bring in personal 
experiences and the overall political landscape as well as administrative develop-
ment trajectories. He and his contributing authors refl ect on some of the administra-
tive processes as a way to discern noticeable practices in the establishment of 
CMAs. The case study material is South Africa’s CMA establishment process to 
date. Some of the practices that come out strongly are human resource issues and 
fi nancial accounting practices that practitioners need to consider when establishing 
such a river basin organisation. This chapter is based on research conducted for 
South Africa’s Water Research Commission between 2014 and 2016. The process 
of establishing the  Flussgebietsgemeinschaft Elbe in Germany is also outlined to 
illustrate the similarities and differences in the experience of establishing a river 
basin organisation in a developed and developing country. 
 Multilevel governance is at the order of the day when considering the case of 
South Africa’s CMA establishment process. The establishment process is not only 
about pitfalls and challenges; there are also opportunities to take advantage of. One 
such opportunity is the knowledge of public administrative processes held by DWS 
offi cials. Such knowledge can be a defi ning resource between a successful and 
stalled establishment process. The identifi ed practices and conclusions drawn 
should not be seen as a set of recommendations for policy-makers and stakeholders 
involved in CMA establishment processes only but also for scientists researching 
the process. Scientists are, after all, also stakeholders when they research CMAs 
and may also be involved in some of the CMAs currently being established. The 
research has shown a strong link between the successes or challenges of the estab-
lishment process and the way in which CMAs operate. This is an area where further 
research is needed as the process of establishing the other seven CMAs 
progresses. 
 In his chapter,  Håkan Tropp contends that in most countries, water crises are not 
primarily driven by resource scarcity but by governance failures. A fundamental 
argument put forth is that the water sector is prone to corruption that leads to very 
dire consequences for sustainable, effi cient and equitable water use, access and allo-
cation. It has contributed to severe limitations in water reform implementation, 
where processes of decentralisation and privatisation sometimes rather have opened 
up for new groups to exploit the system, despite that arguments of better transpar-
ency and accountability were used to institute such changes in the fi rst place. 
 This chapter outlines that lack of water-related integrity incurs huge cost for 
societies, in lives lost, stalling growth, wasted talent and degraded resources. For 
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example, corruption fuels unfair distributions of costs and benefi ts between differ-
ent user groups or completely excludes certain groups of a particular water use. It 
can also be a strong driver to falling groundwater tables and diminishing ecosystem 
services due to unaccounted water withdrawals of lakes and rivers. It increases 
transaction costs and implies very high investment risks for both public and private 
investors. In sum, increased sustainability, equity and effi ciency of water resources 
and services allocation; access; and use will in many places be very hard to come 
by – or attained at a much higher cost – without improving integrity. 
 Water integrity is defi ned as the adherence of water stakeholders and institutions 
to governance principles of transparency, accountability and participation, based on 
core values of honesty, equity and professionalism. In a more practical sense, integ-
rity can refer to how well governance regimes or systems adhere to the rule of law, 
predictability in decision-making procedures and outcomes and if decisions hold up 
for public scrutiny and to what extent they can withstand different types of vested 
interests and corrupt practices. Corruption in water is used as a particular case to 
highlight issues of water integrity. Integrity is strongly manifested in water decision- 
making, and the level of integrity plays a critical role in deciding the outcomes of 
decision-making, that is, who gets what water, when and how. 
 Based on country examples, this chapter identifi es corruption hot spots in the 
water sector such as the initial phases of procurement processes, kickbacks in 
awarding contracts or delivering water services (irrigation and drinking water sup-
ply) and political capture of administrative processes. It also identifi es and synthe-
sises country-based examples of transparency and accountability measures to 
improve integrity. They argue that it is much overdue to start to speak about the 
politically sensitive and unspoken drivers and consequences of corruption in the 
water sector and above all to make a systematic and coherent effort to improve 
water integrity. This chapter points towards a need to strongly include integrity- and 
corruption-related issues in the analysis of and policy responses to water crises. Not 
only is there a need for changed behaviours among public and private water 
decision- makers and users but also high time for setting in place a strong research 
agenda to assess impacts of corruption in water and to contextualise policy responses 
and interventions to improve water integrity. 
 Claudious Chikozho submits that key actors in various developing countries are 
often confronted by diffi cult choices when it comes to the selection and deployment 
of appropriate water governance regimes taking into account national socio- 
economic and political realities. Indeed, scholars and practitioners alike continue to 
grapple with the need to create the optimum water supply and allocation decision- 
making space applicable to specifi c developing countries. This chapter uses case 
studies to explore the utility of developmental statism and free-market economics as 
two major paradigms that have emerged in the face of enduring questions regarding 
how best to govern water supply systems in developing countries. Increasing 
 pressure on available natural resources may have rendered obsolete some of the 
water supply systems and governance regimes that have served human societies 
very well for many decades. It is clear that national water supply governance para-
digms tend to change in tandem with emerging national development theoretical 
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frameworks and priorities. Each nation feels compelled to adopt a particular frame-
work to fulfi l its unique needs. While many developing countries have adopted 
water policy prescriptions from the international arena, national and local socio-
economic and political realities ultimately determine what works and what does not 
work on the ground. Thus, the choice between free-market approaches and develop-
mental state- oriented approaches is never simple. Indeed, the majority of countries 
rely on a mix of market economics and developmental statism to make their water 
governance regimes more realistic and workable on the ground. 
 The authors conclude by stating that it is always important to remember that in 
water governance, context matters. National water supply governance paradigms 
tend to change in tandem with emerging national development theoretical frame-
works and priorities. Each nation feels compelled to adopt a particular framework 
to fulfi l its needs. In practice, more and more water utilities and planning agencies 
have been shifting their focus towards exploration of water supply system effi ciency 
improvement possibilities, implementation of options for WDM within the confi nes 
of IWRM, equitable reallocation of water among competing users and uses to 
reduce consumption and meet future water demand. While many developing coun-
tries have adopted water policy prescriptions from the international arena, national 
and local socio-economic and political realities ultimately determine what works 
and what does not work on the ground. Thus, the choice between free-market 
approaches and developmental state-oriented approaches is never simple. 
Experiences across the globe indicate that careful analysis of local socio-economic 
and political conditions is crucial before deploying specifi c water supply gover-
nance frameworks. Application of the principles of sustainability and equity will 
help bridge the gap between diverse and competing interests and unleash the poten-
tial for more innovation in water supply governance. 
 In her chapter,  Barbara van Koppen explores rights-based freshwater gover-
nance. The UN recognition of a human right to water for drinking, personal and 
other domestic uses and sanitation in 2010 was a political breakthrough in states’ 
commitments to adopt a human rights framework in carrying out part of their man-
date. This chapter explores other domains of freshwater governance in which human 
rights frameworks provide a robust and widely accepted set of normative values to 
such governance. The basis is General Comment No. 15 of the Committee of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 2002, which states that water is 
needed to realise a range of indivisible human rights to nonstarvation, food, health, 
work and an adequate standard of living, and also procedural rights to participation 
and information in water interventions. On that basis, this chapter explores concrete 
implications of the Comment for states’ broader infrastructure-based water services 
implied in the recognised need to access to infrastructure, rights to non- discrimination 
in public service delivery and respect of people’s own prioritisation. This implies a 
right to water for livelihoods with core minimum service levels for water to home-
steads that meet both domestic and small-scale productive uses, so at least 50–100 
l per capita per day. Turning to the state’s mandates and authority in allocating water 
resources, this chapter identifi es three forms of unfair treatment of small-scale users 
in current licence systems. As illustrated by the case of South Africa, the legal tool 
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of “Priority General Authorisations” is proposed. This prioritises water allocation to 
small-scale water users while targeting and enforcing regulatory licences to the few 
high-impact users. 
 The authors discuss how international human rights instruments in general and 
the CESCR General Comment No. 15 on the human right to water in particular 
provide a robust normative system that is well able to address end goals of human 
well-being across the key mandates of the water sector, namely, infrastructure 
development and water resource allocation. While the recognition of a justiciable 
and enforceable right to water for drinking, personal and other domestic uses and 
sanitation has been an important milestone in closing the disconnection between the 
state as duty-bearer for human rights and the state as investor in water infrastructure 
and regulator, the authors argue that this has only been a very partial interpretation 
of the underpinning General Comment No. 15 of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. The same Comment also indicates priorities in other 
freshwater governance domains to realise the substantive rights to livelihoods, food, 
health and an adequate standard of living. This has concrete implications for the 
state’s infrastructure-based water services. Poor people’s productive water needs 
should be fully recognised and met in a non-discriminatory manner. The defi nition 
of a core minimum should not be assumed to be for domestic uses only but should 
include water for small-scale productive uses at and around homesteads as well. 
This priority for multiple basic uses is already a widespread practice, but often still 
seen as “illegal” by sectoral professionals who design single-use infrastructure. An 
inclusive people-driven planning process for infrastructure services will spontane-
ously identify such multiple priorities. 
 The identifi cation of these further implications of General Comment No. 15 
underlines this chapter’s premise that human rights frameworks provide the indis-
pensable normative framework for the twenty-fi rst century freshwater governance. 
 Raymond Ison explains how mechanisms for inclusive governance are built on 
the framing choices that are made about governance and that which is being gov-
erned. His chapter unpacks how governance can be understood and considers differ-
ent historical and contemporary framings of water governance. A framing of 
“governance as praxis” is developed as a central element in this chapter. What 
makes governance inclusive is explored, drawing on theoretical, practical and insti-
tutional aspects before elucidating some of the different mechanisms currently used 
or proposed for creating inclusive water governance (though we argue against 
praxis based on simple mechanism). Finally, the factors that either constrain or 
enable inclusive water governance are explored with a focus on systemic concepts 
of learning and feedback. 
 An inclusive, systemic approach to freshwater governance begins by making the 
distinction between situation and system; no one governance situation is the same 
so contextual design and application are needed even if some of the principles and 
practices employed are held in common across contexts. In this chapter the authors 
have given considerable attention to framing issues and the role of language. All 
metaphors bring forth an associated system; in other words language precedes sys-
tem. In fact, the choice to see a freshwater river as a system is a framing choice – the 
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system does not precede the choices that different actors make. In this chapter the 
authors have presented a narrative that supports their normative position – that it 
makes sense to see freshwater systems as coupled social-biophysical systems so 
that, in a human-induced climate change world, the relational dynamic between and 
within the social and biophysical will benefi t from moving towards forms of inclu-
sive, systemic governance. 
 Jennifer McKay presents a portfolio-based approach to planning and manage-
ment and argues that rapid urbanisation, growing urban populations, environmental 
issues and climate change all present signifi cant challenges for water resource man-
agement, the delivery of essential water and sanitation services and environmental 
protection. As a result, traditional approaches that have relied heavily on large-scale 
infrastructure development are making way for new approaches such as the 
portfolio- based approach to planning and management. In an urban context this 
includes integration of all components of the urban water cycle, and most state gov-
ernments in Australia have embarked on implementing this integrated approach by 
having a mix of water supply sources including demand management and conserva-
tion measures. However, effective implementation of this approach depends on 
policies and regulations and encounters various impediments. Accordingly, this 
chapter focuses on the City of Adelaide in South Australia and explores the legal 
and policy challenges for implementing an integrated urban water management plan 
in Metropolitan Adelaide. Drawing on the results of governance studies carried out 
in Australia that included a literature review and stakeholder and community sur-
veys, this chapter attempts to better understand the barriers to transitioning Adelaide 
to a water-sensitive city. 
 With regard to implementing an integrated urban water management strategy in 
Australia, there is no “one size fi ts all” structural arrangement. Although there is 
growing support for implementing a portfolio of water supply sources, it is also true 
that there are impediments to implementing this approach. The authors caution that 
achieving (cultural) transformations to encourage institutional change for imple-
mentation of an integrated urban water management approach may take several 
years, and therefore planners and policy-makers must have a long-term framework 
for addressing these issues. Looking ahead, there is scope for further research to 
explore the intergovernmental issues and provide models to enable this transition 
and hence be a model for the world in portfolio approaches. 
 Marguerite de Chaisemartin provides an overview and thus contributes to a 
better understanding of the world’s groundwater resource, its distinctiveness and its 
governance – describing the principal elements of and key instruments employed in 
groundwater governance. To this end, the authors introduce several case studies 
from across the globe and offer some corresponding lessons learnt. In particular, 
this chapter presents an analysis of the role of monitoring and assessment in ground-
water governance, showcasing the example of the Netherlands. A global diagnostic 
of the current state of groundwater governance is provided, based on information 
from a set of commissioned thematic papers and the outcomes of fi ve subsequent 
regional consultations carried out within the framework of a GEF-supported project 
on Global Groundwater Governance. It includes insight into some of the fi ndings of 
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that project as regards the four main components of groundwater governance: 
actors, national legal frameworks, policies and information and knowledge. In addi-
tion, the authors address the issue of governance of transboundary groundwater 
resources and the relevant existing international legal frameworks. In conclusion, 
through a Global Vision for 2030, this chapter presents a way forwards to govern 
groundwater and a framework for action to achieve good governance, formulated 
by the Groundwater Governance Project jointly implemented by UNESCO, FAO, 
World Bank and IAH. 
 To achieve the goals of the Shared Vision 2030, a Framework for Action has 
been developed. It describes the main steps to be taken, provides guidance on plan-
ning and prioritising actions and is an urgent call for action to all who can make a 
difference: national and local governments, international organisations, the private 
sector, civil society, media, educational institutions and professional organisations – 
but also well owners, groundwater users and concerned citizens everywhere. The 
main steps elaborated in the Framework for Action are understanding the context, 
creating a basis for governance, building effective institutions, making essential 
linkages, redirecting fi nances and establishing a process of planning and 
management. 
 The Shared Global Vision for Groundwater Governance 2030 and the Global 
Framework for Action to achieve the vision on Groundwater Governance call for 
strengthening groundwater governance. This call for action urges countries, dis-
tricts, communities, companies, organisations and individuals to safeguard the 
groundwater resource that is essential to meet their common future objectives and 
Sustainable Development Goals. This Framework for Action is designed to set in 
place the groundwater governance arrangements that will achieve this vision. 
 Doug Merrey explores the likely trends and outcomes in water governance with 
a particular focus on cooperation and confl ict over the management of water 
resources in two regions: South Asia and Southern Africa. With its extremely large- 
scale shared river basins inhabited by nearly a billion mostly poor people, South 
Asia has struggled to fi nd ways to co-manage water resources to benefi t everyone 
equitably in a context where there is much potential benefi t to be achieved. Southern 
Africa is considered an example of relative success in developing ways to cooper-
ate – but implementation is incredibly complex in systems more water scarce than 
South Asia, though not as large. They examine the prospects for developing gover-
nance arrangements in the two regions through three “lenses” which they character-
ise as “beyond disciplines”, “beyond scales” and “beyond ‘institutional’ hardware 
to ‘human’ software”. Even those who have advocated for the role of institutions 
above, individuals have conceded, as noted for South Asia, that the behaviour of 
individuals within organisations determines the outcomes. More research needs to 
be conducted on the role of the individual in actively addressing complex water- 
related challenges, in redefi ning how multiple sectors cooperate around these issues 
and ultimately infl uencing socio-economic development at the regional level. 
 At present, governance structures, organised nationally and transnationally on a 
basin scale in both regions, presume that “stakeholders” can adequately represent 
themselves in formal settings where allocation, use and management decisions are 
1 Introduction and Refl ections
12
taken. This is problematic in at least three ways, namely, where rural areas are 
divided in terms of large-scale, cash crop producers and small-scale producers 
(Southern Africa) or in terms of wealthy expanding urban centres and small-scale 
producers (South Asia); in urban areas divided between the rich few and the many 
poor and where dominant narratives and framing concepts such as “climate change- 
induced scarcity” and “closed basins”, to name but two, reinforce path dependen-
cies, as the “haves” aim to hold onto what they have and to extend their water 
“rights” where possible. The authors argue that, if left unattended, these three fac-
tors will not only reinforce social inequity, economic ineffi ciency and ecological 
unsustainability, they also heighten the likelihood of confl ict among “stakeholders” 
at a wide variety of scales: within the state, within the city, across the countryside 
and across state borders. 
 The authors conclude that the prospects seem good in Southern Africa, if the 
countries can move from talking to investing and creating a more integrated regional 
economy. The potential is great but prospects are less rosy in South Asia with its 
growing challenges in providing water and power services. Without stronger 
regional networks, partnerships and institutions supported by external facilitators, 
South Asia may fail to take full advantage of its water resources to achieve better 
lives for its people by 2030. 
1.1  Refl ections 
 We believe that this book goes beyond what is already known and explores largely 
unknown territory. The issues and arguments presented here are discussed clearly 
and convincingly. Our hope is that readers will be persuaded, enriched and inspired 
by the discussions of the issues. 
 When under pressure, water can carve new paths to fl ow; the same can be said 
for its governance. However, the water governance evolutionary path is non-linear, 
and hence it is very diffi cult to predict what it might look like in the future. However, 
in this book, we hope the reader will be able to identify with some signals or fl ags 
that point to the progress made in understanding and executing the governance of 
freshwater. As many of the authors have pointed out, it is always important to 
remember that in freshwater governance, context matters. 
 While the book has avoided providing a universal defi nition for water gover-
nance, I would venture to defi ne it as a process through which society and the econ-
omy are prodded in a vector towards common goals for the benefi t of society as a 
whole. It can be produced through and in different modes of hierarchy, through 
markets or through networks that emphasise the interactive nature of making deci-
sions to deal with wicked problems. A combination of the different modes would 
exist depending on the framing of the water problems. 
 In the past, decisions around freshwater governance were made by central 
administrations that initially focused on the provision of services to the elite through 
engineering solutions. This has evolved into acknowledging a number of facts: that 
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all users have a stake and can potentially benefi t the governance of water by taking 
part in decisions relating to managing water at local, national or regional levels; that 
access to water cannot be coupled with the ability to pay for services and that the 
building of large dams as a solution to water supply problems needs to be coupled 
with alternative solutions, such as more sustainable and effi cient use of local 
resources. 
 The ability to pay for water services is no longer a differentiator for who gets 
access to the resource. There is recognition of the fact that access to a certain essen-
tial amount of water is a fundamental human right and that provision needs to be 
made for nature to sustain its ecosystems and biodiversity (South Africa is one of a 
few countries in the world to make legal provision for a water allocation to the 
environment). Green growth offers a broad range of social, environmental and eco-
nomic benefi ts: societies benefi t through increased stability of water supply, 
improved water quality, reduced health risks and potentially fewer water restric-
tions; environmentally, the benefi ts include improved water quantity and quality to 
meet ecological reserve requirements and improved ecosystem service provision-
ing, encouraging water reuse and recycling, as well as reducing the ecological foot-
print; and economically, benefi ts are derived by reducing the economic losses due 
to environmental degradation, improved environmental accounting, well-timed 
infrastructure investments and the creation of green jobs in areas such as ecotourism 
and sustainable fi sheries. 
 The implications of climate change uncertainties, mainly rainfall in its spatial 
and temporal distribution, are hampering the traditional approach of building dams 
as a solution to lack of water in certain locations. There are more successful exam-
ples of local water technologies that point to the building of more water-sensitive 
structures that imitate nature in ways able to enhance adaptation and mitigation of 
climate changes and allowing for greener solutions. 
 An important dimension which is not covered adequately in this book is the pric-
ing of water. In a development context, the adoption of the green growth approach 
could be regarded as supporting a strategy of decoupling economic growth and jobs 
from resource exploitation and climate damage, to sustain economic growth and 
alleviate poverty. Well-managed water systems can be an important driver for eco-
nomic growth, particularly in water-scarce countries that experience suppressed 
demand. Effi cient water pricing, specifi cally calculating a price that refl ects the true 
value of water, has a large part to play in this endeavour, as it helps to overcome 
certain barriers that include market constraints and distortions that can reduce the 
overall benefi ts that accrue to society. Incorporating The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity (TEEB) concept adds an economic dimension and could guide the 
choice and design of policy instruments for the pricing of natural resources, particu-
larly where natural resources are scarce and under pressure. One can argue that it is 
often the poor who are most exposed and most vulnerable to ecological damage, 
and thus internalising TEEB in water pricing systems can become a powerful water 
equity policy instrument. 
 Another aspect that is not adequately covered is data governance. There are some 
fundamental advances around unstructured and structured data that point to a future 
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where data governance is more converged and transparent. Data sources are cur-
rently more divergent and scattered than ever before. With more interest of users in 
protecting water resources and the advances in mobile mapping and remote sensing 
technologies, availability of data is diverse and variant. Today it is likely that 
(younger) employees are using texting, Twitter and even WhatsApp, tied to 
Facebook, to share information in a work context. With data stored in ever more 
increasing locations, how do we distinguish between work and personal data and 
select quality data for long-term storage and retrieval? And, given the increasing 
levels of stakeholder involvement and the growing number of interdisciplinary dia-
logues, how is non-text data saved and analysed, and what are the rules and regula-
tions that could govern that? Perhaps the solution lies in providing access to real-life 
data that has the ability to secure stakeholder confi dence levels, process adherence 
levels and enhance overall participation levels capable of responding to eminent 
changes and disasters. 
 In the uncertain global economic future, there are forces at play between the cur-
rent capitalist dominance and the eroded socialist doctrines. For all people to ben-
efi t, the freedom to make choices remains the secret of true development through 
being afforded development options and the ability to make those choices. Until we 
reach this empowerment level, water will remain an important topic for its profes-
sionals and the stakeholders who benefi t. The governance of water needs to go 
beyond disciplines, beyond scales and beyond the institutional hardware to the 
human software. The future of water governance is about the promotion of the 
human software as embedded within a broader political system. 
 When defi ning the governance mechanisms, there is a need for framing the theo-
retical, practical and institutional tool boxes afforded in the specifi c contexts. 
Framing governance requires documenting good practices and is very important for 
learning which needs to happen not only within water management institutions but 
also by all stakeholders at the various levels. Localised successes of good water 
management face the challenge of amplifi ed implementation and upscaling mainly 
due to contextual variation. While leapfrogging can help in identifying workable 
solutions, there is a need for context-specifi c tool boxes that can be helpful in the 
implementation of good water governance. 
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 Chapter 2 
 The Establishment of Catchment Management 
Agencies in South Africa with Reference 
to the  Flussgebietsgemeinschaft Elbe : Some 
Practical Considerations 
 Richard  Meissner ,  Sabine  Stuart-Hill , and  Zakariya  Nakhooda 
 Abstract  The establishment of catchment management agencies goes beyond the 
involvement of governmental entities or the stipulations contained in regulatory 
structures and policies. A number of actors or stakeholders from both the govern-
mental and non-governmental spheres are involved in establishing a CMA. Practices 
that are associated with CMA establishment often relate to personal experiences 
and the overall political landscape as well as administrative development trajecto-
ries. These are also context specifi c to the respective catchment. We refl ect on some 
of the administrative processes as a way to discern noticeable practices in the estab-
lishment of CMAs. Our case study material is the South African CMA establish-
ment process to date. Some of the practices that come out strongly are human 
resource issues and fi nancial accounting practices that decision-makers need to con-
sider when establishing CMAs. An appreciative relationship with key stakeholders, 
meeting them personally, is also crucial. The chapter is based on research commis-
sioned and funded by South Africa’s Water Research Commission between 2014 
and 2016. The process of establishing the  Flussgebietsgemeinschaft Elbe in 
Germany is also outlined to illustrate the similarities and differences in the experi-
ence of establishing a river basin organisation in a developed and developing 
country. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 The establishment of a river basin organisation like a catchment management 
agency (CMA) might seem like a straightforward process where structures of rule, 
such as government acts and policies, stipulate how and why such organisations 
need to be established. A perception like this can be deceiving, especially when one 
considers the role and involvement of various actors in the establishment process. 
The diffi culty does not always arise in the interpretation of an act, but starts when 
one defi nes what governance and its purpose is, especially beyond management 
interventions and enforcement of law. For us governance is not only about govern-
ment and legislation or the linear cause and effect constituted by causal mechanisms 
such as the drafting and promulgation of legislation. Governance is more complex 
and involves various feedback loops (e.g. Meissner and Jacobs  2014 ) in any gover-
nance endeavour. Governance takes place at multiple levels in society and through 
multiple processes. The multilevel pathways of governance are infl uenced by both 
institutionalised governance mechanisms, like regulations, and non-institutionalised 
mechanisms such as norms and principles (Meissner and Jacobs  2014 ). We defi ne 
governance as (often non-harmonious) interactive socioeconomic and political 
forms of governing (Rhodes  1996 ; Meissner et al.  2013 ) between various non-state 
and state actors, including individuals, to create opportunities and solve problems 
(Kooiman et al.  2008 ) in society. To reiterate, during this governance process, both 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised mechanisms are at play. 
 We argue that multilevel governance is at the order of the day when considering 
the case of South Africa’s CMA establishment process. The CMA establishment 
process dates back to the late 1990s when South Africa embarked on a reform pro-
cess of its water legislation. Based on the participatory and open process of writing 
the White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa, the government 
designed and promulgated the National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998) in 1998. The act 
is explicit on the CMA establishment process, stating in exact terms how a CMA 
should be established, who should play what role and how the governing board of 
the organisation needs to be constituted (RSA  1998 ). Furthermore, the Guide to the 
National Water Act (DWAF  n.d.) and the public document Water Management 
Institutions Overview (de la Harpe et al.  n.d. ) give more detailed defi nitions and 
guidelines that could assist the establishment process. Considering that governance 
is more than the activities emanating from government structures and legislative 
requirements, establishing an organisation like a CMA involves more than just gov-
ernment offi cials and the governing board of the CMA. Especially in the case of 
South Africa abolishing the old Water Act of 1956 (Union of South Africa  1956 ) and 
replacing it with a “new” act that embraces the right to water and well-being as laid 
out in the country’s constitution and emphasises the elements of integrated water 
resource management (IWRM) in various ways (Stuart-Hill and Schulze  2010 ), the 
CMAs strongly represent social equity and transformation. Both these aspects are 
high on the political agenda in post-apartheid South Africa and by implication are 
linked to high expectations from water users. 
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 This chapter refl ects on some of the institutional and non-institutional aspects of 
governance in establishing the country’s CMAs. The fi rst section of the chapter 
deals with the CMA establishment process thus far. In this section we briefl y exam-
ine the process since the idea of CMAs was fi rst mooted in the late 1990s. We then 
refl ect on the practices that we had identifi ed during the face-to-face interviews and 
stakeholder meetings we attended for the research project. We end with a discussion 
and conclusion in which we make a number of recommendations of key aspects for 
successful CMA establishment. 
2.2  Methodology 
 This chapter draws on the results of a 2-year research project we are currently con-
ducting for the Water Research Commission, entitled  Lessons Learnt from the 
Establishment of Catchment Management Agencies (K5/2320). The research team 
has been working with the CMAs and in their respective water management areas 
for a number of years. Thus the results presented here are drawn not only from the 
current investigation and conversations but also from past experience and data gath-
ered for other research endeavours (e.g. Meissner and Funke  2014 ; Stuart-Hill and 
Schulze  2015 ). The approach we followed for the  Lessons Learnt project was to 
conduct face-to-face structured interviews with various stakeholders or role players 
involved in the establishment process or those that had been part of the process in 
the past. To date we have conducted interviews with 27 individuals and attended 
three stakeholder meetings in the Breede-Gouritz and the Inkomati-Usutu CMAs, 1 
as well as an interview with representatives of the  Flussgebietsgemeinschaft Elbe 
(FGG Elbe) in Magdeburg, Germany. 2 We conducted this interview to investigate 
the process followed by a developed country in establishing a river basin organisa-
tion. The inclusion of the FGG Elbe interview may seem ad hoc; however, the com-
parison with FGG Elbe identifi es the similarities and differences in the experience 
of establishing a river basin organisation elsewhere in the world. There are impor-
tant ontological differences between the South African CMAs and the FGG Elbe 
that could enable decision-makers in both realities to learn from one another’s expe-
riences. Some observers might be tempted to argue against the inclusion of the FGG 
Elbe in that we are comparing “apples with oranges”, so to speak. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Lijphart ( 1971 ), John Stuart Mill developed a method of comparing 
differences. In this case, we used deliberate randomisation to select the cases we 
1  These CMAs were previously called the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency and 
the Inkomati Catchment Management Agency. Their names have now changed, and we will refer 
to them by their new names throughout the text, unless we are looking at a signifi cant process 
before their renaming. 
2  In July 2015 the lead author travelled to Hamburg, Germany, for a month-long research visit to 
investigate water security in Hamburg. This visit afforded the lead author the opportunity to visit 
the FGG Elbe, since Hamburg is a harbour city situated on the banks of the Elbe river. 
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would like to compare, namely, the South African CMAs with the FGG Elbe, in that 
the river basin organisations are alike “…with a very high degree of probability, but 
not with absolute certainty” (Lijphart  1971 : 684) since they are all river basin organ-
isations in different geographical and socio-political settings. The inclusion of the 
information gathered during the interview with the FGG Elbe representatives is not 
an end in itself, but an aid in the comparative method (Lijphart  1971 ) we are utilis-
ing to investigate the practical considerations in establishing CMAs in South Africa. 
Our argument is that this could provide a better understanding of the establishment 
of a river basin organisation in other parts of the world. The intention of the FGG 
Elbe interview was not to identify so-called best practices, but to gain a deeper 
understanding of motivations and context in establishing river basin organisations. 
 For the face-to-face interviews in South Africa, not only did we target individuals 
from the two existing CMAs, we also conducted interviews with government offi -
cials that are closely involved in the establishment of the remaining seven CMAs in 
South Africa, most notably, the Vaal CMA and Pongola-Umzimkulu CMA. The 
latter includes a lived experience from the current establishment phase through 
attendance of the steering committee meetings. During the interviews we asked 
stakeholders to refl ect on the establishment process thus far. We also made a number 
of observations during the three stakeholder meetings. Through these observations 
we identifi ed a number of processes that were deemed important by the interview-
ees for consideration in establishing the remaining CMAs. We then grouped the 
issues identifi ed in the interviews into fi ve categories, namely, structures of rule, not 
including stakeholders, fi nances and public administrative processes, the difference 
between the main and trading accounts of DWS and the management of stakeholder 
relations. Before discussing these practices, we will give a rendition, by way of a 
historical account, of the CMA establishment process to date. 
2.3  The CMA Establishment Process 
 South Africa’s existing CMAs were established in terms of section 78(1) of the 
National Water Act (Act No. 36 of 1998) (RSA  1998 ). One of the main principles of 
the National Water Act is its focus on decentralisation. Decentralisation places an 
emphasis on public participation in water management and related decision-making 
processes. Decentralisation also rests on the subsidiary principle, which is encapsu-
lated in the South African Constitution (RSA  1996 ). Subsidiarity means that those 
functions that can be more effectively and effi ciently carried out by lower levels of 
government should be delegated to the lowest appropriate level (Funke et al.  2007 ; 
Meissner and Funke  2014 ). In this regard, the National Water Act and the Constitution 
are two structures of rule that are constitutive in the establishment of CMAs. 
Nevertheless, they are not the only causal mechanisms in establishing CMAs. 
 In October 1999, the government of South Africa established 19 water manage-
ment areas (WMAs). The boundaries of these areas are along catchment divides and 
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do not coincide with the administrative boundaries of local and provincial 
 government spheres. At that time, the government contemplated the establishment 
of 19 CMAs (Meissner and Funke  2014 ), one in each WMA. Since the promulga-
tion of the National Water Act in 1998, the implementation of the legislation has 
been slow and problematic (Funke et al.  2007 ; Meissner and Funke  2014 ). These 
implementation problems also translated in the slow implementation of the envis-
aged 19 CMAs (Hattingh et al.  2004 ; Meissner and Funke  2014 ), with only two 
CMAs implemented to date, namely, the Breede-Gouritz and the Inkomati-
Usutu CMAs. In 2012, the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) decided to 
reduce the 19 planned CMAs to nine; the minister approved the establishment of 
nine CMAs in the newly delineated nine WMAs. This move was due to a reconsid-
eration of the management model and viability assessments related to water resource 
management, funding, capacity, skills and expertise in regulation and oversight. The 
decision was also an attempt to improve integrated water resource management. 
The nine CMAs are Limpopo, Olifants (Mpumalanga Province), Inkomati-Usutu, 
Pongola-Umzimkulu, Vaal, Orange, Mzimvubu-Tsitsikamma, Breede-Gouritz and 
Berg-Olifants (Western Cape) (DWA  2013 ). Currently and apart from the Breede- 
Gouritz and Inkomati-Usutu CMAs, the remaining seven CMAs are considered the 
so-called proto-CMAs since they are in the process of being established. Those 
proto-CMAs are managed by the respective regional offi ces of the DWS. 
 Thus, prior to the establishment of the Breede-Gouritz and Inkomati-Usutu 
CMAs, management of the water resources of the two catchments was the respon-
sibility of the DWS regional offi ces in the Western Cape and Mpumalanga Provinces, 
respectively. Water management took place through the water management area’s 
internal strategic perspective (DWAF  2004 ). In the case of the FGG Elbe, it was 
established to coordinate the implementation of the European Union’s Water 
Framework Directive of 2000 and the Floods Directive of 2007 for Germany’s fed-
eral states sharing the Elbe river basin. Prior to the establishment of the FGG Elbe, 
the German federal states sharing the Elbe river managed it in terms of Germany’s 
national legislative framework. 3 
 The CMAs will perform certain water management functions and are required to 
cooperate and seek agreement on water-related matters amongst various stakehold-
ers and interested parties. In essence, CMAs are service delivery agencies and are 
listed in the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999). The CMAs 
are also linked to Treasury Regulations to ensure fi nancial viability and good gover-
nance (DWA  2013 ). Catchment management agencies also have a mandate to 
develop a catchment management strategy. This strategy is a plan to “realise the 
protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water 
resources in [a CMA’s] respective WMA” (Meissner and Funke  2014 : 185; DWAF 
 2004 ; Funke et al.  2007 ). The catchment management strategy therefore gives effect 
to the role and functions of a CMA. Various stakeholders were involved in the estab-
lishment of both the above-mentioned South African CMAs and followed a negotia-
tion process guided by the regional offi ces of the Department of Water and Sanitation 
3  Personal communication, Sandra Naumann, FGG Elbe, 10 July 2015 
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(DWS) 4 (McConkey et al.  2005 ). In the case of the Breede-Gouritz and Inkomati- 
Usutu CMAs, a reference group was established, consisting of representatives from 
various sectors, such as agriculture, local government, emerging farmers and the 
tourism industry. The DWS was the most notable stakeholder assisted by private 
consultants 5 (Meissner and Funke  2014 ). These consultants assisted in the prepara-
tion of discussion documents and facilitation of meetings and focused on the inter-
action with role players around concerns and suggestions of stakeholders in their 
specifi c regions (MBB Consulting  2001 ). In the case of the FGG Elbe, ten German 
federal states were involved in its establishment. These federal states all share the 
Elbe river basin. Germany’s Federal Ministry of the Environment was also involved 
in the establishment process. There is a similarity between the CMA’s catchment 
management strategies and the FGG Elbe river basin management plan, in that in 
both cases the organisations had to develop their own river basin management 
plans. 6 
 The original impetus for the establishment of the FGG Elbe was government or 
supranational (European Union) structures of rule or two European Union direc-
tives. It would appear that in the South African cases, the process, after government 
direction, viz. South Africa’s National Water Act, was more decentralised with the 
involvement of various stakeholders from society and government. This was in line 
with the decentralisation vision set by the South African government in the post- 
1994 political dispensation, which favoured more involvement of organisations at 
grassroots level as opposed to the command-and-control vision of pre-1994 govern-
ments. From this discussion on the history of the CMAs and the FGG Elbe’s estab-
lishment process, it is clear that governments or supra-governmental entities drove 
the process. When observing the history of CMA establishment from a macro- 
perspective (i.e. a process conducted and directed by government), hidden causal 
mechanisms at play can easily be ignored by observers. These hidden variables 
came to the fore during the interviews we conducted with the various stakeholders 
in South Africa and to a certain extent in Germany. The next section reports on these 
practices at play. 
2.4  Stakeholders’ Discernible Practices 
 Alluding to the brief description of the river basin organisations’ establishment pro-
cess, we can identify a number of practices. The fi rst of these relates to the struc-
tures of rule mentioned above. The National Water Act is central to the CMAs in 
4  Between 1994 and 2009, this department was known as the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) and between 2009 and May 2014 as the Department of Water Affairs (DWA). It 
is currently referred to as the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) (Meissner and Funke 
 2014 ). 
5  Personal communication, Derek Weston, Pegasys Consulting, 12 September 2012 
6  Personal communication, Sandra Naumann, FGG Elbe, 10 July 2015 
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that it gives the Minister of Water and Sanitation a strong infl uence to appoint the 
CMA’s governing board. The governing board is to be the representative of all 
stakeholders within the WMA. Even so, the CMAs are at the same time quite auton-
omous and have mechanisms of democratic control, e.g. the establishment of rela-
tionships with similar organisations in other countries. The required CMS for each 
WMA and CMA also sets principles for water allocation and considers issues 
related to water resource protection, use, development, conservation, management 
and control. In the case of South Africa, these measures must be in line with the 
National Water Resource Strategy (Meissner and Funke  2014 ). However, a CMS is 
yet to be drafted for either of the established CMAs. This is largely due to the incor-
poration of other WMAs with the current CMAs. 7, 8 For instance, the Breede- 
Overberg WMA had been amalgamated with the Gouritz WMA. In the case of the 
Gouritz CMA, establishment of the CMA was put on hold until the amalgamation 
of the WMAs was completed. When the FGG Elbe implemented the Water 
Framework Directive, signifi cant water management issues had been derived by the 
federal states at a river basin level such as river continuity, nutrient loads and chemi-
cal pollution, pollution from old industrial areas in the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), climate change and geomorphology in the river basin. These 
issues make the management of the Elbe river a constant challenge confi rmed by 
representative from the FGG Elbe. 9 This is something that South Africa’s CMAs 
should expect when their strategies are implemented even when they are well estab-
lished and functioning; everything could be a constant challenge because of pres-
sures from various sectors and the CMAs will have to manage a complex natural 
resource system with the aim of socio-economic development. 
 Secondly, when it comes to the involvement of various stakeholders, the results 
of previous research studies conducted on the Breede-Overberg CMA have indi-
cated that it is not always feasible to include all stakeholders in a water management 
area in the development of the CMS. This is one of the major hidden variables in the 
establishment of a CMA. The sheer number of people that want to attend meetings 
can draw out the process unnecessarily and make it time-consuming 10 (Meissner and 
Funke  2014 ). The same applies to the Inkomati-Usutu CMA, where a series of fi ve 
stakeholder meetings and workshops were held by the CMA over the period of a 
year (2010), specifi cally around the development of a CMS (Nyakane-Maluka and 
Jackson  2010 ). This has had a direct impact on the fi nancial and human resource 
costs of establishing the agency. The question of involving a large number of stake-
holders was an issue that also came up during interviews at the FGG Elbe. In this 
case, the offi cials explained that due to the involvement of ten different federal gov-
7  Personal communication, Johann Boshoff, Inkomati-Usuthu Catchment Management Agency, 23 
June 2015 
8  Personal communication, Phakamani  Buthelezi, Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management Agency, 
24 August 2015 
9  Personal communication, Sandra Naumann, FGG Elbe, 10 July 2015 
10  Personal communication, Derek Weston, Pegasys Consulting, 12 September 2012 
2 The Establishment of Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa...
22
ernments, assortment of economic and political interests and aims in the  management 
of the Elbe river came to the fore and had to be negotiated. They also had different 
structures of rule infl uencing, for instance, the monitoring of river health. This can 
lead to a long and time-consuming process to reach agreement on certain issues. 11 
 In terms of fi nancial and human resources, establishing a CMA can be a demand-
ing and taxing process from a public administrative perspective. This is the third 
practice that has emerged from the interviews. Regarding human resources, for 
instance, the process can require a large number of consultations with employees 
from the government department that need to be transferred to the CMA once it has 
been established. One issue that needs consideration is that the offi ces of the CMA 
might not be located near the regional or national offi ces of the DWS. This means 
that employees that had been travelling to the regional and/or national offi ce(s) now 
might need to relocate to a different town so they can be closer to their place of 
employment. This is the case with the Vaal proto-CMA currently being established, 
which might be situated near Rand Water’s head offi ce to the south of Johannesburg. 
To transfer employees from the DWS offi ces in Pretoria will further involve labour 
relation matters. 12 Some employees might feel that they do not want to be trans-
ferred because of personal reasons. This will involve the negotiation of transfer poli-
cies not only at individual level, but labour unions also need to be involved. It is 
likely that this may lead to resistance from employees and low morale because they 
are uncertain about the implications of such human resource practices. This process 
therefore needs careful management and will have to be conducted in a thoroughly 
transparent manner. 
 On a separate note, transfer agreements will involve matters such as employees’ 
pension funds, medical aid, salaries and salary levels, systems for salary payments, 
labour union representation, leave management and so on. In addition to the admin-
istrative processes involved regarding human resources, employees’ perceptions 
around uncertainties regarding employment security must also be taken into 
account. 13 Change management therefore becomes an important process in the 
establishment of a CMA. 
 Fourthly, the difference between a trading entity and the main account of the 
DWS needs to be considered. This is a distinctly South African matter. A trading 
entity is funded from water users that pay for the water they consume, like irrigation 
boards. Department staff members of such trading entities are paid salaries from the 
trading account. The main account is the funding or budget that the DWS receives 
from National Treasury. The challenge with this difference is that corporate man-
agement of the DWS, excluding fi nance, has been servicing both accounts and the 
accounts of the staff members that might be transferred had also been serviced from 
both accounts. One way of getting around this administrative issue is by seconding 
people to the CMA once it has been established; that will give added support to the 
CMA when it is operating sustainably. Another challenge is that hydrometry 
11  Personal communication, Sandra Naumann, FGG Elbe, 10 July 2015 
12  Personal communication, Sydney Nevhorwa, Department of Water and Sanitation, 10 June 2015 
13  Personal communication, Sydney Nevhorwa, Department of Water and Sanitation, 10 June 2015 
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 services might also move to the CMA from the main to the trading account. This 
will also be the case for water use and regulation where budgets need to be trans-
ferred in the same way. The issue with this is that the functions of these units are 
linked to the type of account and moving the units will have human resource impli-
cations. For instance, service-level agreements need to be in place between the 
CMA and the regional and national offi ces so that the services to be supplied by the 
DWS and/or CMA need to be well defi ned and stipulated. 14 
 Effective management of stakeholder relations is another important component 
of CMAs, and this is the fi fth practice identifi ed by the authors. We also observed 
this practice when interviewing the representatives of the FGG Elbe. For the FGG 
Elbe, stakeholder relations are not only an important communication endeavour 
(e.g. keeping stakeholders abreast of what is happening in the river basin and fl ood 
warning) but also necessary in the daily functions like river health monitoring. 15 We 
argue that without good stakeholder relations, decentralisation cannot be adequately 
achieved since decentralisation involves the interface (e.g. communication) between 
authorities and stakeholders at grassroots level. In this regard, both established 
CMAs have relatively close and remarkably good relationships with stakeholders. 
These relationships, as with any relationship, had to be built from the onset. For 
instance, initially, stakeholders were reluctant to engage with the Breede-Gouritz 
CMA owing largely to challenging experiences with the regional/national DWS 
offi ces. For instance, some individuals in stakeholder groupings have been waiting 
on DWS for numerous years with regard to licencing applications. 16 Because of this 
matter, stakeholders wanted to know whether the CMA would be any different from 
the way in which DWS carries out water-related activities and tasks. In other words, 
there is an expectation from stakeholders that the CMA will, in certain instances, do 
a “better job” than the DWS. The onus was on CMA staff attending the meetings to 
persuade the stakeholders fi rstly to participate in stakeholder meetings and explain 
the benefi ts of these meetings and secondly to give members the assurance that the 
past is the past and that the CMA would have other options at hand to assist stake-
holders with their needs. 17 
2.5  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The establishment of a CMA does not happen overnight. There are a number of 
issues that need to be considered by policy-makers and stakeholders involved in the 
establishment process. Structures of rule are important constitutive aspects in the 
14  Personal communication, Sydney Nevhorwa, Department of Water and Sanitation, 10 June 2015 
15  Personal communication, Sandra Naumann, FGG Elbe, 10 July 2015 
16  Attendance of a stakeholder meeting with the Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management Agency 
staff, 20 August 2015 
17  Attendance of a stakeholder meeting with the Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management Agency 
staff, 20 August 2015 
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establishment of a river basin organisation. We have seen this in the case of South 
Africa’s CMAs and the FGG Elbe. Nevertheless, structures of rule are not enough. 
There are other variables also at play in the establishment of river basin organisa-
tions and their subsequent governance. Variables that are important in this regard are 
the involvement of stakeholders during the pre-establishment phase and stakeholder 
relations after establishment. These are important aspects which require careful 
management in order for the CMAs to achieve their objectives of decentralised, 
participatory, sustainable water resource management. 
 The sheer number of stakeholders involved during the pre-establishment phase 
was an issue not only for South Africa’s CMAs but also for the FGG Elbe. It became 
a complex affair in both cases because stakeholders bring with them their own 
issues, perceptions, expectations and interests. With regard to the fi nancial aspects 
of CMAs’ operations, there are no issues currently, but for future development of 
the CMA, this may be a constraint. The DWS should continue to provide fi nancial 
support to the CMA even after the CMA starts receiving water tariffs. This would 
not only highlight the support of the DWS of a decentralised approach to water 
resource management, but will also enhance staff morale and give the CMA the 
ability to carry out an even wider range of tasks in developing water resources sus-
tainably. There is also a need for participatory management as well as implementing 
the vision of equity in water resource management and the achievement of water 
security, which would further enable the CMA to play its role as catchment steward. 
The DWS could also consider phasing out such fi nancial support; at this stage it is 
impossible to reach a defi nite conclusion as to what the results of this action might 
be, since there is no past experience of this in South Africa. It would therefore be 
premature to say that it could jeopardise the fi nancial viability of the CMAs. 
 Currently, stakeholder relations between the CMA and members within the 
WMA are relatively good in the two established and operational CMAs. This is also 
the case with the FGG Elbe where they keep stakeholders abreast of current affairs 
in the Elbe river basin. It would appear that the CMAs and the FGG Elbe have put 
a high premium on stakeholder relations. This is something that will stand these 
organisations in good stead for their future governance endeavours. However, in the 
case of CMAs, there is room for improvement when it comes to perceptions regard-
ing the involvement of DWS in the establishment process. Trustworthy and con-
structive stakeholder relationships are central to the effective and effi cient 
management of water resources and to an extent the success of CMAs. From current 
observations of several stakeholder meetings, we observed that DWS offi cials often 
arrive late for these meetings and failed to cater to the needs of attendees, therefore 
adding to the negative perceptions of the DWS. What is more, language can be a 
barrier since people, especially those in the rural areas, are more comfortable get-
ting and delivering messages in their native language. This is something the CMAs 
also need to consider. 
 Furthermore, currently the CMAs have an adequate staff complement. 
Nevertheless, adequate does not mean that there are no shortages. Certain areas, 
such as water quality monitoring, require suffi cient technical staff. This seems to be 
an issue at the Inkomati-Usutu CMA as they outsource the testing of their water 
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samples. Sample testing has a very long turnaround time due to issues with the labo-
ratory. If the CMA had its own functioning laboratory, test results would be obtained 
a lot faster, and more water samples could be tested. However, the establishment 
and operation of a laboratory have its own logistical challenges, one of which is 
accreditation from applicable regulatory bodies like the South African National 
Accreditation System (SANAS); these factors should be carefully considered before 
making a decision regarding an independent laboratory. 
 Within the establishment phase of CMAs, DWS could provide more resources 
and guidelines with regard to the initial functions of CMAs. This could enable the 
CMAs to begin operations fully understanding their roles and responsibilities. A 
comprehensive list of initial functions, including processes and tools, beyond what 
is mentioned in the National Water Act of 1998 and possibly in the National Water 
Resource Strategy (DWA  2013 ), needs to be produced so that staff have an under-
standing and adequate guidance as to what is required of them. It would be advis-
able to include a staff member with a legislative background in the establishment 
and operational process. In order for the CMA to provide adequate monitoring and 
enforcement, individuals with an understanding of environmental law should be 
included as the CMA receives its full delegation. This was lacking with regard to the 
Inkomati-Usutu CMA as well as the Breede-Gouritz CMA. 18 The establishment of 
a proto-CMA within DWS regional offi ces may be a good option. This would allow 
the CMA to “hit the ground running” as opposed to taking time to fi nd its feet. 
However, this also has the risk of “copying and pasting” activities and decision- 
making processes from the regional DWS offi ce. As alluded to above, this is not 
adequate to fulfi l functions and establish relationships with stakeholders. 
 A clear direction between national strategic initiatives, structures of rule and the 
management of the river basin at WMA and basin levels assists policy-makers 
involved in the establishment process on what needs to be done and gives a clear 
direction on how to initiate the process. This includes clarity on functions, roles and 
responsibilities. There seems to be very little space for ambiguity, and uncertainty 
has a signifi cant impact on the success of the establishment phase, which can carry 
through into the operational phase. Not only is there uncertainty during the estab-
lishment phase. In the case of the FGG Elbe, the representatives said that they are 
constantly being challenged by issues such as pollution and nutrient loads. This is 
likely to also be the case with South Africa’s CMAs since they are also, like the 
FGG Elbe, managing a complex natural resource with multiple stakeholders. 
 Moreover, offi cials need to plan the establishment process very carefully, espe-
cially regarding the allocation of fi nancial and human resources. Careful planning 
would enable policy-makers to ascertain where to draw the line when involving a 
certain number of stakeholders and can assist them in striking a balance between 
involving too few or too many stakeholders. With regard to fi nancial resources, both 
CMAs currently receive suffi cient funding from DWS. However, as the CMAs have 
now become large spatial units with numerous catchments and sub-catchments, 
18  Personal communication, J Boshoff, Inkomati-Usutu Catchment Management Agency, 23 June 
2015 
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with further delegations, the allocation of fi nancial resources may become a future 
issue. Also, it is envisaged that CMAs will become self-suffi cient, thereby attaining 
funds through receiving tariffs paid by water users. This could prove to be a major 
fi nancial constraint as the CMA would receive approximately 70 % of its expected 
budget through these tariffs. There are still questions with regard to the remaining 
30 %. 19 Planning the fi nancial viability and security of the CMA becomes a key vari-
able here, and suffi cient fi nances need to be allocated to enable the CMAs to ensure 
their ability to be responsive to the administrative and stakeholder demands. 
 Regarding human resource processes, it is recommended that labour unions be 
involved from the outset so that uncertainties can be minimised and employees can 
take ownership of their transfers. Another issue with regard to the employment of 
staff is that there is no task-specifi c training of individuals. All conversations, inter-
views and engagements have shown that the CMA environment requires a different 
set of skills compared to the known job profi les of regional or the national DWS 
offi cials. This means that the majority of the tasks carried out by the CMA require 
staff to learn as they grow within the CMA environment. 20, 21 Such learning needs an 
adaptive, responsive organisational set-up and a leadership that trusts its employees 
and vice versa. It is not our intention to impose adaptive management principles on 
the organisation. However, it should be clearly stated that the learning environment 
of the organisation should not be restricted to a set of lawlike principles; the organ-
isation’s leadership needs to decide how it will apply learning practices. Should 
adaptive management principles be imposed on an organisation, it would mean that 
command and control had moved from an old centralised government authority to 
an unaccountable and centralised “epistemic authority”. The employees should be 
given the space and possible training to enable engagement and learning in a con-
tinuous and inclusive manner. 
 What is more, future CMAs would have to take note of stakeholder expectations, 
and those expectations should be partially defi ning in establishing a relationship 
between the CMA and its stakeholders. These issues or practices might not be major 
constraints, but could infl uence the operations of a CMA and thus its successes 
signifi cantly. 
 Policy-makers should also bear in mind that the establishment process is not only 
about pitfalls and challenges. There are also opportunities to take advantage of. One 
such opportunity is the knowledge of public administrative processes held by DWS 
offi cials. Such knowledge can be a defi ning resource between a successful and 
stalled establishment process. In this regard, the knowledge of public administrators 
should not be viewed by stakeholders, scientists included, as another burden on the 
establishment process. Scientists have a tendency to not include public  administrative 
19  Personal communication, Jan van Staden, Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management Agency, 25 
August 2015 
20  Personal communication, Johann Boshoff, Inkomati-Usutu Catchment Management Agency, 23 
June 2015 
21  Personal communication, Phakamani  Buthelezi, Breede-Gouritz Catchment Management 
Agency, 24 August 2015 
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processes in their research endeavours when analysing CMAs. They would rather 
look at the streamlining of the establishment process, technical skills and possibly 
political issues. The identifi ed practices and conclusions drawn should therefore not 
be seen as a set of recommendations for policy-makers and stakeholders involved in 
CMA establishment processes only, but also for scientists researching the process. 
Scientists are, after all, also stakeholders when they research CMAs and may also 
be involved in some of the CMAs currently being established. The research has 
shown a strong link between the successes or challenges of the establishment pro-
cess and the way in which CMAs operate. This is an area where further research is 
needed as the process of establishing the other seven CMAs progresses. 
 References 
 De la Harpe, J., Ferreira, J. -A., & Potter, A. (n.d.) Water management institutions overview. 
Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
 Department of Water Affairs (DWA). (2013).  National water resource strategy, June 2013 (NWRS 
2nd ed.). Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs. 
 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). (n.d.) Guide to the National Water Act. 
Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). (2004).  National water resource strategy . 
Pretoria: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
 Funke, N., Nortje, K., Findlater, K., Burns, M., Turton, A., Weaver, A., & Hattingh, H. (2007). 
Redressing inequality: South Africa’s new water policy.  Environment, 49 (3), 10–23. 
 Hattingh, J., Maree, G., Oelofse, G., Turton, S., & Van Wyk, E. (2004). Environmental governance 
and equity in a democratic South Africa. Conference paper presented at the AWRA/IWLRI 
International Conference on Water Law Governance in Dundee, Scotland. 
 Kooiman, J., Bavinck, M., Chuenpagdee, R., Mahon, R., & Pullin, R. (2008). Interactive gover-
nance and governability: An introduction.  Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies, 
7 (1), 1–11. 
 Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method.  The American Political 
Science Review, 65 (3), 682–693. 
 MBB Consulting Engineers. (2001). Proposal for the establishment of a catchment management 
agency for the Inkomati Basin. Prepared on behalf of the Inkomati catchment management 
agency reference group. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Nelspruit, South Africa. 
 McConkey, G. E., Enright, W. D., Roberts, J. A., & Khan, R. (2005).  The development of a catch-
ment management agency for the Breede River, Western Cape, South Africa . Cape Town: 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
 Meissner, R., & Funke, N. (2014). The politics of establishing catchment management agencies in 
South Africa: The case of the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency. In D. Huitema 
& S. Meijerink (Eds.),  The politics of river basin organisations: Coalitions, institutional design 
choices and consequences . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 Meissner, R., & Jacobs, I. (2014). Theorising complex water governance in Africa: The case of the 
proposed Epupa Dam on the Kunene River.  International Environmental Agreements:P, 14 (2), 
1–28. 
 Meissner, R., Funke, N., Nienaber, S., & Ntombela, C. (2013). The status quo of research on South 
Africa’s water resources management institutions.  Water SA, 39 (5), 721–731. 
 Nyakane-Maluka, N., & Jackson, B. (2010). The 2011/12 to 2013/14 strategic plan for the Inkomati 
Catchment Management Agency. Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, 8 
June 2010, Cape Town. 
2 The Establishment of Catchment Management Agencies in South Africa...
28
 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 
108). Government Printer, Pretoria. 
 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1998). National Water Act (Act No. 36). Government Printer, 
Pretoria. 
 Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996). The new governance: Governing without government.  Political Studies, 
XLIV , 652–667. 
 Stuart-Hill, S. I., & Schulze, R. (2010). Does South Africa’s water law and policy allow for climate 
change adaptation?  Climate and Development, 2 , 128–144. 
 Stuart-Hill, S. I., & Schulze, R. (Eds.). (2015).  Developing water related climate change adapta-
tion options to support implementation of policy and strategies for ‘Water for Growth and 
Development’ (WRC report no. 1965/1/15). Pretoria: Water Research Commission. 
 Union of South Africa. (1956). Water Act No. 54 of 1956. Government Printer, Pretoria. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ ) which permits any 
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) 
and source are credited. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included 
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory 
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or 
reproduce the material.
 
R. Meissner et al.
29© The Author(s) 2017 
E. Karar (ed.), Freshwater Governance for the 21st Century, Global Issues 
in Water Policy 6, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43350-9_3
 Chapter 3 
 Towards Inclusive Water Governance: OECD 
Evidence and Key Principles of Stakeholder 
Engagement in the Water Sector 
 Aziza  Akhmouch and  Delphine  Clavreul 
 Abstract  Citizens increasingly demand to be more engaged in how public policy 
decisions are made. In this environment, stakeholder engagement has emerged as a 
principle of good water governance. However, despite extensive research and case 
studies on the topic in recent years, the lack of evidence-based assessment on how 
effective engagement processes have proven to be in reaching intended objectives of 
water governance is striking. Most participatory evaluation exercises fail to provide 
decision-makers with the evidence they need to inform future engagement 
processes. 
 This chapter presents the key fi ndings of an OECD study, which relies mainly on 
empirical data from a survey carried out across 215 stakeholders, within and outside 
the water sector, and derived from 69 case studies collected worldwide. It suggests 
an analytical framework to assess the impact of stakeholder engagement in water- 
related decision-making and policy implementation, based on interdependent com-
ponents, i.e. drivers, obstacles, mechanisms, impacts, costs and benefi ts. 
 Results highlight the need for better understanding of the pressing and emerging 
issues related to stakeholder engagement. These include the external and internal 
drivers that trigger the engagement processes, the arrival of new entrants that ought 
to be considered, innovative tools that have emerged to manage the interface 
between multiple players and types of costs and benefi ts incurred by engagement at 
policy and project levels. The chapter concludes with policy guidance to decision- 
makers and practitioners in the form of necessary conditions on how to set up the 
enabling environment for inclusive water governance. 
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ment •  Inclusive 
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3.1  Introduction: A Call for More Inclusive Water 
Governance 
 Growing attention to inclusive water governance is motivated to a large extent by 
increasing pressure on water resources in many parts of the world. Future projec-
tions related to water are sobering: by the middle of this century, the world popula-
tion will reach nine billion, four billion of which will live in severely water-stressed 
basins, whilst demand for water is expected to increase by 55 % globally (OECD 
 2012 ). The challenges are huge, but they can be turned into opportunities. A number 
of water crises around the globe are primarily governance crises. In many circum-
stances, the problem goes beyond hydrology, infrastructure and fi nancing; it is 
about who does what, at which scale, how and why. In a word, with the right  gover-
nance approach, water could be a harbinger of progress. 
 Water governance is the ‘the range of political, institutional and administrative 
rules, practices and (formal and informal) processes through which and how deci-
sions are taken and implemented; decision-makers are held accountable in the 
development and management of water resources and the delivery of water services; 
and, last but not least, stakeholders articulate their interests and have their concerns 
considered’ (OECD  2011 ). 
 Over the coming decade, decision-makers throughout the world will be forced to 
make tough choices about how to manage water in ways that are effi cient, equitable 
and environmentally sound. Whether their efforts succeed may depend, in large 
part, on providing the broad range of stakeholders with a voice in water-related 
decisions that affect them. Stakeholder engagement holds the promise of improving 
acceptance and trust in water governance and reducing the potential for confl ict over 
water issues. 
 Despite extensive research and case studies in recent years on the topic of stake-
holder engagement, there is a lack of evidence-based assessment on how effective 
engagement processes have proven to be in reaching intended objectives of water 
governance. Most evaluations carried out on stakeholder engagement fail to provide 
decision-makers with the evidence they need to inform future engagement pro-
cesses, rather calling for caution against generalising beyond the context of specifi c 
case studies (Abelson and Gauvin  2006 ). In that context, better evidence needs to be 
produced and policy guidance is required to encourage decision-makers and practi-
tioners to engage with all stakeholders in the early stages of decision-making in 
order to secure support for water reforms, to raise awareness about water risks and 
costs, to increase water users’ willingness to pay and to deal with confl icts. 
 This chapter presents key OECD evidence and messages on the main trends, 
drivers, obstacles, mechanisms, effectiveness, costs and benefi ts of stakeholder 
engagement practices in the water sector. It concludes by providing a set of princi-
ples for creating the enabling environment for inclusive water governance 1 . 
1  This chapter draws heavily on the OECD ( 2015a ) report: ‘Stakeholder engagement for inclusive 
water governance’, OECD Publishing, Paris (OECD  2015a ). 
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 Public acceptance and trust in water governance rely on inclusiveness and the 
capacity to accommodate a broad range of (often confl icting) interests across the 
water chain and policy cycle. A critical test of trustworthy and legitimate water 
governance is not just whether stakeholders are engaged but also whether they are 
actively playing their part. To guide public action in that direction, the OECD 
adopted Principles on Water Governance that set standards for more effective, effi -
cient and inclusive design and implementation of water policies and which include 
a building block of stakeholder engagement (OECD  2015b ). 
3.2  An Overview of Key Terms and Trends in Inclusive 
Water Governance 
 Governments and public governance are becoming increasingly open. As countries 
are still coping with the consequences of the fi nancial crisis, the public sector is fac-
ing acute challenges in terms of fi scal pressure with increased demands from citi-
zens to be more engaged in how public policy decisions are taken. The general 
move from a ‘top-down, hierarchical model’ exerting sovereign control over the 
people and groups making up civil society to gradual involvement of public, non- 
state actors such as private and not-for-profi t organisations and sectors at different 
levels has characterised public policy since the 1990s. 
 Developing a common language represents one of the primary challenges to ana-
lysing the contribution of stakeholder engagement in the water sector. According to 
Smith ( 1983 ), public participation is defi ned as a range of procedures and methods 
designed to consult, involve and inform local communities and citizens (i.e. the 
‘public’). It typically refers to the involvement of individuals and groups in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of a project or plan (Brown and Wyckoff- 
Baird  1992 ; Yee  2010 ). However, the process of involving stakeholders has changed 
and is progressively moving away from mere ‘participation’. It is no longer restricted 
only to ‘civil society’ and project-based approaches but attempts to address a 
broader range of actors in a more systematic way. This evolvement should be taken 
into account in the existing variety of concepts and vocabulary associated with 
stakeholder engagement. 
 Herein, stakeholder engagement is defi ned as the process by which any person or 
group who has an interest or stake in a water-related topic is involved in the related 
activities and decision-making and implementation processes. The person or group 
may be directly or indirectly affected by water policy and/or have the ability to 
infl uence the outcome positively or negatively (OECD  2015a ). 
 Various degrees of engagement and different typologies of engagement and par-
ticipation have been discussed in the literature. A well-known categorisation is the 
‘ladder of citizen participation’ developed by Arnstein ( 1969 ) which identifi es eight 
levels or ‘rungs’, ranging from manipulation (the lowest in the group of nonpartici-
pation steps) to citizen control (the highest step and highest degree of citizen power). 
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This range shows that there is a signifi cant gradation of citizens’ participation. 
Arnstein’s work has now been deemed obsolete and debatable because it considered 
participation as an end in itself rather than as a means (Wehn et al.  2014 ). Other 
typologies have emerged: Pretty ( 1995 ) ‘typologies of participation’; Fung ( 2006 ) 
‘democracy cube’; and UNDP Water Governance Facility, Stockholm International 
Water Institute, Water Integrity Network ( 2013 ) ‘levels of engagement’. This chap-
ter distinguishes six levels of stakeholder engagement, depending on the process 
and the intentions being pursued (Fig.  3.1 ).
 Overall, stakeholder engagement has been more institutionalised for water 
 resources management than water  service delivery. Legislation on surface water and 
groundwater quality and quantity and principles, such as integrated water resource 
management, has encouraged the creation of river basin organisations and their fora 
and the contribution of stakeholders to decisions related to planning. Engagement 
has been less systematic for water services and often consisting of handling custom-
ers’ complaints despite the existence of consultation (rather ad hoc without consid-
eration of the wider application) via shareholding, governing boards, regulatory 
policy and partnerships with citizens and users. 
 For a long period, stakeholder engagement in water governance remained mostly 
incidental, apart from some noticeable exceptions (e.g. the Polder approach in the 
Netherlands to build consensus (OECD  2014 )). The fl exibility associated with proj-
ect- or issue-based stakeholder engagement has made it a preferred option for many 
decision-makers rather than engaging in more systematic inclusive approaches. It 
Provide opportunities to take part in the policy/project process
Does not entail that participants have an influence over 
decision making
Structural level of engagement with the objective to 
develop collective choices
Often embedded in the organisation’s structure
Agreed-upon collaboration between stakeholders
Characterised by joint agreement
Balanced share of power among 
stakeholders involved
Gather comments, perception, information and experience of stakeholders









Make water-related information and data available to other parties
Share information unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally
Make targeted audience more knowledgeable and sensitive to specific water issue
Encourage stakeholders to relate to the issue and take action
Communication
 Fig. 3.1  OECD typology of levels of stakeholder engagement (Source: OECD ( 2015a )) 
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consists in setting up ad hoc mechanisms such as workshops, hearings, panels or 
campaigns to gather stakeholders around a specifi c issue. However, these engage-
ment processes are often time bound, limited in scope and end conjunctly with the 
implementation or evaluation of the given project or policy. Stakeholder engage-
ment processes have also been reactive rather than proactive. They tend to be a 
response to a need or an obligation, such as to comply with regulatory frameworks 
on the topic, or during crises and emergencies (droughts, fl oods, economic crisis, 
etc.) rather than being carried out on a voluntary basis. 
 Environmental, institutional and social trends within and outside the water sector 
have called for more inclusive governance and have spurred greater stakeholder 
engagement in water-related decision-making. On paper ( de jure ), regulations such 
as the Aarhus Convention, the EU Water Framework Directive and the EU Flood 
Directive mandate public engagement; however, in practice ( de facto ), the impor-
tance given to engagement and the extent of its implementation vary from one situ-
ation to another. This underscores the need to consider the effects of inclusive 
approaches on policy decisions. 
 The analytical framework suggested hereafter is organised around fi ve mutually 
dependent components to look at stakeholder engagement holistically: (i) detecting 
drivers to understand the forces and levers for actions; (ii) mapping stakeholders in 
terms of their roles, responsibilities, infl uence, motivations, level of connectivity 
and scale; (iii) diagnosing obstacles and mitigating related risks to integrity, 
 accountability and sustainability; (iv) identifying mechanisms that are fi t-for-pur-
pose; and (v) fostering evaluation to point out areas in need of improvements and 
trade-offs (Fig.  3.2 ). This framework can be used as a reading template to develop a 
comprehensive approach to engagement efforts and to decipher the actual contribu-









 Fig. 3.2  OECD analytical framework of stakeholder engagement in water governance (Source: 
Based on OECD ( 2015a )) 
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 To ground this analysis in sound evidence, a survey of stakeholder engagement 
in water governance was conducted in 2014 across 215 stakeholders with various 
levels of interest and experience in stakeholder engagement. Whilst the results of 
the survey provide valuable insights into and feedback on the reality of stakeholder 
engagement practices, they do not intend to be statistically comprehensive or refl ect 
the multitude of views, arrangements and players in the fi eld of water 2 . A compen-
dium of 69 case studies was also collected worldwide to provide insight into practi-
cal experiences. 
3.3  Why Engage Stakeholders: The Driving Forces 
Behind Inclusive Water Governance 
 The water outlook is not optimistic, and future economic, social, climate, urban and 
technological trends challenge water governance and the capacity of governments 
to address them, often calling for multi-stakeholder solutions. Pressure points over 
water allocation, infrastructure fi nancing and disaster management require doing 
better with less money, less water and with more people willing to get on board. The 
daunting picture for the water sector in the future has prompted renewed emphasis 
on the role of stakeholder engagement across the public, private and non-profi t sec-
tors combined with structural and conjunctural drivers that have pushed stakeholder 
engagement to develop along different rationales. 
 A range of long-term structural drivers has resulted in a paradigm shift in water 
governance to better cope with future challenges. They can be clustered into four 
broad categories: climate change will affect water availability and resilience of 
water infrastructures, with different levels of impacts across the world; economic 
and demographic trends will drive water demand, in particular in cities, and affect 
the capacity of governments to respond (i.e. their ability to mobilise public funds); 
sociopolitical trends, such as the concept of IWRM, recent developments in 
European water-related policies, the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals will set new standards, regulations and aspirational goals paying greater 
attention to adaptive governance; and innovation and technologies will stimulate 
greater connectivity and new relationships, in particular related to web-based com-
munication avenues. 
 Stakeholder engagement has also been triggered by conjunctural drivers and is 
greatly infl uenced by changing circumstances and situations (Fig.  3.3 ). Debates 
around water-related policy reforms and projects are primary drivers of stakeholder 
engagement. Stakeholders are more likely to take part in discussions when it con-
cerns new policies they will have to uphold, whilst decision-makers look to consult 
and involve stakeholders likely to be impacted to ensure acceptability and sustain-
ability of the policies to be implemented.
2  Details of the survey’s sample of respondents and methodology are provided in OECD ( 2015a ). 
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 Survey results show that crises, change or emergency-driven situations, such as 
fl oods and droughts, are the second most important driver of stakeholder engage-
ment. The community engagement initiative ‘Rebuild by Design’, for instance, was 
founded as a response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy in the United 
States. Legal requirements on water-related stakeholder engagement have emerged 
in the past decade and boosted stakeholder engagement. In Japan, for example, the 
Japan Water Agency Law requires mandatory stakeholder mapping and engage-
ment in all the activities of water agencies. Competition over water resources is 
considered the fourth driver. Engaging all actors impacted can support continuing 
dialogue on competing needs to be balanced and necessary trade-offs. In France, 
Électricité de France (EDF) signed a Water Saving Convention with major irrigators 
in the Durance Valley to improve water effi ciency and allocation through improved 
local stakeholder engagement, which has led to a reduction in agricultural water 
consumption from 325 million to 235 million cubic metres. 
 Successful stakeholder engagement comes from a real understanding of the 
rationale that underlies it. It points to the reasons why engagement should or need 
to take place, for what outcomes and with which categories of stakeholders. In turn, 
decision-makers can defi ne realistic and forward-looking policy objectives for 
stakeholder engagement and ensure that the processes are outcome-oriented. 
3.4  Who to Engage: Stakeholders, Their Motivations 
and Their Interactions at Different Scales 
 A fi rst step in the process of effective stakeholder engagement is to identify who 
they are and to determine what motivates them. Knowing who is responsible for 
what and at which level is an essential starting point and can help identify 
Note: The figure considers the drivers ranked from 1 to 3 on a scale from 1 to 11.
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Change in organisational culture
Cost efficiency
Adaptive governance
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Regulatory frameworks for public participation
Political and democratic pressure
Crisis, change or emergency-driven situation
Policy reform or project under discussion
 Fig. 3.3  Recently identifi ed drivers for stakeholder engagement in the water sector (215 
respondents) 
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redundancies and gaps in the institutional framework that affect policy coherence 
and sector performance. Stakeholder mapping can be used to identify the core 
stakeholder functions in the sector and to assess how effectively they are carried out. 
Such mapping also highlights the interaction with, and the impact of stakeholders 
on, other areas that infl uence the water sector. 
 Beyond the ‘traditional’ actors, new players have gained interest and infl uence in 
water governance (Fig.  3.4 ). Whilst the role of the private sector has been inclined 
to focus on companies delivering water supply and sanitation, businesses have paid 
increasing attention to water governance in their strategies, especially to cope with 
regulatory risks and to secure water allocation. In parallel, citizens and water user 
associations have gained increasing infl uence over political decisions on water. As 
risks of fl oods intensify, property developers are also gaining infl uence, as spatial 
development generates long-term liabilities and fi nancial implications in terms of 
water management, such as compensation for the loss of green areas and water 
amenities. They can play an important role in harnessing new sources of fi nance and 
contributing to the development of nontechnical solutions to manage fl oods. 
Institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds) have 
also begun to factor environmental, social and governance issues into their decision- 
making process, and they are investing more and more in water infrastructure and 
utilities.
 Some stakeholder categories are frequently excluded from the process. These 
include women (as the primary users of water in many parts of the world, for domes-
tic consumption, subsistence agriculture and health), youth (as the future generation 
that will need to solve issues related to water), the rural and urban poor (as the main 
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 Fig. 3.4  Traditional, new and underrepresented stakeholders in the water sector (Source: OECD 
(2015a)) 
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communities. Nature and other nonconsumptive users are also often absent from 
engagement processes. Greater efforts to encourage innovation are called for to con-
nect and engage with these groups or individuals, who do not always come forward 
on their own. In order to gain a more balanced picture, it is very important to include 
these minority or ‘less-vocal’ stakeholders beyond formal engagement channels. In 
New Zealand, the Canterbury Regional Council launched an engagement process 
with district councils and the Māori tribal authority to develop and implement the 
new Canterbury Water Management Strategy based on a collaborative governance 
framework whereby ‘local people plan locally’. It led to positive outcomes in terms 
of sustainability and resilience of water management in the region and to better 
community understanding of indigenous cultural values. 
 Stakeholders have different motivations, needs and interests. They aspire to dif-
ferent goals in water governance, whether these relate to water resource 
 management – a primary concern mainly for national governments, businesses and 
international organisations; the supply of water and sanitation – mostly in the case 
of regulators and civil society; water disaster management; or environmental pro-
tection. Based on their core motivations, and often their mandate, stakeholders have 
different governance concerns that affect their willingness to contribute to water- 
related policies and projects as well as their degree of engagement. 
 The way they interact can also vary from place to place. Depending on their 
responsibilities and interest, stakeholders interact more or less with one another. 
Interactions amongst stakeholders tend to take place in silos, relying essentially on 
peer-to-peer exchanges, as is the case, for instance, for governments, river basin 
organisations, civil society, businesses and academics (Fig.  3.5 ). Understanding 
these dynamics is crucial to assessing the level of stakeholders’ infl uence and 
engagement and to clarifying issues related to communication, trust, consensus- 
building and solidarity. For example, sociometric network analysis of American 
water utility professionals was carried out to shed light on the importance of 
exchange channels, amongst peers and opinion leaders, for innovation diffusion and 
knowledge-sharing in the municipal water industry.
 Water is a fi eld particularly sensitive to issues of scale. Water issues and hydro-
logical boundaries cut across administrative frontiers. Water governance and water 
resource management take place at various spatial scales, both in their ecological 
and political dimensions. First, the hydrological system with its different levels 
from small catchments to large river basins plays a prominent role from the indi-
vidual water body to the global climate. Second, competencies of political interven-
tions have shifted both towards the national and supranational levels in the form of 
international agreements or the growing infl uence of the European Union; and 
towards the regional and local levels, in the form of decentralisation of water 
decision- making and implementation involving a diversity of local non-state actors. 
 Engagement processes range from local watershed groups negotiating over allo-
cation practices to national committees debating priorities or international meetings 
seeking consensus about the management of transboundary basins between sover-
eign states. The issue of scale also relates to questions of democratic legitimacy. 
The higher the level of decision-making, the lower the possibilities for comprehen-
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sive participation of all relevant constituencies and thus the higher the likelihood 
that confl icts may arise. Inversely, the lower the level of government, the more dif-
fi cult it is to effectively address water governance problems, in particular those that 
are not strictly local, without having the big picture. 
 Stakeholder engagement can provide platforms to address the mismatch between 
administrative and hydrological scales. Water-related projects and policies can be 
driven by local livelihoods tied to local ecosystems or by energy producers making 
long-term production and investment choices at the national level. Thus, some 
stakeholders promote hydrological scales that correspond to manageable units in 
which they operate (e.g. river basin organisations). Others promote conventional 
administrative levels, arguing that this is where capacity, accountability and legiti-
macy already exist. In the Great Lakes region of North America, multilevel engage-
ment processes on water resource management between the province of Ontario, 
municipalities, local NGOs and First Nation communities led to the formulation of 
common policy directions and long-term strategies for water protection. Fitting 
stakeholder engagement to place-based needs can help reconcile decisions within 


























 Fig. 3.5  Most frequent interactions across stakeholders in the water sector (Note: The fi gure 
shows the interactions across governments (national, regional, local), service providers, watershed 
institutions, regulators and civil society considered as ‘very frequent’. The blue arrows represent 
interactions between the categories of stakeholders and the black arrows represent interactions 
within each category of stakeholders) (Source: OECD Survey on Stakeholder Engagement for 
Effective Water Governance (2014)) 
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3.5  Overcoming the Barriers to Inclusive Water Governance 
 Engagement processes vary across places and stakeholders, but common barriers 
can be identifi ed. Decision-makers need to carefully anticipate these bottlenecks 
and mitigate related risks (Fig.  3.6 ).
 Respondents to the survey highlighted several major obstacles:
 –  First, the lack of political will and leadership: stakeholder engagement implies a 
shift in the balance of power including towards actors that may not share the 
same intentions, perspectives and interests. 
 –  Second, the lack of clarity on the use of stakeholder inputs: if stakeholders with 
interest or infl uence do not understand how their input will contribute to decision- 
making, they may feel misled or manipulated by the process and will therefore 
lose interest. Satisfying all stakeholders’ interests is a daunting task and implies 
the willingness to support the outcomes of the engagement process, even when 
they fail to coincide with one’s vested and partisan interests. Clarifying the 
engagement process is one way to secure support and buy-in. 
 –  Third, institutional fragmentation: responsibilities scattered across a multitude of 
actors create fi ssures in water governance with subareas administered indepen-
dently and limited coordination incentives leading to poor consultation and weak 
accountability. The impact of institutional fragmentation is therefore often 
played out at the subnational level, with inadequate consultation on the needs of 
other related sectors, or subnational levels and overlapping responsibility. 
Fragmentation precludes the effi ciencies and synergies that can be obtained 
through cooperation across authorities, water-related sectors and scales, and this 
can lead to policy outcomes focused on a specifi c issue or territorial area with 
little spill- over effect that can benefi t the broader water sector. 
 –  Fourth, the lack of funding: insuffi cient or unstable revenues to sustain the 
engagement process, logistical expenses related to meeting venues or support 
material and the lack of competent and dedicated staff are common bottlenecks, 
especially when government funding has been slashed in times of economic and 
fi nancial crisis. 
 In addition, consultation ‘fatigue’ is a risk to avoid, and it helps to be clear and 
forthright about how people’s input will actually be used. Engagement with broad 
groups helps to ignite the political will and the leadership required to deal with typi-
cal shortcomings, such as staff and funding, legal issues and inertia. Decision- 
making processes can also be hindered by confl icts of interest or consultation 
‘capture’, especially when certain groups of actors and lobbies are better organised 
to voice their concerns. For instance, in some EU countries, farmers overrode 
engagement initiatives related to the implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive, leaving insuffi cient water for the environment (OECD  2014 ). 
 Decision-makers need to carefully anticipate bottlenecks to the integration of 
stakeholder engagement in water policy and projects and mitigate related risks. 
Different tools and procedures can help to achieve this. Translating existing stan-
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dards for inclusive decision-making into legislative frameworks can provide incen-
tives to support the integration of stakeholder engagement. Defi ning strategies that 
make clear how stakeholder contributions will infl uence the fi nal outcome can pre-
vent frustration with regard to the infl uence stakeholders have over the process. 
Setting up information water systems and securing funds will also be critical to 
sustaining engagement processes in the long run. Engagement efforts should be 
allocated the same staffi ng and budget as other components of a water policy and 
project development process. Mechanisms designed to prevent the risk of undue 
access and infl uence by powerful, better organised infl uence groups are needed in 
tandem. Together with openness and engagement, solid integrity frameworks for 
policy-making can help ensure that fi nal policy decisions refl ect the views of the 
many and not just the few. Tools such as ‘integrity pacts’ and ‘social witnesses’ can 
also help to reduce the likelihood of confl ict of interest and consultation capture, 
whilst ex post surveys on motivations can investigate levels of interest on specifi c 
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 Fig. 3.6  Major obstacles to stakeholder engagement in the water sector (215 respondents) (Note: 
The graph considers the average response from the perspective of both targets and promoters for 
obstacles diagnosed as ‘critical’ and ‘important’ on a range from ‘critical’ to ‘important’, ‘some-
what important’ and ‘not important’, to the question ‘which obstacles does your organisation face 
when taking part in or promoting stakeholder engagement?’) (Source: OECD Survey on 
Stakeholder Engagement for Effective Water Governance (2014)) 
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3.6  How to Engage Stakeholders: A Range of Formal 
and Informal Mechanisms 
 There is a wide variety of mechanisms for engaging stakeholders, but they work 
differently according to place, time and objectives. Navigating this diversity and 
selecting the right mechanism(s) for engagement can be a daunting task for deci-
sion-makers. The survey helped identify 24 mechanisms that can be classifi ed into 
2 types: formal mechanisms (tools that have institutional or legal ground and often 
stem from an offi cial agreement, a contract between parties or charters with clear 
operating rules and priorities) and informal mechanisms (not institutionalised but 
rather can be implemented at the discretion of the convener of the engagement 
process).
 Stakeholders use some mechanisms more often than others. Meetings, work-
shops and expert panels were identifi ed as the most often used mechanisms in the 
survey, followed by water associations and networks, stakeholder consultation as 
part of regulatory processes and river basin organisations (Fig.  3.7 ). 
 Innovative mechanisms and decision tools are gaining traction because of tech-
nological advances as well as greater skill and openness in applying the tools to 
discussion. The practical deployment of new information and communication tech-







































 Fig. 3.7  Use of stakeholder engagement mechanisms in the water sector (215 respondents) (Note: 
The fi gure considers the average of ‘yes’ responses provided from the perspective of both targets 
and promoters to the question ‘Which stakeholder engagement mechanisms does your organisa-
tion use or take part in?’) (Source: OECD Survey on Stakeholder Engagement for Effective Water 
Governance (2014)) 
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applications (Guimarães-Pereira et al.  2003 ), and the function of ICT platforms has 
taken new and varied dimensions as virtual meetings, and Internet-based platforms 
(social media, chat rooms, online fora) are used more frequently. E-participation has 
been used, for instance, to set up citizen observatories for fl ood risk management in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom where citizen participation was composed 
of a variety of citizen groups (volunteers, elected citizens, citizen scientists and 
communities) and rested on a range of communication modes from listening as a 
spectator to expressing and developing preferences on specifi c issues (Wehn and 
Evers  2014 ). 
 Efforts are still required to generalise digital tools in water decision-making and 
policy/project implementation, but in their various multilateral forms, ICTs are 
increasingly being used by decision-makers to help stakeholders better understand 
what they do. For instance, in Portugal the Water and Waste Services Regulation 
Authority (ERSAR) has developed a mobile app that provides relevant information 
to users on the quality of service provision across 278 municipalities. 
 These different mechanisms have their strengths and weaknesses (Fig.  3.8 ). 
Moreover, engagement modalities vary in terms of the amount of time they take, 
the number of stakeholders they involve and the amount of resources they require. 
Similarly, different policy tools may be applied to the different steps of the pol-
icy cycle (i.e. design, implementation or evaluation) or to different categories of 
actors.
 It is crucial for decision-makers to carefully align tools with the level of 
engagement targeted and the context in which the engagement takes place. The 
effectiveness of mechanisms also relies on the capacities and resources needed for 
stakeholders to use them effectively, including knowledge, know-how and fund-
ing (travel expenses to attend a meeting, necessary technological settings). Also, 
new methods are being continually developed and require new skills and capaci-
ties. Thus, there is no one single optimal mechanism for stakeholder engagement 
but a menu of options for which the pros and cons need to be weighed up very 
carefully. 
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• Likely to be better informed 
• Build confidence
• Dedicated & qualified staff 
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• Open atmosphere and 
deliberation
• Build sense of community 
INFORMAL MECHANISMS
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Examples: meetings, ICTs, traditional 
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interest-pay-say principle; citizen 
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• Can be perceived as single-
minded
• Risks of lobbying and capture
• Principle-agent tension
Weaknesses:
• Difficult to include outcomes in 
final decisions
• Lack of follow-up actions
• Lack of skilled facilitators and time
 Fig. 3.8  Strengths and weaknesses of engagement mechanisms (Source: Based on OECD 
( 2015a )) 
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3.7  Assessing Stakeholder Engagement: Effectiveness, Costs 
and Benefi ts 
 There has been little evaluation of the effectiveness, costs and benefi ts of stake-
holder engagement in the water sector, because this type of analyses is relatively 
new to the public sector. Evaluation has generally remained on an ad hoc basis, 
potentially because stakeholder engagement has often been carried out as an ‘add-
 on’ to conventional processes, or a tick-the-box approach is frequently being used 
to comply with existing legislation and rules. 
 Assessing stakeholder engagement should not be considered as an end in itself 
but should serve a broader purpose of improving the process and its outcomes. It 
can:
 –  Strengthen the accountability of decision-makers, by measuring whether public 
and institutional resources, including stakeholders’ time and effort, are effec-
tively utilised 
 –  Assist in determining whether the engagement process was successful and in 
drawing up an inventory of the lessons learnt towards future improvement 
 –  Map out the potential challenges that may be encountered (e.g. divergent per-
spectives regarding fl ood defence measures between land planners, property 
owners and government authorities or regarding water resource allocation 
between farmers, industries and environmentalists) 
 Some diffi culties may be experienced when evaluating stakeholder engagement. 
First, there is a lack of comprehensive frameworks of agreed-upon evaluation meth-
ods and reliable measurement tools. Second, there is a wide variety in the design 
and goals of engagement processes; therefore, evaluation frameworks should be 
general enough to apply across different types of processes, yet specifi c enough to 
have value for learning and practice. Third, stakeholder engagement is an inherently 
complex and value-laden concept; hence there are no widely held criteria for judg-
ing the success and failure of engagement efforts both in terms of process and 
outcomes. 
 Evaluation tools are increasingly being used to measure the success of engage-
ment efforts. Multi-stakeholder meetings help to collect feedback on the level of 
performance of engagement processes; evaluation reports record the process (suc-
cesses, failures, lessons learnt) and allow for analysis to improve future engagement 
processes. When publicly disclosed, these reports can shed light on how stakehold-
ers’ inputs were used and whether engagement was worthwhile. Other tools such as 
polls and surveys can provide information for assessing the engagement process, 
such as levels of satisfaction. Some stakeholder categories (e.g. civil society) use 
evaluation mechanisms more often than others. There may be a perception that cus-
tomer feedback on a given stakeholder engagement process, particularly in terms of 
complaints, should be avoided. However, complaints can be useful warning signs 
that the process can be improved. 
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 Evidence from the survey and case studies highlights the fact that stakeholder 
engagement is an investment. Decision-makers are inclined to conduct discussions, 
consultations and exchange of opinions that can infl ate some costs, be they direct, 
indirect, monetary or nonmonetary (Fig.  3.9 ). These costs relate to delays in the 
decision-making process, operational expenses (facilities, travel, staff, overtime, 
etc.) and the production and disclosure of the required information.
 The process of engaging stakeholders may be more costly than the absence of 
consultation. However, dialogue and cooperation amongst stakeholders allows 
 testing and refi ning of policies and projects and thus can yield short- and long-term 
benefi ts (Fig.  3.10 ). Short-term benefi ts relate to the outcomes of engagement such 
as better quality decision-making, increased willingness of stakeholders to collabo-
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Early costs
Negotiation and mediation of existing social
conflicts 
Communication to stakeholders, including 
under-represented actors
Production and disclosure of information
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 Fig. 3.10  Four types of long-term benefi ts of stakeholder engagement (Source: OECD ( 2015a )) 
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rate to solve common water problems or greater support for the implementation of 
a water project or policy.
 Long-term benefi ts relate to improved understanding and awareness of fl ood 
risks, more confi dence in governments’ decisions or capacity building. Overall, 
benefi ts can be clustered into four types:
 –  Acceptability and sustainability , in terms of effective implementation of water 
policy and projects, proper enforcement of regulation, political acceptability and 
ownership of decision and outcomes 
 –  Social equity and cohesion , which is related to trust, confi dence and customer 
satisfaction, as well as corporate social responsibility 
 –  Capacity and knowledge development , which emanates from raising greater 
awareness, sharing information and forming opinions 
 –  Economic effi ciency , as it can assist in optimising cost saving, value for money 
and time saving, as well as broader economic benefi ts related to greater policy 
coherence and synergies across sectors and projects. 
 Conducting evaluations on the costs and benefi ts of stakeholder engagement can 
provide the evidence to effectively guide decision-making and policy/project imple-
mentation with tangible data and analyses. Different costs and benefi ts accrue to 
different stakeholder groups at different times and require managing trade-offs to 
ensure successful engagement processes and outcomes. There is a dearth of knowl-
edge on the distributional impacts of stakeholder engagement. The danger is the 
potentially inequitable distribution of the benefi ts of engagement. 
 The sustainability of stakeholder engagement will not only depend on the net 
difference between aggregate costs and benefi ts, but also on how they are distrib-
uted between stakeholders and on stakeholders’ willingness to bear them. Also, 
water policy reforms and large projects can induce important adjustment costs, 
especially in the short term, whilst the benefi ts of such initiatives may only become 
visible in the long term. It is crucial to critically refl ect upon the ratio of costs and 
benefi ts during engagement processes and determine the appropriate trade-offs 
related to this dual temporality. 
3.8  Conclusion: OECD Necessary Conditions for Inclusive 
Water Governance 
 Evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that decision-makers who adopt a 
systemic, inclusive approach to water governance are likely to get a better return on 
the time and resources they invest. They will also be better equipped to handle 
stakeholder issues and risks more effectively. 
 For engagement processes to be relevant, a careful balance is required between 
what they try to achieve, the resources they require and whether they succeed in 
reaching the intended objectives. Decision-makers at all levels have a critical role to 
play in establishing the enabling environment for result-oriented, effective and 
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impactful stakeholder engagement. Although engagement processes cannot be eas-
ily replicated from one context to another, the OECD proposes the following condi-
tions for creating the enabling environment for inclusive water governance:
 1.  Map all stakeholders who have a stake in the outcome or who are likely to 
be affected, as well as their responsibility, core motivations and interactions . 
Stakeholder mapping should be done in relation to a specifi c issue and be updated 
on a regular basis. Such mapping should pay attention to newcomers, players 
outside the water sector and traditionally underrepresented groups. This is criti-
cal to ensure that all stakeholders are identifi ed and properly involved throughout 
the policy/project cycle. Finding the right balance between inclusiveness and 
empowerment of stakeholders is also important. Engagement processes (and 
related mechanisms) need to accommodate the needs of stakeholders with vary-
ing levels of interests and resources to ensure inclusivity and accessibility. Risks 
related to consultation capture from overrepresented categories to the detriment 
of unheard voices, as well as risks of prejudice against a particular category of 
stakeholders deserve careful consideration. Equity between present and future 
generations in a perspective of sustainability should be promoted. Thus, disag-
gregated data on gender, age economic status and the level of impact of proposed 
policies and measures are crucial. 
 2.  Defi ne the ultimate line of decision-making, the objectives of stakeholder 
engagement and the expected use of inputs . Clarifying the goals and reasons 
for engagement is the key to building mutual understanding and trust of how 
stakeholders may be involved in the process and for informed stakeholders to 
provide quality contributions in line with expectations. In an engagement pro-
cess with carefully set objectives, stakeholder engagement can make a meaning-
ful contribution to the formulation of river basin plans at the watershed level, 
service delivery, awareness-raising (e.g. on water costs, risks, future trends), 
auditing, risk mapping, as well as performance monitoring. Similarly, the author-
ity responsible for taking decisions, and its willingness to take stakeholders’ 
ideas on board in doing so, should be clearly identifi ed to enhance confi dence in 
the value of the process. Transparency and accountability in how the engagement 
process is designed and implemented (e.g. stakeholder mapping methods, use of 
stakeholders’ inputs) are crucial to improve credibility and legitimacy and to 
build trust amongst the stakeholders involved. Diligent work is necessary to 
ensure that the engagement process is fair and equitable and to reliably engage 
stakeholders. 
 3.  Allocate proper fi nancial and human resources and share requisite informa-
tion for result-oriented stakeholder engagement . Improving the overall con-
tribution to substantive discussions and decision-making requires access to 
timely and understandable information (be it cultural, scientifi c, traditional, 
etc.), technical expertise, experience sharing and funding in the right format and 
in good time (planning) to realistically and effectively participate. Supporting 
two-way information-sharing through consistent and appropriate communica-
tion channels, including web-based technologies when feasible, is key. The 
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fi nancial affordability of the engagement process is also important to ensure the 
effective engagement of all those that have a stake; convey accurate, trusted and 
accessible information to diverse sectors; foster opinion-forming within and 
across stakeholder groups; and build support to the process. In order to interpret 
and apply these resources and the information gathered, competences and capa-
bilities need to be developed at all levels to enable sustainable stakeholder 
engagement (e.g. skills, social learning). 
 4.  Regularly assess the process and outcomes of stakeholder engagement to 
learn, adjust and improve accordingly . Such evaluation and monitoring can 
resort to fact-based and perception-based tools and indicators and be carried out 
by targets, promoters and/or third parties. Results should be disclosed to increase 
accountability, provide insight into the success of the engagement process in 
reaching its intended objectives and learn from experience to improve practice in 
the future. Evaluation should not be limited to  ex ante and ex post assessment but 
remain an ongoing process throughout the policy/project cycle. Stakeholder 
engagement can yield benefi ts in terms of resilience, sustainability, cohesion, 
acceptability, capacity and effi ciency. However, it can also delay decision- 
making and implementation and generate different types of material (monetary 
and nonmonetary), process, reputational and social costs. Assessing the costs 
and benefi ts of engagement processes can assist in ensuring that all interests, 
including those of underrepresented stakeholders, are respected regarding the 
distribution of impacts, compensation and benefi ts. Mitigation measures are 
required to reduce costs and to set the right incentives whilst managing the dual 
short-term/long-term temporality. 
 5.  Embed engagement processes in clear legal and policy frameworks, organ-
isational structures/principles and responsible authorities . There is no water 
governance without governance at large. Similarly, there can be no effective 
stakeholder engagement without proper incentives for bottom-up and inclusive 
policy-making. A clear set of rules, platforms and vehicles for doing so is critical 
to move from reactive to proactive and systematic stakeholder engagement in the 
water sector. However, institutionalisation increases the risk of engagement 
‘fatigue’ and/or ‘capture’ from overrepresented categories to the detriment of 
unheard voices. It should be fl exible to take into consideration place-based needs 
and changing circumstances whilst fostering a change in the ‘mindset’, daily 
practices, professional skills and culture of decision-making. Provisions for 
stakeholder engagement should be aligned coherently and holistically across the 
water chain and policy domains related to water. 
 6.  Customise the type and level of engagement to the needs and keep the pro-
cess fl exible to changing circumstances . Stakeholder engagement tools and 
mechanisms work differently across places, times, objectives and stages of the 
policy/project cycle. They should be tailored to each context (geographic, socio-
economic, cultural), type of stakeholder concerned, policy goal targeted and 
place-based needs to accommodate varying levels of interest and resources from 
stakeholders and consider other options as needs arise. Water governance sys-
tems are complex and in a state of constant fl ux, where change is dynamic and 
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often unpredictable. Engagement processes therefore need to enable multiple 
stakeholders to respond and adapt to uncertainty and should remain fl exible to 
manage risks and resilient to adapt to changing environments. Lessons can be 
learnt from failure in engagement approaches in terms of management of com-
plexity and how to bring about fundamental change. 
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 Chapter 4 
 Free-Market Economics and Developmental 
Statism as Political Paradigms: Implications 
for Water Governance Theory and Practice 
in Developing Countries 
 Claudious  Chikozho and  Everisto  Mapedza 
 Abstract  Key actors in various developing countries are often confronted by dif-
fi cult choices when it comes to the selection and deployment of appropriate water 
governance regimes taking into account national socio-economic and political reali-
ties. Indeed, scholars and practitioners alike continue to grapple with the need to 
create the optimum water-supply and allocation decision-making space applicable 
to specifi c developing countries. This chapter uses case studies to explore the utility 
of free-market economics and developmental statism as two major paradigms that 
have emerged in the face of enduring questions about how best to govern water- 
supply systems in developing countries. The chapter establishes that increasing 
pressure on available natural resources may have already rendered obsolete some of 
the water-supply systems and governance regimes that have served human societies 
very well for many decades. It is also clear that national water-supply governance 
paradigms tend to change in tandem with emerging national development theoreti-
cal frameworks and priorities. Each nation or local government feels compelled to 
adopt a particular framework to fulfi l its needs taking into account the broader 
global water policy context. While many developing countries have adopted water 
policy prescriptions from the international arena, national and local socio-economic 
and political realities ultimately determine what works and what does not work on 
the ground. Local realities have also helped to inform how nation-states domesticate 
global concepts for their local purposes. Thus, the choice between free-market 
approaches and developmental state-oriented approaches is never simple, and 
hybrid models are often deployed. Indeed, the majority of countries and municipali-
ties rely on a mix of market economics and developmental statism to make their 
water governance regimes more realistic and workable on the ground. 
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4.1  Introduction and Background 
 The past six decades of changing development paradigms have seen alternating 
national and international water policies emphasise the state, user groups or markets 
as essential for solving water resource governance challenges. Closer analysis 
reveals that each of these solutions has worked in some places but failed in others, 
especially when attempts were made to pilot the solutions across many countries 
and diverse socio-economic situations (Meinzen-Dick  2007 ). But since the early 
1990s, integrated water resource management (IWRM) has emerged as the domi-
nant framework for guiding decision-making and planning in the water sectors of 
developing countries. With the observed and anticipated worsening of water scar-
city due to climate change and various anthropogenic factors that increase water 
demand, the push for IWRM has never been greater. 
 It is within this context that discourses on the importance of the “political para-
digm” for water governance in developing countries are usually framed. In these 
discourses, scholars and practitioners alike grapple with the need to create the opti-
mum water-supply and allocation decision-making framework applicable to a 
developing country, especially in Africa. The enduring question is no longer whether 
or not water should be managed purely as a social or economic good. Instead, it is 
now more about how best a particular country and its service delivery agencies can 
manage freshwater-supply systems taking into account the state’s developmental 
role while at the same time addressing the free-market economy imperatives evident 
in and promoted by advocates of IWRM approaches. At the same time, implementa-
tion is often constrained by resource limitations, structural adjustment programmes 
and poverty reduction strategies. 
 Analytical papers by several scholars indicate that traditional approaches for 
meeting increasing demand for water relied almost exclusively on centralised infra-
structure and decision-making characterised by big dams and reservoirs, pipelines 
and treatment plants, water departments and agencies (see Gleick  2002 ; Chikozho 
 2008 ; GWP  2012 ). These approaches, dominated by a supply orientation and reli-
ance on technical solutions to water problems, have since been discarded in favour 
of a governance regime that embraces user involvement in decision-making and 
more effi cient resource management. In effect, IWRM explicitly challenges tradi-
tional water development and governance systems. It starts with the recognition that 
top-down, supply-led, technically based and sectoral approaches to water gover-
nance and management impose unsustainably high economic, social and ecological 
C. Chikozho and E. Mapedza
53
costs on human societies and on the natural environment. The water governance 
paradigm that has now emerged is underpinned by neoliberal approaches that 
emphasise, inter alia, a “rolling back of the state from the frontiers of development 
planning” and treating water-supply services as “economic” products that need to 
be paid for. It is a way of thinking that emphasises decentralised management struc-
tures, use of effi cient technologies and deployment of water pricing structures that 
act as both incentives and disincentives for “irresponsible” water use. 
 This chapter addresses two major paradigms that have emerged in the face of 
enduring questions regarding how to govern water-supply systems in a developmen-
tal state or in a free-market economy. We present the main discourses attributable to 
each of these perspectives and their implications in a developing country context. 
We acknowledge that the increasing scarcity and demand for freshwater has serious 
implications for how water is allocated and protected. We argue that in the face of 
new pressures on the resource, water-supply systems, models and governance 
regimes that have served human societies for a long time may now fail to cope. 
Therefore, this chapter brings attention and sharper focus on the need to deploy 
alternative tools and approaches to water-supply governance and management in 
order to protect and sustainably allocate this resource. The chapter also brings to the 
fore the fact that despite the dichotomy between free-market economy and 
developmental- state paradigms, in practice, elements of both paradigms tend to be 
combined, albeit in different proportions. 
 Well-known scholarship that addresses water institutions includes Rosegrant and 
Binswanger ( 1994 ), Barnekov et al. ( 1989 ), Saleth and Dinar ( 2005 ), Meinzen-Dick 
( 2007 ), Briscoe ( 2011 ), Beveridge and Monsees ( 2012 ) and Horne ( 2013 ). Most of 
these scholars partly focus on the benefi ts or disadvantages of water markets and 
provide insights about their utility in specifi c contexts as well as guidance on how 
they may be improved. Typically, most of them use economic effi ciency and equity 
perspectives as the point of departure in their analyses. Our goal in this chapter is 
more modest, that is, to show how developing countries may or may not deploy 
market mechanisms in their water-supply systems and what this implies in terms of 
effi ciency, equity and sustainability. We do not necessarily provide specifi c recom-
mendations about how to improve water markets; neither do we discuss best prac-
tice in terms of water institutions (see Saleth and Dinar  2005 ). Instead, we provide 
an overview of the key debates and major institutional underpinnings of water- 
supply sectors in developing countries and their potential performance under mar-
ket or developmental state-oriented planning conditions. This chapter is intended to 
inform practitioners, policymakers and theorists who grapple continuously with the 
challenge of crafting effective water governance systems in a rapidly altering envi-
ronment in developing countries. Section 3.1 focuses on key discourses, concepts 
and expectations relevant to the management of water in a free-market economy. 
Section 3.2 explores the major discourses, concepts and expectations relevant to the 
management of water in a developmental state. 
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4.1.1  Managing Water in a Free-Market Economy: A Brief 
Historical Trajectory 
 While understanding around the vulnerability and fi nite nature of water in the face 
of rapidly growing demand for the resource has a long history, it was highlighted 
together with the concept of the “right to water” in much clearer terms than ever 
before during the United Nations (UN) Conference on Water, 1977 at Mar del Plata. 
Since then, debates on water governance in developing countries have mainly 
revolved around the need to discard the long-held belief that water is a social good 
to be provided by the state, either free of charge or at very low cost. To proponents 
of this approach, developing and delivering new water-supply systems and sup-
pressing water prices appear much more politically expedient than focusing on 
charging higher prices and improving the effi ciency of existing supply systems. 
This approach was buttressed by the widely held belief that water was always going 
to be in abundance (Molle  2009 ). Ineffi ciencies in water use were either not detected 
at all or simply ignored. Thus, the failure to recognise the economic value of water 
led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource (Kevinsen et al. 
 2014 ). As Smith and Wang ( 2008 ) point out, solely searching for water supply-side 
remedies may mask overconsumptive or unsustainable behaviours that are acknowl-
edged during the critical self-examination that inevitably occurs when a water con-
servation approach is adopted. 
 Both the 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Brundtland Commission) entitled “Our Common Future” and the Dublin Principles 
of 1992 heralded a signifi cant shift in perceptions about how water and other natural 
resources should be governed and managed, giving rise to the acceptance of the 
integrated approach embodied in IWRM. Guided by the Dublin Principles, govern-
ments, water management agencies, international organisations, civil society agen-
cies and others have engaged in a long-term change process to improve management 
of water resources (see FAO  1995 ; GWP  2003 ; Chikozho  2010 ). A product of the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 
1992, Agenda 21, Principle No. 4, declared that “Water has an economic value in all 
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (United Nations 
 1992 ). In 1993, the World Bank issued a comprehensive policy paper that basically 
reiterated that water should be viewed as a limited resource to be managed in an 
integrated manner to meet national objectives – economic, social, security and envi-
ronmental rather than as an input into specifi c sectors (World Bank  1993a ). Attention 
signifi cantly shifted from technical solutions to solutions of a managerial and insti-
tutional nature in the early 1990s (Schwartz  2008 ). This shift should also be under-
stood within the context of a broader neoliberal agenda led by the World Bank and 
the IMF during the same period that advocated reduction of the role of the state in 
development planning. 
 In effect, IWRM has been promoted in many developing countries by various 
international players such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP), the World Water 
Council, the World Bank and the UN, as well as national governments, as a key 
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means of improving access to safe water supply and sanitation and, more generally, 
alleviating poverty and improving peoples’ lives. In the process, “water as an eco-
nomic good” has evolved to take precedence over the IWRM principles of social 
and environmental equity (see Mukhtarov  2006 ; Mollinga  2008 ; Beveridge and 
Monsees  2012 ). Most of the key international water-policy players have either 
directly supported or advocated institutional reforms in developing countries whose 
backbone is the IWRM framework. In countries that have adopted the “water-as-an- 
economic-good” principle, the reforms that ensue have tended to drastically alter 
the relationships between the state, civil society and private sector players active in 
water supply and sanitation. The “water-as-an-economic-good” principle has come 
to be viewed as an important way of achieving effi cient and equitable water use as 
well as encouraging better protection of the resource (Chikozho  2010 ). The World 
Bank in particular came to play a central role in developing and promoting water 
management policies and reforms consistent with its interpretation of water as an 
economic good (Budds  2004 ). It embraced the principles of water privatisation, in 
terms of both private-sector participation in urban water utilities and the defi nition 
of private property rights over water resources, as a means of addressing the dual 
concerns of increased water-supply coverage and effi cient water resource 
management. 
4.1.1.1  Theoretical Underpinnings of a Free-Market Economy 
 A free-market economy basically refers to an economic system in which economic 
decisions and the pricing of goods and services are guided solely by the aggregate 
interactions of a country’s citizens and businesses. There is little government inter-
vention or central planning except as a guarantor of the transactional environment 
through development and enforcement of the regulatory environment (Coates  2000 ; 
Hall and Soskice  2001 ). In other words, goods and services are produced and sold 
with very limited interference from the state. Trading relations exist mainly between 
and among the producers of raw materials, producers of processed goods and ser-
vices, retailers and consumers. The laws of demand and supply determine the direc-
tion and speed with which goods and services move on the market (Jessop  2002 ; 
Perkins et al.  2012 ). Consumers express their choices through the decisions they 
make when allocating their fi nances to enable specifi c transactions to occur. A free- 
market economy is therefore, the opposite of a centrally planned economy, in which 
government decisions determine the direction that most aspects of a country’s eco-
nomic activity take. 
 Free-market economies are based on the assumption that market forces, such as 
supply and demand, are the best determinants of what is right for a nation’s well- 
being, and these are based on rational decisions made by consumers seeking to 
optimise or maximise their benefi ts from various transactions. While most devel-
oped nations today could be classifi ed as having mixed economies, they are often 
said to have market economies because they allow market forces to drive most of 
their activities, typically engaging in government intervention only to the extent that 
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it is needed to provide stability (Jessop  2002 ). In essence, proponents of free mar-
kets and privatisation assume that the private sector is inherently dynamic, produc-
tive and dependable. They also hold the belief that private institutions are intrinsically 
superior to public institutions for the delivery of goods and services. They have the 
confi dence that market effi ciency is the appropriate criterion of social performance 
in virtually all spheres of community activity (see Barnekov et al.  1989 ; Castro 
 2007 ). Although the market economy is clearly the system of choice in today’s 
global marketplace, there is signifi cant debate regarding the amount of government 
intervention considered optimal for effi cient economic operations in developing 
countries. 
 Debates surrounding the applicability of free-market principles in developing 
countries intensifi ed in the past few decades, especially with the failure of the 
socialist path to development in the late 1980s and the rise to prominence of neolib-
eralism as promoted by the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and 
their development partners (the so-called Washington Consensus). The major ideol-
ogy behind neoliberalism is that economic, political and social relations are best 
organised through formally free choices of free and rational actors who seek to 
advance their own material or ideal interests in an institutional framework that, by 
design, maximises the scope for free choice (Coates  2000 ; Jessop  1997 ; Perkins 
et al.  2012 ). Economically, it promotes the expansion of the market economy and 
monetisation of exchange in as many social practices as possible. From a political 
perspective, it implies that decision-making should involve a state that has limited 
substantive powers of economic and social intervention and commits itself to maxi-
mising the freedom of actors in the economy to engage in economic transactions 
that they consider benefi cial to their welfare (Jessop  2002 ). 
 In most free-market economies, calls for the liberalisation and deregulation of 
economic transactions within national borders and beyond have prevailed to the 
point where even formerly social democratic political parties decline to challenge 
them. This has also entailed privatisation of state-owned enterprises and public ser-
vices and application of market proxies in the public sector (see Hodgson  1992 ; 
Jessop  2002 ). Hoskisson et al. ( 2000 ) argue that as a political project, free-market 
economics seeks to actively promote rolling back of the state from its traditional 
and routine forms of intervention associated with the mixed economy and the 
welfare- oriented national state. It also involves a deliberate shift in public policy 
that leads to the roll-out of new forms of governance such as decentralised national 
planning and service delivery, privatisation and commercialisation of public ser-
vices such as water and electricity supply. 
 Presumably, these new forms of governance are more suitable for a thriving 
market- driven national economy (Stein  1994 ). This typically involves the selective 
transfer of state capacities upwards, downwards and sideways, as intervention is 
rescaled in the hope of securing conditions for a smoothly operating world market 
and to promote supply-side competitiveness on various scales above and below the 
national level (Jessop  1997 ). A shift also occurs from government to market forces 
and public–private partnerships. This shift refl ects the neoliberal belief in the prob-
ability, if not inevitability, of state failure and the need to involve relevant 
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 stakeholders in supply-side policies (ibid). If the state cannot deliver something as 
basic as water and sanitation, the argument goes that is a strong indication of a gen-
eral failure of public-sector capacity (see Anderson and Snyder  1997 ). Therefore, 
water scarcity becomes simultaneously indicative of a problem of poverty, of mod-
ernisation and of governance, and reforms are required to correct state failure 
(Goldman  2007 ). The extent to which the reforms and new forms of governance are 
applicable to a sector such as water supply remains debatable, particularly given the 
orthodox categorisation of water as a  public good in mainstream public manage-
ment discourses for many decades. 1 
4.1.1.2  Implications for Water Governance and Management 
 While very few countries in the developing world use the free-market economy 
principles to solely determine water allocation and distribution among various 
social groups, many public water utilities in Africa have been grappling with exten-
sive reforms as part of the implementation of IWRM. Such reforms have also been 
implemented in the context of broader public-sector reforms aimed at improving 
public service delivery across various government departments. 2 A key defi ning fea-
ture of these reforms is the introduction of management principles and practices 
associated with typical private-sector commercialisation processes (Schwartz 
 2008 ). These include using the laws of supply and demand to determine prices for 
water and strict commitments to making profi ts. The implications of these reforms 
on water-supply system effi ciency and equity are likely to be far reaching. 
 Implementation of the reforms on the ground has been characterised by two main 
approaches. The fi rst one is a situation where management of the water utilities in 
urban areas is delegated to the private sector through concession contracts or other 
contractual arrangements. The second is a strategy that retains management of the 
water utility in a public agency, but concentrates on introducing management prac-
tices associated with the private sector for both urban areas and irrigated agriculture 
(ibid). Introduction of private-sector management approaches usually results in 
changes to the water rights or licensing regime. The expectation is that water 
licences or rights can be eventually traded on the open market based on demand and 
supply while progressively “depoliticising” the water governance regime (see 
Hernández-Mora et al.  2015 ). According to Brown et al. ( 2009 ), many international 
1  Gravelle and Rees ( 1981 ) state that “The defi ning characteristic of a public good is that consump-
tion of it by one individual does not actually or potentially reduce the amount available to be con-
sumed by another individual”. Thus, individuals cannot be effectively excluded from using or 
consuming those goods, and the use by one individual does not reduce availability to others, e.g. 
fresh air, forests, fi sheries, water, etc. 
2  Schwartz ( 2008 ) states that the origins of this form of reform, often referred to as the  New Public 
Management , lie in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where it was initiated in the early 
1980s. These “reforms are a signifi cant part of the  new public management discourses that have 
been promoted by a broad coalition of sector professionals, donors and international development 
agencies”. 
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and bilateral donors and lending agencies have supported privatisation of water- 
supply systems believing that private-sector involvement is a means of removing 
politics from the sector and also a reliable source of investment capital. However, 
the extent to which such assumptions are realised in reality differs from place to 
place. 
 A major thrust of reforms in developing countries has been towards implement-
ing changes in arrangements within the public sector by increasing the autonomy of 
state-owned utilities and requiring them to manage resources such as water on a 
more commercial basis (Schwartz  2008 ). Broadly, new public management (NPM) 
reforms in the water-supply and sanitation sector share characteristics such as 
increasing the level of autonomy of the utility, separating regulatory tasks from 
service provision, creating quasi-competition in the water sector in terms of service 
provision, increasing tariffs to cost recovering levels and increasing customer orien-
tation and increasing accountability for the results produced by the water utility 
(Herrera and Post  2014 ). To ensure that the utility is actually producing the services 
that it is supposed to be producing, an accompanying regulatory framework is often 
developed and implemented which provides incentives for the utility to improve 
service provision. Consumers are expected to obtain access to water by obtaining 
formal water rights or licences. The state agencies and autonomous utilities supply-
ing water benefi t directly through increased revenues raised from water licences and 
permits. 
 In the long run, an expected offshoot of water privatisation and commercialisa-
tion is the emergence of water trading among users with formal rights to water. 
Briscoe ( 2011 ) points out that once users have clear, transferable property rights to 
water, they automatically consider whether they wish to forego a particular use of 
water in exchange for compensation from another user who may place a higher 
value on the water. Reallocating water then becomes a matter of voluntary and 
mutually benefi cial agreements between willing buyers and willing sellers and not 
a matter of confi scation or an endless search for new sources of supply by state 
agencies. Throughout the arid Western United States, for example, and in the 
Murray-Darling basin in Australia, water rights are considered as legal property 
and, under different rules in different states, allow for approved transfers between 
willing buyers and willing sellers (see Grafton et al.  2011 ; NWC  2011 ). Chile and 
Mexico are the other well-known examples of countries where formal water mar-
kets have been introduced (Horne  2013 ). It has also become an issue for debate in 
the UK as part of the UK’s reconsideration of abstraction management. However, in 
most developing countries, water markets mainly consist of informal agreements 
between neighbouring farmers about how to share supplied or extracted water for 
their mutual benefi t. Typically, this involves one farmer allowing access to water to 
another user in exchange for a fi nancial or nonfi nancial payment (Briscoe  2011 ; 
Nikolakis et al.  2013 ). 
 Where the free-market economy is fully functional and an appropriate regulatory 
environment for water markets is created, effi ciency gains are noticeable. For exam-
ple, Horne ( 2013 ) states that the operation of water markets in the Murray-Darling 
basin provides an important example of the potential benefi ts of water trading for 
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irrigators, communities and the environment. Generally, water markets in this basin 
account for over 80 % of both the water entitlement trade and the trade in seasonal 
allocations (or trade in actual water) nationally. Tradability of water and water 
assets follows complex rules, and for the most part, trading in surface water entitle-
ments occurs only in relation to regulated water fl ows within and between valleys, 
provided there are no hydrological reasons inhibiting trade (NWC  2012 ; National 
Water Market  2012 ). 
 In the face of increasing water stress, it is possible that more countries will turn 
towards legal, formally managed water markets which enable them to shift water 
from low-value to high-value uses (Briscoe  2011 ). One would also imagine that 
once the free-market economy approach is deployed, policy and legislation govern-
ing water allocation and supply systems inevitably treat water as an economic good. 
The “user-pays” and “polluter-pays” principles are then applied to enhance water 
governance effi ciency. 3 Application of these principles also implies running the 
water sector on a cost-recovery basis so that it becomes self-fi nancing instead of 
relying on government budgetary allocations and subsidies. It also means charging 
higher prices for water than before in order to recover all costs of supplying the 
water to users (see Herrera and Post  2014 ). In such a case, companies and individu-
als whose activities cause water pollution have to obtain water pollution permits. 
They are then charged certain prices (penalties) according to the level of pollution 
they cause. The money raised is intended to be used to correct any environmental 
damage caused by the pollution. 
 Another common feature of managing water in a free-market economy (and 
indeed an important one) is the emphasis on water conservation and demand man-
agement (WDM). This is perhaps best showcased in urban areas where human pop-
ulation continues to be more concentrated and also in irrigated agriculture which 
tends to be a major water-use sector in most countries (see Gleick  2002 ). In devel-
oping country urban water-supply systems, unaccounted-for water often averages 
between 40 % and 60 % resulting from old infrastructure and burst or leaking pipes. 
Efforts to address such water losses through conservation measures and WDM often 
bear impressive results (Brandes and Ferguson  2004 ; Schwartz  2008 ; Da-ping et al. 
 2011 ). As Gumbo ( 2004 ) points out, the argument for WDM is sound and convinc-
ing: if there is a shortage of water for urban supplies, do not limit the solution to 
supply options only, but also consider demand-side options, such as minimising 
water losses and infl uencing demand to more desirable levels through structural 
measures such as retrofi tting of water appliances, recycling and reuse, active or 
reactive leak detection and repair. 
 Useful nonstructural measures would include education and awareness cam-
paigns, restrictions on water use, water tariff structure policy changes and innova-
tive presentation of utility bills. In essence, WDM has evolved into long-term 
3  Correljé et al. ( 2007 ) state that the polluter-pays and the user-pays principles are both related to 
who should bear the costs of environmental degradation. Those who cause pollution should meet 
the costs to which it gives rise, and users of a natural resource must bear the cost of running down 
natural capital. 
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municipal planning that helps to avoid costly capital infrastructural expansions 
(Vickers  2001 ; Brooks  2006 ; Kevinsen et al.  2014 ). A study by Gumbo ( 2004 ) 
focusing on eight cities in Southern Africa concluded that cities such as Bulawayo 
in Zimbabwe, Windhoek in Namibia and Hermanus in South Africa, which have 
invested in WDM, signifi cantly reduced water losses (by at least 20 %). The same 
study also concluded that cities performing well in terms of WDM have higher 
water-supply coverage fi gures, with at least 90 % of the population having individ-
ual or household water connections, while cities that did not implement WDM 
approaches could not account for more than half of the water supplied. 
 Economic incentives and water pricing policy strategies are today’s powerful 
WDM tools, making this option more environmentally friendly and, at the same 
time, an economically effective alternative solution to balance supply and demand 
(Kolokytha et al.  2002 ). Pricing through metering allows water users to become 
more aware of local consumption and is a prerequisite for the implementation of 
volume-based water pricing mechanisms (Kevinsen et al.  2014 ). Switching from a 
fl at or fi xed water rate to a metred system and increasing tariffs have been shown to 
reduce water demand (Da-ping et al.  2011 ). The goals most often cited in discus-
sions of water pricing and tariff structures include effi ciency, equity and sustain-
ability (see Kanakoudis et al.  2011 ; Wichelns  2013 ). If set at the right levels, prices 
increase the possibility that consumers will better understand the prevailing perti-
nent costs and water scarcity conditions, and in the process, they will be encouraged 
to choose water volumes that refl ect an effi cient allocation of water between com-
peting uses over time. In Beijing, China, a new pricing system that linked the cost 
of water to the amount of water used signifi cantly encouraged conservation (Gleick 
 2000 ). A similar pricing system decreased average monthly residential water use by 
nearly 30 % in Bogor, Indonesia (Postel  2000 ). Regional water providers in South 
Africa managed to delay the construction of new water-supply systems by imposing 
higher rates, distributing water conservation equipment and educating the public 
(Gumbo  2004 ). 
4.1.1.3  Challenges of Managing Water Using Free-Market Approaches 
 It is, however, important to note that within the context of equity and pursuing 
national objectives of redressing historical imbalances in access to water, the free- 
market approach (particularly pricing) usually becomes a hotly contested subject. 
The notion that all members of a community must have access to an affordable sup-
ply of water for domestic uses and livelihood activities is widely accepted in most 
parts of the world. Thus, equity becomes particularly prevalent in discussions of 
water tariff structures, given that water is essential and that in many settings, a 
purely market-based allocation of water between competing users would deprive 
poor residents of their access to a safe and reliable supply (Wichelns  2013 ). From a 
theoretical perspective, one option for simultaneously addressing both equity and 
effi ciency through pricing is to deploy increasing block-rate tariffs. This is a pricing 
structure that provides some amount of water to poor residents at very low prices, 
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while requiring wealthier residents to pay higher prices. Increasing block-rate tariffs 
have been implemented in many countries, as they enable water agencies to estab-
lish a very low price for the volume of water required for subsistence, while charg-
ing much higher prices for water deliveries in excess of minimal requirements (see 
Evans et al.  2002 ; Madhoo  2011 ). 
 However, the use of block-rate tariffs has had mixed results in various countries 
and cannot, therefore, be considered as the automatic panacea to water pricing con-
troversies. For example, in several cases the incremental prices of water have been 
too low to motivate wise use on the part of wealthier consumers, and as a result, 
cost-recovery efforts have tended to fall short of initial estimates while the notion of 
sustainability remains unfulfi lled. In other cases, water-supply connection rates 
have not improved at all even after block-rate tariffs have been introduced (see 
Keener et al.  2010 ). This suggests that block-rate tariffs are not necessarily the sil-
ver bullet for addressing water pricing challenges. Even the best-designed tariff 
structure cannot provide benefi ts to poor households that are not connected to the 
supply network (Angel-Urdinola and Wodon  2012 ). Water is not a typical or an 
ordinary economic good, and because of its specifi c characteristics, it is diffi cult to 
apply economic theory to it (Lamoree and Van Steenbergen  2006 ; Anokye and 
Gupta  2012 ). In any case, water has no substitute, and if water for basic needs is 
treated as an economic commodity, it is likely to have serious consequences, par-
ticularly for the poor who often do not have alternative sources or substitutes 
(Grimble  1999 ). To this end, water utilities in developing countries should still con-
sider increasing their investments in expanding water-supply service delivery in 
order to increase access for the poor. 
 From the foregoing, it is increasingly clear that the establishment of water mar-
kets is neither simple nor a readily available panacea. Experience has shown that the 
establishment of water markets is considerably more complex and nuanced than is 
often assumed and that it is not enough to just extol the virtues of pricing (Briscoe 
 2011 ). For starters, ordinary water users understand a price as a payment for a ser-
vice rendered. In most developing countries where the supplier is usually a monop-
oly (and prices are set outside of the market), this means that the legitimate price in 
the eyes of users is that which it costs an effi cient producer (usually a public utility) 
to produce the service (Nickson  1997 ; Schwartz  2008 ). However, it is common for 
the supplier in Africa to be ineffi cient, and users are unwilling to pay for these ser-
vices under those conditions (Briscoe  2011 ). In addition, even under the most 
advantageous of settings, users will vigorously resist the notion that they should pay 
for  sunk costs which, in their eyes, have already been paid for by taxes or other 
assessments (Nickson  1997 ). 4 Pressure to increase cost recovery without addressing 
these fundamental accountability questions is a major part of the reason why cost 
recovery has been so poor in many countries (Briscoe  2011 ). 
4  In economics and business decision-making, sunk costs are retrospective (past) costs that have 
already been incurred and cannot be recovered. They are independent of any event that may occur 
in the future. As such, once committed, sunk costs no longer constitute a portion of the cost of 
production (see Baumol and Willig  1981 ; Sherman  2008 ). 
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 A typical example is water privatisation in Bolivia in the early 1990s that 
occurred with total disregard for the concerns of the citizenry. It resulted in water 
tariffs that were beyond many citizens’ ability to pay, such that it became a very 
controversial issue and source of confl ict in Latin America, leading to a series of 
political debates, protests and even riots (see Castro  2007 ; Hailu et al.  2012 ). The 
concession was terminated in March 2000 as a result of massive public mobilisa-
tions that led to the withdrawal of the entire federal cabinet. The concessionaire’s 
subsequent attempts to seek redress in international courts failed dismally. An 
examination of the performance of the private sector with respect to water-supply 
connections for poor households in Jakarta, Indonesia, concluded that the Jakarta 
private-sector partnership contract had not been pro-poor, and the expected trickle- 
down effect did not materialise (Bakker  2007 ). New connections were preferentially 
targeted at middle- and upper-income households over the period 1998–2005, and 
the numbers of new connections had been lower than the original targets. The fail-
ure to connect the poor is not solely attributable to the private operators and identi-
fi es disincentives to provide individual network connections to poor households on 
the part of the municipality, the private concessionaires and poor households (ibid). 
 In 1981, Chile reformed its Water Code in line with neoliberal principles, based 
on private water rights that could be freely traded with few restrictions and minimal 
state regulation. International fi nancial institutions have embraced the Chilean 
model, claiming that it results in more effi cient water use, and potentially fosters 
social and environmental benefi ts (Budds  2004 ). However, the free-market Water 
Code has been the focus of a lengthy and heated debate, and attempts to modify it 
have been debated in congress for over ten years. Moreover, its implementation has 
been problematic, both in terms of failing to foster active water markets and the 
growing evidence of social as well as environmental confl icts (Hearne and Easter 
 1997 ; Bauer  2004 ). None of the purported benefi ts of water markets for peasant 
farmers in Chile have been observed in practice; indeed, the present mode of water 
management has had negative socio-environmental implications for peasants in 
terms of reduced formal access to water and increased vulnerability to drought 
(Budds  2004 ). 
 In other parts of the world where the water “marketisation” agenda has been 
vigorously promoted, various studies have highlighted the common use of non- 
institutional forms of resistance by citizens. These include violent and non-violent 
protests, vandalism, illegal reconnections and other forms of collective action. In 
Lima, Peru, for instance, citizens resisted attempts by the water utility to closely 
monitor household water usage by stealing and vandalising water meters with much 
greater frequency. For example, whereas 32 256 meters were stolen or vandalised in 
2000, this number increased to 85 176 by 2007 (see Ioris  2012 ; Herrera and Post 
 2014 ). In a number of South African cities, activists protested the installation of 
water meters, leading to arrests and criminal charges (see Conca  2006 ; Harvey 
 2005 ). In Durban and Tygerberg, for instance, citizens reconnected themselves to 
the water-supply system following service cut-offs for non-payment (Morgan  2011 ). 
High rates of service cut-offs for non-payment in Tygerberg and Cape Town actu-
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ally “sparked township revolts, making these areas periodically ungovernable” 
(Smith  2004 :389). Protestors also boycotted payment in Pretoria while in Durban, 
large crowds rallied in the water utility offi ces, holding 10-rand notes to symbolise 
the maximum amount they could afford to pay per month (Bakker  2010 ; Morgan 
 2011 ). In Lusaka, Zambia, price increases that doubled tariffs for middle-class users 
and more than quadrupled tariffs for low-income users became politically untenable 
when people protested, and the tariffs were soon reduced signifi cantly (Dagdeviren 
 2008 ). 
 Overall, the available evidence indicates that market-based approaches to water- 
supply governance that may have worked in some developed countries do not neces-
sarily apply in developing country contexts. This suggests that sensitivity to the 
socio-economic, institutional and political dimensions of water management is fun-
damental to successful implementation of IWRM (see Chikozho  2010 ; Beveridge 
and Monsees  2012 ). Closer analysis of the IWRM framework also reveals the nega-
tive effects of policy standardisation and formulation at the international level and 
promotion of policy transfer from the top downwards (Mukhtarov  2006 ). In this 
model, a network of international agencies, water experts and professionals have 
colluded to redefi ne the water resource management agenda in ways that promote 
transfer of neoliberal-oriented water policy prescriptions across the world. As a 
result, much of the IWRM decision-making prescriptions tend to ignore the social, 
cultural and political context, as well as the historical aspects within which these are 
embedded (Ashton  2007 ). 
 When a state adopts a free-market approach to water governance in a developing 
country, immediate questions arise regarding the extent to which the approach takes 
into account these institutional and political sensitivities (Bruns et al.  2005 ). This 
becomes a hotly contested terrain in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe 
where deep-seated historical inequities in access to water have prevailed for a long 
time. It may be viewed as excluding previously disadvantaged groups from access-
ing the resource since pricing structures determined on the basis of economic effi -
ciency and cost recovery would be predominant (Bouchaud  2008 ). That is perhaps 
why scholars such as Mukhtarov ( 2006 ) and Butterworth et al. ( 2010 ) have argued 
strongly that IWRM was never a “people-centred” concept, having emerged from 
practitioners’ ecological concerns over the then-dominant utilitarian use of water 
supply and discharge. The approach runs the risk of legitimising existing power and 
access rights inequalities as well as oversimplifying the diversity of needs and inter-
ests of local actors (see Molle  2008 ; Saravanan et al.  2009 ). 
 Another controversial feature of the market economy approach is that it urges 
government to retreat from the frontiers of development planning by reducing the 
size and costs of its activities in the water sector, deliberately shifting from a supply- 
orientation to a demand-driven approach, based on the user-pays principle (see 
Nhira and Derman  1997 ; Schreiner and Van Koppen  2001 ). Policies and legislation 
are subsequently revised to suit the emerging water governance regime. Bithas 
( 2008 ) carried out an elementary microeconomic analysis, which demonstrated that 
even in cases where private water companies are given the mandate to supply water, 
constant state intervention is necessary to correct market failures and approach 
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social full-cost pricing. Goldman ( 2007 ) argues that the key word is “affordable”, as 
many of these water-supply services have been provided in developing countries but 
have now been shut off because people cannot afford to pay for them. In this chap-
ter, our position is that, although there is an increasing recognition, at least rhetori-
cally, that neoliberal water-supply policies have failed to achieve the expected 
results; the marketisation forces set in motion since the advent of IWRM will con-
tinue to shape institutional reforms and policy decisions that may deepen rather than 
reduce inequities in developing countries’ water sectors. These processes require 
careful analysis and reconfi guration before they can work in developing countries. 
4.1.2  Managing Water in a Developmental State 
 The idea of a “developmental state” has proved to be one of the most attractive 
concepts in development theory and practice for several decades. Shortcomings evi-
dent in market-oriented approaches to the management of water and national econo-
mies at large have led to the emergence of a strong counter-narrative about 
macroeconomic policy and water-supply planning. This counter-narrative is based 
on the conviction that the state still has a developmental role to play even in cases 
where the free-market economy agenda is given priority (Dassah  2011 ). As Radice 
( 2008 ) points out, in the 1980s and 1990s, the concept played two roles in develop-
mental debates. First, it provided a coherent counter to the dominant neoliberal 
narrative that portrayed the market as the master institution underlying both growth 
and welfare such that by 1990, the developmental state had become the major ideo-
logical rallying point for those who wished to contest the appropriateness of neolib-
eralism and the Washington Consensus as a framework for effective governance and 
economic development in the global south. Sindzingre ( 2004 ) argues that the con-
cept of the developmental state continues to be the most fertile conceptual issue in 
development economics more than a decade after its formulation, for it has explained 
the exceptional growth performances of East Asian countries as resulting from a 
combination of economic, political and institutional structural changes. 
 By the turn of the millennium, the application of the concept had spread beyond 
these origins, but it is still useful to recall its beginnings (Evans  2012 ). According to 
Radice ( 2008 ), the developmental state remains one of the chief points of reference, 
both analytical and political, for those who reject the current neoliberal global order. 
Proponents of the developmental state strongly believe that since there are so many 
imperfections in developing country market economies, it remains the responsibil-
ity of the state to step in and lead national planning and implement specifi c policies, 
plans, programmes and projects to drive the national development agenda (see 
Dassah  2011 ; Deen  2011 ; Routley  2014 ). The concept of the developmental state 
itself was popularised in 1982 by Chalmers Johnson. It has since been written about 
extensively and critically analysed in tandem with empirical experiences of its 
application (Ayee  2013 ). 
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 The successful developmental state experiences of several countries in Asia such 
as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, China, India and Taiwan have been 
repeatedly used to demonstrate how and why the rest of the developing world can 
and should move swiftly towards rapid economic growth (Edigheji  2005 ; UNECA 
 2013b ). Even with reference to Africa, there are scholars who strongly believe that 
the developmental state model of national economic planning is the way to go. For 
example, Taylor ( 2002 ) argues that of those countries in Africa that have recorded 
respectable levels of economic development, it is precisely the developmental states 
of Botswana and Mauritius that have performed well. It is therefore important to 
articulate the concept’s theoretical underpinnings and empirical application in order 
to generate relevant lessons for the rest of the developing world. 
4.1.2.1  Theoretical Underpinnings of a Developmental State 
 As an analytical concept, the “developmental state” has been described variously as 
one that places economic development at the top of government policy priorities 
and which is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal (see 
Mkandawire  2001 ; UNECA  2013a ). Some of the instruments often referred to 
include the establishment of well-functioning formal institutions, weaving of for-
mal and informal networks of collaboration among citizens and government offi -
cials and the utilisation of new opportunities for trade and profi table production (see 
Fakir  2007 ; UNECA  2013b ). According to Radice ( 2008 ), in contrast to the conven-
tionally polar models of liberal free-market capitalism and the state-socialist 
planned economy, the developmental state is seen as a distinctive political economy 
that combines elements of market and plan, linking a mixed economy to a politi-
cal–ideological approach that combines authoritarian technocracy with a relatively 
egalitarian distribution of income and wealth. 
 The developmental state has also been characterised as a state that promotes 
macroeconomic stability, as well as establishing an institutional framework that 
provides law and order, effective administration of justice and peaceful resolution of 
confl icts, ensuring property rights and appropriate infrastructure investments and 
advancing human development (Dadzie  2013 ; Ayee  2013 ). It is seen as a state that 
is determined to infl uence the direction and pace of economic development by 
directly intervening in the national development process, rather than relying on the 
uncoordinated infl uence of market forces to allocate economic resources (Johnson 
 1982 ; Taylor  2002 ). Elsewhere, the developmental state has been described as one 
that authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a binding manner, is able to formu-
late and implement its policies and programmes. In other words, it is a state that is 
capable of deploying the requisite institutional architecture and mobilising society 
towards realisation of its developmentalist project (Edigheji  2010 ; UNECA  2013a ). 
 UNCTAD ( 2007 ) points out that the literature on developmental states has 
focused their characterisation on two major features, namely, a developmental ide-
ology and a structure pertaining to the requisite institutions, norms and standards 
that can support the development process. Therefore, their  raison d’être is building 
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the political, administrative and technical capacity to support development, in what 
has been summed up as constituting the “software and the hardware” of 
 developmental states (see Kim  2007 ; Weiss  2010 ; Dadzie  2013 ). In short, the devel-
opmental state is understood, at one level, to be a unitary actor vis-à-vis markets, 
social forces and international pressures. It is also conceptualised as a set of institu-
tions that structure the behaviour, preferences and strategies of all political actors, 
inside and outside of the actual state apparatus (Wong  2004 ). Ultimately, robust 
state- intervention measures determine the nature and pace of socio-economic prog-
ress (Routley  2014 ). The implications of this state-centric paradigm, both as an 
empirical reality to be studied and a theoretical construct to be debated, are far 
reaching, particularly when one considers governance of a resource sector such as 
water and sanitation. 
 It is also important for scholars to understand that in East Asia where the concept 
was successfully tried out and popularised, government development policies were 
neither socialist in design, nor did they promote completely unfettered markets 
(Fakir  2007 ). The East Asian experience, and the role of the state in facilitating post- 
war growth, confounded existing capitalism–socialism and North–South debates 
(Johnson  1999 ). When understood against this ideologically charged context, it 
becomes easier to understand how the examples of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea 
are often regarded as the living prototypes of developmentalism. Krieckhaus ( 2002 ) 
states that many East Asian countries have obtained economic growth rates unparal-
leled in human history, with per capita income roughly doubling every decade over 
the past 30 years. Therefore, they were post-war anomalies whose experiences still 
demand explanation (Leftwich  2005 ). 
 Some of the key factors that have been identifi ed as necessary ingredients for the 
emergence and sustenance of developmental states include the establishment of 
production-oriented private sectors and performance-oriented governance gener-
ally, which essentially refers to fully functional and effective institutions (Meyns 
and Musamba  2010 ). Beyond merely identifying and stressing the importance of 
these factors in the emergence of developmental states, the literature has also exten-
sively examined the processes by which they can and should be put in place. For 
example, the developmental states in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan used public 
policy instruments to allocate productive resources rather than relying solely on the 
market (Bagchi  2000 ; Kim  2007 ). They also targeted certain industrial sectors in 
their allocation of resources, sometimes playing a leadership role in prospecting 
potentially lucrative industrial sectors and at other times playing a followership role 
in strengthening pre-existing private-sector initiatives (Wade  2004 ). 
 Through the creation of tariff barriers, the subsidisation of research and infra-
structural development, the use of export incentives and centralised control over the 
fi nancial system, the developmental state demonstrated how “getting the prices 
wrong” through government intervention into the market was an effective strategy 
to compensate for East Asia’s relative economic backwardness and to jump-start the 
region’s catch-up development (Meyns and Musamba  2010 ; Mkandawire  2012 ). 
The distributive consequences of economic growth were less important to the devel-
opmental state, provided that social inequality was never too severe and that the 
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trickle-down effects of aggregate growth continued to be felt (Haggard  2004 ; Shaw 
 2012 ). The developmental state was also defi ned by its ability to balance strategic 
linkages with, and relative autonomy from, different societal forces thereby avoid-
ing the threat of elite capture. As Fakir ( 2007 ) points out, undergirding all these is 
the autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use its capacities to devise 
long-term economic policies unencumbered by claims of myopic private interests. 
 One can infer from the foregoing discussion that the developmental state is able 
to craft a vision that it will relentlessly pursue in search of a solid economic devel-
opment path. It is prepared to do whatever it takes to realise that vision and hence 
the deployment of both market-oriented approaches and state-led development 
strategies, practices and projects. It is able to assess its capacity and identify the 
public and private-sector ingredients it needs to deliver that vision. We propose in 
this chapter that key attributes of a developmental state will include dosages of 
pragmatism, authoritarianism, economic expediency, entrepreneurship and innova-
tion. The developmental state is also able to rise above and sidestep elite capture 
tendencies and ensure the emergence of a more egalitarian society. 
4.1.2.2  Implications for Water Governance and Management 
 The “Asian miracle” has already demonstrated that it is possible for countries in the 
developing world to apply the developmental state model and achieve rapid socio- 
economic development. From a water and sanitation supply perspective, the devel-
opmental state would essentially focus on the effective delivery of services using 
various instruments. In any case, availability of water in suffi cient quantities and 
quality is crucial to the achievement of socio-economic development in any country. 
The developmental state is expected to provide the essential water infrastructure 
and services necessary to help catalyse economic development and improve the 
livelihoods of all communities. Fakir ( 2007 ) states that the state does this primarily 
by regulating, administering, executing, mediating, investing and delivering the 
construction, operations, maintenance and servicing of water service delivery 
infrastructure. 
 In a developmental state, the public service not only focuses on specifi c infra-
structural outputs but is also acutely aware of the “soft” (policy and institutional) 
issues critical to sustainable governance of the sector. It strives to deliver water 
services in ways that are effi cient and effective and to maintain the dignity of citi-
zens by ensuring that even poorer sections of society have access to a basic level of 
water supply and sanitation. The developmental state will use its agencies to pro-
vide water and sanitation services but will also embrace the potential contribution 
and competitive advantage of the private sector. As Bagchi ( 2000 ) points out, one 
important feature of a successful developmental state is its ability to switch gears 
from market-directed to state-directed growth, or vice versa depending on geopoliti-
cal circumstances, as well as combining both market and state direction in a syner-
gistic manner, when opportunity beckons. In other words, when managing water in 
a developmental state, the government is likely to facilitate the emergence of a 
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mixed economy in which the arm most suitable to provide water services at a par-
ticular point in time and place will be given the opportunity to do so. The use of 
public–private partnerships becomes a readily accepted practice. Therefore, the spe-
cifi c competencies, skills and values required in the water sector of a democratic 
developmental state are defi ned by its development context, priorities and chal-
lenges as well as the specifi c institutional conditions that exist or may need to be 
created to enable realisation of a specifi c vision. 
4.1.2.3  Challenges of Managing Water in a Developmental State 
 A key aspect raised in most of the criticism on the notion of a developmental state 
is that the effectiveness of the developmental state is severely restricted in contem-
porary times. National and global ideological, economic and political changes have 
resulted in its formation and operationalisation becoming an impossibility. Thus, 
even the Asian developmental states would fi nd it diffi cult to replicate their perfor-
mances in contemporary times (see Meyns and Musamba  2010 ; Deen  2011 ). For 
instance, key actors in the water sectors of developing countries now have to deal 
with new challenges and pressures that were non-existent in the past. These include 
increasing water demand, climate change, increasing demands for better democratic 
dispensations and declining fi nancial resources for water infrastructure. These chal-
lenges require new forms of governance and planning that may not be suffi ciently 
addressed by one model of development planning. 
 Another challenge that arises when managing water in a developmental state is 
that the state itself is conceptualised as normative and better, particularly in terms of 
its capacity. It is this which underpins the debate about whether a state is strong or 
weak. However, we already know that many developing countries do not have the 
capacity to deliver on public services (water included). As Gainsborough ( 2009 ) 
points out, the trouble with the “developmental state” literature is that discussion of 
the state is underpinned by a series of assumptions about what the state is which are 
not universally valid. Thus, while one can analyse developing countries in terms of 
whether they measure up to Weberian notions of state capacity, it seems much more 
sensible to try and understand that they are non-Weberian in the majority of cases 
and do not necessarily have the capacity required to assume the role of a develop-
mental state. For non-Weberian states, politics is much more about patronage and 
much less about delivering “public goods” such as water-supply development (ibid). 
As a result, water governance is negatively affected by limitations in state 
capacity. 
 Historically, many developmental states have been based on various forms of 
nondemocratic political regimes (see Fritz and Menocal  2007 ). However, the fact 
that it is possible to name a good number of authoritarian developmental states does 
not settle the issue. It certainly does not imply that all authoritarian regimes are 
developmental. It also does not mean that states need to be authoritarian in order to 
be developmental (ibid). Unfortunately, there are many examples of “anti-” or non-
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developmental authoritarian states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Managing 
water in such contexts will always be diffi cult, and deployment of the developmen-
tal state model in the water sector may prove fruitless. This point resonates well 
with Gainsborough ( 2009 ) when he states that state capacities generally cannot 
increase if a developmental commitment among the state elite is missing or insuf-
fi ciently resolute. This may be the main reason why so many donor-sponsored 
capacity-building initiatives have proven ineffective in various parts of the develop-
ing world. 
 There is also little doubt that building developmental states in a democratic con-
text does bring with it particular challenges which, for the most part, Asian and 
other historic success stories did not face. The dominance of the IWRM framework 
today, with its emphasis on decentralised water-supply and governance systems, 
makes application of the typical developmental state model almost impossible in 
developing countries. For one thing, democracy has an inherent tendency to dis-
perse power and slow down decision-making processes, and it also makes the state 
less autonomous and less insulated from societal demands (see Fritz and Menocal 
 2007 ). A majority of developing countries that have experienced a democratisation 
process since the 1980s fi nd themselves stuck in an unfi nished transition. In these 
“hybrid” regimes (combining traits of authoritarianism and democracy), political 
leaders confront increasing pressures to deliver, but state capacity remains limited 
and accountability mechanisms weak or even non-existent while development goals 
remain elusive (see Fritz and Menocal  2006 ; Rakner et al.  2007 ). These conditions 
have remained prevalent in many developing countries thereby limiting the possi-
bilities of establishing a developmental state. Water governance has so far been 
affected by the complexities arising from state incapacity. 
4.1.3  Discussion 
 It is clear that the level of state intervention that the developmental state paradigm 
requires contradicts neoliberal theory. However, discourses about the developmen-
tal state would not have been topical still today had it not been for the failure of 
neoliberal policies to bring about sustained development, particularly in Africa. 
Sindzingre ( 2004 ) points out that the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997-1998 has been 
interpreted by mainstream analyses as a confi rmation of the irrelevance of the devel-
opmental state concept as well as the fragility and limited developmental character 
of its ingredients. We argue that this concept remains seminal and important for 
understanding the determinants of the economic failures of other developing coun-
tries, as well as the possible exportability of its ingredients to other historical and 
economic contexts, such as sub-Saharan Africa. The economic stagnation of sub- 
Saharan Africa and the failure to develop effective water governance systems may 
indeed be interpreted as a consequence of common characteristics and constraints 
of its states, in terms of history, economy, global integration and political economy 
rather than failure of the developmental state model. 
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 At the same time, there are key characteristic features of water supply and sanita-
tion that one cannot ignore even in a free-market economy. Due to the nature of 
water as a basic need, debates about water-supply governance are now increasingly 
framed within a human rights framework whose principles indicate that it is vital for 
all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. 
Realisation of this human right seems more possible in a developmental state. Free- 
market approaches do not suffi ciently address these requirements. Dassah ( 2011 : 
588) expresses this more aptly when he points out that “although not all state-led 
developmental efforts succeed, hardly any state has ever been successfully trans-
formed through market mechanisms only”. There is also suffi cient evidence from 
the Asian Tigers’ experiences demonstrating that national transformation processes 
can succeed with full involvement of the state (Castells  1992 ; World Bank  1993b ). 5 
 From the discourses presented in this paper and evidence from the published 
literature, it is clear that water is a location-specifi c resource which is usually mostly 
non-tradable, because markets for water may be subject to imperfection. That is 
why water pricing has rarely been effi cient and equitable whenever it is introduced. 
As Shah et al. ( 2005 ) point out, the physical, social, institutional and economic 
conditions characterising developing countries are totally different from those in the 
rich temperate zone countries, and the objectives are usually also completely differ-
ent. Analysts often overlook the fact that it took several centuries for the Western 
world’s water management to be where it is today. Therefore, the “one-size-fi ts-all” 
model of IWRM needs to be revisited so that it can be adjusted to suit country- 
specifi c socio-economic contexts. This suggests that deployment of free-market 
forces in the water sector may not be appropriate in developing countries. In its 
Economic Report on the continent in 2011, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) abandoned inherited market liberalisation in 
favour of a “developmental state approach” in which burgeoning growth would be 
advanced though sustained infrastructural, institutional and social development 
based on lessons from East Asia (Shaw  2012 ). This suggests that UNECA appreci-
ated the need for the developmental state model of governance to regain its visibility 
in Africa. Its application in the water sector will therefore be quite timely. 
 The irrationality of neoliberal policy prescriptions which underlie the offi cial 
water reform processes in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, is typifi ed by the side-
lining of localised understandings of water resource management when most users 
at the local levels generally do not treat water as an economic commodity. Therefore, 
fl exibility is required for developing countries to adjust the reform model to their 
own specifi c conditions. In addition, the reduction of the state’s role in development 
planning and resource management seems untimely. The state cannot afford to 
remain a passive actor in a world in which forces of globalisation threaten to erode 
the basis for that role. It needs to recapture its critical role and ensure that the 
5  These countries were far from paragons of laissez-faireism and, instead, were highly dynamic 
economies in which the state played an active role to ensure high levels of accumulation, technol-
ogy absorption and conquest of foreign markets (see Mkandawire  2001 ; Stiglitz  2002 for more 
details). 
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nation’s policy and water governance institutional structures are suffi ciently adapted 
to local conditions and emerging global resource governance discourses. This point 
resonates strongly with the conclusion by Chabal and Daloz ( 1999 ) that even 
 neoliberal frameworks are tamed locally to meet the context under which imple-
mentation is taking place, especially in the context of Africa. The public protests 
against water privatisation and pricing in various countries briefl y mentioned in this 
paper demonstrate the importance of understanding the local situation suffi ciently. 
 While traditional water-supply schemes were mainly comprised of large, central-
ised infrastructure, emerging approaches are characterised by integration of water 
infrastructure with biophysical systems, taking into consideration the social, eco-
nomic, environmental and political factors that determine provision of water for 
ecological and human uses and a long-term sustainability perspective (see Brown 
and Keath  2008 ; Van de Meene et al.  2011 ). We argue that this more comprehensive 
approach to water governance is more easily attained in the context of a develop-
mental state. Precepts guiding the free-market paradigm produce a very narrow per-
spective that is not geared to address this comprehensive list of priorities. 
 We are also acutely aware that over the past few decades, dominant public policy 
discourses have frequently attempted to paint the distinction between public and 
private agency as quite sharp and clear, to the extent that one can make the sweeping 
generalisation that the world’s water problems are either due to the public or the 
private sector. However, most conventional successful water projects show that this 
distinction is largely artifi cial and that the public–private distinction has always 
been blurred. Participation of both private and public agencies in most of the world’s 
largest water projects may actually be the norm rather than the exception. Scholars 
such as Hill and Hupe ( 2002 ), Meuleman ( 2008 ) and Pierre and Peters ( 2000 ) argue 
that in reality different, and sometimes ideal, water governance approaches will 
rarely be deployed in isolation, but rather mixed or hybrid forms will be detected in 
practice due to the complexity of real-world situations. Indeed, environmental gov-
ernance scholars such as Kooiman and Jentoft ( 2009 ), Lemos and Agrawal ( 2006 ) 
and Pahl-Wostl ( 2009 ) contend that hybrid governance approaches are likely to 
deliver more sustainable outcomes. This suggests that a mix of developmental state 
and free-market approaches stands a better chance of attaining optimum levels of 
service provision while ensuring sustainability of the water sector. 
 Several scholars have already identifi ed numerous systemic and interrelated 
social and institutional barriers impeding implementation of sustainable water gov-
ernance (see Farrelly and Brown  2011 ; Harremoes  2002 ; Mitchell  2006 ). Some of 
the barriers include institutional fragmentation, poor political leadership, unproduc-
tive intergovernmental relations, limited long-term strategic planning and inade-
quate community participation (see Brown  2005 ; Brown and Farrelly  2009 ). In this 
paper, our position is that only a strong and committed developmental state will be 
able to overcome these barriers. From our assessment, the implications for water- 
supply governance practitioners are also very clear. If free-market approaches are 
deployed, the key is an institutional framework that promotes effi cient and account-
able water service provision, with users being able to observe that their payments 
are actually used to improve the quality and coverage of water-supply services. 
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Without this, water users will not feel the obligation to pay. The design of water 
pricing policies is often complicated by the need to balance fi nancial sustainability 
of the service provider with the water users’ ability to pay. Historically, water has 
been signifi cantly underpriced, and therefore, sudden and steep price hikes can 
quickly escalate into a political challenge. Conversely, if tariff structures are not 
designed taking into account the broader social implications, price increases may 
disproportionally affect poorer households. 
 It is also important to acknowledge that the global fi nancial crises and recession 
experienced in recent years might have left champions of free-market capitalism 
facing an increasingly sceptical international audience. In this chapter, we argue 
that the failure of free-market approaches on the ground in other spheres beyond 
water is likely to leave scholars more sceptical about its applicability to the water 
sector. We further argue that there is already limited historical evidence to support 
the claim that free-market economic principles could be the main driver for success-
ful water-supply governance in Africa and other parts of the developing world. On 
the contrary, the historical evidence shows that profi t-oriented market approaches 
tend to produce highly exclusionary and elitist outcomes which are unlikely to ben-
efi t the poor. Chances of achieving universal coverage for water supply and sanita-
tion will be possible when nation-states adopt policy principles that give priority to 
the basic human right to water instead of market interests. It is our considered belief 
that such policies and principles are likely to be easier to deploy within the context 
of a strong and capable developmental state. 
 In essence, despite the attractiveness of the free-market economy, the debate 
about the role of the state in economic development planning and water governance 
has come full circle. With the onset of the global fi nancial and economic crisis in 
2007, many developed countries, led by the United States, undertook radical state- 
led fi nancial and economic intervention measures to rescue their economies from 
collapse. This has further broadened and strengthened the case for an active role of 
the state in economic development, particularly in the developing world. The con-
cept of the developmental state has therefore risen to the top of development dis-
courses once again, and its application in the water sector would be very timely. 
4.1.4  Conclusion 
 This chapter has explored in detail the implications of managing water in a free- 
market economy and in a developmental state. From the exploration, it is clear that 
national water-supply governance paradigms tend to change in tandem with emerg-
ing national development theoretical frameworks and priorities. Each nation feels 
compelled to adopt a particular framework to fulfi l its needs. In practice, more and 
more water utilities and planning agencies have been shifting their focus towards 
exploration of water-supply system effi ciency improvement possibilities, imple-
mentation of options for WDM within the confi nes of IWRM and equitable reallo-
cation of water among competing users and uses to reduce consumption and meet 
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future water demand. While many developing countries have adopted water policy 
prescriptions from the international arena, national and local socio-economic and 
political realities ultimately determine what works and what does not work on the 
ground. Thus, the choice between free-market approaches and developmental state- 
oriented approaches is never simple. Experiences across the globe indicate that 
careful analysis of local socio-economic and political conditions is crucial before 
deploying specifi c water-supply governance frameworks. The calls for the costs and 
benefi ts of water infrastructure developments to be distributed in a more equitable 
manner and for unmet basic human needs to be addressed urgently are most likely 
to continue growing in Africa and beyond. In this regard, more concerted efforts 
will be required to better understand and meet the diverse interests and needs of all 
affected stakeholders in the water sector. Application of the principles of sustain-
ability and equity will help bridge the gap between diverse and competing interests 
and unleash the potential for more innovation in water-supply governance. It is 
always important to remember that in water governance, context matters. 
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 Chapter 5 
 Urban Water Governance as a Function 
of the ‘Urban Hydrosocial Transition’ 
 Chad  Staddon ,  Robert  Sarkozi , and  Sean  Langberg 
 Abstract  Urban governance is as much about infrastructure as it is about people 
and processes. In particular, the history of urban governance is closely intertwined 
with the history of urban water services. Historically, as urban areas became larger 
and more densely inhabited, the collective need for better water services (drinking 
water, sanitation and fl ood protection in particular) became overwhelming. Cities 
simply could not grow beyond a certain relatively modest size without the simulta-
neous articulation of an integrated water services infrastructure to replace the piece-
meal local arrangements previously in place. This necessarily implied new and 
more complex governance arrangements, in this case the institutionalisation of 
water services management in functional departmental structures, linked to political 
decision-making, fi nance, quality assurance and related functions. Whilst other 
papers have presented case studies of the urban hydrosocial transition (UHT) in 
terms of the physical extension of water services (e.g. water supply, sanitation and 
surface water management), this chapter focuses specifi cally on urban governance 
of water. We argue that the progressive breakdown of Fordist neo-corporatism in 
water services has opened up the fi eld to a proliferation of ‘glocal’ (to use 
Swyngedouw’s useful neologism) governance arrangements. Whilst integrated 
water resource management (IWRM) principles imply a supra-urban scale of gov-
ernance, the fact that urbanisation brings with it local concentration of water-related 
impacts means that there is an ineluctable local and urban dimension to water gov-
ernance. It is therefore not surprising that cities around the world are asserting 
themselves as central players in water governance. Brief case studies from around 
the world are presented by way of illustration. 
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5.1  Introduction 
 The development and extension of water services infrastructure has been a key 
foundational element of industrialisation and urbanisation since at least the ‘Great 
Sanitary Awakening’ of the mid-nineteenth century. As urban areas became both 
larger and more densely inhabited, the collective need for better water services 
(drinking water, sanitation and fl ood protection in particular) became overwhelm-
ing. Cities simply could not grow beyond a certain relatively modest size without 
the simultaneous articulation of an integrated water services infrastructure to replace 
the piecemeal local arrangements then in place, a reality amply demonstrated by Dr. 
John Snow’s intervention during the 1854 cholera epidemic in London. The mid- 
twentieth- century completion (in Europe, North America and parts of Australasia) 
of the resulting project of mass provision of standardised water supply and sanita-
tion services, what we have elsewhere (Staddon  2010 ; Staddon and Langberg  2014 ) 
called ‘hydromodernism’, was then followed by several waves of restructuring in 
the water services value chain, based particularly on new ideas about the respective 
roles of the public and private sectors, new technologies and burgeoning recognition 
of the water needs of the natural environment. 
 Unfortunately, in much of the developing world, even ‘hydromodernism’ is as 
yet unattained and perhaps unattainable. In addition, too-rapid urbanisation in many 
developing nations has gone hand in hand with the growth of what are called ‘peri- 
urban’ areas that combine urban and rural characteristics and present new chal-
lenges to water (and other) services provision (Harris et al.  2013 ; McGee  2002 ; 
Tacoli  2006 ). Despite concerted international efforts in recent decades, there are 
still at least a BILLION people in the developing world without adequate access to 
basic water services. A typical pattern, exemplifi ed by Kampala, Uganda, involves 
a very limited extent of piped drinking water and sewerage interconnection to urban 
households (classic ‘hydromodernism’), with the vast majority depending on expen-
sive private water sellers, local water collection (often undertaken by children) and 
defecation in pit latrines and/or in the open. Dr. Snow would be horrifi ed by the high 
level of water services  in security prevailing in many twenty-fi rst-century cit-
ies around the world. 
 Fortunately there is a way of easily presenting the historical progression from a 
low level of water services to a higher level, and the governance arrangements 
needed to bring it about. It is also possible to indicate the key drivers of water ser-
vices development. Cities around the world can be understood from the point of 
view of their location within the ‘urban hydrosocial transition’ (UHT), a historical 
geographical framework that sees cities as manifestations of successive ‘hydroso-
cial contracts’ between agents of economic, political, cultural and technological 
change. This concept builds on work undertaken by Brown and Morison ( 2011 ) and 
Brown et al. ( 2009 ) on ‘water-sensitive cities’ (also Lundqvist et al.  2001 ), Turton 
and Meissner ( 2002 ) on the ‘hydrosocial contract’, Swyngedouw ( 2005 ) on ‘urban 
metabolism’ and Thapa et al. ( 2014 ) on ‘water security indices’. A key innovation 
offered here is the simplifi ed three-part historical geographical schema based on a 
limited number of readily available key indicators and associated drivers, including 
models of urban water governance. 
C. Staddon et al.
83
 Whilst other papers (e.g. Staddon and Langberg  2014 ) have presented case stud-
ies of the UHT in terms of the physical extension of water services (water supply, 
sanitation and surface water management), this chapter focuses more on urban-scale 
governance of water. We argue that the progressive breakdown of Fordist neo- 
corporatism in water services has opened up the fi eld for a proliferation of ‘glocal’ 
(to use Swyngedouw’s useful neologism) governance arrangements. Whilst IWRM 
principles usually imply a supra-urban scale of governance, the fact that impacts are 
expressed  locally and urbanisation brings with it a concentration of water-related 
impacts means that there is an ineluctable urban dimension to water governance. 
Conversely, urban governance has a strong water (and public works) dimension. 
Urban leaders have played a critical role in the development of new models of ser-
vice delivery in water supply, sanitation, surface water drainage and water-related 
ecosystems services, even as higher-level ‘apex organisations’ have sought to assert 
themselves. As the three ‘water-city’ case studies show, there are real challenges in 
achieving urban-scale system integration between water and services, especially as 
articulated through development control and land-use planning. Thus analytical 
attention to changing geographies of urban water governance illuminates much 
more than the mere particularities of local experience in water services. Brief case 
studies from around the world are presented by way of illustration. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the UHT as a way of thinking about 
the changing relationship between cities, water services and the related institution 
of urban water governance. In addition to permitting observers to place any given 
city on a comparative continuum of hydrosocial development, the concept also sug-
gests likely hydrosocial development futures based on attention to the underlying 
drivers of progress through the UHT. The salience of the UHT concept is illustrated 
with data from urban exemplars from the developed world (Bristol, UK, and Osaka, 
Japan) and the developing world (Kampala, Uganda). 
5.2  The Urban Hydrosocial Transition 
 The scholarly study of water networks has focused mainly on urban areas, following 
well-known studies of large sociotechnical systems such as electricity (Hughes 
 1985 ), transportation (Hall  1969 ), telecommunications (Hadlaw  2011 ) and gas (Tarr 
and Dupuy  1988 ). These works generally presuppose a static state of natural 
resources and tend to overemphasise technological innovations as the primary 
engines of urban change. This approach generally consists of urban case studies of 
infrastructure development through continuous waves of technological innovation, 
business model restructuring and changing attitudes about state regulation. Hughes’s 
( 1985 ) otherwise gripping account of the battle between advocates of DC and AC 
electricity distribution systems in the eastern US is a good example of this genre. 
The literature on urban water services is by now large, focusing especially on the 
study of the local water markets, the consequences of service privatisation (as part 
of a larger restructuring of the state apparatus) and urban management of the 
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networks and changing urban water cultures (e.g. Barraqué  1998 ; Brown and 
Morison  2011 ; Brown et al.  2009 ; Jaglin  2004 ; Molle  2001 ; Schneier-Madanes 
 2003 ; Swyngedouw  2005 ). However, as with the literature on urban infrastructures, 
there is a tendency towards either technological or economic determinism. 
 In contrast to the above literature, we argue that urban water services strategies 
that are sensitive to regional or local, social, economic and cultural factors emerge 
through what Turton and others have called the ‘hydrosocial contract’ (Lundqvist 
et al.  2001 ; Turton and Ohlsson  1999 ). Turton and Meissner ( 2002 ) characterise the 
hydrosocial contract as:
 …the unwritten contract that exists between the public and the government…that comes 
into existence when the individual is no longer capable of mobilising suffi cient water for 
their own personal survival, and that acts as a mandate by which government ultimately 
takes on and executes this responsibility. This hydrosocial contract thus acts as the basis for 
institutional development, and also determines what the public deems to be fair and legiti-
mate practice such as the desire for ecological sustainability… 
 This is an important underpinning to the UHT model because it grounds thinking 
in acknowledgement of the fact that ‘big’ ideas (e.g. about the relative roles of pub-
lic and private sectors or about the ‘rights’ of urban citizens to certain services) must 
always enter into accommodations with pre-existing local conditions (e.g. the pre- 
existing institutional and geographical structures of water provision in England and 
Wales prior to privatisation in 1989). In other words, from the mass cholera and 
typhus epidemics in nineteenth-century European cities, water services infrastruc-
ture has developed as a function of the interaction between new technical capabili-
ties (e.g. perfection of sand fi ltration, invention of chlorination and other disinfection 
methods, etc.), the inertia of the pre-existing hydrosocial system (based on paternal-
istic localism) and the changing attitudes of citizens and government (‘governmen-
tality’) towards the respective roles of public and private sectors in planning, 
fi nancing and regulating this burgeoning civil infrastructure. Context really does 
matter – water services governance is both a general and a specifi c phenomenon. 
Thus privatisation in England and Wales came at the price of quite strong regulation 
refl ective of prevailing British ideas about state-economy-society relations, a British 
‘hydrosocial contract’ if you will. In other places, as is well known, water services 
privatisation has been less well regulated, refl ecting different local conditions and 
with sometimes disastrous results (Cochabamba, Bolivia, being a particularly poi-
gnant example – see Olivera and Lewis  2004 ). 
 So the UHT depends, ultimately, on the underlying ‘hydrosocial contract’ pre-
vailing in a given place and time. And it is possible to sketch out in greater detail its 
specifi c economic, political, technical and environmental characteristics. Table  5.1 
depicts some of the key characteristics and drivers of the UHT since the mid- 
nineteenth century. As nineteenth-century societies really began to urbanise, moder-
nise and democratise, starting in Europe and North America, water services 
necessarily became an ever larger part of the political ‘conversation’. In the fi rst 
phase of the UHT, what we call ‘hydro-precarity’, a sense of ‘civic mission’ 
 eventually developed around public health and water services, combining with 
available technologies and investment capital (public and private) to create what 
Barraqué calls the ‘more water from further’ hydroengineering principle.
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 Though there are important differences between the urban hydropolitics of, say, 
early American versus French or Japanese cities, there are also abiding commonali-
ties, most importantly the over-reliance on a technocratic elite of engineers and their 
(neo)corporatist political allies. This is what makes the systems of Roman Bath and 
sixteenth-century Plymouth more alike to each other than their nineteenth-century 
counterparts: similar political economic alliances deploying water services tech-
nologies to make the cities of their eras more comfortable  for themselves . The idea 
of a broader public good was still a long way off, notwithstanding the occasional 
public water supplies offered by (usually) religious institutions. Feudal political 
systems simply did not include the idea of the irreducible equality of all people, 
which would be a prerequisite for bearing the cost and administrative burden of 
extending water services (or any other utility) beyond the aristocratic and burgeon-
ing capitalist classes. As late as the mid-1830s, only a few private companies were 
in the business of providing water to local customers who could pay, with no onus 
to provide to poorer residents (Dickinson  1954 ; Staddon  2010 ). Not until 1852 did 
the British Parliament legislate for a uniform, mass public water services system in 
the capital. The specifi city of this new hydrosocial contract can be seen more clearly 
if we contrast it with the strong sense of public duty that underwrote the more 
expansive, but disaggregated, systems of public water supply prevailing in Middle 
Eastern cities through the latter part of the same time period, even in the absence of 
central mandate or decree (Staddon  2010 ). 
 We suggest that 1914 is a convenient date attaching to the beginning of the irre-
versible decline of the fi rst era and the faint beginnings of the second, ‘hydromoder-
nity’. Whilst the old regime does not disappear overnight, it appears that by the 
outbreak of the First World War, water services systems not just in London but 
throughout the British Isles (and in Europe and North America) were being devel-
oped according to the belief that all should enjoy some standard of water, regardless 
of ability to pay. Indeed, the urban hygiene movement of the late nineteenth and 
 Table 5.1  The urban hydrosocial transition 
 Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3 
 Hydro-precarity  Hydromodernism  Hydro-security 
 Approximate 
dates 
 Up to 1914  1914 to 1992  After 1992 
 Economic system  Pre-Fordist  Fordist/industrial  Post-Fordist/
post-industrial 




 Expanding water 
services 
 Industrialising water 
services, esp. vertical 
integration 







 Reductionist/scientifi c/ 
monolithic 





of human and 
nature 
 Utilitarian, ecological 
modernism 
 Biocentric 
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early twentieth centuries made tutored use of water services a  moral obligation. It is 
surely no coincidence that in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the major 
technological means to organise and deliver such an ambitious agenda also 
appeared – necessity, as so often, was the mother of invention. Joseph Bazalgette 
began his ‘great interceptor sewer’ project in 1859, an iconic project that required a 
new politics of water services as well as new technologies and new ways of organis-
ing capital investment (Halliday  2001 ). Perfection of slow sand fi ltration, adoption 
of chlorine as a purifying additive to drinking water, the proliferation of reservoirs 
(often underwritten by Acts of Parliament) and the emergence of limited liability 
companies as the key commercial vehicles for commercial organisation all came 
about in the second half of the nineteenth century. This hydrosocial contract was 
however not completed until the passage of the 1945 Water Act which mandated 
consolidation, and part-nationalisation, of Britain’s water services system. 
 The second phase, ‘hydromodernism’, was characterised by an almost messianic 
belief in water technologies (especially dams and big engineering works) and the 
ultimate responsibility of government to provide mass water services. Water ser-
vices were seen predominantly as functions of large public bureaucracies operating 
at the urban or regional scales. This hydrosocial contract prevailed well into the 
1980s and early 1990s before it was decisively challenged by a new urban hydropol-
itics, based on a burgeoning distrust of both the technocentrism and the public 
authority premises upon which hydromodernism rested (at least in Britain). Indeed 
the shift away from ecological modernism towards a more biocentric value system 
meant that water services increasingly had to take account of the needs of the natu-
ral environment. This new sensitivity to the environmental dimension of water ser-
vices has emerged at nearly the same moment as the prevailing faith in government 
as an effi cient service provider has faltered. After 1992 a new hydrosocial contract, 
integrated water resource management (IWRM), was articulated based on the neo- 
liberal view that environmental and social outcomes could be achieved more effi -
ciently by private providers. In the UK, water services governance underwent a 
marked transformation just before 1992 as water services companies were priva-
tised in 1989 and the state role recast as one of providing strong economic, quality 
assurance and environmental regulation of privatised local water services monopo-
lies (Bakker  2003 ; Staddon  2010 ). Jamie Linton ( 2010 ) points out that this current 
hydrosocial contract reframes peoples’ relationship with water services in terms of 
commodifi cation and (fi nancial) exchange relations. Even the names of public over-
sight bodies in the UK, the ‘Consumer Council for Water’ and ‘Customer Challenge 
Groups’, now refl ect the priority given to water services as commercial exchange. 
 The depiction of the UHT in Table  5.1 is not the only way we have sought to 
visualise this complex geohistorical process. Elsewhere (Staddon and Langberg 
 2014 ) we have used an indicator-based approach, presenting such quantitative mea-
sures as:
•  Percentage serviced by piped water supply 
•  Percentage served by wastewater systems 
•  Daily per capita water consumption 
C. Staddon et al.
87
•  Capital intensivity in water services provision 
•  Water intensivity in urban GDP 
•  Water tariffs 
 However, for our purposes here we focus not on the outward quantitative mea-
sures of urban water services transitions but on the underlying social, economic and 
(especially) political processes. In the case studies that follow (drawn from a rapidly 
accumulating set of case studies currently being developed through the International 
Water Security Network –  www.watersecuritynetwork.org ), we will concentrate our 
attention on critical shifts in the drivers identifi ed in Table  5.1 . As noted above, the 
three case studies were chosen specifi cally with a view to highlighting contrasts in 
the approaches to urban water governance. 
5.3  Urban Water Governance in Three Cities 
5.3.1  Bristol, England 
 The city of Bristol, England, is (in British terms) a middle-sized city of approxi-
mately 400 000 people. Even as late as the early 1980s, traditions of locally or 
regionally focused heavy industry and engineering were economically dominant, 
though these have suffered greatly from cheaper overseas competition, and second-
ary manufacturing has now largely disappeared. By 2014 Bristol was a very differ-
ent sort of place, dependent now on high-value engineering (especially in aerospace), 
higher education (it is home to two major universities and numerous further educa-
tion colleges) and fi nancial management (banking, insurance and investment ser-
vices). Gross value added per employed person and rates of tertiary education are 
amongst the best in Britain although there are signifi cant geographical pockets of 
social and economic deprivation, especially in the Southmead, Easton and Lawrence 
Hill wards of the central city. 
 Prior to the attempt to create a mass water services system from the mid- 
nineteenth century onwards, the only piped water supplies to the city were ‘con-
duits’ originally commissioned by various religious orders to serve their parishes, 
such as the pipe from Knowle to St Mary Redcliffe church originally installed by 
Robert de Berkeley in the twelfth century. Water  quality was barely considered at 
all, unfortunately, as the long-standing practice of dumping refuse, including indus-
trial waste (Bristol had numerous tanneries and dye works), domestic rubbish 
(including dead animals) and excrement (animal and human) into the streets to be 
fl ushed into the nearest watercourse, continued to be practised until well into the 
nineteenth century. The English satirist Tobias Smollett might have been speaking 
about Bristol when in 1769 he observed of London that:
 If I would drink water, I must quaff the mawkish contents of an open aqueduct exposed to 
all manner of defi lement from the Thames…human excrement is the least offensive part of 
the concrete, which is composed of all the drugs, minerals, poisons used in mechanics and 
manufacture, enriched with the putrefying carcases of beasts and men… 
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 The cholera, typhus and diarrhoea epidemics of the mid-nineteenth century pro-
vided the next great push for improved water services. With citizens, especially 
poorer ones, dying in their tens of thousands, social reformers such as the Webbs, 
Edwin Chadwick and Sir Joseph Bazalgette began the process of transforming 
England’s ancient and ill-adapted water and sewerage systems into something fi t for 
purpose (Fig.  5.1 ). At this time the fi rst comprehensive legislation to monitor and 
manage public infrastructure, the 1848 Public Health Act, was passed. Although its 
requirements would not become mandatory until 1875, after this time local authori-
ties had a formal duty to provide (minimal) water supply and sewerage and to moni-
tor public health. In Bristol, the actions of Dr. William Budd, founder director of 
Bristol Water Corporation and a medical researcher much infl uenced by the seminal 
work of Dr. John Snow in London, were central to the early development of a sys-
tematic water services network for the city. This systematic water services infra-
structure was initiated in 1846 when the Bristol Waterworks Company (now Bristol 
Water) was created to develop and manage a uniform public water services network 
for the burgeoning city. The fi rst of the Barrow reservoirs (the so-called ‘line of 
works’) was commissioned in 1850, the Blagdon Reservoir in 1888 and the Cheddar 
Reservoir in 1922. By 1898 the company was supplying a daily average of 22 gal-
lons (about 100 litres) per person – a level of supply many twenty-fi rst-century pro-
viders around the world even now fail to achieve. The Littleton and Sharpness 
schemes, located to the north of the city, plumbed Bristol into the Severn River (one 
of Britain’s largest rivers) in the 1950s and remains central to the city’s water ser-
vices security. Currently Bristol Water supplies customers with approximately 300 
megalitres (ML) of drinking water per day, drawn largely from these main sources.
 With respect to wastewater management, advances in technology in the nine-
teenth century combined with increasing certainty about the causal link between 
exposure to contaminated water and illness to create both the technical means to act 
and the political will to do so. From mid-century Metropolitan Boards of (Public) 
Works, often led by physicians and public health specialists such as Doctors Snow 
and Budd, were formed in most major British cities. These Boards organised civic 
investment in wastewater collection and transport pipe networks towards water 
treatment works on the fringes of cities. 1 Sand fi ltration and other kinds of more 
sophisticated water treatment systems were developed in the fi rst half of the nine-
teenth century by engineers such as James Peacock, Robert Thom and James 
Simpson. Indeed Simpson’s ‘slow sand fi ltration system’ which depends upon the 
aerobic digestion of sewage wastes by diatoms and green algae growing on the sand 
surface is still in use in parts of the UK, though now augmented by a wide range of 
other technologies. Bristol’s MBW managed to successfully broker the transition 
towards integrated and universal wastewater management (McGrath  1985 ). Chew 
Valley reservoir, located to the south of the city and completed in the early 1950s, is 
a monument to this ‘big engineering, big government’ form of water services provi-
sion (Fig.  5.2 ). 
1  In fact, the MBWs were in part a creature of the backlash against the unaccountable power, espe-
cially to tax, of Edwin Chadwick’s ‘Metropolitan Sewers Commissions’ created during the 1840s 
(Davis  2001 ). 
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 Fig. 5.1  ‘Death’s 
Dispensary’ 1866 woodcut 
illustration depicting 
London’s often deadly 
water supply 
 Fig. 5.2  Chew Valley 
reservoir: hydromodernity 
in Bristol, UK 
 As of 2015, the main Bristol area sewage treatment plant, located at Avonmouth 
and operated by Wessex Water 2 , treats most of the sewage generated by the city of 
2  Bristol’s drinking water is supplied by Bristol Water and its sewerage services by Wessex Water, 
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Bristol, approximately 210 ML of sewage each day. Plant upgrades and sustainability- 
orientated changes to the treatment process mean that it now transforms that sewage 
into its own power (through biogas recovery), agricultural fertiliser (which is given 
away virtually free of charge) and clean water for release back into the natural envi-
ronment according to the terms of its licences with the Environment Agency. In fact 
such is the success of the biogas recovery plant that Wessex Water now imports 
additional digestible wastes from a variety of sources including other wastewater 
treatment facilities in the region (Fig.  5.3 ). 
 From the point of view of transitions in urban water governance, there are three 
key things to note. First, the shift from phase 1 to phase 2 was largely completed by 
1914, when virtually 100 % of the urban population had some form of reliable water 
supply and sanitation was considerably improved and water services companies 
such as the Bristol Waterworks Company had become vertically integrated entities. 
Both direct measures (percentage population served) and indirect measures (health 
outcomes as measured in disability- adjusted life-years 3 or ‘DALYs’) bear this out. 
The emergence of central administrative responsibility for public health in the 
1840s and 1850s was central to this success. Second, the transition from phase 2 to 
phase 3 was manifest by the late 1980s when the emphasis began to clearly shift 
from ‘more water from further’ (to use Barraqué’s felicitous phrase) and ‘more hard 
engineering’ to more attention to behaviour change, effi ciency and the environment. 
In this transition process, the key drivers of business strategy for both water services 
companies are more fi rmly linked to environmental sustainability, horizontal inte-
gration with other synergistic services sectors and water demand management. 
Although there are new responsibilities for local governments in managing espe-
cially surface water (under the Flooding and Water Management Act 2010 and the 
Water Act 2014), governance of water services in England and Wales remains the 
province of centrally mandated government agencies including the Offi ce of the 
3  A measure of overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost due to ill-health, dis-
ability or early death 
 Fig. 5.3  Avonmouth 
wastewater treatment 
works, Bristol, UK: 
beyond the ‘engineering 
paradigm’ 
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Water Regulator (Ofwat), the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) and the 
Environment Agency. 4 There are also avenues for local input into water services 
planning through the so-called Customer Challenge Groups tasked with ensuring 
that water companies’ business plans refl ect customer priorities and willingness to 
pay for capital and operational improvements. 
5.3.2  Kampala, Uganda 
 Having started as a centre of the Buganda kingdom, by the late nineteenth century, 
Kampala had become a centre of colonial administration for British East Africa 
before becoming the capital of an independent Uganda in 1962. Since independence 
Uganda has endured frequent spasms of violent confl ict and repression, including 
during the regime of Idi Amin (1971–1979), the Ugandan Civil War (1981–1986), 
First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo Wars as well as confronted 
ongoing depredations by the Lord’s Resistance Army between 1987 and 2005. 
During these periods economic and infrastructure development slowed dramatically 
across the country. The economy of Uganda remains overdependent on agricultural 
and horticultural exports although recent discoveries of oil and mineral resources 
have spurred higher-value industrial development especially in the north of the 
country. Unlike many other areas of Africa, such as the Sahel and North Africa, 
Uganda is endowed with signifi cant freshwater resources. Lying within the Nile 
Basin, about 18 % of the country is covered by rivers, lakes and wetlands, including 
Lake Victoria, the second largest freshwater lake in the world (UNESCO-WWAP 
 2006 ). 
 Kampala’s fi rst piped water and sewerage systems were completed during the 
colonial period in the 1930s. The construction of new facilities accelerated between 
1950 and 1965 under the framework of large national development programmes, 
though many of these facilities fell rapidly into disrepair in the 1970s. Since inde-
pendence the city has experienced several periods of rural to urban migration- 
accelerated population growth, coinciding with periods of relative political calm 
and economic development. Nonetheless, the lack of rigorous development control 
and the large infl ux of rural poor, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, have created 
a huge, and largely unmet, demand for water services in the Kampala urban region. 
By 1990 this urban water infrastructure served less than 10 % of the population with 
plumbed-in domestic connections (UNESCO-WWAP  2006 ). Most urban dwellers, 
like their rural counterparts, remain largely reliant on informal, decentralised sys-
tems of water services supply. Though the Millennium Development Goals’ Joint 
Monitoring Programme considers that more than 80 % of urban Ugandans now 
enjoy access to an ‘improved’ water source, the same publication notes that less than 
4  In fact, in a recent case decided by the Upper Tribunal of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union makes it clear that although private economic entities, Britain’s water companies have the 
legal status and responsibilities of ‘public authorities’. 
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20 % have access to piped water. Moreover, Hopewell and Graham ( 2014 ) note that 
it is still the case that fully 10 % of Kampala’s residents spend more than 30 min 
collecting water for household use each and every day. 
 Most of the city’s water originates to the south in Lake Victoria, is stored in 24 
onshore reservoirs and is treated at the Ggaba I (1928), II (1992) and III (2007) 
water treatment works, all operated by the National Water and Sanitation Company 
(NWSC). The three plants have an average daily production of 147,955 m 3 of drink-
ing water (Directorate of Water Development  2010 ; MWE  2006 ). They are designed 
as conventional urban water systems utilising a fi rst stage of physical separation, 
consisting of coagulation and fl occulation chambers together with clarifi ers, a rapid 
sand fi ltration second stage and a third stage involving chlorination. In 2011 the 
Ugandan government announced plans to build a water treatment plant in Katosi 
that would serve 2.4 million people in and around Kampala and upgrade the Ggaba 
Treatment Complex (NWSC  2011 ). 
 Originally set up in 1972 the publically owned NWSC was reorganised in 1995 
after passage of The National Environmental Act and given more authority to 
expand its area of service. Throughout the late 1990s, NWSC began serving, 
although rather incompletely, cities and towns throughout Uganda. As of 2012 the 
NWSC had barely 300 000 connections spread across 34 urban areas, with Kampala 
District alone accounting for nearly 106 000, meaning that most Ugandans do not 
benefi t directly from its services (Directorate of Water Development 2010). 5 Whilst 
NWSC is attempting to extend the number of connections in all its service areas, it 
acknowledges that a near-universal level of household and business connections (as 
in European water systems) is not attainable. Thus, water services provision is char-
acterised by a complex hybrid of the ‘hydromodernist’ formal system and myriad 
‘informal’ systems, ranging from small-scale water sellers to community-level 
water supply and management schemes (as mandated in the 1999 Water Act). This 
hybridity makes Kampala, and Uganda more broadly, quite different from the other 
two case studies discussed in this chapter. It does not neatly fall into phase 1 or 2 of 
the UHT but rather juggles geographically uneven development of water provision 
services (Figs.  5.4 and  5.5 ). 
 In small- and medium-sized towns, the private sector plays a larger role in pro-
viding water. In 2006, out of the 143 small towns that had operational piped water 
supplies and schemes, 57 were managed and operated by private companies. The 
push to privatise has produced mixed results with some areas of improvement and 
effi ciency offset by areas of abject service failure (Danert et al.  2003 ). Kampala, 
with its oscillation between public, private and public-private control of water ser-
vices as well as the broader countrywide debate over privatisation, exists within the 
context of an even broader continent-wide search for the balance between public 
capacity and private sector support. We expect water services in Kampala (and 
Uganda) to evolve with and perhaps also shape this debate. 
5  With approximately 6.5 million households and only 300 000 connections, this implies a connec-
tion rate of 5 % (MWE  2006 ). 
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 Fig. 5.5  Rainwater 
harvesting tank: a 
sustainable approach to 
hydro-security? 
 Fig. 5.4  Surface water 
collection: hydro-precarity 
 Though incredibly labour intensive, especially for women and girls, most 
Ugandans outside the modest service area served by NWSC or local water systems 
depend on surface water or groundwater collection systems for their domestic 
needs. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) drafted in 1999 and updated in 
subsequent years that guides the countrywide economic development strategy 
devotes a substantial space to discussing the development of water provision ser-
vices. However, the disparity between urban and rural water services – which 
 creates hybridity – is evident within the document. As of 2004, the PEAP notes that 
60 % of urban households had access to an improved water source compared to only 
5 % of rural households. 6 Even when water is commercially available, it typically 
6  One of the MDGs was to ‘halve the proportion of the population without sustainable access to an 
improved water source’, though this could include such self-supply initiatives as rainwater harvest-
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consumes up to 22 % of household income making it even more diffi cult for rural 
areas to engage in provision centralisation and, in turn, forcing reliance on informal 
water collection (Ministry of Finance  2004 ). 
 Though signifi cant progress has been made in improving access to basic water 
supplies, there are still chronic problems with undersupply and water quality man-
agement. In many areas, and supported by the 1999 Water Act and National Water 
Plan, many communities have developed self-supply systems, based on some com-
bination of groundwater collection and rainwater harvesting (McLaughlin et al. 
 2014 ; UNESCO-WWAP  2006 ). One of the key objectives of the 1999 Water Act is 
‘To promote the rational management and use of the waters of Uganda through use 
of appropriate standards, co-ordination of activities, allocation and delegation of 
responsibilities’ (MWE  2006 ; MWLE  1999 : 8).
 A key mechanism for so doing involves the creation of community-level water 
user committees (WUCs) whose membership is drawn from the benefi ciaries of the 
water supply, tasking them with ensuring the proper maintenance of the water sys-
tem by collecting revenue from users (Terry et al.  2015 ). This demonstrates the 
move from a rights-based to a more market-based system of resource allocation, 
much in line with IWRM principles declared in 1992. However, whilst handing over 
responsibility for day-to-day planning and running of water resources to WUCs, the 
Act also vests all water rights in the government which has therefore become the 
owner of all water resources in Uganda. Local authorities are required to organise 
the formation of WUCs within their area, although the responsibility for this task 
between the district, sub-county or parish is ambiguously drafted within the Act 
which has added to the confusion. Once created, the WUC is responsible for plan-
ning and managing local water services. The poor drafting of the Act is one factor 
that has made the implementation of better functioning local water supplies less 
successful than had been expected. 
 The case of Kampala indicates what may turn out to be a common developing 
world scenario – a form of hybrid ‘hydro-precarity/hydromodernism’ whereby 
some areas of the urban region have fully modern water services, whilst others, even 
close by, do not. Also ‘hybrid’ is the complex welter of formal and informal water 
systems, with signifi cant service gaps and disparities stubbornly manifest in the 
twenty-fi rst-century city (Poupeau and Hardy  2014 ). Unfortunately it appears not 
necessarily to be the case that the two different types of service will necessarily 
converge over time, as the lagging ‘hydroprecarious’ zones catch up to the more 
advanced zones. Therefore, a key challenge for both the NWSC and urban govern-
ment will be the rationalisation and integration of these formal and informal sys-
tems into a system providing more comprehensive coverage at a standard level of 
service. Even more importantly, Uganda needs to translate its rapidly improving 
policy and institutional framework into improved water services ‘on the ground’. As 
in Bristol, this will also involve getting to grips with the water services implications 
of development planning and control – the need for integrated urban water services 
planning is manifest. 
ing, private water selling and NGO-brokered groundwater collection systems. 
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5.3.3  Osaka, Japan 
 The modern city of Osaka grew out of the planned settlement developed around 
Osaka Castle from the late sixteenth century onwards. This town was built on a grid 
system, with water supply and sewerage provided by ditches (‘seweri desui’) run-
ning behind properties on an east–west line. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, 
Japan entered into a period of comprehensive modernisation which also led to mod-
ernisation of water supply and sewerage systems. In Osaka, the ‘seweri desui’ and 
the rest of the city’s rudimentary water services system were modernised starting in 
the late nineteenth century. During this period accelerated urbanisation and active 
trading with foreign countries had caused Japan to experience epidemics of water-
borne diseases such as cholera and typhus (scourges that were on the wane in Europe 
by this time) which saw the total number of cases rise to 410 000 by the end of the 
century. Port cities, beginning with Yokohama in 1887, were thus especially moti-
vated to introduce waterworks infrastructure since these cities were at high risk of 
outbreaks. In 1895 Osaka city became the fourth Japanese urban region to construct 
an integrated water supply system (MHLWGJ  2008 ). As the city moved from the 
fi rst to the second phase of the UHT, service coverage rapidly increased until the 
Second World War when 97 % of the entire country’s population enjoyed piped 
water services – a huge achievement. 
 Although densely inhabited, Japan enjoys relatively high levels of rainfall across 
much of its land area, with more than 3 300 m 3 /person/year renewable water avail-
ability 7 (Aquastat  2015 ). Japan also has some of the most effi cient urban water utili-
ties in the world (Hall et al.  2005 ). In an Asian Development Bank (ADB) survey of 
water in Asian cities, the Japanese city of Osaka was described as providing ‘an 
excellent water service’ (Corral  2007 ), rising well above safety and quality stan-
dards set by the country’s Water Supply Act 2002 (OMWB  2012 ). This performance 
however is now threatened by the policies of the Japanese government of Shinzo 
Abe (elected in 2007 on a promise to reform the long sluggish Japanese economy) 
and proposals from the state-owned Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) to privatise 
public infrastructure. The city of Osaka is readying itself to unleash the country’s 
fi rst big experiment in turning a water utility into a public-private entity, a move 
which will pave the way for a partial equity sale of local water utilities and privatise 
a fundamentally communal resource over the coming years (GWI  2014 ) (Table  5.2 ).
 Today Osaka city has a population of some 2 782 000 people with a population 
density of 33 335 people per square mile (WPS  2013 ). As of 2010 daily water pro-
duction is over 1.2 million m 3 /day with per capita consumption at 310 l/person/day 
(Aquastat  2015 ), which is the fourth highest in the world (Asian Development Bank 
 2006 ; Data360  2014 ). The Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau (OMWB) man-
ages and oversees tap water and industrial water supply for the city, as well as water 
treatment technologies, water distribution management, leakage reduction and anti- 
7  Between 1 000 and 2 000 m 3 /person/year makes a country ‘water stressed’ – Japan is a long way 
from that. 
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earthquake measures (OMWB  2014 ). In the last fi scal year, the OMWB earned a net 
income of US$103 million on a revenue of US$654 million and is considered a 
successful, fully modern water utility (SIWW  2014 ). 
 The modern Osaka water services system has signifi cant dam and reservoir 
developments throughout the upper Yodo River catchment above the city. Starting 
with the Kunijima Water Treatment Plant, opened in 1914, OMWB has developed a 
large network of supply reservoirs, distribution pipelines and treatment plants, the 
latter built around granular activated charcoal (GAC), ozonation and post-contact 
chlorination treatment technologies (Fig.  5.6 ). The storm water and sewerage sys-
tem was begun in the 1890s with the construction of brick-lined interceptor sewers 
(as in London and Paris) which are still in use today (as in Paris and London!). 
Domestic night-soil collection was still the primary method of domestic sewerage 
until the late 1950s (as in many Asian cities), after which human waste collection 
was switched over to a conventional industrial piped system. Given its available 
onshore resources, there has been no inclination to develop desalination as part of 
the water-into-supply network.
 Since 2000 OMWB has invested heavily in sustainability measures, including a 
253 kW hydropower installation at the Nagai Distribution Plant and a 150 kW solar 
installation at the Kunijima Purifi cation Plant. OMWB has also implemented a new 
biosolids treatment plan based on:
•  Better management of the extensive network of combined sewer overfl ows in the 
city 
•  Processing of biosolids (‘cake’) for power generation via biogas recovery and 
incineration 
•  Creation of post-treatment consumer products such as ‘Yodo soil’ and slag con-
crete for general distribution and use 
 As land is at a premium in densely inhabited Osaka, OWB has also incorporated 
green infrastructure developments, including playing fi elds and allotment-style gar-
dens at many of its more spatially extensive treatment installations. The region’s 
vulnerability to natural disasters, especially earthquakes, means that special atten-
tion has been given to infrastructural resilience with OWB constructing vast under-
ground ‘fl oodways’ as well as encouraging green infrastructure amongst domestic 
 Table 5.2  Water services statistics 
 Drinking water  Wastewater 
 % population served  100  % population served  99.9 
 Daily per capita 
Consumption (litres/day) 
 310  Wastewater treatment capacity 
(1x10 6 m 3 /day) 
 2.9 
 Water losses (%)  6  Sludge to landfi ll  0 
 Water charges (¥/m  3  )  95 – 200  Length of sanitary sewers (km)  4 857 
 Treated water volume 
(1x10  6   m  3  /day) 
 2.4  % wastewater reuse  5 
 OMWB  2014 
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and industrial users to reduce urban fl ood risk. This sort of system integration 
between different public bureaucracies, in this case between water utility and civil 
defence authorities, is one of the hallmarks of the city’s particular version of 
‘hydro-security’. 
 However, structural change to Osaka’s water supply is imminent. In March 2015 
city leaders announced a plan to auction off the water services ‘concession’ by 
March 2016 (SIWW  2014 ). The Osaka government has said that ‘partially privatis-
ing the city’s water services will promote collaboration between the government 
and private companies, as well as prepare water businesses to expand overseas to 
offset declining domestic demand’ (SIWW  2014 ). City offi cials also hope that the 
initiative will decrease debt and increase private investment in the coming years. 
These are of course the standard reasons given for water utility privatisation around 
the world (Staddon  2010 ). 
 Privatising public services and portions of public infrastructure is not a new con-
cept in Japan. Other Japanese cities have sold rights in airports as well as the 
Japanese National Railways and the Tokyo Metro, which were privatised in 1987 
and 2004, respectively (SIWW  2014 ). The Japanese government has, over the past 
few years, also adopted a series of policies to facilitate private operation of public 
services, including water. These include a law promoting Public Finance Initiatives 
(PFI), a new Water Act in 2002 which enabled delegation of water services manage-
ment and new laws enabling local governments to outsource municipal services 
more generally. In 2003 the DBJ launched a new fi nancial mechanism designed to 
provide low interest funds for private companies to invest in acquiring and running 
 Fig. 5.6  Osaka’s network 
of drinking water and 
sewage treatment plants 
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municipal assets, with the DBJ itself prepared to become an equity investor holding 
a stake of up to 50 %. In practice municipalities have been slow to respond to the 
various pressures for more privatisation due in part to union opposition, as well as 
the fact that water services are seen by users as excellent (Hall et al.  2005 ). There is 
no grass-roots support for restructuring the water services sector. 
 Cities like Osaka, where water is managed well by public authorities, have how-
ever demolished the argument that private sector participation is the only way to 
improve effi ciency and even outperformed cities with prominent water services pri-
vatisation arrangements such as Jakarta and Manila (Staddon  2010 ). Furthermore, 
Osaka boasts a non-revenue water level (NRW) (an indicator of the level of 
unaccounted- for water and lost income due to leakages and unpaid bills) of only 
7 %, which is an outstanding performance by international standards (Netto  2005 ) – 
by contrast, NRW in England is closer to 20 %. 
 Opponents to privatisation of water services provision fear that such schemes 
may fail to deliver clean and safe drinking water to communities and divert resources 
away from rural areas to urban centres via channelling and groundwater mining 
(Netto  2005 ). However, privatisation schemes are still being pushed with vigour by 
international fi nancial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) which dominates global 
investment in water privatisation (Lappe  2014 ; Hagopian  2014 ), increasing its lend-
ing on water projects from US$546 million to US$7.5 billion between 2002 and 
2011 (World Bank  2014 ). 
5.4  Concluding Comments 
 In retrospect it is perhaps unsurprising that urban water services manifest common 
and predictable historical geographical development trends. It would perhaps be 
stranger were this not the case. After all, technological innovations in, for example, 
wastewater treatment are transmitted through professional networks with ever- 
increasing speed, and as we have seen, the hydrosocial contract has evolved inexo-
rably from an initial inkling that there was a role for the public sector in addressing 
water-related illnesses in burgeoning nineteenth-century cities through a period of 
industrial massifi cation of water services in the twentieth century towards the cur-
rent phase of both greater democratic localism (however expressed) and environ-
mental sensitivity. The urban hydrosocial transition is however not temporally 
lockstep or completely uniform; different places have experienced their own ver-
sions of each of these three phases at somewhat different times. The current phase 
of ‘democratic localism’, for instance, is Janus faced: on the one hand implying 
grass-roots determination of the nature of the twenty-fi rst-century hydrosocial con-
tract, but on the other signalling a challenge to the previous logic of public sector 
water services provision. In the three urban case studies presented here, we can see 
clear differences in geohistorical sequencing of water services development, linked 
to initial starting conditions, differential economic and urbanisation pressures and, 
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especially, different political positions on the role of the local and central states in 
brokering water services development. 
 With respect to urban water governance, the key preoccupation of this volume, 
there are also some clear historical patterns. First, cities tend to experience an initial 
public health driver for the extension and expansion of urban water services. 
Whether in the mid-nineteenth (Bristol), early twentieth (Osaka) or late twentieth 
(Kampala) centuries, increasing the density of cities also brings with it a clear need 
for  centralised command and control over public health with some level of public 
sector involvement in water services an inevitable corollary. This involvement can 
entail either regulatory oversight or direct provision or both. In British cities public 
health-oriented ‘Metropolitan Water Boards’ were in place by the late nineteenth 
century, and similar institutions appeared later in Japanese and still later in East 
African cities. Sometimes these Water Boards provided water services themselves 
(a public provision model), and sometimes they merely acted to license and regulate 
private service providers. Either way, the state retained a signifi cant role in policy 
formation and regulation, if not direct provision. In England and Wales these func-
tions are now exercised by government agencies charged with regulation of drink-
ing water quality (DWI), water business planning (Ofwat) and impact on the natural 
environment (Environment Agency). Since the Flooding and Water Management 
Act of 2010, urban authorities in England and Wales have had new statutory duties 
for fl ood planning and surface water management. In Osaka, these functions are all 
still largely managed within the OWB, though privatisation pressures may break up 
this vertically integrated system from 2015 forwards in accordance with Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s neo-liberal programme. Clearly, in Kampala, Uganda, the 
water services system is relatively poorly developed, particularly with respect to 
both wastewater and surface water management. Lack of clear government policy, 
political instability and economic weakness has meant that these sectors have devel-
oped primarily through programmes managed and funded by bilateral and multilat-
eral aid organisations. Put another way, the Ugandan government has still to work 
out a clear hydrosocial contract with civil society, whereas in both Bristol and Osaka 
the basis of the hydrosocial contract has in recent years been shifted from mass 
service delivery towards biocentrism and resilience – alongside a shifting balance 
between public and private providers. 
 Simultaneously the geographical scale of water services regulation has increas-
ingly shifted towards the river basin or catchment, a transition that risks pitting 
strictly urban interests, whether bureaucratic or private, against the broader claims 
to manage river basins’ resources in a more holistic way for the greater good (Molle 
and Hoanh  2011 ). Yet, shifting the gaze of urban water management from cities to 
urban regions or river basins also allows the possibility of thinking more equitably 
about the distribution of water services costs and benefi ts from the usually more 
rural upper catchments to the usually more urban lower catchments. Such ‘rescal-
ing’ of urban water governance has, for example, opened the way for considering 
how up-catchment land managers (e.g. farmers) can benefi t from producing cleaner 
source waters for down-catchment cities through ‘payment for ecosystems services’ 
mechanisms. Yet ‘rescaling’ is also unavoidably contentious as different tiers of 
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government vie for control over water resources whilst simultaneously shying away 
from responsibility for water services outcomes. 
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 Chapter 6 
 Urban Water Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century: A Portfolio-Based Approach 
to Planning and Management 
 Ganesh  Keremane ,  Jennifer  McKay , and  Zhifang  Wu 
 Abstract  Rapid urbanisation, growing urban populations, environmental issues 
and climate change all represent signifi cant challenges for water resource manage-
ment, the delivery of essential water and sanitation services and environmental pro-
tection. As a result, traditional approaches that have relied heavily on large-scale 
infrastructure development are making way for new approaches such as the 
portfolio- based approach to planning and management. In an urban context, this 
includes integration of all components of the urban water cycle, and most state gov-
ernments in Australia have embarked on implementing this integrated approach by 
having a mix of water supply sources including demand management and conserva-
tion measures. However, effective implementation of this approach depends on poli-
cies and regulations and encounters various impediments. Accordingly this chapter 
focuses on the City of Adelaide in South Australia and explores the legal and policy 
challenges for implementing an integrated urban water management plan in 
Metropolitan Adelaide. Drawing on the results of governance studies carried out in 
Australia that included a literature review, stakeholder and community surveys, the 
chapter attempts to better understand the barriers to transitioning Adelaide to a 
water-sensitive city. 
 Keywords  Urban water management •  Governance •  Portfolio approach • 
 Stakeholder perceptions 
6.1  Introduction 
 Over half the world’s population now lives in urban areas, and most of the popula-
tion growth over the next four decades is expected to take place in urban areas (UN 
DESA  2014 ). This represents a considerable challenge for water resource 
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management, the delivery of essential water and sanitation services and environ-
mental protection. To help meet these challenges and better serve both economic 
and environmental objectives, there is a need to employ a broader range of tools 
than in the past. This means that traditional approaches which have relied heavily on 
large- scale infrastructure development (dams, levees and conveyance facilities) 
have to make way for a new integrated approach – integrated urban water manage-
ment (IUWM) – which is the integration of all components of the urban water cycle. 
This integration takes place within the city’s urban development and in the context 
of wider basin management to achieve sustainable economic, social and environ-
mental goals (Bahri  2012 ; World Bank  2012 ). Consequently, there is a shift in urban 
water management from a system relying on climate-dependent traditional water 
resources to a portfolio system that uses several sources. The portfolio paradigm 
includes both demand and supply management measures, and Table  6.1 compares 
the “old” and “new” paradigms of urban water management.
 However, implementation of this approach encounters various impediments that 
are mostly related to governance. Governance of water resources is a long-term and 
complex affair involving different levels of actors at different scales, from house-
holds, irrigators and industries to the governments (Laban  2007 ; McKay  2007 ). The 
interactions between these actors should be considered when promoting local water 
governance (Laban  1994 ,  2007 ), and this is true in the case of both rural and urban 
water management context. This chapter focuses on the latter, and using Adelaide 
City in South Australia as a case study, it attempts to explore the legal and policy 
challenges for implementing an IUWM plan in Metropolitan Adelaide. 
6.1.1  Urban Water Management in Australia 
 Australia, like many countries around the world, has embarked on implementing the 
IUWM approach to supply and secure water for urban areas. The overall strategy is 
to develop effi cient and fl exible urban water systems by adopting a holistic approach 
in which all components of the urban water cycle are integrated and includes a mix 
of water supply sources – freshwater (surface water, groundwater) and produced 
water (desalinated water, stormwater and treated effl uent). 
 In Australia, urban water reform is one of the eight key elements of the National 
Water Initiative (NWI) which is a joint commitment by all states and territory gov-
ernments and the Australian Government to manage surface water and groundwater 
resources for rural and urban use and optimise economic, social and environmental 
outcomes (COAG  2004 ). The initiative created a coherent and comprehensive 
framework for the management of Australia’s water resources; specifi cally, para-
graph 92 of the NWI aims to identify and develop innovative ways of managing and 
achieving more effi cient water use in our cities. Furthermore, the Initiative recog-
nises a nested relationship between three related terms:
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 1.  Integrated urban water cycle management (paragraph 92(iv)) 
 2.  Water-sensitive urban design [paragraph 92(i)] 
 3.  Water-sensitive urban developments [paragraphs 92(ii) and (iii)] 
 The National Water Commission (NWC) in consultation with NWI parties and 
the Urban Water Advisory Group provided working defi nitions of the three terms to 
assist the NWI parties and consequently integrated urban water management is 
defi ned as:
 The integrated management of all water sources, to ensure that water is used optimally 
within a catchment resource, state and national policy context. It promotes the coordinated 
planning, sustainable development and management of water, land and related resources 
(including energy use) that are linked to urban areas. It directs the application of Water 
Sensitive Urban Design principles within existing and new urban environments. (NWC 
 2007 ) 
 This “paradigm shift” in Australia is largely attributed to a group of key individu-
als in Western Australia (Mitchell  2006 : 590). According to the author, in the early 
1990s, these individuals were calling for a new approach to urban planning and 
design, based on the premise that conventional water supply, sewerage and drainage 
practices that rely on conveyance and centralised treatment and discharge systems 
 Table 6.1  The “old” and “new” paradigms of urban water management 
 Old paradigm  New paradigm 
 Stormwater is a nuisance  Stormwater is a resource 
 Convey stormwater away from urban area as 
rapidly as possible. 
 Harvest stormwater as a water supply and 
infi ltrate or retain it to support aquifers, 
waterways and vegetation 
 One use  Reuse and reclamation 
 Water follows one-way path from supply, to 
a single use, to treatment and disposal, to the 
environment 
 Water can be used multiple times for fi t to use 
purposes 
 Build to demand  Manage demand 
 It is necessary to build more capacity as 
demand increases 
 Demand management opportunities are real and 
increasing. Take advantage of all cost-effective 
options before increasing infrastructure capacity 
 Limit complexity and employ standard 
solutions 
 Allow diverse solutions 
 Small number of technologies by urban 
water professionals defi nes water 
infrastructure 
 Decision-makers are multidisciplinary. Allow 
new management strategies and technologies 
 Integration by accident  Physical and institutional integration by design 
 Physically, water supply, wastewater and 
stormwater are separated. However, they 
may be managed by the same agency as a 
matter of coincidence 
 Linkages must be made between water supply, 
wastewater and stormwater, which require highly 
coordinated management 
 Collaboration meant public relations  Collaboration means engagement 
 Approach other agencies and public when 
approval or prechosen solution is required 
 Enlist all stakeholders (other agencies and 
public) in search for effective solutions 
 Source: Pinkham ( 1999 ) 
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cannot be sustained in the long term. Over the years, the integrated approach to 
urban water management has received impetus from the governments at all levels. 
In addition to the NWI signed in 2004, the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) in 2009 agreed to increase its efforts to accelerate the pace of urban water 
management reform and as a result adopted the National Urban Water Planning 
Principles outlined below:
•  Deliver urban water supplies in accordance with agreed levels of service. 
•  Base urban water planning on the best information available at the time and 
invest in acquiring information on an ongoing basis to continually improve the 
knowledge base. 
•  Adopt a partnership approach so that stakeholders are able to make an informed 
contribution to urban water planning, including consideration of the appropriate 
supply/demand balance. 
•  Manage water in the urban context on a whole of water cycle basis. 
•  Consider the full portfolio of water supply and demand options. 
•  Develop and manage urban water supplies within sustainable limits. 
•  Use pricing and markets, where effi cient and feasible, to help achieve planned 
urban water supply/demand balance. 
•  Periodically review urban water plans. 
 The aim of these principles is to provide Australian governments and water utili-
ties with the tools to develop plans to manage the supply/demand balance of a retic-
ulated supply for an urban population. Therefore adoption of a portfolio water 
supply approach is a high policy priority for all the state governments in Australia. 
 However, implementation of this approach depends on policies and regulations 
and encounters various impediments. From the literature related to urban water 
management, it is evident that while progress on the scientifi c and technical aspects 
related to IUWM has been admirable, there are signifi cant institutional aspects that 
need equal attention. Our own studies on water governance in Australia (McKay 
 2005 ,  2007 ), particularly on urban water management (Keremane et al.  2011 ; Wu 
et al.  2012 ; Keremane et al.  2014 ), and other studies (e.g. Maksimović and Tejada- 
Guibert  2001 ; Brown et al.  2006 ; Mitchell  2006 ) have identifi ed a wide range of 
social and institutional barriers to adoption, including insuffi cient practitioner skills 
and knowledge, organisational resistance, the lack of political will, limited regula-
tory incentives and the lack of institutional capacity. Unlike other countries, in 
Australia the water reforms have led the state governments and their agencies to 
better align planning and development requirements with an integrated approach to 
the management of the urban water cycle, but a range of governance factors includ-
ing regulatory conditions, management systems and institutional arrangements are 
impeding new practices. Furthermore, there are acute path dependency issues 
 introspectively for each state and hence federal, state and private sector relations 
issues. According to Dovers ( 2008 ) water institutions in Australia generally operate 
within an institutional system that is consistent with past rather than present knowl-
edge and imperatives. With regard to urban water management, “the co-evolution of 
institutions and large-scale technological infrastructure generates an interdepen-
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dence that makes urban water regimes resistant to change” (Wallington et al.  2010 ). 
However, in recent times many new proposals such as a harmonised system of laws 
and privatisation of public infrastructure are on the table (Infrastructure Australia 
 2013 ); the privatisation issue is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
 While it is widely acknowledged that it is time for new approaches, such new 
approaches are able to evolve within a dialogue-based system as demonstrated with 
the Basin Plan which was embedded in several state-based Australian multi- 
stakeholder processes. Nevertheless, Australia has the institutions and the demo-
cratic structure to form models to enable the transition to a portfolio approach. Most 
state governments in Australia have embarked on implementing IUWM by having a 
portfolio of water supply sources. This chapter focuses on the state of South 
Australia, which is already a well-recognised leader in many aspects of urban water 
management, particularly stormwater harvesting and reuse, and wastewater reuse. 
Furthermore, in October 2014 the South Australian Government released an issues 
paper that stated the Government’s commitment to furthering the urban water man-
agement reforms by developing an innovative integrated urban water management 
plan for Greater Adelaide. (DEWNR  2014 : 3). Accordingly, this chapter attempts to 
explore the legal and policy challenges for implementing an integrated urban water 
management plan in Adelaide. 
6.2  Method 
 As mentioned earlier, this chapter is based on our previous work related to water 
governance in Australia, particularly two studies: (1) a legal and governance study 
to identify governance challenges and potential options to support the implementa-
tion of an IUWM plan in Adelaide and (2) examining urban community perspec-
tives about water governance in Australia. The fi rst study included a national and 
international review of literature on institutional arrangements for diversifying the 
water supply source portfolio, face-to-face discussions and an online survey of key 
actors representing different stakeholders/agencies (e.g. SA Water, DEWNR, local 
council, etc.) that are involved in delivering safe and secure water and wastewater 
services to Metropolitan Adelaide (see Table  6.2 ).
 The second study was an online survey of urban communities in three Australian 
cities, namely, the cities of Salisbury and Charles Sturt in South Australia and City 
of Gold Coast in Queensland. The online survey was conducted using an e-mail list 
bought from a permission-based and research-only internet panel of a marketing 
company. This meant that e-mails were sent only to those people who had sub-
scribed to receive e-mails from this company for research purposes. Respondents 
were offered an incentive to enter into a draw for one of eight Coles gift vouchers 
each valued at AUD$50. In total, the survey was sent to 6 000 randomly selected 
e-mail addresses, with 370 valid responses. We acknowledge that the response rate 
(6.22 %) is low, and thus the results are likely to be biased. Also, the e-mail addresses 
bought were from three specifi c locations in Australia and hence cannot be gener-
alised. We note these as the limitations of this study. 
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 Table 6.2  List of key stakeholders participating in the study 
 Stakeholder agencies 
 SA Water (9) 
 Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources (5) 
 Environment Protection Authority (3) 
 Department of Primary Industries and Regions (2) 
 Essential Services Commission of South Australia (1) 
 Stormwater Management Authority (1) 
 SA Health (1) 
 Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure (1) 
 Conservation Council of South Australia (1) 
 Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges NRM Board (1) 
 Local governments a (13) 
 International Centre of Excellence in Water Resources Management (3) 
 Private sector through the Water Industry Alliance (14) 
 Notes: Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of representatives 
 a There are 17 city councils in Metropolitan Adelaide, and 13 participated in the study 
6.3  Findings 
 Australia, as discussed above, has embarked on implementing the IUWM approach 
to supply and secure water for urban areas. The overall strategy is to develop effi -
cient and fl exible urban water systems by adopting a holistic approach in which all 
the components of the urban water cycle are integrated and includes a mix of water 
supply sources – freshwater (surface water, groundwater) and produced water 
(desalinated water, stormwater and treated effl uent). For example, in Victoria, 
Melbourne has access to a diverse range of water sources, many of which are avail-
able within the city (metropolitan) boundaries. These include groundwater, urban 
stormwater, rainwater (roof runoff), recycled wastewater and desalinated water. 
Similarly, the water supply mix in Adelaide (the city under study) includes seven 
sources of water listed below and demands management measures:
•  Two surface water sources – Adelaide and Mount Lofty Ranges catchment and 
the Murray River 
•  Groundwater sources 
•  Produced or “new” water sources – desalinated water, recycled wastewater and 
stormwater and 
•  Rainwater/roof water 
 The objective is to secure water supply to the cities now and in the future. 
However, implementation is the challenge because management of water in 
Australia is a complex process; the following section provides an overview of the 
complexity. 
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6.3.1  Water Management in Australia: Institutional 
and Regulatory Model 
 Water management in Australian states and territories is the responsibility of various 
government agencies, water authorities and water utilities. Responsibility for regional 
and local water management lies with various organisations, including catchment 
management authorities, rural water utilities and local water utilities. These organisa-
tions undertake a range of regulatory, administrative and governance functions, and 
as a result there are different institutional models for water management. Regarding 
ownership of the assets and operations, state or local governments own all the water 
utilities in Australia. With the exception of some irrigation schemes, there has been 
little privatisation in the water sector. Australia also has an effective regulatory regime 
to protect public and environmental health along with an economic regulator in each 
state assigned with the responsibility both for prices and for customer service stan-
dards. More details of these arrangements are discussed later in the chapter. 
 The water industry in Australia operates under state laws, and as a result, differ-
ent states and territories have introduced such reforms at different rates and in dif-
ferent ways (Srivastava  2004 ). Because of power sharing, each state government has 
created its own unique system for the allocation and use of water, and so the bodies 
providing water, gas and electricity have become powerful in each state, with little 
evidence of working together (McKay and Halanaik  2003 ). This has led to issues 
related to sharing of water resources, which in turn has forced the states to form 
agreements such as the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement and the Border Ranges 
Agreement (McKay  2002 ). This subsequently moved to a further set of reforms 
within the Australian water sector, and since 1992 the Australian Government has 
embarked on two phases of ambitious reform of state laws and policies for water 
management: the fi rst in 1994, known as the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) reforms, and the second in 2004, known as the National Water Initiative 
reforms (McKay  2006 ,  2007 ; Hussey and Dovers  2006 ). This was followed by the 
passing of the  Water Act 2007 (Commonwealth) which set down a detailed regime 
for the use and management of Australia’s water resources, most signifi cantly 
through requiring the development of a “Basin Plan” (Kildea and Williams  2010 ). 
The Basin Plan was adapted by the Minister in 2012, and it envisages an integrated 
approach across jurisdictions. However, much of its implementation will take place 
through state water resource plans (Kildea and Williams  2010 ). 
 Furthermore, water management in the states and territories is the responsibility 
of various government agencies, water authorities and water utilities. Responsibility 
for regional and local water management lies with various organisations, including 
catchment management authorities, rural water utilities and local water utilities. 
These organisations undertake a range of regulatory, administrative and governance 
functions. Accordingly, across Australia there are different institutional models for 
urban water management. For example, in both Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory, the water service provider owns and operates its assets. In South Australia, 
the water service provider owns the assets, but operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure have been outsourced through a long-term contract to a consortium of 
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private fi rms – ALLWATER. In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the water 
and sewerage assets and business are owned and operated by ACTEW Corporation 
(ACTEW), which is owned by the ACT Government. Table  6.3 indicates the insti-
tutional arrangements in all the Australian states. With respect to ownership and 
operations, state or local governments own all the water utilities in Australia. With 
the exception of some irrigation schemes, there has been little privatisation in the 
water sector. However, there has been restructuring and institutional role separation 
within the public sector departments. The public sector departments have been 
transformed to corporations, subject to the same laws that govern the private sector 
and with clear commercial objectives (Srivastava  2004 ). Further, a number of water 
utilities have contracted out their design, construction and various operational roles 
to the private sector through service or management contracts.
 Regarding the regulatory models, Australia has a variety of regulatory regimes: 
health regulation, environmental regulation and economic regulation. An economic 
regulator has the responsibility both for prices and for customer service standards. 
The emerging trends and practices in Australia with respect to economic regulation 
show a clear shift towards independent regulation, and most of the state and territory 
jurisdictions favour a multi-sector approach. For health regulation, in almost all the 
states, the health department controls compliance with national water and sewage 
quality standards. Environmental regulation comes under an Environment Protection 
Authority/Agency (EPA) in all states, except in Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory, where it is the responsibility of a government department. 
6.3.2  Governance Challenges in Implementing the IUWM 
Plan in Adelaide 
 A review of the literature suggests that there are signifi cant institutional aspects that 
need equal attention while implementing an integrated urban water management 
strategy. Accordingly, a study was conducted in South Australia to assess the legal 
 Table 6.3  Institutional structure of water and wastewater service provision in Australia 
 Regions  Water and wastewater service providers 
 New South Wales  State-owned utilities, statutory authorities, local governments 
 Victoria  State-owned utilities, regional water authorities 
 Queensland  State-owned utilities, statutory authority, local governments, state- 
owned waterboards, drainage boards, bore waterboards, private 
companies 
 South Australia  State-owned utility, local governments 
 Western Australia  State-owned utility, statutory authorities 
 Tasmania  Local government-owned utility 
 Australian Capital 
Territory 
 State-owned utility 
 Northern Territory  State-owned utility 
 Source: LECG Limited Asia Pacifi c  2011 ; NWC  2012 ; DEWS  2013 
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and governance implications of IUWM and to explore the management issues 
related to diversifying the supply portfolio in Metropolitan Adelaide from institu-
tional perspectives. The idea was to work with key stakeholders in government and 
the private sector to identify challenges and possible solutions, based on South 
Australian law and national and international experience. Solutions for implementa-
tion could include legislative (changes to the law), regulatory (changes in the way 
the law is implemented) and institutional (changes in the governance of water sup-
ply and management) aspects. As indicated in Table  6.2 , the stakeholders who took 
part in the study were from a breadth of organisations involved in urban water man-
agement, thereby providing a good representation of the South Australian urban 
water sector. Moreover, they all had signifi cant experience in planning and operat-
ing their systems in the face of uncertainties associated with future hydrology, 
weather, available water supply and projected water demand (which was a main 
selection criterion for participation). Table  6.4 summarises the major issues and 
potential solutions for implementing an integrated strategy in Adelaide, South 
Australia. These data were drawn from the literature review and the interviews. The 
following section discusses these issues in detail from the point of view of the key 
stakeholders.
6.3.2.1  Challenges to Implementing the IUWM Plan in Adelaide 
 The challenges and potential solutions to facilitating the implementation of IUWM 
in Adelaide were identifi ed through preliminary discussions with the stakeholders. 
Literature reviews and documentary analyses also informed this process. For a more 
detailed examination, these issues were then organised into two categories – policy 
challenges and legal challenges – and the participants were asked to rate the speci-
fi ed challenges by using “agree and disagree” scales. They were also encouraged to 
identify additional challenges and/or make further recommendations in relation to 
overcoming these challenges. The results are presented in Table  6.5 .
 The main fi ndings from the analysis presented in Table  6.5 are aligned with 
Giordano and Shah ( 2014 ) who argued that, in essence, integrated water resource 
management is a call to stop fragmentary approaches to water management. 
Fragmentation occurs where responsibility for water governance is allocated among 
multiple actors and/or agencies with relatively little, or no, coordination and a lack 
of clarity around how fi nal decisions are made (Bakker and Cook  2011 ). 
 Water management in Australia is characterised by a lack of intergovernmental 
coordination, as indicated by the study participants who state that “too many differ-
ent regulations and licenses are administered by a large number of different govern-
ment agencies”, and there is a “lack of [an] integrated framework to draw policy 
perspectives together” (see Table  6.5 ). The relationships among key players were 
considered to be complex, and the “lack of clarity on rights and responsibilities for 
all aspects of water management and use” was considered as a very real concern to 
implementing the IUWM plan in Adelaide for operators, as was the long processing 
time required for licensing. 
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 To some extent these issues are universal given that water is a multipurpose fl ow 
resource that constantly transgresses political boundaries, authority over which is 
continually negotiated between different users, sectors and scales of governance. 
This raises the issue of how best to address the fragmentation that is so characteris-
tic of water governance (Keremane et al.  2014 ). The setting “up [of] a process to 
work more collaboratively” and the “develop [ment] of an integrated water manage-
ment plan” were strongly recommended by the participants. “A clear lead role for 
one agency” or “co-ordinat[ion] through one state agency” were other suggestions 
put forward by main actors (see Table  6.5 ). However, the participants pointed out 
that “there is a danger that this would add one more layer to the complexity” and 
that the “lead agency will be crucial for ownership, but must be careful not to only 
have one perspective (e.g. environmental and not industry)”. 
 “Cross-boundary disputes” and “unclear property rights/ownership rights for 
non-prescribed water sources” were considered as important legal challenges to the 
implementation of an integrated urban water management plan in Adelaide. 
However, “unclear access rights to water sources on private land” and “unclear pri-
vate ownership of water courses” were not viewed as major challenges. The partici-
pants argued that ownership is clear but not well understood and expensive for 
individual landowners. As quoted by one, “according to legislation, watercourse 
ownership is clear. What’s not clear are the obligations attached to this”. The partici-
pants argued that “this extends throughout the water, wastewater, and recycled water 
 Table 6.4  Governance challenges and potential solutions for implementing IUWM plan in 
Adelaide 
 Governance challenges  Possible solutions 
 Institutional fragmentation  Establishing governance model that links government, civil 
society and science in a set of partnerships and that promotes 
close collaboration and interactions between each of these 
sectors and/or adopt models that are site specifi c 
 Unclear ownership and access 
rights to the new water resources 
(stormwater, wastewater, MAR) 
 Institutional reforms to ensure new water sources are 
considered in the planning framework at the appropriate 
level and complementary legislative reforms to clarify the 
rights and obligations for new water sources 
 Funding for stormwater 
management 
 Encourage private sector participation and/or local 
government authorities establishing their own dedicated and 
stable funding mechanisms known as stormwater utility a in 
the USA. This may require institutional and regulatory 
changes 
 Public perceptions and 
acceptance of new water 
resources 
 Public education by developing an effective water education 
plan 
 Community participation  Develop effective stakeholder engagement processes and 
maintain transparency 
 Note:  a Stormwater utility is a method of stormwater fi nancing where property owners are charged 
a modest fee for using the stormwater drainage network. The revenue gained is used to fi nance 
capital and operating expenses that are needed for local stormwater quality and quantity manage-
ment 
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 Table 6.5  Challenges to implementing the IUWM and potential solutions 
 Strongly 
disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree 
 Strongly 
agree  Unsure 
 1. Policy challenges 
  Too many different 
regulations and licences are 
administered by a large 
number of different 
government agencies 
 0 %  9 %  7 %  41 %  39 %  4 % 
  Lack of clarity on rights and 
responsibilities for all aspects 
of water management and use 
 0 %  7 %  13 %  37 %  37 %  7 % 
  Lack of integrated framework 
to draw policy perspectives 
together 
 0 %  4 %  17 %  30 %  48 %  0 % 
   Processing of licensing 
takes far too long 
 2 %  7 %  30 %  30 %  20 %  11 % 
   Suggested solutions 
  Set up a process to work more 
collaboratively 
 0 %  0 %  9 %  45 %  43 %  2 % 
  Developed an integrated water 
management plan 
 0 %  7 %  25 %  30 %  36 %  2 % 
  A clear lead role for one 
agency 
 2 %  5 %  20 %  36 %  36 %  0 % 
  Recommend to coordinate 
through one state-based 
agency 
 7 %  2 %  23 %  39 %  30 %  0 % 
 2. Legal challenges 
  Cross-boundary disputes  0 %  11 %  11 %  57 %  15 %  7 % 
  Unclear property rights/
ownership rights for 
non-prescribed water sources 
 0 %  13 %  17 %  39 %  22 %  9 % 
  Unclear access rights to water 
sources on private land 
 0 %  24 %  22 %  30 %  17 %  7 % 
  Unclear private ownership of 
water courses 
 0 %  26 %  22 %  30 %  17 %  4 % 
  Suggested solutions 
  There should be certainty and 
a collaborative effort for best 
policy instrument 
 0 %  0 %  11 %  41 %  43 %  4 % 
  Clarify the ownership of 
stormwater and water in the 
creek and if they need to be 
part of the optimal mix in case 
of aquifer recharge- injected 
water entitlements 
 2 %  4 %  13 %  54 %  22 %  4 % 
  Political solution NRM Code 
of Conduct for maintaining 
water sources 
 2 %  7 %  36 %  36 %  9 %  11 % 
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markets, whether by local government or the private sector. Unless sustainability 
can be re-integrated into water policy, there will be a disintegrated approach that 
simply drives water sources to be least cost”. 
 The participants strongly recommended that “certainty, collaborative effort for 
[the] best policy instrument” was needed to overcome the challenges. Some of the 
other possible solutions identifi ed included “clarify[ing] the ownership of stormwa-
ter and water in the creek if they need to be part of the optimal mix and in case of 
aquifer recharge-injected water entitlements” and having “a clear Act for a multi- 
purpose sustainable IUWM strategy/plan”. However, the participants acknowledged 
that in practice, it may take a considerable amount of time to achieve certainty and 
collaborative effort for a best policy instrument and clear ownership. 
6.3.2.2  Barriers to Implementing IUWM Plan in Adelaide 
 In the literature, there is agreement about the hurdles faced in implementing an 
IUWM plan, and two factors – organisational culture and institutional capacity – 
emerge as important elements that infl uence this change, particularly with respect to 
the diversifi cation of water sources (Wallington et al.  2010 ). Organisational culture 
is defi ned in many different ways in the literature. However, the most commonly 
understood defi nition of organisational culture is “the way we do things around 
here” (Lundy and Cowling  1996 : 168). Another important issue related to imple-
menting the “new” strategy is institutional capacity. The building of institutional 
capacity is important for encouraging institutional change (Brown and Farrelly 
 2009 ). Also, as Wakely ( 1997 ) argues, institutional capacity determines the ability 
of an institution to perform effectively at its own tasks and to coordinate with others 
in its fi eld. In addition, within the water industry, as argued by Mukheibir et al. 
( 2014 : 71), “the rigid cultural norms of organisations, professionals and academics 
… and capacity development, are barriers to integrated and innovative water man-
agement”. In this regard, the aim of this study was to examine the perceptions of the 
key stakeholders in the South Australian urban water sector about these barriers (see 
Fig.  6.1 ).
 The participants agreed that the organisational culture of government depart-
ments was a major barrier to the implementation of IUWM in Adelaide as refl ected 
in the quote below:
 …, the culture is one where mistakes are never acknowledged. The organisations do not 
hold themselves accountable for their failings and broken promises. Until this can change, 
the entire sector will be uncertain. 
 In terms of the signifi cance of the impact of these barriers, the abovementioned 
issue of organisational culture was followed by institutional capacity, institutional 
uncertainty about access rights and institutional uncertainty about the ownership of 
water. Full compliance with environmental regulations and public health regula-
tions was not considered to be a major barrier. See Keremane et al. ( 2014 ) for fur-
ther discussions on these issues. 
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 In fact, “institutional capacity” was not considered to be an issue by the partici-
pants; they only considered it to be too dispersed/unfocused at present. This was 
primarily considered to be a fi nancial issue about the resourcing of SA Water and 
Department of Environment, Water, and Natural Resources (DEWNR). The partici-
pants further indicated that “institutional uncertainty about the ownership of water” 
and “institutional uncertainty about access rights” depended on the source and were 
related to non-prescribed sources only. These were primarily related to stormwater 
reuse and managed aquifer recharge (MAR) schemes. “Full compliance with public 
health regulations” was not considered as a major barrier to the implementation of 
IUWM in Adelaide; however, “compliance” was perceived as being necessary. 
 The participants agreed that “IUWM must be established to be environmentally- 
sustainable”. Rather than a barrier, “full compliance with environmental regula-
tions” was considered to be a driver because more wastewater and stormwater reuse 
results in less environmental impact on marine waters. In addition, “environmental 
regulation” was criticised as being “a rubber stamping exercise” and “the real bar-
rier is that organisational players cannot make clear commitments towards how they 
will protect and enhance biodiversity, or how they will transition towards truly sus-
tainable management practices”. 
6.3.3  Issues Related to Ownership and Governance Structures 
 From the literature and discussions above, it is clear that the impediments to imple-
menting an integrated approach are not generally technological, but are instead, 
socio-institutional. In this study the stakeholders were asked to voice their opinion 
about demand management and the existing governance arrangements related to 
different water sources available in Adelaide, and the results are illustrated in Fig. 
 6.2 . From their responses, it is clear that DEWNR was seen as being responsible for 
the management of the catchments and groundwater, while SA Water played a 
larger role in governing desalinated water and recycled wastewater. When it comes 
to stormwater and rainwater, local governments had a major role to play.
 Fig. 6.1  Stakeholders’ perceptions about the barriers to implementing IUWM in Adelaide 
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 However, when asked how effective the existing arrangements are, more than 
50 % of the respondents were of the opinion that they are poor (Fig.  6.3 ). The stake-
holders substantiated their responses by stating the following:
 Unclear who is responsible or the driver for what… Near impossible to get diverse water 
supply projects being undertaken. State gov. has no funding, staff or capacity to implement 
or administer/approve others to implement. 
 Too many BODIES trying to apply too many POLICIES for such a complex and life- 
critical resource. 
 Highly fragmented with differing responsibilities with established cultures. 
 In addition, 26 % of the respondents indicated that the arrangements are good 
and said that “governance arrangements only need fi ne tuning – no perceived need 
by the public means no leadership by the political class”. It was interesting to note 
that none of the respondents stated that the existing arrangements are very good 
while 19 % were neutral (Fig.  6.3 ). 
 Fig. 6.2  Stakeholders’ perceptions about existing water governance arrangements in Adelaide 
 Fig. 6.3  Effectiveness of existing arrangements 
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 The stakeholders were further asked to indicate who, according to them, should 
be governing these water sources; the results are illustrated in Fig.  6.4 . A major 
change, as indicated by the fi gures, is that most of the stakeholders wanted DEWNR 
to play an enhanced role in the management of the “new” water sources, such as 
stormwater, rainwater, recycled wastewater and desalinated water.
 The respondents were asked to provide suggestions for improving the existing 
arrangements. Some of the responses are given below:
 We could consider a high-level small Adelaide Water Authority reporting direct to / or 
chaired by the Minister with sole responsibility for Adelaide’s source water supplies. This 
Authority could consist of a rep from each of these existing orgs. 
 I’ve indicated DEWNR from the list however consideration of a multi-stakeholder sup-
ported entity possibly lead by DEWNR may also be considered. 
 The survey further asked the stakeholders to respond to a question specifi cally 
related to who should control access to Adelaide’s “new” water sources (see Fig. 
 6.5 ). The majority of the stakeholders perceived that SA Water should control access 
to desalinated water (80 %) and recycled water (>60 %). In relation to stormwater, 
the majority of the stakeholders (>70 %) were of the opinion that DEWNR should 
control access, followed by local councils (around 60 %). In the case of rooftop 
water/rainwater, more than 60 % of the stakeholders felt that local councils should 
control access, followed by DEWNR at around 37 %.
 Some of the other suggestions provided by the stakeholders for controlling the 
access to Adelaide’s new water sources include:
 Adelaide needs a respected body strong enough to oversee the management of Adelaide’s 
Total Water Sources. 
 Under current governance arrangements there is no one body that should be in control 
of access to stormwater. Would need to change the governance arrangements. 
6.3.4  Privatisation of Public Infrastructure 
 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, one of the new approaches to achieve improved 
governance is privatisation of public infrastructure including water infrastructure 
assets. In 2012 Infrastructure Australia prepared a paper titled  Australia ’ s Public 
 Fig. 6.4  Stakeholders’ perceptions on who should be responsible for governing Adelaide’s water 
sources 
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Infrastructure –  Part of the Answer to Removing the Infrastructure Defi cit that 
backed the idea of Australian governments transferring publicly owned infrastruc-
ture to the private sector and using the net proceeds to build the new infrastructure. 
The report further suggested that transferring existing infrastructure to the private 
sector would also achieve signifi cant broader economic productivity benefi ts from 
introducing private sector discipline, improving the ability to fi nance the expansion 
of infrastructure as required, greater transparency in the costs of community service 
obligations and improved governance – where the government is no longer both the 
regulator and the owner. 
 The report identifi ed 82 profi t-making government assets that could be sold rela-
tively quickly – in some cases within a year – and without major regulatory changes. 
It also recommended selling the assets, which include power generators, airports, 
ports and water utilities, to Australian superannuation funds, which are particularly 
attracted to the steady yields offered by public assets and would help overcome polit-
ical opposition to the privatisation idea. Within the water industry, the report identi-
fi ed ten water infrastructure assets with a hypothetical enterprise value of AUD$37.5 
billion (US$33.1 billion) which could potentially be sold to the private sector in 
order to generate cash to tackle the country’s growing infrastructure defi cit. A fol-
low-up report released in 2013, entitled  Australia ’ s Public Infrastructure – Update 
Paper reinforced this point of selling public assets to fund infrastructure projects. 
 However, in the absence of a level regulatory playing fi eld, the move is unlikely 
to be followed up with any tangible action. To address this issue, the  Infrastructure 
Australia:  2013  State of Play Report recommended setting up a national water regu-
lator to “provide stability, a clear national policy objective, improve opportunities 
for private sector investment through great accountability, less red tape, and appro-
priately put distance between a state-owned business and the regulator”. Amidst all 
these developments, Australia’s former Finance Minister Mr. Hockey had offered 
states billions to sell off their assets. Under the deal to promote infrastructure invest-
ment, the states would have to agree to privatise assets. The corporate tax the private 
owner would then pay to the federal government will be returned to the respective 
state government as a tax equivalent incentive payment. Currently state government- 
owned corporations do not pay company tax. Consequently, in the interests of com-
 Fig. 6.5  Stakeholders’ perceptions on who should control access to Adelaide’s “new” sources of 
water 
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petition, these corporations must pay state governments a tax payment equivalent to 
what the corporation would pay if subject to federal company tax. However, water 
privatisation is a highly controversial topic and touches on the much broader argu-
ments for and against the private control of formerly public services. For example, 
see Box  6.1 about a dispute between private water suppliers and the state govern-
ment in Adelaide with regard to supplying drinking water. 
 Box 6.1: Confl ict Between Water Suppliers Leaves Urban Residents in 
Adelaide Without Water 
 The Adelaide Hills Face Zone suburb of Skye was left without water for 
showering and fl ushing toilets for three days this week coinciding with a 
spell of extreme fi re danger. The problem was blamed on a dispute 
between two independent water companies and a local council that does 
not believe it has any responsibility. Despite Skye being just 8 km from 
the CBD, its residents have been without mains drinking water since the 
area was subdivided 50 years ago. SA Water and the State Government at 
the time decided it would cost too much to bring mains water to Skye, 
making it diffi cult for blocks to be sold until the Foothills Water Company 
started digging bores to provide water. 
 About 100 locals sent a petition calling for a mains water supply to 
Burnside Council in September 2008, which was forwarded to SA Water. 
With any extension to its network, SA Water requires two-thirds of the 
residents to agree to it – at a cost of $26,500 per property. But many 
residents did not want to pay and were content with their water supply, 
which is unaffected by water restrictions, and refused. Instead, they rely on 
fi ve different private companies whose pipes pump water from bores, while 
others rely solely on rainwater tanks. The water is suitable only for washing 
and gardening, not drinking. In 2010, the Federal Government rejected a $3 
million funding application from Burnside Council to have the suburb 
connected to mains water. 
 Water provided by one of these companies, the Foothills Water Company, 
has announced it will cease operating from August. Foothills Water 
Company director Murray Willis decided to wind up his company because 
he faced a $2 million bill to replace pipes. He placed blame for the pipes’ 
demise squarely with Burnside Council, saying it refused to remove pine 
trees which were damaging his pipes. He and the council have been involved 
in a long-running confl ict over who should foot the bill for the repair the 
pipes. Burnside has paid for some of the repairs. Burnside chief executive 
Paul Deb said the council had never received a request from Mr Willis to 
have trees removed. He said the pipes were installed in the mid-1960s and 
only had a life expectancy of 65 years before they needed to be replaced. 
 Source:  Courier Mail , 2 January 2010;  The Advertiser , 24 March 2014; 
 Messenger Community News , 28 March 2014 
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6.3.5  Community Perspectives on Water Governance 
 The online survey explored perceptions of three urban communities in South 
Australia and Queensland about water governance arrangements and their under-
standing of the local water planning process. Water planning is the core of water 
governance, and effective water planning is fundamental to the NWI and is the best 
way for determining how different sectors share valuable water resources among 
competing uses (NWC  2004 ). The results of this study go some way to inform 
decision-makers in terms of the community’s perspectives on the question of the 
new era post the Water Act 2007, which is  At which point or points in the Australian 
government structure should urban water supply be governed ? The issues addressed 
in the survey were presented in the form of attitude statements, and the fi ndings are 
presented in the following sections. 
6.3.5.1  Water Governance 
 Overall, there was disagreement among the respondents on water governance 
responsibility being clearly defi ned between the federal, state and local govern-
ments in Australia. However, the majority of respondents agreed that the federal 
government should take the main responsibility for water governance (Figs.  6.6 , 
 6.7 , and  6.8 ); these fi ndings are in line with those of Brown ( 2007 ) who reported 
that the bulk of Australians support federalism in Australia and believe it is time for 
many areas of state government regulation to give way to uniform national plans. 
The study (Brown  2007 ) further argued that many citizens favour the idea of 
Canberra taking power because of the inability of the current states to deliver on 
many crucial issues and are no more likely to do so in the future. The fi ndings of this 
study support this argument in the context of water governance since the communi-
ties clearly favoured a federal system of water governance (Table  6.6 ).
 When asked to rank their preference for various authorities to be governing 
Australia’s water resources, the federal government was given the fi rst priority fol-
lowed by the National Water Commission (NWC) which is a statutory water body 
established under the  National Water Commission Act 2004 1 advising the Australian 
Government on national water issues. Therefore the NWC could be viewed as a 
federal authority as well, implying that the communities favoured the idea of 
Canberra taking over the power of water allocation and water planning from the 
states. The water suppliers were the least preferred (Table  6.4 ). 
 Respondents were invited to suggest any other ways to govern Australia’s water 
resources, and we received replies such as “An independent Australia wide author-
ity, with absolute power over all aspects of water supply & usage” and “An indepen-
dent umpire” which further support our argument of federal water governance. 
Some replies mentioned the issue of public involvement by stating “I believe the 
1  In 2014, the National Water Commission Act 2004 was repealed, and the National Water 
Commission was abolished. 
G. Keremane et al.
121
public should have the rights to vote on what and how it should be done!!” or 
“should be a joint effort like a committee made up of all concerned authorities with 
a public consultation” which is clearly mentioned in the NWI clause related to com-
munity partnerships and adjustment (Clause 93, NWC  2004 ). 
6.3.5.2  Water Planning 
 Another issue which our study examined was how respondents perceived the water 
planning process in their respective state. Respondents were asked to rate their 
agreements with four statements related to their understanding of local water plan-
ning issues (see Figs.  6.9 ,  6.10 , and  6.11 ). Overall, respondents indicated that they 
did not have a good understanding of the state government’s water planning pro-
cess. The fi ndings show that generally respondents did not agree that the current 
water planning process had worked well in their regions; neither did they believe 
that the aim of the current water plans is to achieve a sustainable use of groundwater 
in the country. However, respondents were fully confi dent that it is possible to have 
sustainable water allocation policies in local regions.
 Fig. 6.6  Community perceptions about the statement: Water governance issues should be consid-
ered at national level 
 Fig. 6.7  Community perceptions about the statement: The federal government should take over 
the power of water allocation from states 
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 Fig. 6.8  Community perceptions about the statement: The federal government should take the 
responsibility for water planning and development 
 Table 6.6  Ranking order for question: Who do you prefer to be governing Australia’s water 
resources? 
 City of 
Salisbury 
 City of 
Charles Sturt 




 The federal government  1  1  1  1 
 National Water Commission  2  2  3  2 
 State government  3  3  2  3 
 Water resource management 
regional authority 
 4  4  5  4 
 Environment Protection Authority  5  5  6  6 
 Council  6  6  4  5 
 Water supplier  7  7  7  7 
 (Scale from 1 = most preferable to 7 = least preferable) 
 Fig. 6.9  Community perceptions about the statement: The water planning process initiated by 
state government in the 1990s has worked well 
 
 
G. Keremane et al.
123
6.4  Conclusions 
 The major challenge facing Australia is to balance water usage for residential con-
sumption, irrigation, industrial consumption and other uses with provision for 
appropriate environmental fl ows. In agreeing to the fi rst round of water reforms, 
COAG 1994, the Australian government formally acknowledged that rivers, catch-
ments and aquifers are not constrained by state boundaries and that water activities 
in one state could have impacts in other states (Chartres and Williams  2006 ). The 
second round of water reforms known as the National Water Initiative (NWI) recog-
nised the continuing national imperative to develop an effi cient and sustainable 
water use in Australia (Chartres and Williams  2006 ). The fi ndings of this study sug-
gest that there is a need for the third water reform in which water governance at 
national level would be established. Besides, the country has to choose between 
 Fig. 6.10  Community perceptions about the statement: Current Australian water plans aim to 
achieve a sustainable use of groundwater in the country 
 Fig. 6.11  Community perceptions about the statement: It is possible to have sustainable water 
policies in this region 
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more expensive capital investment like desalination plants and environmental 
options like stormwater storage and use via managed aquifer recharge which was 
strongly supported by the respondents. Nevertheless, the question on the extent to 
which and for what uses the community accepts the use of stormwater needs to be 
researched, although our study (Keremane et al.  2011 ) has partly touched upon 
some of these issues from a community perspective. 
 With regard to implementing an integrated urban water management strategy in 
Australia, there is no “one size fi ts all” structural arrangement. While there is grow-
ing support for implementing a portfolio of water supply sources, it is also true that 
there are impediments to implementing this approach. These impediments are not 
generally technological, but are, instead, socio-institutional and in policy and legal 
areas (Keeley and Scoones  2003 ; Gupta  2007 ; Uhlendahl et al.  2011 ; Keremane 
et al.  2014 ). In addition, most of the challenges are related to the “new” water 
sources – stormwater and recycled wastewater. Results of the present study 
 corroborate this fi nding in that the major policy and legal challenges highlighted by 
key stakeholders were related to treated stormwater and recycled wastewater. The 
most commonly identifi ed impediment was the lack of a coordinated institutional 
framework revealing poor inter-organisational collaboration and coordination. In 
particular, the issues included the lack of an integrated water management plan, 
fragmented roles and responsibilities, unclear property rights and the lack of one 
leading agency to implement IUWM, often resulting in organisations being more 
reactive rather than reinforcing a proactive operational culture (Brown and Farrelly 
 2009 ). Fragmented and unclear roles and responsibilities relate not only to internal 
issues within organisations but also between and among other organisations. 
 As Brown ( 2008 ) points out, addressing these issues and achieving sustainable 
urban water management may require institutional change and extensive redesign of 
organisations and their basic operating practices (Brown  2008 ). This requires 
engaging the governments, corporations and society in a three-way collaborative 
effort (Chiplunkar et al.  2012 ). The focus therefore has to be on implementing insti-
tutional change through reform approaches that emphasise the introduction of 
developed coordinating mechanisms and an improvement in intra- and inter- 
organisational relationships (Briassoulis  2004 ; Mitchell  2005 ). This means creating 
favourable institutional contexts, with the appropriate mix of public and private 
actors who are supported by coherent legislative and policy frameworks (Bahri 
 2011 ). This may require modifying existing legislation and policies to conform to a 
consistent framework based on the NWI principles in implementing a diverse water 
supply portfolio. However, achieving (cultural) transformations to encourage insti-
tutional change for implementation of an integrated urban water management 
approach may take several years, and therefore planners and policymakers must 
have a long-term framework for addressing these issues. Looking ahead, there is 
scope for further research to explore the intergovernmental issues and provide mod-
els to enable this transition and hence be a model for the world in portfolio 
approaches. 
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 Chapter 7 
 Rights-Based Freshwater Governance 
for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond 
an Exclusionary Focus on Domestic 
Water Uses 
 Barbara  Van Koppen ,  Anne  Hellum ,  Lyla  Mehta ,  Bill  Derman , 
and  Barbara  Schreiner 
 Abstract  The UN recognition of a human right to water for drinking, personal and 
other domestic uses and sanitation in 2010 was a political breakthrough in states’ 
commitments to adopt a human rights framework in carrying out part of their man-
date. This chapter explores other domains of freshwater governance in which human 
rights frameworks provide a robust and widely accepted set of normative values to 
such governance. The basis is General Comment No. 15 of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2002, which states that water is needed to 
realise a range of indivisible human rights to non-starvation, food, health, work and 
an adequate standard of living and also procedural rights to participation and infor-
mation in water interventions. On that basis, the chapter explores concrete 
 implications of the Comment for states’ broader infrastructure-based water services 
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implied in the recognised need to access to infrastructure, rights to non-discrimina-
tion in public service delivery and respect of people’s own prioritisation. This 
implies a right to water for livelihoods with core minimum service levels for water 
to homesteads that meet both domestic and small-scale productive uses, so at least 
50–100 l per capita per day. Turning to the state’s mandates and authority in allocat-
ing water resources, the chapter identifi es three forms of unfair treatment of small-
scale users in current licence systems. As illustrated by the case of South Africa, the 
legal tool of “Priority General Authorisations” is proposed. This prioritises water 
allocation to small-scale water users while targeting and enforcing regulatory 
licences to the few high-impact users. 
 Keywords  Human rights •  Freshwater governance •  Socioeconomic rights • 
 Multiple-use water services •  Water allocation •  Licence systems 
7.1  Introduction 
 In 2010, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the UN Human Rights 
Council adopted two resolutions that affi rmed the recognition of the right to water 
for drinking, personal and other domestic uses and sanitation as a justiciable and 
enforceable human right derived from the right to an adequate standard of living (A/
RES/64/292 in UN  2010a ; and A/HRC/RES/15/9 in UN  2010b ). The far-reaching, 
legally binding implication was that it obliged states as duty bearers to ensure that 
every citizen has affordable access to water infrastructure services for drinking, 
personal and other domestic uses and sanitation. This political commitment was a 
breakthrough in linking water development and management with international 
human rights frameworks and national rights-based constitutions. The narrow focus 
on safe drinking water, personal and other domestic uses and sanitation represents a 
political  priority that does not fully correspond to the right to an adequate living 
standard, which includes water as a part of the right to food. Some governments, for 
example, of South Africa and India, have enacted rights-based water laws that make 
 prioritisation of domestic water uses and sanitation mandatory. Many national and 
international human rights institutions; public water, sanitation and hygiene organ-
isations; and civil society organisations also  prioritise its realisation (UNICEF and 
WHO  2015 ; WaterLex  2014 ). 
 However, this prioritisation does not exclude similar rights-based prioritisation 
in other domains of water development and management, on the contrary. The 
premise of this chapter is that international human rights instruments and constitu-
tional rights are a highly appropriate, if not the only, normative yardstick for states 
in the twenty-fi rst century to fulfi l their duty and authority in freshwater governance 
in the broadest sense. This premise is not unique to the water sector. Human rights 
have been mainstreamed in the UN’s development planning since 1997. In 2003, 
the UN produced a statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based 
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Approaches to Development Cooperation, and in 2009, the 19 organisations of the 
United Nations Development Group established the Human Rights Mainstreaming 
Mechanism (Baillat et al.  2013 ). Human rights also inspire citizens and states, as in 
Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, to adopt new rights-based constitu-
tions to shed the legal legacy of their colonial predecessors. As also refl ected in the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a global consensus is emerging on 
human values embodied in human and constitutional rights. This is undoubtedly the 
world’s most infl uential normative value system and yardstick to steer global and 
national state interventions. These trends also provide fertile ground for rights- 
based freshwater governance in the broad sense, including, but not limited to, a 
priority for water for drinking, personal and other domestic uses and sanitation 
alone. 
 In the water sector, a growing number of human rights institutions, civil society 
organisations and researchers have conceptualised rights-based freshwater gover-
nance and have invoked human rights frameworks in action and litigation. For 
example, a call for wastewater management supported the realisation of the right to 
sanitation. Various national and global human rights institutions, especially in Latin 
America, exposed major water pollution and damage by mines and exclusion from 
any voluntary, informed and prior consent as violation of the human right to a clean 
environment (WaterLex  2014 ). In other cases, rights to a clean environment are 
invoked to justify a quantitative reservation of “environmental fl ows”. New issues 
have been raised pertaining to the duty of the state to ensure fl ood protection and 
prevent soil erosion (WaterLex  2014 ). 
 The past two decades have also seen a strong global move towards participation, 
transparency, accountability and access to information or “free, prior and informed 
consent”. In some cases of large-scale investments in dams, for example, in Latin 
America, human rights to participation are invoked. However, others, such as the 
global Water Integrity Network, aim at transparency, accountability and participa-
tion in the water sector and combating corruption as values on their own, and refer-
ence to human rights is rare. A case that is raised as a human rights issue with 
far-reaching implications regards the nature of private water services providers’ 
obligations relating to disclosure of environmental information (WaterLex  2014 ). 
 Duties of the state to realise constitutional rights and international human rights 
that it ratifi ed also hold for two other core mandates of the state in freshwater gov-
ernance. One is public infrastructure-based service provision for productive water 
uses, including agriculture, mining and industries. Water volumes used for produc-
tive purposes are much higher than for domestic uses; the latter represent at the 
most two to three percent of total water volumes used. The state is also the primary 
regulatory authority, not only with responsibilities to safeguard water quality as 
mentioned, but also responsible for the allocation of water quantities, often as the 
statutory custodian of the nation’s water resources. 
 The importance of rights-based approaches in these two core tasks of states is 
increasingly recognised. The Water Governance Facility of the United Nations 
Development Programme at Stockholm International Water Institute (WGF  2012 ) 
emphasised precisely these domains: “Human Rights Based Approaches can be 
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very useful to advance equity aspects of distribution of water rights and non- 
discrimination of water resources management and allocation” (WGF  2012 : 5). 
“The international human rights framework can help to set development priorities 
and provide a way to address confl icting rights and interests that is transparent and 
emphasises redress when rights are violated” (WGF  2012 : 12). Rights-based 
approaches fi ll a major gap in the dominant discourse of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM), as “In practice IWRM has to a large degree neglected to 
directly address social equity issues and Human Rights Based Approaches can be 
seen as a methodology to strengthen such work” (WGF  2012 : 13). 
 The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition in their report 
on Water for Food Security and Nutrition examined the interlinkages between food 
security, water and nutrition in relation to the right to food and the current right to 
water for personal and domestic uses. One of the key recommendations is 
“Promoting a rights-based approach to water for food security and nutrition” (HLPE 
 2015 : 108). 
 Scholars started exploring concrete implications of rights-based approaches for 
women, the poor and other marginalised groups. Hellum et al. ( 2015 ) invoked the 
right to non-discrimination in the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. Recognising the indivisibility of rights and the 
importance of both domestic and productive uses of water for multifaceted well- 
being, they made the case for a gender-equal right to water for livelihoods (Hellum 
et al.  2015 ). 
 In the remainder of this chapter, we will further examine concrete implications 
of closing the current gap between the state as duty bearer of human rights and the 
state as infrastructure-based water provider for both domestic and productive uses 
and as regulator in allocating water resources. The focus is on the most marginalised 
women and men in low- and middle-income countries, whose human rights to water 
are most severely violated. In the following, we fi rst go back to the fi rst milestone 
in connecting human rights and water management. This is the legal opinion on the 
human right to water by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), in its General Comment No. 15 of 2002 (UN CESCR  2003 ). This 
Comment prioritised water for drinking and other domestic uses and underpinned 
the Resolutions in 2010. However, as we will see in the next section, this Comment 
also clearly identifi ed prioritisation in other dimensions of freshwater governance, 
in particular in infrastructure development and water allocation. 
 Section  7.3 discusses rights-based approaches for the core function of the state 
of promoting infrastructure development, partly by own public investments in infra-
structure and partly by promoting others to invest. Section  7.4 examines rights- 
based state regulation in the quantitative allocation of water resources, as illustrated 
by experiences in South Africa. Section  7.5 draws conclusions. 
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7.2  Broader Prioritisation in CESCR General Comment 
No. 15 
 Unlike the right to food, the right to water was not explicitly acknowledged in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Water was only indirectly referred to 
as derived from the right to life and dignity. Explicit but very brief references to a 
right to water were made in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (UN  1979 ) and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UN  1990 ). The process of recognition of the right to water thus evolved 
much later than the right to food (Mehta  2014 ; Hellum et al.  2015 ). 
 On November 27, 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights adopted the General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water, elabo-
rating the norms and defi nitions of the human right to water. 1 The Committee articu-
lated both substantive and procedural aspects of a human right to water (UN CESCR 
 2003 ). It highlighted the many ways in which a right to water is derived from and 
contributes to realising other socioeconomic rights, referring to the Vienna Declaration 
(UN  1993 ) that states: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a 
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis”. 
 While emphasising a priority for water provision for personal and domestic uses, 
the Comment recognises that priorities  also and simultaneously include water to 
prevent starvation and meet “core obligations” in general. Sanitation is also 
mentioned:
 Water is required for a range of different purposes, besides personal and domestic uses, to 
realize many of the Covenant rights. For instance, water is necessary to produce food (right 
to adequate food) and ensure environmental hygiene (right to health). Water is essential for 
securing livelihoods (right to gain a living by work) and enjoying certain cultural practices 
(right to take part in cultural life). Nevertheless, priority in the allocation of water must be 
given to the right to water for personal and domestic uses. Priority should also be given to 
the water resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as water required to 
meet the core obligations of each of the Covenant rights. (General Comment No. 15 para 6) 
 General Comment No. 15 further explicitly refers to farming and livelihoods and 
the need for infrastructure to realise access to water:
 People should not be deprived of their means of subsistence. States should ensure adequate 
access to water for subsistence farming and for securing the livelihoods of indigenous peo-
ples. This also entails that disadvantaged and marginalized farmers, including women farm-
ers, have equitable access to water and water management systems, including sustainable 
rain harvesting and irrigation technology. (General Comment No. 15 para 7) 
1  General Comment No. 15, The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – ICESCR), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Twenty-ninth ses-
sion, 2002). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) monitors the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (UN 
 1966 ). General comments are interpretations of the contents of rights included in the ICESCR by 
the Committee. The Committee stressed the State’s legal responsibility in fulfi lling the right and 
defi ned water as a social and cultural good and not solely an economic commodity. 
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 Referring to the general right to non-discrimination, “the right of access to water 
and water facilities and services should be ensured on a non-discriminatory basis, 
especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups” (General Comment No. 15 
para 8). 
 The Comment also includes procedural rights:
 The right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-making processes that may 
affect their exercise of the right to water must be an integral part of any policy, programme 
or strategy concerning water. Individuals and groups should be given full and equal access 
to information concerning water, water services and the environment, held by public 
authorities or third parties. (General Comment No. 15 para 48) 
 Impacts from state and non-state actors’ actions are included in these procedural 
rights:
 Before any action that interferes with an individual’s right to water is carried out by the 
State party, or by any other third party, the relevant authorities must ensure that such actions 
are performed in a manner warranted by law, compatible with the Covenant, and that com-
prises: (a) opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) timely and full 
disclosure of information on the proposed measures; (c) reasonable notice of proposed 
actions; (d) legal recourse and remedies for those affected; and (e) legal assistance for 
obtaining legal remedies. (General Comment No. 15 para 25) 
 As mentioned, the prioritisation for domestic water uses in General Comment 
No. 15 was the basis for the breakthrough in rights-based approaches to water 
development and management in 2010. In the next section, we explore the implica-
tions of General Comment No. 15 for prioritisation in infrastructure development 
for productive and multiple water uses. 
7.3  Rights-Based Water Services for Productive and Multiple 
Water Uses 
 Infrastructure development is society’s primary way to ensure that water of the right 
quality and quantity is available at the right time at the right site for human use or 
to protect against fl ooding and too much water. Storage infrastructure increases the 
quantities of water resources available for human use year-round, so as to “increase 
the pie” of available water. Water “infrastructure” is broad; it ranges from buckets 
or micro-basins to capture run-off for plant roots to large-scale dams. The state 
plays a crucial role in infrastructure development by investing in construction, oper-
ation and maintenance or by enabling and capacitating people to invest themselves 
in technologies for self-supply, for example, by training or supporting water tech-
nology supply chains and dissemination of, for example, affordable pumps and 
energy. 
 A human right to state-promoted infrastructure services for productive water 
uses to realise the right to non-starvation, food, work and an adequate standard of 
living can be derived from at least three aspects of General Comment No. 15. The 
B. Van Koppen et al.
135
fi rst aspect is the Comment’s acknowledgement that irrigation and water-harvesting 
technologies (or more broadly, agricultural water management technologies) are 
needed and, hence, that the state is a duty bearer in respecting, protecting and fulfi ll-
ing this need, in the same way as the state already commits to the current human 
right to water for personal and domestic uses. 
 The second aspect, namely, the reference in the General Comment to equitable 
access and non-discrimination in state subsidies in public irrigation schemes and 
other projects, raises pertinent new questions about the benefi ciaries of public 
investments in water infrastructure. The water, sanitation and hygiene subsector 
measures the performance of its services in terms of people reached with those ser-
vices. In contrast, people are largely invisible in the productive water subsectors. 
For example, irrigation performance indicators are about sizes of irrigated land, 
kilometres of canals and perhaps performance and users’ satisfaction about water 
service delivery, crop yields and potential aggregate incomes. Numbers of farmers, 
let alone their gender or class, are lacking in routine monitoring. At best, assump-
tions about benefi ciaries can be made on the basis of the affordability of technology: 
bucket irrigation is likely to benefi t the poorest. 
 More broadly as well, the terminologies for productive water uses are mono-
lithic, abstract, aggregate “sectors”, such as “the” irrigation, hydropower, mining or 
municipal water sectors. Major intra-sectoral differences between, for example, 
small-scale subsistence farmers and large-scale agribusiness are too often over-
looked. Connecting two or three sectors into a “nexus” confi rms this people-blind 
discourse. This persistent single-water use and sector-based discourse hides inequal-
ities, depoliticises priority setting and is a strong obstacle for any people-centred 
approach, including human rights-based approaches. Benefi ts of irrigation schemes 
depend on irrigated area, so people with more land benefi t more from “irrigation” 
investments. Or as illustrated in South Africa, it is true that the government is pro-
gressively working towards non-discrimination in access to public funding and pay-
ment for municipal and irrigation water services by those who can pay. However, a 
sector-based language continues to hide how the “haves” who benefi tted from large 
public investments in sophisticated infrastructure by the apartheid state are still the 
main benefi ciaries of state subsidies to operate and maintain these bulk water sup-
plies. Insight into the distribution of benefi ts of public sector-based fund allocation 
and the grounds for this distribution is likely to reveal unfair discrimination. 
 Hidden in these sectors, poor women’s and men’s water needs for productive 
uses to meet the human right to food and an adequate standard of living and cultural 
uses and to prevent starvation are mostly ignored. Yet, without alternative liveli-
hood strategies, poor people tend to have more diversifi ed and climate-dependent 
livelihoods than anyone else and, hence, depend more than anyone else on secure 
access to water for a range of productive uses in livestock, cropping, horticulture, 
fi sheries, tree growing, crafts and small-scale enterprise. 
 The third aspect of General Comment No. 15 that underpins a right to water 
infrastructure services for productive uses is the right to participation. In addition to 
ensuring participatory procedures, participation also concerns respecting, protect-
ing and fulfi lling poor people’s own priorities for domestic  and a range of  productive 
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uses. These priorities for multiple uses are overlooked in the single-use sectoral 
approaches of the compartmentalised water sector, in which infrastructure is 
designed for one single use, either irrigation, or domestic uses, or livestock. Such 
infrastructure designed by public planners for single uses is in reality and invariably 
turned into multipurpose infrastructure (Van Koppen et al.  2009 ,  2014a ). 
 “Domestic” water supplies are used for a range of productive uses, which help 
meeting basic food supplies and income generation (Moriarty et al.  2004 ). For 
example, Hall et al. ( 2013 ) found that even at consumption levels of 20 l per capita 
per day, half of the households used these quantities for domestic  and productive 
uses. In mountainous areas with free gravity energy in Colombia, the proportion of 
households using pipes for multiple uses is 82–98 % in three rural areas, but only 
just below 50 % in two urban areas (Van Koppen et al.  2009 ). Pérez de Mendiguren 
Castresana ( 2004 ) found in a rural area in South Africa that the proportion of house-
holds using “domestic” supplies for productive uses was higher where the water 
supplies were more reliable. Similarly, irrigation schemes are used for multiple pur-
poses as the rule, also by the landless and women who don’t have access to irrigated 
land (Meinzen-Dick  1997 ; Renault et al.  2013 ). Infrastructure exclusively for irriga-
tion is the exception, for example, as groundwater pumping in distant fi elds. 
 Instead of declaring such non-planned uses as “illegal” and trying to prevent 
these uses (typically in vain), these uses should be acknowledged as people’s right 
to set their own priorities. Irrigation planners should certainly respect people’s pri-
ority for domestic uses. In genuine participatory water services, people’s multiple 
water needs and priorities should be the starting point of planning and providing 
water services. Since the early 2000s, this approach of so-called Multiple Use Water 
Services (MUS) has been fi eld tested across the world and is now applied in 22 
countries (see  www.musgroup.net ). Multipurpose infrastructure and locally driven 
combinations of multiple water sources also emerged spontaneously wherever the 
prioritisation of general development interventions was left to local players. This 
was the case in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, which reaches 55 million people per year. This turned out to be the world’s 
largest rural water supply programme (Verma et al.  2011 ). The development of 
multipurpose infrastructure, in which water is taken from multiple sources to meet 
multiple needs, is the way in which communities have been managing their water 
resources since time immemorial in a more cost-effective and environmentally 
friendly way than the public sector. 
 One concrete implication of these aspects of General Comment No. 15 for 
infrastructure- based services is a new defi nition of the substantive core minimum 
human right to infrastructure-based water services. Currently, service levels for 
water supplies delivered near or at homesteads are 20–50 l per capita per day, sup-
posedly to meet personal and domestic needs (and sanitation) only. This should be 
raised to 50–100 l per capita per day in order to  also enable basic productive uses 
(Hall et al.  2013 ; Van Koppen et al.  2014a ). Unlike irrigation development that 
tends to disproportionately favour those with more land, multiple-use water ser-
vices to homesteads benefi t everybody, including the land-poor and landless, child- 
headed households, the sick and disabled. Out of these quantities, three to fi ve litres 
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per capita per day should be safe for drinking and cooking, for example, through 
point-of-use water treatment as also recommended by health specialists. Insisting 
on the high drinking water quality standards for all other domestic water uses and 
productive water uses can be a wasteful expenditure. 
7.4  Rights-Based Water Allocation 
 With increasing competition for water, the role of the state in water allocation 
becomes increasingly important as well. This is also the case in the widespread land 
acquisitions and grabs that are typically accompanied by water grabs. The Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food has, in recent years, frequently commented on their 
impact(s) on local people’s food security (Franco et al.  2013 ). As a result of these 
challenges, there have been growing calls to elaborate a human rights perspective to 
land and to water that is more interconnected, more social justice oriented and more 
participatory and encompasses the use of water for production of food at the house-
hold level to meet the right to food (Franco et al.  2013 ). 
 The case of South Africa highlights the challenges and potential rights-based 
solutions at stake. South Africa articulated a progressive rights-based constitution 
under its post-1994 dispensation, committing to suffi cient access to water and food 
for all (RSA  1996 : section 27 (2)). It translated these rights into a rights-based 
Water Services Act ( 1997 ) prioritising access to water for domestic uses and sanita-
tion for all. The South African Human Rights Commission proactively monitors the 
realisation of constitutional rights, including the right to water and sanitation 
(SAHRC  2014 ). 
 Moreover, the National Water Act (1998) (RSA  1998 ) also formally addresses 
the highly unequal distribution of water use as a result of the land and water grabs 
in the colonial era. Calculations show that 1.2 % of the population uses 95 % of the 
allocated water resources, leading to a Gini coeffi cient of 0.99 for rural areas (Cullis 
and Van Koppen  2008 ). The constitutional commitment to redress the inequities of 
the past is translated into the National Water Act as the legal possibility of a dis-
tributive water reform to reallocate water from the “haves” to the “have-nots”. 
Under certain conditions those who have to give up a small share of their water 
allocations for that purpose are not compensated. The Act further enshrines legal 
instruments to allocate water resources, while also redressing inequities of the past. 
The periodic National Water Resource Strategy sets priorities. The administrative 
system to implement water allocation is the licence (or permit) system. The latter 
system is widely applied elsewhere in the world as well (Van Koppen et al.  2014b ). 
The issuing and monitoring of licences are the government’s main tool to  regulate 
water users, for example, by rejecting an application for a licence altogether in over- 
allocated areas or by setting caps on volumes used and reducing the period of a 
licence. Waste discharge conditions (the polluter pays) and payment for water 
resource management tasks (the user pays) are other conditions tied to licences. 
Obviously, such regulation to safeguard suffi cient availability of water of the right 
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quality is especially important for the marginalised, who are often hit hardest by 
others’ overuse and pollution. So licences can be vital tools to implement rights- 
based water allocation. However, as further discussed below, what is often ignored 
is that the licence system is also the only way to obtain formal entitlements to water. 
 In 2008, this commitment to redress the inequities of the past was operation-
alised in a Water Allocation Reform. This sets as targets that 60 % of allocable water 
should be in black hands (“black” meaning Africans, Coloureds and Indians) by 
2020, equally divided among women and men (DWAF  2008 ). Moreover, the National 
Water Resource Strategy (2nd volume) (DWA  2013a ) follows the main principle of 
General Comment No. 15 in  prioritising water uses for poverty eradication and 
redress of inequities of the past as the third highest priority. The fi rst priority is for 
the Reserve, which consists of a Human Basic Needs Reserve (which is currently set 
at 25 l per capita per day and amounts to just one percent of the mean annual run-off) 
and an Ecological Reserve (which is set at considerably higher volumes of about one 
fi fth of the mean annual run-off). The second priority is for international obligations. 
Signifi cantly, water use for poverty eradication and redress of inequities of the past 
has a  higher priority than so-called strategic uses, which is mainly electricity genera-
tion and, lastly, water for general economic purposes that require licences. 
 In spite of these progressive policies and regulations, the disappointing reality 
is that the distribution of all new water uses that were taken up after the promulga-
tion of the National Water Act (1998) has remained as skewed as before. Out of the 
4 284 water-use licences for new water uptake issued between 1998 and 2012, only 
1 518 were for black individuals. Signifi cantly, the total volumes allocated to them 
were very low: just 1.6 % of total water allocated through all licences (DWA 
 2013b ). The percentage of women licence holders is probably less than 10 % 
(Anderson, personal communication). 
 While this perpetuation of inequalities is largely the result of a continued lack of 
access to water infrastructure and skewed land tenure, the policies, regulations and 
the Water Allocation Reform targets fail to be operationalised. Even worse, the 
main water allocation tool to operationalise redress, the licence system, is designed 
in such a way that it treats black women and men, the majority of whom are small- 
and microscale water users, unfairly (as in many licence systems elsewhere). There 
are three grounds why this treatment is unfair. 
 First, while introducing the licence system, the National Water Act (1998) con-
solidated the racial discrimination of black people entrenched in past water rights 
regimes. The Act recognises Existing Lawful Uses that were lawful under the water 
laws preceding 1998 as continuing to be lawful until those rights are converted into 
licences (under a specifi c process of compulsory licensing in specifi c geographic 
areas with one or more water resources). Those former laws were a patchwork of 
legal arrangements, including riparian rights, access to normal and surplus fl ows, 
private groundwater rights, irrigation schedules determined by the irrigation boards, 
permits for commercial afforestation, permits in area-specifi c Government Water 
Control Areas (in both the white Republic of South Africa and former homelands) 
and very weak rights for Africans in former homelands, on white-owned farms or 
black townships. The homelands were declared as state land, so the water resources 
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were also owned by the colonial state. Formally, this right could be transferred to 
inhabitants of the homelands. However, in practice, this hardly ever happened. This 
was “justifi ed” by referring to the bureaucracy: “Sometimes the problem was to 
determine which offi cial of the State had to grant the necessary permission” 
(Thompson et al.  2001 ). In reality, in homelands and on white-owned farms and 
peri-urban settlements, living customary water rights regimes coexisted with the 
formal legislative regime. The recognition of the “Existing Lawful Uses” not only 
implied the acceptance of the highly skewed distribution of water uses but also 
consolidated the much weaker legal status of customary living laws in the former 
homelands, on large-scale farms and peri-urban settings. Where white men can, and 
do, refer to well-defi ned pre-1998 rights, black people cannot, not even to the much 
smaller quantities used. 
 The second ground of unfair treatment of small-scale users regards the obliga-
tory application for licences for the uptake of new water or the area-wide applica-
tion of licensing by every water user under compulsory licensing. In this process, 
small-scale water users, the large majority of whom are black people, face dispro-
portionate administrative costs for relatively small volumes of water. Even though 
procedures for small-scale users are less complex than for high-impact users, the 
efforts remain disproportionate. Moreover, through no fault of their own, the state 
is not even able to allocate its scarce human resources to reach out to all small-scale 
water users who typically live in remote areas with fewer transport and administra-
tive facilities. Women are even more discriminated because licences are typically 
allocated in the name of the household head, which is assumed to be a man and only 
by default a woman. 
 Micro-users are exempted from the obligation to apply for a licence. This is a 
third form of unfair treatment, because the legal status of exempted microscale 
water uses is second-class, as confi rmed by the FAO ( 2004 ):
 The problem is that a person who seeks to benefi t from such an entitlement cannot lawfully 
prevent anyone else from also using the resource even if that use affects his own prior use/
entitlement. Indeed the question arises as to whether or not they really amount to legal 
rights at all. (FAO  2004 ) 
 In line with both General Comment No. 15 and the National Water Resource 
Strategy (2nd volume), this unfair treatment can be ended by rights-based water 
allocation, which legally prioritises water uses that meet the constitution’s socio-
economic rights to access to suffi cient water and food, especially by (indigenous) 
black people (Van Koppen and Schreiner  2015 ). In South Africa, this can be opera-
tionalised through the Act’s legal tool of so-called General Authorisations. These 
are exemptions to the obligation to apply for a licence for small-scale uses for spe-
cifi c groups or water sources, just above the exempted microscale uses (Anderson 
et al.  2007 ). By vesting a priority in such General Authorisation, the second-class 
legal status of exemptions shifts, in principle, to premium-class legal entitlement 
status in line with the high priority in the National Water Resource Strategy (2nd 
volume). The threshold above which water users need to apply for a licence and 
below which they are exempted could be set by realistically assessing the state’s 
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logistic capacity to issue and monitor licences of many small-scale users who, 
together, still hardly use any signifi cant water volumes and the handful of high-
impact users, such as mines and large-scale farmers. State capacity is low; till today, 
many of the high-impact users still get away without any licence, so without any 
state regulation of their water use and waste discharge. As custodian of the nation’s 
water resources, the minister can issue such priority general authorisation with the 
stroke of a pen. However, this option is still being debated, even though such rights-
based priority entitlement to water does not oblige the state in any way to also pro-
vide the infrastructure. 
7.5  Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we discussed how international human rights instruments in general 
and the CESCR General Comment No. 15 on the human right to water in particular 
provide a robust normative system that is well able to address end goals of human 
well-being across the key mandates of the water sector, namely, infrastructure 
development and water resource allocation. Moreover, the recognition of the indi-
visibility and interdependency of human rights applies exceptionally well to water 
resources. Water is key to many dimensions of human well-being and ill-being. 
Secure access to water is especially important for the agrarian livelihoods of the 
rural and peri-urban poor. 
 While the recognition of a justiciable and enforceable right to water for drinking, 
personal and other domestic uses and sanitation has been an important milestone in 
closing the disconnection between the state as duty bearer for human rights and the 
state as investor in water infrastructure and regulator, we argued that this has only 
been a very partial interpretation of the underpinning General Comment No. 15 of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The same Comment also 
indicates priorities in other freshwater governance domains to realise the substan-
tive rights to livelihoods, food, health and an adequate standard of living. This has 
concrete implications for the state’s infrastructure-based water services. Poor peo-
ple’s productive water needs should be fully recognised and met in a non- 
discriminatory manner. The defi nition of a core minimum should not be assumed to 
be for domestic uses only, but should include water for small-scale productive uses 
at and around homesteads as well. This priority for multiple basic uses is already 
widespread practice, but often still seen as “illegal” by sectoral professionals who 
design single-use infrastructure. An inclusive people-driven planning process for 
infrastructure services will spontaneously identify such multiple priorities. 
 A concrete implication of a rights-based approach to the state’s authority and 
responsibility in water allocation is that water should be available for such basic 
uses to meet the right to food, health and an adequate standard of living. Priorities 
in allocation should safeguard such minimum volumes. This should not only be 
defi ned in policies and regulations, but also operationalised in the legal instruments 
to allocate water. Licence systems in particular should be redesigned to prioritise 
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such uses, while targeting regulation and prioritising the state’s resources to enforce 
compliance to the large-scale high-impact users who overuse and pollute water 
most severely. 
 The identifi cation of these further implications of General Comment No. 15 
underlines the chapter’s premise that human rights frameworks provide the indis-
pensable normative framework for twenty-fi rst-century freshwater governance. 
 References 
 Anderson, A., Quibell, G., Cullis, J., & Ncapayi, N. (2007). General authorisations as a tool to 
promote water allocation reform in South Africa.  Law, Environment and Development Journal, 
3 (2), 164–178. 
 Baillat, A., Schmitz, T., & Szabó, M. (2013).  Towards a human rights based water governance: 
Challenges for the post 2015 thematic consultations on water . WaterLex, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 http://www.waterlex.org/new/wp 
 Cullis, J., & Van Koppen, B. (2008).  Applying the Gini coeffi cient to measure the distribution of 
water use and benefi ts of water use in South Africa’s provinces (Unpublished report). 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and International Water Management Institute, 
Pretoria, South Africa. 
 Department of Water Affairs (DWA), Republic of South Africa. (2013a).  National Water Resource 
Strategy (2nd edn, Water for an Equitable and Sustainable Future). Pretoria: Department of 
Water Affairs. 
 Department of Water Affairs (DWA), Republic of South Africa. (2013b).  Water allocation reform . 
Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs. PowerPoint presentation, 16 April 
2013.  http://d2zmx6mlqh7g3a.cloudfront.net/cdn/farfuture/b24vv0q7YzDjaLQee34wk_VAU_
uXpX1_3cq8Lf-w 
 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Republic of South Africa. (2008).  Water allocation 
reform strategy . Pretoria: Chief Directorate Water Use, Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry. 
 FAO. (2004).  Land and water – The rights interface (FAO Legislative Study 84). Rome: Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. 
 Franco, J., Mehta, L., & Veldwisch, G. J. (2013). The global politics of water grabbing.  Third 
World Quarterly, 34 (9), 1651–1675. 
 Hall, R., Van Koppen, B., & Houweling, E. (2013). The human right to safe and clean drinking 
water: A necessary condition for, and limitation on, development in rural and peri-urban com-
munities.  Science and Engineering Ethics, 20 (4), 849–868. doi: 10.1007/s11948-013-9499-3 . 
 Hellum, A., Ikdahl, I., & Kameri-Mbote, P. (2015). Against the current: Engendering the human 
right to water and sanitation. In A. Hellum, M. Kameri, & B. Van Koppen (Eds.),  Water is life: 
Women’s human rights in national and local water governance in Southern and Eastern Africa . 
Harare: Weaver Press. 
 High Level Panel of Experts. (2015).  Water for food security and nutrition . A report by the High 
Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food 
Security, HLPE, Rome, Italy. 
 Mehta, L. (2014). Water and human development.  World Development, 59 , 59–69. 
 Meinzen-Dick, R. (1997). Valuing the multiple uses of water. In M. Kay, Y. Franks, & L. Smith 
(Eds.),  Water: Economics, management and demand (pp. 50–58). London: E&FN Spon. 
 Moriarty, P., Butterworth, J., & Van Koppen, B. (Eds.). (2004).  Beyond domestic: Case studies on 
poverty and productive uses of water at the household level (IRC technical papers series 41). 
Delft: IRC/NRI/IWMI. 
7 Rights-Based Freshwater Governance for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond…
142
 Pérez de Mendiguren Castresana, J. C. (2004). Productive uses of water at the household level: 
Evidence from Bushbuckridge, South Africa. In P. Moriarty, J. Butterworth, & B. Van Koppen 
(Eds.),  Beyond domestic: Case studies on poverty and productive uses of water at the house-
hold level (IRC technical papers series 41). Delft: IRC/NRI/IWMI. 
 Renault, D., Wahaj, R., & Smits, S. (2013).  Multiple uses of water services in large irrigation 
systems. Auditing and planning modernization (The MASSMUS approach, FAO Irrigation and 
Drainage Paper 67). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1996). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 
108). Statutes of the Republic of South Africa Constitutional Law, Offi ce of the President, Cape 
Town, South Africa. 
 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1997). Water Services Act. Act No. 108 of 1997, Government 
Gazette No. 18522, Offi ce of the President, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 Republic of South Africa (RSA). (1998). National Water Act. Act No. 36, Government Gazette 
Vol. 398, 26 August 1998, Offi ce of the President, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 South African Human Rights Commission. (2014).  Report on the right to access suffi cient water 
and decent sanitation in South Africa . South African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg. 
 http://www.gov.za/documents/report-right-access-sufficient-water-and-decent-sanitation-
south-africa-2014 
 Thompson, H. C. M., Stimie, E., Richters, S., & Perret, S. (2001).  Policies, legislation and organi-
zations related to water in South Africa, with special reference to the Olifants River basin 
(Working paper 18 (South Africa working paper no. 7)). Colombo: International Water 
Management Institute. 
 UNICEF., & World Health Organisation. (2015).  Progress on sanitation and drinking water – 
2015 update and MDG assessment . New York: Joint Monitoring Programme UNICEF/WHO. 
 http://www.wssinfo.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/resources/JMP-Update-report-2015_English.
pdf 
 United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) (1966) UN Doc A/6316. 
 United Nations. (1979). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) (1979), UN Doc. A/34/46, United Nations, New York, USA. 
 United Nations. (1990). Convention on the Rights of the Child. General Assembly Resolution 
44/25 of 20 November 1989, United Nations, New York, USA. 
 United Nations. (1993). Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/Conf.157/23 
(12 June 1993), United Nations, New York, USA. 
 United Nations. (2010a). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 64/292. The human right 
to water and sanitation. A/RES/64/292, United Nations, New York, USA. 
 United Nations. (2010b). Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Human 
Rights Council 6 October 2010, A/HRC/RES/15/9, United Nations, New York, USA. 
 United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). (2003). General 
Comment No. 15. The right to water and sanitation (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11, United Nations, 
New York, USA.  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/CESCR_GC_15.pdf 
 Van Koppen, B., & Schreiner, B. (2015). Gender-equality in statutory water law: The case of prior-
ity general authorisations in South Africa. In A. Hellum, M. Kameri, & B. Van Koppen (Eds.), 
 Water is life: Women’s human rights in national and local water governance in Southern and 
Eastern Africa . Harare: Weaver Press. 
 Van Koppen, B., Smits, S., Penning De Vries, F., Mikhail, M., & Boelee, E. (2009).  Climbing the 
water ladder: Multiple-use water services for poverty reduction (Technical report 52). Delft: 
IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre, International Water Management Institute and 
CPWF.  www.musgroup.net 
 Van Koppen, B., Smits, S., Rumbaitis del Rio, C., & Thomas, J. (2014a).  Upscaling multiple use 
water services: Accountability in the water sector . London/The Hague: Practical Action/
IWMI/WLE – International Water and Sanitation Centre IRC – Rockefeller Foundation. 
B. Van Koppen et al.
143
 Van Koppen, B., Van der Zaag, P., Manzungu, E., & Tapela, B. (2014b). Roman water law in rural 
Africa: Finishing the unfi nished business of colonial dispossession.  Water International ,  39 (1): 
49–62.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2013.863636 
 Verma, S., Kurian, B., Malik, R. P. S., Shah, T., & Van Koppen, B. (2011).  Multiple use water 
services in India: Scoping study . India: International Water Management Institute, IRC 
International Water and Sanitation Centre and Rockefeller Foundation. 
 Water Governance Facility (WGF). (2012).  Human rights-based approaches and managing water 
resources: Exploring the potential for enhancing development outcomes (WGF report no 1). 
Stockholm: Stockholm International Water Institute. 
 WaterLex. (2014).  National human rights institutions and water governance: Compilation of good 
practices . Geneva: WaterLex. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ ) which permits any 
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) 
and source are credited. 
 The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative 
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included 
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory 
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or 
reproduce the material.
 
7 Rights-Based Freshwater Governance for the Twenty-First Century: Beyond…
145© The Author(s) 2017 
E. Karar (ed.), Freshwater Governance for the 21st Century, Global Issues 
in Water Policy 6, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43350-9_8
 Chapter 8 
 Inclusive Transboundary Water Governance 
 Anton  Earle and  Marian  J.  Neal 
 Abstract  Transboundary watercourses, including rivers, lakes and aquifers (con-
fi ned and unconfi ned), shared between two or more countries, are home to over 
70 % of the world’s population and supply water for roughly 60 % of global food 
production. It is no surprise that the management of these watercourses has been 
entrusted to national states, which have the power to take sovereign decisions over 
their management, use and conservation. State sovereignty is mitigated through the 
existence of a global institutional framework comprised of customary international 
water law (the norms dictating how states behave), global and regional conventions, 
basin-level agreements and basin management organisations. The good news is that 
there is a large body of joint institutions between countries with transboundary 
watercourses, the UN estimating that around 3600 exist. This in part explains the 
relative lack of military interstate confl icts. Less good news is that despite the exis-
tence of international- and basin-level agreements and basin organisations, the ben-
efi ts to be expected from international cooperation around transboundary 
watercourses have in most cases not materialised. Acute, persistent and seemingly 
intractable problems persist, with ecosystem degradation not being reversed, joint 
investments in water infrastructure not materialising and joint management organ-
isations failing to attract signifi cant long-term support from the respective basin 
states. Despite at least two decades of concerted support by the international devel-
opment community, the impacts of enhanced interstate cooperation are noticeable 
through their absence. This chapter investigates why this may be so and introduces 
a starting point which moves beyond the state-centric approach to transboundary 
water management. In doing so it does not challenge the sovereign right of states to 
manage their watercourses; instead it shows how a range of non-state actors do in 
fact infl uence state practice through a variety of mechanisms. As these mechanisms 
are frequently covert, it becomes diffi cult to assess the integrity of the relationships 
between actors, in turn making public engagement and participation diffi cult. 
Needed is a governance paradigm which opens the decision-making arena to 
 non- state actors all in support of the national governments and their respective man-
dates. This chapter ends with an indication of what such a governance arrangement 
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would look like across the four success factors identifi ed in the preface of this book: 
science- informed decision-making, investments in appropriate infrastructure, devel-
opment of skills and talent and the water use behaviour of stakeholders. 
 Keywords  Transboundary water management •  Customary international law • 
 Cooperation •  Justice •  Governance frameworks 
8.1  Introduction 
 The UN Human Development Report of 2006, which focuses on water issues, con-
cludes that the “scarcity at the heart of the global water crisis is rooted in power, 
poverty and inequality, not in physical availability” (UNDP  2006 : 2). In essence this 
is a crisis of governance. This message is echoed by a range of international organ-
isations (UNDP  2006 ; UNESCO  2008 ; UNEP  2009 ; UN-Water  2008 ; Jacobsen 
et al.  2013 ; World Bank  2013 ). 
 Lacking are effective organisations and institutions for the sustainable develop-
ment and management of the world’s water resources (Bigas  2012 ). This ineffec-
tiveness manifests itself in the poor state of freshwater ecosystems, which according 
to the Worldwide Fund for Nature is the most degraded of all the biomes (WWF 
 2012 ). Of the world’s 177 large rivers (those over 1000 km), only 64 remain free 
fl owing, unimpeded by dams and other barriers, while only 21 of these large rivers 
retain a direct connection with the sea (WWF  2012 ). Water resources are under 
increasing pressure from human growth, activities and settlement (WI  2010 ), indus-
tries and cities that consume vast quantities of water and have to convey water over 
increasing distances to satisfy demands (UN-Habitat  2010 ) and production of crops 
for food and fuel that use ever-increasing amounts of water. 
 Transboundary water resources, including rivers, lakes and aquifers that are 
shared between two or more states, further complicate effective water governance, 
by introducing an international-political dimension. Approximately 276 river basins 
cross international borders and serve as a primary source of freshwater for approxi-
mately 40 % of the world’s population. These basins are home to over 70 % of the 
world’s population and supply water for roughly 60 % of global food production. 
About 30–50 % of the world’s population depend on groundwater source from 608 
transboundary aquifer systems (IGRAC and UNESCO-IHP  2015 ). 
 Water management and allocation decisions that are made at the international 
and national levels often rely on national and subnational organisations for their 
implementation and often rely on civil society and/or local communities for their 
acceptance and legitimisation. This chapter illustrates the imperative for the inclu-
sion of non-state actors in the decision-making architecture of transboundary water 
governance. 
 This chapter will fi rstly clarify a number of terms used in the chapter; it then 
describes the issue of a state-centric approach and the problem that this creates; the 
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concept of multilevel governance is then discussed as a concept that could shed 
some light on the issue; we then delve into more detail on the organisational struc-
ture of transboundary water governance, followed by an exploration of water justice 
and social inclusion. 
8.2  Clarifying Terms 
8.2.1  Scales and Levels 
 There are many defi nitions of scale and level in the literature, and the terms are 
often confl ated. For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to distinguish between 
these two terms. Thus the term scale refers to different ordering systems for space, 
time, administration and jurisdiction (Ramasar  2014 ); and the term level refers to 
points along a scale which in most cases takes on a spatial unit of analysis, for 
example, global, basin, state, province and local levels (Gibson et al.  2000 ; Cash 
et al.  2006 ). 
8.2.2  Organisations and Institutions 
 The decision-making architecture of transboundary water governance comprises 
two scales, namely, organisation and institution. In this chapter the defi nitions from 
North ( 1990 ) are adopted, where institutions are considered “the rules of the game” 
and include principles, policies, regulations, legislation, conventions, agreements, 
treaties and social norms and organisations are considered the “players”, for exam-
ple, government departments, non-government organisations, civil society groups, 
river basin organisations, municipalities and community-based organisations. These 
organisations and institutions can be explicitly mapped out for each transboundary 
water issue of interest as a mechanism to develop a deeper understanding of the 
levels within each scale that comprise this architecture. 
8.2.3  The Issue: A State-Centric Approach 
 The management of transboundary waters naturally falls within the ambit of the 
state. The state is the referent level that is entrusted and empowered to make sover-
eign decisions over the management, use and conservation of these shared waters. 
In relation to water, state sovereignty is upheld through the existence of a global 
institutional framework comprised of customary international water law (the norms 
dictating how states behave), global and regional conventions and bilateral or 
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multilateral basin-level agreements and treaties. The UN estimates that approxi-
mately 3600 joint institutions exist between states to govern transboundary water 
resources (UN-Water  2013 ). 
 However, despite the existence of these institutions, the benefi ts to be expected 
from international cooperation over transboundary water resources have in most 
cases not materialised as expected (Earle et al.  2010 ). Acute, persistent or seemingly 
intractable problems persist, with ecosystem degradation continuing unabated, joint 
investments in water infrastructure not materialising and joint management organ-
isations failing to attract signifi cant long-term support from their respective basin 
states. Despite at least two decades of concerted support by the international devel-
opment community, the impacts of enhanced interstate cooperation are noticeable 
through their absence (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ). These challenges pose a risk to other 
interventions seeking to promote development, peace, regional integration, ecosys-
tem protection and poverty eradication in a transboundary context. Coupled with 
the multiplier effects of climatic change, there exists a real possibility of tensions 
over water escalating at various levels (Ki-Moon  2007 ; NATO  2010 ; OSCE  2010 ; 
Department of Defense (DoD)  2010 ; NIC  2012 ). 
 States at times choose to engage in cooperative processes, while at other times, 
or indeed in other basins, they do not. In the majority of research efforts on trans-
boundary water governance, states are viewed and analysed as homogeneous units, 
with an assumption that water resource use and allocation occurring at the national 
level will cascade down to a broad range of users (Sneddon and Fox  2006 ; Hirsch 
and Jensen  2006 ; Suhardiman and Giordano  2012 ; Reed and Bruyneel  2010 ). The 
fl aw of this assumption is that it omits subnational actors and the role they may play 
in driving transboundary water governance processes at the national and interna-
tional level. 
8.2.4  Connecting the Scales and Levels 
 One thesis that could shed some light on the lack of cooperation over transboundary 
water resources is that of a multilevel governance approach. Multilevel governance 
is both a process and a description of governance architecture. It provides a frame-
work for describing the complex interaction and interdependencies between the 
plethora of “actors” and “rules of the game”. An explicit integration of the different 
levels within the organisational and institutional scales of governance is imperative 
for effective decisions over transboundary water resources to be made, implemented 
and accepted (Patrick et al.  2014a ). 
 Multilevel governance is an arrangement where institutions operate at various 
levels (e.g. local, regional, state, national, global) with multiple mandates and across 
different, but overlapping areas. The use of the term governance rather than govern-
ment refl ects the shift in decision-making powers from the state, where a state is a 
political and geopolitical entity administrated by a government, to non-state actors. 
The more nuanced understanding of this is not a complete shift in power but rather 
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a model of collective bundling of organisations that all infl uence the decision- 
making process (Patrick et al.  2014b ). The devolution of power to other government 
actors through a decentralised state model also adds to this new collective gover-
nance model. The sharing between different actors of the role of institutional devel-
opment, institutional formulation, institutional implementation and institutional 
regulation and monitoring add a further layer of complexity to our understanding of 
governance. 
 Multilevel governance is a network arrangement of institutions that can cooper-
ate to successfully manage common pool resources such as water. Some of these 
institutions may be initiated to manage specifi c aspects of natural resource manage-
ment such as water allocation, or they may be of a more general nature where water 
allocation is one aspect of a bigger portfolio. Each institution is essentially indepen-
dent of the other, although some may be nested, where the scope of authority is 
superseded by the next higher level or they may form an autonomous network of 
institutions with overlapping goals and policy objectives (Ostrom  1996 ). Suhardiman 
and Giordano ( 2012 : 304) contend that the distinctions between what constitutes a 
state and a non-state actor have become blurred, with overlap between these groups 
due to partnerships being formed as well as a movement of individuals between 
these groups. This leads state and non-state actors to develop “nested institutional 
structures” which manage resources at various levels of scale. 
 A multilevel institutional arrangement could distribute resources and capacities 
in such a way that any “perverse incentive and information problems at one level are 
offset to some extent by the positive incentives and information capabilities for 
actors at other levels” (Andersson and Ostrom  2008 : 73) and that this arrangement 
will achieve better water management outcomes than either a completely decentral-
ised or centralised institutional structure (Patrick et al.  2014a ). 
 There are various costs associated with a multilevel governance arrangement 
such as production, administration and bureaucratic costs (McGinnis  2005 ) that 
might exclude it as the most appropriate organisational arrangement for all prob-
lems and goals. It is, however, an appealing concept as it does not prescribe a spe-
cifi c blueprint governance model (Andersson and Ostrom  2008 ), and thus it can 
accommodate contextual issues and differences and make use of existing institu-
tional and organisational structures. It is a system that also acknowledges the 
dynamic nature of water resource governance and is thus more adaptive and respon-
sive to issues that arise at different levels and encourages a cooperative approach to 
addressing water management issues. 
8.2.5  A Closer Look at Organisational Structure 
 Earle et al. ( 2010 ) propose that transboundary water resources can provide an 
opportunity to contribute to regional development and peace if the organisational 
capacity exists to manage them cooperatively. They propose a conceptualisation of 
this organisational framework as consisting of three interrelated communities of 
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actors. They comprise the water management community (including water users 
from civil society and the private sector and water managers from governmental 
departments or agencies), international community (external to the basin actors 
such as researchers and development partners) and politicians in the basin states 
(see Fig.  8.1 ).
 These three communities interact in a variety of ways, infl uencing each other and 
learning from each other; however, the overall pace and direction of transboundary 
water governance processes is set by the politicians (as representatives of the central 
state). These communities are not heterogeneous; their components are exposed to 
a range of pressures and power dynamics operating at various levels, some within 
the water sector and some from outside. The nuances of pressures and power rela-
tions at a variety of levels need to be better understood if transboundary waters are 
not to become a source of confl ict or countries remain trapped in a state of “negative 
peace” – merely the absence of war (Earle et al.  2010 ). 
 Interested groups operate at a variety of levels and often place pressure on politi-
cians to provide them with access to resources, jobs or other services, in so doing 
Research, Academic &
IFIs - developing new
concepts,often based
on the solutions








Politicians - allocating values
in society, protecting state
intrest, sovereignty, rights
etc.Co-opt and support ideas
from the Researchers on their
terms.
 Fig. 8.1  The cogs within the organisational scale of transboundary water governance (Earle et al. 
 2010 ) 
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infl uencing the actions of these politicians at the international level (Earle  2013 ). 
The politicians in turn have fi nal say over the international water management 
regimes which they are willing to commit their respective country to; if there is the 
perception amongst local-level stakeholders that entering into an international 
agreement will negatively impact their access to water resources, then there is great 
pressure placed on politicians not to proceed with such an action. Thus states, as 
represented by politicians, are not the only actors possessing agency; they are but 
part of a range of actors that play a role in water governance frameworks (Earle 
et al.  2010 ). By better understanding the interests of these non-state actors, it may 
be possible to better understand some of the choices articulated by states at the 
international level (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ; Earle et al.  2015 ). 
8.3  Driving the Cogs 
8.3.1  Power 
 Issues around power become paramount at this point – with various subnational 
actors possessing better access to political decision-makers than others. As a result 
of what Allan and Mirumachi ( 2010 ) refer to as the “hydraulic mission” approach 
to managing and developing water resources, the primary actors in TWM processes 
have been states – represented by technical, economic and political elites operating 
in what generally gets termed “the national interest”. Left out are the local commu-
nities relying on the resource directly: the water users, poor, women and other 
important groups. Instruments such as the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997 
make an effort of presenting an attempt at an inclusive stakeholder approach – 
through asserting the importance of the “no-harm rule” and the “equitable share 
approach”. However, it lands up supporting the status quo through the omission of 
any reference to stakeholder issues or participation mechanisms. Likewise, regional 
transboundary laws such as the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the SADC Protocol on 
Shared Watercourses are found to be silent on issues related to stakeholder partici-
pation and gender (Earle and Bazilli  2013 ). 
8.3.2  Reframing Issues Across Levels 
 National interests and socio-economic imperatives drive the political agenda of 
individual nation-states. The uptake of transboundary water management and coop-
eration efforts could be greatly improved by reframing them in the national interest. 
The same can be said about human security needs. What mechanisms of reframing 
can be adopted by international- and local-level issues to align them more with 
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national interests? What compliance and implementation mechanisms of national 
interest priorities can be utilised to improve human and water security? We need to 
understand better how knowledge on regional water resources can more effectively 
feed into decision-making at different scales. We need to demonstrate how existing 
knowledge can add value. This is not only knowledge of biophysical systems but the 
political processes that drive choices and trade-offs. Can we reframe the “duty to 
cooperate” outlined in the UN Charter to move beyond state actors and identify a 
role of non-state actors? 
8.3.3  Shifting Power Dynamics 
8.3.3.1  Municipal to National to International 
 Cities are powerful actors since the majority of the earth’s population today live in 
urban areas, making cities important drivers of water resource management pro-
cesses (UN-Habitat  2010 ; Earle  2013 ). While municipal water use in most countries 
is a small portion of overall water use, it commands a high assurance of supply due 
to economic and political infl uence, placing cities in a strong position to compete 
for water resources across increasing distances. The quest for urban water security 
includes the provision of services directly related to water resources, such as elec-
tricity generated from hydropower, on international transboundary water manage-
ment processes. 
 Cities have driven several transboundary water governance processes, accessing 
central state politicians through a variety of mechanisms, some explicit and others 
not. In a study unpacking the role of cities on transboundary water processes, Earle 
( 2013 ) contends that cities infl uence the agenda in transboundary water governance 
in three main ways: (1) their increased capacity to pay for water resources (in com-
parison with rural water users) means that they can harness large-scale water trans-
fers for their use; (2) via their need for electricity and other services (such as fl ood 
protection) where cities are dependent on water resources; and (3) the need for their 
politicians to secure a political power base in the rural areas. For example, cities 
such as Johannesburg, Amman, Windhoek, Lusaka, Bangkok and Cairo have all 
played a driving role in the development of water resources or the evolution of water 
management institutions in the international transboundary basins around them. 
This can in cases lead to increased cooperation, where the water-related needs of 
cities have led to the development of new laws, institutions and collaborative infra-
structure projects. However, this same thirst can lead to increasing water stress in 
the basin as well as neighbouring basins, possibly resulting in confl ict at the inter-
state level. Further investigation is required to determine how the water-related 
needs of cities are articulated at the national level. Most likely it is not through any 
one channel or mechanism, but rather a range of actors that refl ect the needs of cities 
and (mostly independent of one another) motivate national governments to take up 
specifi c initiatives at the transboundary water level. 
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 Generally it is found that the role of cities in transboundary water processes is 
not often considered in research on transboundary water, making it important to 
reach a better understanding of this interaction (Earle  2013 ). By better understand-
ing this role, light is shed on the “black box” of interstate interactions around trans-
boundary water. Data and records of city-level planning and policies on water 
resources are, arguably, more accessible to researchers than the records of interstate 
negotiation and policy processes on transboundary watercourses. 
8.3.3.2  International Interests over Local Interests 
 International agreements or treaties are often used to codify water-sharing arrange-
ments between sovereign states, but there have been some cases where local com-
munities have been disproportionally burdened with some of the negative outcomes 
of decisions made at the international level. This is illustrated by way of example by 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, an international water-sharing project between 
Lesotho and South Africa. South Africa pays royalties to Lesotho for water trans-
ferred to its economic hub, and Lesotho receives hydropower electricity for its 
domestic use. The treaty signed between Lesotho and South Africa is considered by 
some as an example of good practice (Haas et al.  2010 ). However, the infrastructure 
involved in this interbasin transfer and hydropower scheme includes large dam 
development which has had signifi cant negative impacts on the long-term ability of 
the affected local communities within Lesotho to maintain their livelihoods even 
though they received monetary compensation or were resettled (Mokorosi and Van 
der Zaag  2007 ). This example illustrates that decisions that are sometimes consid-
ered good practice at one level (in this case at the international level between South 
Africa and Lesotho) do not necessarily translate to positive outcomes at other levels 
(in this case at the local community level within Lesotho). 
8.3.3.3  International Interests over National Interests 
 The state is treated as a “black box” with little possibility of gaining an insider’s 
point of view. This approach has been challenged by Hirsch and Jensen ( 2006 ) in 
their study on national interests in the Mekong River basin where they contend that 
the working assumption of the international partners supporting cooperative man-
agement structures of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has been that the 
respective riparian governments represent the collective interests of the states 
(Hirsch and Jensen  2006 ). They fi nd a wide range of interests which are not easily 
reducible to “the national interest”, the result being that MRC institutional pro-
cesses are not implemented at national level – due to the lack of support within 
riparian countries. At best this represents a waste of taxpayers’ money from the 
countries supporting the development of the MRC; at worst it opens the possibility 
for specifi c interested groups in the basin to dominate the agenda and promote 
approaches which legitimise their objectives and standing. Appeals to the “national 
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interest” in doing so become a “discursive strategy often invoked to legitimise large 
infrastructure projects whose environmental and social consequences may in fact be 
quite disastrous” (Hirsch and Jensen  2006 : xviii). Put another way, “by virtue of 
their invocations of sovereignty and overarching concern with cooperation among 
riparian states over a highly abstracted notion of “water resource”, they are neces-
sarily oblivious to environmental confl icts involving non-state actors” (Sneddon 
and Fox  2006 : 197). 
8.3.4  Tracking Water Diplomacy 
 Water diplomacy is a process that enables countries to prevent, resolve or manage 
confl icts and negotiate arrangements or agreements on the allocation and manage-
ment of international water resources. It is a dynamic process that seeks to develop 
reasonable, sustainable and peaceful solutions to water allocation and management 
while promoting or infl uencing regional cooperation and collaboration. Water 
diplomacy can open up the cooperation dialogue to multiple stakeholders, including 
municipalities, provinces and civil society. Water diplomacy necessarily involves a 
suite of skill sets, with hydrologists, lawyers and political scientists sharing the 
negotiation table with diplomats and decision-makers. 
 Tensions over shared water resources are cross-cutting and often lie at the heart 
of national security priorities with close linkages to a wider set of economic, social 
and geopolitical issues (Patrick et al.  2014a ). At the international level, tensions 
over water resources can impact negatively on regional development, dampen resil-
ience to climate change and raise the risk of geopolitical instability. Conventionally, 
diplomacy is seen as high-level interaction and dialogue between nation-states. 
Diplomacy is now defi ned according to various levels and can be categorised into 
Track I, II and III diplomacy. These different tracks vary in terms of degree of offi -
cial (Track I) vs. unoffi cial dialogue (Track II); actors in the dialogue, high-level 
political and military leaders (Track I) vs. individuals and private groups (Track III); 
and the purpose of the dialogue: peace talks (Track I), sharing of ideas that inform 
the offi cial process (Track II) and empowerment of individuals and communities to 
participate in the negotiation process (Track III) (Snodderly  2011 ). 
8.3.5  Striving for Water Justice and Social Inclusion 
 Water allocation and management decisions made at one level, for example, the 
diplomatic or international level,  should translate into socially and environmentally 
acceptable outcomes at the local level. What do we mean by acceptable and how do 
we measure improvements in water and human security? How can local-level pro-
cesses and issues translate into national and international-political imperatives for 
peace and cooperation? Can we identify good practices of transboundary water and 
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benefi t sharing that contribute to human security? Are there explanatory variables 
for cooperation and confl ict that can be drawn from the social sciences? For exam-
ple, justice, ethics, faith and customs and spirituality are all in some way connected 
and infl uence human security. Are there underlying values and philosophies that can 
act as a catalyst for peace or confl ict resolution or require incorporation into water 
diplomacy efforts? 
 Reframing a problem, a solution or a system can be used as a means of including 
or excluding certain actors, perspectives and processes (Kurtz  2003 ; Van Lieshout 
et al.  2011 ). This process of inclusion and exclusion has also been examined in the 
justice literature, primarily by Susan Opotow. She explores it in the context of envi-
ronmental confl icts and has termed it the  scope of justice (Opotow and Weiss  2000 ). 
The scope of justice, also known as the scope of moral exclusion, has been defi ned 
as the psychological boundary for fairness (Opotow and Weiss  2000 ) or the bound-
ary within which justice is perceived to be relevant (Patrick et al.  2014a ). Principles 
of justice govern our conduct towards those within our scope of justice, while moral 
exclusion rationalises the denial of those outside our scope of justice (Opotow and 
Weiss  2000 ) and thus enables and justifi es the application of justice principles in an 
inconsistent or even in an unjust manner. 
 By obtaining a better understanding of the way in which non-state actors infl u-
ence transboundary water management, or are excluded from these processes, it is 
possible to gain access to what Allan and Mirumachi ( 2010 : 25) refer to as the 
“world of disappeared hydropolitics”. In situations of water scarcity, relations 
between states over water resources become politicised and possibly securitised, 
leading to decision-making disappearing from public view; researchers are not 
privy to the discussions and decision-making processes between central states, but 
by analysing some of the non-state actors and their interests (which are usually 
more openly stated), it is possible to gain an insight into some of the hidden prac-
tices of states. 
 Tensions also exist between international justice and social justice. The develop-
ment of theories of social justice has predominately focused on or assumed the state 
level rather than the international level (Cole and Schroeder  2004 ) and has resulted 
in much discussion about which should take precedence. The debate centres on 
whether international justice is only about relations between states or whether it is 
between people throughout the globe. This discussion is becoming more and more 
relevant with the globalisation of industry and commerce, and the development of 
supranational level organisations, and is a concern when discussing issues of justice 
within and between supranational entities, such as the European Union, and indi-
vidual persons whose claims for justice are largely confi ned to state structures. As it 
stands, issues of social justice at the local level as well as issues of social justice at 
the global level are seen as the responsibility of the state (Cole and Schroeder  2004 ); 
it is therefore an entity that matters for social justice. 
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8.4  Conclusion 
 In their article on process-based approaches to researching transboundary water 
management, Suhardiman and Giordano ( 2012 : 305) highlight the need to “better 
understand transboundary decision making processes, and how these processes are 
shaped by different actors’ interests, strategies, and access to resources within mul-
tiple governance levels and domains”. By gaining more insight into their roles as 
well as the way in which they are excluded from these processes, it should be pos-
sible to carry out a more effective analysis of the actions and positions adopted at a 
state level regarding transboundary water management. 
 The good governance of water resources is an integral part of promoting sustain-
able development globally (OECD  2012 ). What is needed is a governance paradigm 
that opens the decision-making arena to non-state actors, all in support of the 
national governments and their respective mandates. The rationale behind many 
international interventions to improve transboundary water governance is that the 
state is the prime actor amongst a range of other actors because they hold the main 
decision-making power. This has meant that the role of non-(central) state actors in 
transboundary water management has typically been under-researched (Suhardiman 
and Giordano  2012 ), producing only a partial picture of the full governance 
landscape. 
 The complexity of collaborative management institutions between countries, as 
well as the range of stakeholders within these countries (and the need for equitable 
and just allocation of resources between them), presents an opportunity to contrib-
ute to regional development objectives, provided that timely and well-structured 
institutions are put in place to avoid and mitigate the possibility of disputes develop-
ing into confl ict (Earle et al.  2010 ). All this needs to take place with due recognition 
of the probable impacts of climate change, with effective policies developed and 
implemented across all levels to mitigate as well as adapt to these adverse impacts. 
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 Chapter 9 
 Mechanisms for Inclusive Governance 
 Raymond  L.  Ison and  Philip  J.  Wallis 
 Abstract  How mechanisms for inclusive governance are understood is built on the 
framing choices that are made about governance and that which is being governed. 
This chapter unpacks how governance can be understood and considers different 
historical and contemporary framings of water governance. A framing of “gover-
nance as praxis” is developed as a central element in the chapter. What makes gov-
ernance inclusive is explored, drawing on theoretical, practical and institutional 
aspects before elucidating some of the different mechanisms currently used or pro-
posed for creating inclusive water governance (though we argue against praxis 
based on simple mechanism). Finally, the factors that either constrain or enable 
inclusive water governance are explored with a focus on systemic concepts of learn-
ing and feedback. 
 Keywords  Water governance •  Participation •  Institutional arrangements •  Social 
learning •  Adaptive management •  Framing 
9.1  Scene Setting 
 We were invited to address the topic of “mechanisms for inclusive governance”. In 
many ways this is a loaded title as it comprises three terms that cannot be taken for 
granted: “governance”, “inclusive” and “mechanism”. For us the pivotal term is 
governance which, as a contested concept, requires an appreciation of how it might 
be framed and the possible implications of a given framing choice. Expressed in this 
way, it is also necessary that we say what we mean by “framing” and “framing 
choice”. In turn, our title leaves open, and thus potentially ambiguous, the question 
of what is being governed – a river, a catchment, a complex adaptive system, etc. 
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Resolution of this question involves a second set of framing choices. The question 
of inclusivity can only be addressed conceptually once the former issues are 
resolved. Questions of how framing happens at the start of any activity and who is 
involved are suffused with power with both practical and theoretical implications. 
 In making our claims, we appreciate that there are multiple pathways to inclusiv-
ity in a given context and no blueprint or panacea; what is or is not inclusive will be 
open to interpretation and contextual design. The term “mechanism” has been the 
subject of intense critique in science studies and certainly cannot be used non- 
refl exively. It would be unfortunate, for example, if policy-makers and practitioners 
in water governance felt that they could do their job by selecting elements (e.g. 
tools, techniques, methods) to combine in simple, mechanistic ways. Our antidote 
to the trap of mechanism is to recognise that every concept, theory, tool, technique 
or method always has a user and that this use always happens within a context and 
for a human set purpose (Fig.  9.1 ). It is the relational dynamic depicted in Fig.  9.1 
that constitutes what we will call a practice performance, though this is a very basic 
form – usually it is far more complex with multiple actors, tools, techniques, theo-
ries, etc. When the performance involves the conscious but practical use of theory, 
we call that praxis.
 The next part of our chapter, Sect.  9.2 , addresses framing, explores how gover-
nance can be understood and considers different framings of water governance, in 
particular how these “framings” have developed over time and can be shaped, or 
transformed, through practical, inclusive, processes. The section also puts forward 
the framing of “governance as praxis” for discussion throughout the chapter. 
Section  9.3 addresses what makes governance inclusive, drawing on theoretical, 
practical and institutional aspects. In Sect  9.4 , we deal with some of the different 
mechanisms currently used or proposed for creating inclusive water governance. 
Finally, in Sect.  9.5 , the factors that either constrain or enable inclusive water 
 Fig. 9.1  A concept, theory, institution (e.g. policy, regulation, etc.) and a codifi ed practice (e.g. 
EIA, environmental impact assessment) can be understood as a social technology that acts sys-
temically in relation to practice and human purpose just like a hammer (Source: Ison  2010 ) 
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governance are explored with a focus on the constraints to, or opportunities for, 
systemic water governance. 
9.2  Framing Choices 
 A frame is the context through which a person interprets the world, also known as 
his or her perception, perspective, worldview, mental model, script or schema 
(Schön and Rein  1994 ; Isendahl et al.  2009 ; Dewulf et al.  2009 ). 
9.2.1  Why Start with Framing? 
 It is generally not appreciated that there are choices that can, and need to, be made 
as any practitioner engages with a situation of concern. Failure to recognise agency 
in framing one’s practice and the situation of concern leads to loss of transparency, 
ineffi ciencies and, too often, confl ict, e.g. competing frames arise around contested 
topics and concepts, such as social-ecological systems, or resilience (McEvoy et al. 
 2013 ). Both governance, as a practice, and choices over that which is governed 
exemplify this conundrum. Power over others is manifest when one group or set of 
interests control how a concept (e.g. social ecological system), issue or problem is 
framed to the detriment of other stakeholders. 
 Framing failure occurs when policy-makers and researchers fail to recognise that 
they have agency, and thus choices, about how to frame situations of concern; inclu-
sive framing failure happens when those responsible for a policy, or other forms of 
purposeful action, fail to appreciate that inclusivity begins with opening up oppor-
tunities for diverse stakeholders, holding multiple perspectives, to be involved in 
making framing decisions, e.g. is a catchment framed as a hydrological system, an 
ecological system, a social-ecological system, etc. It is because of the practical and 
ethical implications of framing choices that we want to make our own choices in 
writing this chapter as transparent as we can. 
 At its most basic, governance can be understood as an abstract and descriptive 
concept or alternatively, in its verb form, “governing” as a form of practice that has 
to be carried out in unique ways in multiple contexts and at multiple scales, e.g. 
across and between national, regional and local levels (Wallis and Ison  2011a ,  b ). In 
recent history, the framing of rivers and/or catchments (terms which are framing 
choices in themselves) has been largely the province of hydrologists, engineers, 
physical geographers and, more recently, ecologists (Molle  2009 ). These are the 
framing choices on which integrated water resource management (IWRM) has been 
largely built. Too often these choices have had the consequence of restricting con-
ceptually and practically, in governance terms, water to the river channel (e.g. 
through focusing on water quality and biodiversity). For example, historical fram-
ing choices currently constrain the activities of the English Environment Agency as 
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it grapples with implementation of a new catchment-based approach because it is 
administratively not able to deal with water in the landscape (the province of another 
government body). Most signifi cantly though, past framing has failed to account for 
the social in relation to the biophysical and, where present, treating it as an add-on 
rather than integral to the question of what has to be governed (Ison et al.  2007 ). 
 Framing failure is often a precursor to maladaptive responses (practices, policies, 
investments – see Barnett and O’Neill  2010 ) because “frames” are used by humans 
to negotiate the complexity of the world they experience by determining what 
requires attention and what can be ignored. Any framing choice brings with it sys-
temic consequences; they shape practice and create pathway dependencies. As 
Lakoff ( 2010 : 71–72) notes:
 All thinking and talking involves ‘framing.’ And since frames come in systems, a single 
word typically activates not only its defi ning frame, but also much of the system its defi ning 
frame is in. Moreover, many frame-circuits have direct connections to the emotional regions 
of the brain. Emotions are an inescapable part of normal thought. Indeed, you cannot be 
rational without emotions. 
 Lakoff’s claims are insightful as they draw attention to the systemic conse-
quences of framing choices including the effects both cognitively and physiologi-
cally on the user of a framing choice – which includes both speaker/writer and 
listener/reader. In other words, it is not possible to avoid the situated and embodied 
nature of our engagement with the world, for which we each must take responsibil-
ity (Ison  2010 ). Ison et al. ( 2015b ) demonstrate how metaphor theory could be used 
in practical ways to enhance inclusivity in framing choices; failure to unpack fram-
ing assumptions when working collaboratively can undermine governance effec-
tiveness. Of course this also includes how governance or governing is framed. 
9.2.2  Framing Governance 
 In the title of his paper “the new governance: governing without government”, 
Rhodes ( 1996 : 652) makes the fi rst major distinction we wish to reinforce, i.e. gov-
ernance is not the same as government. Rhodes ( 1996 : 652–3) points out that “gov-
ernance signifi es a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process 
of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which 
society is governed”. He goes on to outline six different uses of governance: “(i) as 
the minimal state; (ii) as corporate governance; (iii) as the new public management; 
(iv) as “good governance”; (v) as a socio-cybernetic system; and (vi) as self- 
organizing networks”. These categories are clearly not mutually exclusive. 
 Rhodes’ ( 1996 ) categories, and those of other authors like Steurer ( 2013 ), could 
be used to create a typology of governance. However, we are wary of typologies that 
become reifi ed as classifi catory schemas (Ison  2010 ), instead favouring inquiry into 
the concept of governance (and other concepts) that reveals (i) the epistemological 
commitments that are being put to use when a concept is used (e.g. see Ison et al. 
 2013a for a discussion on the concept of social learning) and (ii) the elements of 
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praxis, or enactment of governance (a governance/governing performance) and 
where praxis is understood as context-sensitive, theory-informed practical 
action (Ison et al.  2014a ). Such an inquiry may reveal praxis features in all or none 
of Rhodes’ six categories which could then be used to inform innovations in practice 
in contextual and purposeful ways. In our experience, debates about the structures 
and defi nitions of categories do little to enhance praxis. 
 Many but not all authors recognise the historical links of the term “governance” 
to the act of steering; usually, it is claimed by state and non-state actors (e.g. Steurer 
 2013 : 388). However, not many authors make the connection between governance 
and the Greek word “kybernetes” (from which cybernetics is derived) meaning 
helmsperson or steersperson as in sailing a boat. Thus a governor can be understood 
to regulate a steam engine’s function in response to feedback or a sailor may chart a 
course in response to the complex interdependencies that connect them, via feed-
back processes, with wind, current and human purpose. It follows that governance 
may be mechanistic in response to complicated situations or systemic in response to 
complex situations in the sense used by Snowden and Kurzl ( 2003 ) to differentiate 
between complicated and complex. 
 The choice of a cyber-systemic lineage of framing governance issues which we 
adopt in this chapter is not new (e.g. Blunden and Dando  1994 ) but is possibly 
neglected or poorly articulated in recent governance discourse (e.g. Rhodes ibid). 
Within this framing, our central organising metaphor is of a helmsperson (sailor) 
steering, or charting, an ongoing viable course in response to feedback (from cur-
rents, wind, etc.) and in relation to a purpose that is negotiated and renegotiated 
within an unfolding context, i.e. in response to uncertainty (Cook and Yanow  1993 ; 
Ison  2010 ). It is in relation to questions of purpose and who participates in agreeing 
purpose that inclusivity becomes central, both practically and theoretically. 
 Other dilemmas appear in the governance literature such as that articulated by 
Steurer ( 2013 : 388), as “who steers and how”. Whilst questions of “who” and “how” 
are vitally important, they must, in our view, be systemically related to questions of 
“what” and “why”. Consistent with systems theory, we choose to understand why/
what/how as a nested hierarchy equating to supra-system/system/subsystem (Fig. 
 9.2 ). “What” relates to a purposeful framing choice, e.g. a catchment understood as 
a hydrological system, a social-ecological system, a complex adaptive system, 
etc. – but it is important to understand that a system is not some pregiven entity, but 
a device that is created so as to learn about, or change, a situation of concern from a 
systemic perspective; “why” relates to the purpose of the system as understood by 
those who want to learn about or change the conceptualised system of interest. For 
a given “what”, there are multiple “hows”. Working in the Cooum River, Chennai, 
India, Bunch ( 2003 ) exemplifi es how using soft systems methodology (SSM) these 
systemic concepts can be used with stakeholders to effect improvements.
 Conceptually “who” is in another domain – in some contexts “who” can equate 
to a “how” (e.g. by engaging stakeholders in a situation of concern), but within 
second-order cybernetic understandings (Ison  2010 ), the answer to “who” is present 
in every saying and doing; the “observer” is always present even if social practices, 
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particularly practices associated with doing science, abstract them away. In this 
regard, we as authors are present in what we say and acknowledge responsibility for 
our saying/writing. From this perspective, there is no external, objective, observer 
position, i.e. we are all situated in what we do when we do what we do. Our position 
has broader implications for understanding inclusivity which is not just a question 
of “who” but also “when”, i.e. is consultation tokenistic after “what” and “why” 
have been decided, or do a full range of potential stakeholders participate in effect-
ing “why” and “what” through active citizenship that develops eco-literacy and pro-
cesses that deepen democracy? Put another way, inclusivity is creating the means 
for taking and enabling responsibility, including for one’s own practice. 
9.2.3  Framing Practice 
 Figure  9.3 is a heuristic developed to facilitate a conversation about what practitio-
ners do when they engage in their practices, e.g. governing water catchments. It is 
important to understand this dynamic to begin to fully appreciate (i) how framing 
operates, (ii) the implications of particular framing choices, and (iii) how gover-
nance might be enacted in relation to chosen framings. The systemic implications 
for framing choices can be understood by exploring Fig.  9.3 . If policy-makers (e.g. 
government agencies) and outsider researchers are understood as those on the left 
who bring their politics, theories of change and implicit and explicit theoretical and 
methodological understandings (e.g. disciplines) to the collaborative situation (pro-
gramme, project, catchment management agency, water users association, etc.), 
they face local people (extant stakeholders or those whose stakes need to be built) 
who too have their politics, theories of change, etc. Then of course there are the dif-
fering cultural traditions of the researchers, administrators, local actors, etc.
 One pervasive and ultimately divisive division is that between biophysical and 
social research/researcher traditions (Ison et al.  2013c ). Programmes, projects and 
 Fig. 9.2  The systemic relationships between why, what and how as understood from a systems 
theoretical perspective – these are observer-dependent categories (Source: Adapted from Checkland 
and Poulter  2006 ) 
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NRM agencies – in fact any purposeful human action in the fi eld of natural resource 
management (NRM) to succeed – must be capable of creating an effective perfor-
mance (a relational dynamic) amongst these multiple actors just like the players in 
a new band or orchestra. Our framing rests on the acknowledgment of uncertainty 
and the realisation that it is the quality of the relationship between the social and the 
biophysical as revealed in different trajectories that now warrants attention. 
 As a means to unpack this relational dynamic, we have invoked the Janus meta-
phor (Ison et al. 2014b). Janus was the Roman god of gates, doors, doorways, begin-
nings and endings. What the Romans realised in admitting Janus to their Pantheon 
of Gods was the eternal fl ow and connectedness that is central to our world – that 
for every outside there is an inside. Janus is an antidote to the trap of language and 
thinking that arises when we name, and think of, things in isolation from the pro-
cesses of which they are a part (Koestler  1967 ,  1978 ). In other words, when actions 
are isolated conceptually, practically and methodologically in a project situation 
(outside) from the same set of considerations in programme and project framing, 
design and conduct (inside), then systemic coherence can too easily be lost, e.g. 
whether the outside research team has the right mix of social and biophysical scien-
tists and thus the requisite skills set that such mixes enable (Ison et al.  2013c , 
 2014b ). Systemic coherence between the outside of on-the-ground projects or 
agency operations and the inside of programme design and logic, what is increas-
ingly referred to in the literature as the “programme theory of change”, is we will 
argue a matter of achieving the systemic governance of a series of nested purposeful 
activities that could be framed as ongoing inquiries, as medium-term programmes 
or short-term projects. However, projects as an institutional form are no longer ade-
quate for achieving effective, long-term systemic governance (Ison  2010 ). 
 Fig. 9.3  A Janus-like dynamic between water governance policy-makers and funders with 
catchment- based stakeholders – all actors with their own histories as practitioners (P), frameworks 
of ideas (F) and methods and methodologies (M) brought to bear on situation of concern (S), 
framed initially in different ways, from which data and information are captured (C) in some form 
(Source: Adapted from Ison et al.  2013d ) 
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9.2.4  Governance as Praxis 
 Historically, and in some circles still, rivers and/or catchments have been framed as 
natural, biological, hydrological, ecological entities, sometimes “systems” (Molle 
 2009 ). However, there is a shift underway, driven in part by emergent understand-
ings of the need for climate change adaptation. In the pre-Anthropocene era, many, 
if not most, of our institutions were built on a belief that there is a fi xed form of 
knowledge around which a problem can be stabilised and regulations or other gov-
ernance mechanisms formulated and applied as a fi x (Ison et al.  2007 ). This is linked 
to the pervasiveness of evidence-based decision-making, especially within the med-
ical sciences, and has been historically applied in many other fi elds, such as hydrol-
ogy. In the water fi eld, historically dominated by engineers and water technologists, 
Milly et al. ( 2008 ) outline how “stationarity”, the idea that natural systems fl uctuate 
within an unchanging envelope of variability, has become a foundational concept 
that permeates training and practice in water-resource engineering. However, in the 
context of climate change, they argue that “…stationarity is dead and should no 
longer serve as a central, default assumption in water-resource risk assessment and 
planning” (p. 573). They argue that “fi nding a suitable successor is crucial for 
human adaptation to changing climate” (p. 573). Lins and Cohn ( 2011 : 476) put the 
situation this way:
 Instances where nonstationarities are fundamentally uncertain or chaotic pose a qualita-
tively different problem. With respect to climate, for example, it has been hypothesized that 
the addition of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere will alter the hydrologic cycle. Details of 
future change – magnitude, sign, timing, and location – are unknown, and possibly unknow-
able, even for large watersheds. Given such “information” what, if anything, should one do? 
 They go on to argue that:
 based on the scientifi c uncertainties that exist with respect to climate change at practical, 
spatial, and temporal scales, and existing challenges …, we conclude that climate change is 
better understood as a cause for humility [rather than for physics] and caution, and that 
model-based scenarios of future climatic conditions are unlikely to make a quantitative 
contribution to our physical understanding. 
 Galloway ( 2011 : 563) reports on a meeting of US water professionals which 
sought to address the “death of stationarity” and the implications for their praxis. He 
says: “Two decades ago they would simply have turned to the Interagency Advisory 
Committee on Water Data Bulletin 17B (1982) to produce an estimate of 100-year 
and other fl ood fl ows, knowing that stationarity permitted them to create a statistical 
estimate of their threats.” This is a good example of climate change triggering 
awareness of the need for institutional transformation. Amongst their conclusions 
was that future “change will necessitate new approaches in planning”, i.e. “(a) 
dynamic design – pick the plan that is effective in meeting multiple plausible futures 
and (b) [the] need [for] a new, multi-disciplinary attack on water resources planning 
and management – we need a new paradigm” (p.564). Galloway (ibid) notes, how-
ever, that there is confl ict over future direction and that most hydrologists continue 
to use techniques that assume stationarity. 
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 Performances and designs built on stationarity and fi xed knowledge forms give 
rise to systematic (i.e. linear, step by step) practice rather than systemic practice that 
is relational, recursive and circular and characterised by feedback processes, learn-
ing and adaptation (Ison  2010 ). In other words, traditional framings used in water/
catchment governance are no longer adequate to our circumstances. As the com-
mentators cited above argue, new understandings and practices (new paradigms) are 
needed. What a river/catchment is taken to be is undergoing a shift of historical 
proportions as exemplifi ed in a move from the framings on which IWRM rests (see 
below) to the governance of a social-ecological system. The use of the concept 
“nexus” is a further shift in framing choice exemplifi ed by Campbell ( 2014 ) when 
he spoke about “converging insecurities of food, water, energy and climate, and 
their implications for 21st Century farming systems”. 
 In our Systemic Governance Research Program (SGRP) and CADWAGO 
research (see  http://www.cadwago.net/ ), we are exploring the implications of fram-
ing governance in terms of the theory-informed practices (praxis) that can give rise 
to effective performances amongst multiple stakeholders in contexts of uncertainty 
and surprise (Ison and Wallis  2011 ; Ison et al.  2013b ). A performance as in a good 
team, an orchestra, dance or play demands inclusion of the “right actors”. 
9.3  What Makes Governance Inclusive? 
 This section addresses what makes governance inclusive, drawing on theoretical, 
practical and institutional aspects. To address the idea of inclusivity, we do not draw 
our boundary purely in the social domain but instead prefer a framing of a river/
catchment as a structurally coupled social-biophysical system (Fig.  9.4 ). Please 
note we are not claiming that catchments  are these types of systems but that it 
makes sense to frame them as such whilst recognising that other framings may also 
 Fig. 9.4  A metaphor for a mutually infl uencing, structurally coupled, social-biophysical system. 
The bubble constitutes the human social system; in the image on the right, the arrows represent 
processes and institutions invented by humans that mediate the relationship, over time, of a social 
and biophysical system (Source: Adapted from Ison  2010 ) 
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have utility. We choose this framing because of experiences of confusion around the 
concept social-ecological system, especially as to how boundary judgements (to the 
system) and relational dynamics are understood. Our framing choice does not treat 
a social-biophysical system as a single entity or system, but as a relational dynamic 
between two systems mediated by human-invented institutions (rules of the game) 
and technologies. This framing is also an act of inclusion as it recognises the sys-
temic, relational dynamics between people and their biophysical environments as 
well as distinct relational dynamics within a social and a biophysical system (Figs. 
 9.3 and  9.4 ); situational framing sets the key initial starting conditions which give 
rise to inclusivity, or not. Within our preferred framing, concerns like “biodiversity 
conservation” are means of infl uencing the unfolding dynamic between the social 
and the biophysical through the design and use of new institutions that serve human 
purposes in relation to conservation, e.g. the institutional forms of “ecosystems ser-
vices” if they become widespread are likely to have a major impact on this unfold-
ing dynamic (Ison  2011 ).
 Framing choices and awareness need to operate at multiple levels and in relation 
to situations and practices. We have outlined our framing preference for the situa-
tions that have to be governed – structurally coupled social-biophysical systems. 
However, how these might be governed requires another framing choice – here our 
preference is to see governance situations as akin to “wicked problems” or situa-
tions characterised by complexity, uncertainty, interdependencies, and multiple per-
spectives where what is at issue has to be constructed by concerned stakeholders 
(Ison et al.  2007 ,  2015a ). Thus, what is, or is not, inclusive is related to the locked-in 
historical features of a situation that can create pathway dependencies and to initial 
starting conditions associated with a new issue or an emergent concern or crisis. As 
practice in relation to situation unfolds, there are multiple opportunities for being 
inclusive or not. Here we outline three matters that if not understood can affect 
inclusivity. 
9.3.1  Theories of Change 
 In research for development (R4D) and water governance circles, the concept of 
“theories of change” has begun to shape almost all praxis because of how it is linked 
to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of projects and programmes and thus mea-
sures of success and funding. Because of the power this concept has been given and 
because it is in some ways foundational to praxis, we explore it here. Figure  9.3 can 
be used to unpack the various understandings that can be attributed to a “theory of 
change”. Unfortunately, all too often this term has come to mean the systematic 
coherence between the “outside” of on-the-ground projects and the “inside” of pro-
gramme design and logic, i.e. it has become a mechanism known as the “programme 
theory of change” to test  ex ante what a programme design will deliver or the impact 
it will have. At its crudest, a “theory of change” diagram (as they are usually 
expressed) is a more sophisticated form of a project logframe. At its most 
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sophisticated, “theories of change” are concerned with an  ex ante (and continuing) 
process of inquiry that surfaces different worldviews amongst multiple stakehold-
ers, usually in designed “theories of change” workshops. 
 For example, Coover et al. ( 1977 ) advocate exploring elements of a theory of 
change so as to clarify purpose and to establish what would be regarded as success. 
Their elements include a consideration of the nature of human beings; the nature 
and sources of power, truth and authority; an analysis of causality of social prob-
lems; roles of individuals and institutions; visions of how change can occur; and 
mechanisms for change. These elements might well be adapted to use in the context 
of catchments framed as we have chosen. Earlier sections of our chapter are, we 
claim, very practical because all issues we raise underpin the theories of change that 
different stakeholders hold. The point is that the more that an individual or group’s 
“conceptual baggage” and epistemological and theoretical commitments (e.g. local 
knowledge, cultural knowledge, scientifi c knowledge) are surfaced within a conver-
sation or dialogue, then the more the inclusivity deepened and the conditions for 
building a creative and effective performance emerge (Ison and Russell  2000 ). 
Inclusivity gets nowhere unless these issues are appreciated and addressed. In turn, 
how learning is understood and thus enabled is shaped by theories of change and 
learning. 
9.3.2  Understandings and Practices 
 Within social theories of learning (in contrast to older, cognitivist theories), learning 
emerges from the dynamics of social relations (Blackmore  2007 ). In researching 
social learning from this theoretical understanding of learning, what changes 
through inclusivity are the practices and understandings of those involved as they 
construct and transform what is at issue (Fig.  9.5 ). Participation is a necessary but 
not suffi cient condition for social learning to happen (Carr and Wilkinson  2005 ; 
Collins and Ison  2009 ,  2010 ; Collins et al.  2009 ). Much has been made of Arnstein’s 
( 1969 ) ladder of public participation, where participation is conceptualised as 
power. Various models of participation have been institutionalised, such as the 
International Association for Public Participation (iap2) spectrum of participation, 
commonly employed in the public service as guidance for engaging citizens. 
Critique of ladder or spectrum metaphors emphasise their oversimplifi cation, a lack 
of learning or feedback mechanisms, hierarchical framing and, in particular, a lack 
of context in which participation is situated (Collins and Ison  2009 ).
 Social learning within the SLIM research tradition moves beyond participation 
and is understood as both a social dynamic that transforms situations and a gover-
nance mechanism that can be invested in – much like a city’s orchestra (see Colvin 
et al.  2014 ; Ison et al.  2013a ). Inclusivity is thus more than a participation as those 
constraints to, or enablers of the shifts in understanding, and/or practices crucial to 
social learning have to be addressed. Institutions are the most signifi cant constrain-
ers or enablers of changes in understanding and practices. 
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9.3.3  Institutions and Social Technologies 
 Adopting North’s ( 1990 ) understanding of institutions as “rules of the game”, we 
fi nd that some rules are more inclusive than others and also that there are advantages 
to regarding institutions as a form of social technology in the sense depicted in 
Fig.  9.1 . Institutions understood as technologies enable a questioning of the mediat-
ing role that they play in relation to practice rather than entities considered in isola-
tion. Institutions for governing water resources range from stringently defi ned 
legislation and regulation, to more fl exible forms such as organisations, community 
groups, projects or policies, to emergent phenomena such as markets or different 
“types” of water (e.g. potable water, wastewater, etc.). In catchment management, 
institutions are pervasive and resolve into a high degree of complexity (Wallis and 
Ison  2011b ). 
9.4  Enacting Inclusive Governance 
 This section deals with some different approaches that are currently utilised or pro-
posed for creating inclusive water governance. Traditional framings, we claim, are 
not inclusive, whereas the examples following tend to open up the possibility of 
inclusiveness though do not guarantee it. These are not mechanisms in a mechanis-
tic sense; rather they represent different framings potentially conducive to inclusive 
 Fig. 9.5  Social learning: the process of socially constructing an issue by actors in which their 
understandings and practices change, leading to transformation of the situation (S1 is the historical 
situation not shown and S2, S3 and Sn are situations transformed over time) through collective/
concerted action (Source: Steyaert and Jiggins  2007 ) 
 
R.L. Ison and P.J. Wallis
171
governance; they are mechanisms in the sense that they are choices that can be made 
purposefully, but they are not “blueprints” to be followed mechanistically through 
rule-based procedures. As we outline in the last section, these framing choices cre-
ate contexts for systemic innovation and design. Each, as domains of praxis, has 
developed particular tools, techniques, institutions, metaphors and methods which 
when used effectively can facilitate inclusivity – we exemplify some of these in the 
fi nal part of this section under the rubric of “modalities of practice”. 
9.4.1  Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
 IWRM is considered to be a central concept in contemporary water governance 
(White  1998 ; Lubell and Edelenbos  2013 ). The key feature of IWRM is “integra-
tion”, which is a normative goal that can refer to the integration of fragmented 
responsibilities for water governance (functions), institutional fragmentation (e.g. 
Wallis and Ison  2011b ) and societal fragmentation (Lubell and Edelenbos  2013 ). 
The latter, societal fragmentation, is characterised by a disconnect between those 
making decisions and those affected by them. IWRM promotes stakeholder partici-
pation through some platform or institutional arrangement that promotes inclusion. 
However, as Warner ( 2006 ) found in an assessment of multi-stakeholder platforms 
in managing catchments, a realistic assessment of their purpose and capacity to 
achieve this ought to be considered before initiation. A fi nding from SLIM research 
(Ison et al.  2007 ), in which 14 empirical case studies of water governance platforms 
were undertaken, was that the existence of a multi-stakeholder platform, i.e. of 
multi-stakeholder institutions, did not guarantee effective performances that could 
be said to constitute social learning. 
 How is IWRM suited to governing the relational dynamics between people and 
their biophysical environments? One enduring challenge that Molle ( 2009 ) high-
lighted is managing interconnected and nested biophysical landscapes with discon-
nected administrative and social systems. Inclusiveness in IWRM could help 
“connect” social systems, achieving a greater variety of participants particularly 
through inclusion of people with local-scale interests. Institutional barriers, such as 
the centralisation of policy and lack of support for local capacity to implement 
IWRM (Medema et al.  2008 ), are both impediments to and arguments for greater 
inclusiveness. 
 Despite the duration of IWRM as a governance framing choice (White  1998 ), 
what has not become clear is a praxis (or praxeology) of IWRM including the insti-
tutional forms needed to support this praxis. In this framing, the perennial issue is 
how to address the question: what do actors need to experience to claim that integra-
tion has occurred? In our experience, this question is rarely addressed well, in situ-
ations where integration is sought or claimed. 
9 Mechanisms for Inclusive Governance
172
9.4.2  Strategic Adaptive Management (SAM) 
 SAM has developed as a praxis in response to a framing choice about situations 
such as those concerned with “freshwater ecosystem conservation” (Kingsford and 
Biggs  2012 ), the adaptive management of national parks (Biggs and Rogers  2003 ; 
Freitag et al.  2014 ) or the systemic governance of river catchments (Pollard and Du 
Toit  2011 ; Kingsford et al.  2010 ) framed as complex (sometimes as complex adap-
tive) systems. It is mainly, though not exclusively, a South African innovation which 
continues to evolve (Roux and Foxcroft  2011 ; see RESILIM Project –  http://award.
org.za/project/resilience-in-the-limpopo-basin ). Freitag et al. ( 2014 : 4) describe 
SAM’s origins in the following terms:
 The KNP turned to the ecosystem management approach advocated by Rogers and Bestbier 
( 1997 ), which acknowledged the centralities of scale and participation, incorporated soci-
etal value systems, and provided management accountability. It was termed strategic adap-
tive management (SAM) because it emphasized the notion of preparing for the future rather 
than reacting to the past (Rogers and Bestbier  1997 ; Rogers and Biggs  1999 ) and was facili-
tated through an inclusive process designed to establish a shared vision and hierarchy of 
objectives, which would direct management toward acceptable and achievable operational 
goals. A goal maintenance and revision process promoted learning and institutional mem-
ory to accommodate ongoing adjustments to emerging conditions and new understandings. 
(Rogers and Bestbier  1997 ) 
 As Fig.  9.6 depicts, there are a range of stages to SAM each employing different 
methods, techniques and tools. The quality of engagement is regarded as a key fi rst 
step, i.e. inclusivity, although the criteria for, and thus the boundaries of, inclusivity 
are not always elucidated in reports on SAM. Nonetheless, there is evidence, in the 
rivers of Kruger Park in particular, of a “closer working partnership between 
researchers, managers and fi eld staff with buy-in [to the SAM approach] and co- 
learning” (Pollard et al.  2011 ).
 As with all method innovation, it is important that users do not fall into the trap 
of thinking of SAM (or other approaches) as blueprints to be blindly followed; 
praxis that is methodologically robust always involves the adaptation of the method 
(and its constituent elements) to a given context, and all users should be open to 
theory-informed innovation whilst avoiding the ad hoc addition of tools and 
techniques. 
9.4.3  Social Learning 
 Whilst the concept of social learning can be represented through a variety of meta-
phors (Ison et al.  2013a ), we opt to use it in the sense of creating a governance 
performance that can frame learning amongst stakeholders in social-biophysical 
systems. This process is depicted in simple terms in Fig.  9.5 . As with any praxis that 
is performative in nature, the effectiveness of the performance is a product of, as 
well as a producer of, social relationships between those involved – something we 
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have described as building relational capital. In contrast to the traditional gover-
nance approaches of regulation, information and markets where fi xed forms of 
knowledge are applied to manage natural resources, social learning offers a chance 
for inclusive learning about and acting to improve situations (Ison et al.  2007 ; 
Collins and Ison  2009 ). In this sense, social learning can be understood as both 
governance mechanism, something to invest in like the orchestra of a city, and a 
social dynamic between different actors with different instruments who strive to 
create a performance that is agreed to be effective for the context or issue. 
 As Wallis et al. ( 2013 ) describe, social learning is not necessarily new – they 
provide evidence of social learning from a Salinity Pilot Program Advisory 
Committee in Victoria, Australia, that evolved under a particular set of historical 
circumstances. “Effective performances” were built in addressing salinity at catch-
ment scale, but the understandings, practices and institutional arrangements that 
enabled this to happen have been largely lost to the current generation of policy- 
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 Fig. 9.6  A model of generic strategic adaptive management (Source: Adapted from Kingsford and 
Biggs  2012 : 19) 
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9.4.4  Modalities of Practice 
 Each of the approaches outlined above incorporates different tools and techniques 
that when enacted give rise to an effective performance, or not. Like all perfor-
mances, mastery from hard work is required. No approach is intrinsically bad or 
good but offers different governance possibilities when adapted to context and with 
innovations through incorporating different modalities of practice. Sometimes, 
however, unhelpful modalities of practice become conserved. Ison et al. ( 2011 : 
3979) drew attention to the widespread conservation within ICM and IWRM of the 
linear metaphor associated with systematic, linear cause and effect, and mainly 
reductionist, thinking despite the espoused holistic intent of these approaches. They 
make the case for:
 experimenting with and progressing innovative second-order modalities’ of dialogue (those 
forms of conversation in which there is a reciprocal ‘turning together’ as in some dances) 
and learning through various forms of deliberation across relevant organisations. A key 
focus [being] how policy makers, policy implementers and scientists might better work and 
learn together, and the specifi c skills and practices the new modalities require. 
 In Table  9.1 , seven modalities of practice are described which could, in theory, 
be used within any governance framing, but, when used effectively and with contex-
tual understanding, have the potential to enhance inclusivity. We caution against 
interpreting these as tools – unless one understands that all tools have a use context 
and a user that is generally unique.
 The examples within Table  9.1 are by no means exhaustive, and as argued by 
Ison et al. ( 2011 : 3984), “no modality can be considered successful in and of itself, 
as success will be derived from an awareness of context and the generation of per-
formances fi t for circumstances”. 
9.5  Constraints and Opportunities 
 This fi nal discussion explores the factors that either constrain or enable inclusive 
water governance, with a focus on those factors which currently constrain shifts 
towards systemic governance. It is important to realise that despite considerable 
research activity which has generated conceptual and methodological innovation 
for inclusive governance of rivers/water catchments, there are limited examples of 
sustained, inclusive, “governance performances”. We make this claim despite the 
very large effort and resultant literature devoted to participatory approaches. Why is 
this the case? The answer is of course multifaceted. 
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9.5.1  Key Constraints to Inclusivity 
 The following are, from our perspective, key constraints to governance innovation 
that secures inclusivity in a sustained, ongoing manner.
 1.  Persistent ,  inappropriate framing failure : As argued by Jorgenson and Steir 
( 2013 : 15), practitioners, in whatever domain, must take responsibility for their 
invitations and context setting as well as how their frame is heard and acted upon 
by others. They argue for taking seriously “Schön’s ( 1983 ) notion of ‘refl ection- 
in- action’, responding in the moment to divergences in frame setting that we as 
good listeners, allow ourselves to hear”. Drawing on the insights of Gregory 
Bateson, these authors note how framing occurs at multiple levels and involves 
attention to the presence and acceptance of ambiguity and paradox as crucial 
sources of novelty, or innovation, which are essential when responding to 
uncertainty. 
 2.  Boundary judgement failure : Whenever the concept “system” is invoked, then a 
boundary judgement as to what is system and what is environment of the system, 
as mediated by a boundary judgement, must be made. Otherwise the concept 
“system” is virtually meaningless. Once recognised as a key element of praxis, 
 Table 9.1  Modalities of practice and implications for inclusivity in water governance 
 Modalities of practice  Implications for inclusivity 
 Mapping and 
diagramming 
 The act of diagramming using a range of systems techniques (e.g. rich 
pictures, systems maps, etc.), either individually or collectively can 
unpack mental models and worldviews, surface patterns of causality 
and infl uence and boundary judgements 
 Media technology  Social media, participatory mapping platforms, online communities and 
other media technologies provide platforms for participation in 
policy-making and planning 
 Intermediary objects  Objects, such as geographic landmarks, documents or even living things 
can act as mediating or facilitating devices for identifying stakeholders 
and encouraging deliberation 
 Development and use 
of heuristics 
 Heuristics are conceptual models that are purposefully designed to 
facilitate learning and change. The fi gures in this chapter are examples 
of heuristics that mediate new understandings 
 Metaphor exploration  Questioning the phrases used by stakeholders in conveying their ideas 
can reveal particular worldviews and conceptual traps (e.g. the 
“roll-out” of policy implies a linear transfer). Exploring metaphors with 
other stakeholders can lead to greater shared understanding 
 Systemic inquiry  Systemic inquiry involves a more free-form exploration of complex 
situations, compared to predefi ned projects. Performed jointly, systemic 





 Communities of practice are groups of people who work together 
towards realising a common goal. They cannot simply be created, but 
the conditions for their emergence can be provided 
 Source: Adapted from Ison et al. ( 2011 : 3983–4) 
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then it becomes critical to address the question of “who participates in making 
the boundary judgment(s)?” (Ulrich and Reynolds  2010 ). Unlike Huntjens et al. 
( 2012 ) who refer to the need for boundary defi nition (as if systems pre-existed 
their formulation), we would argue for praxis that engages critically with bound-
ary formulation and critique (see Chapter 12 in Ison  2010 ). 
 3.  Refl exivity failure amongst practitioners and policy - makers : By refl exivity, we 
mean the second-order process of refl ection upon refl ection. Refl exivity, as 
praxis, is what is needed to purposefully move between single-, double- and 
triple- loop learning (e.g. Huntjens et al.  2012 ) – to make these terms more than 
category descriptions. As Schneider and Ingram ( n.d. ) argue, the role of policy 
analysts has not evolved to fi t a new model of collaborative governance, instead 
remaining narrowly focused on “production of models, forecasts, causal analysis 
and experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation studies”. Schneider and 
Ingram (ibid) along with Ison et al. ( 2015a ) also point to the constraints to refl ex-
ivity, and thus governance reform, posed by the sustained adherence to a “utili-
tarian rationality”, or what is sometimes described as “the high ground of 
technical rationality”, rather than descending into the “swamp of real-life issues” 
(Schön  1995 ). 
 4.  Failure to change patterns of investment and institutions of systemic innovation : 
In a climate change world where stationarity is dead, it makes no sense to sustain 
traditional investment patterns associated with the linear conception of prob-
lem → knowledge → regulation/education provision → monitoring → adoption/
compliance. The evidence is that in environmental issues, it is easy to regulate 
but diffi cult and expensive to monitor and gain compliance. This historical model 
also means that upfront investment is generally low but that for effective compli-
ance, costs increase over time, or new policies and regulations have to be sought, 
thus creating a treadmill of policy failure in the face of “wicked-like” issues 
(Ison et al.  2015a ). Moves towards inclusive governance shift investment to the 
front end of purposeful action. 
 5.  Institutionalisation failure : Over 40 years ago, Rittel and Webber ( 1973 ) invented 
the terms “wicked” and “tame” to frame situations of concern to them as plan-
ners and designers, and despite growing recognition of consistent public policy 
failure in the face of situations they called “wicked” (APSC  2007 ; Ison et al. 
 2015a ), institutional arrangements have rarely been put in place to engage effec-
tively with these types of situations. This is an example of persistent institutional 
failure and is part of the motivation for authors like Huntjens et al. ( 2012 ) and 
Ison et al. ( 2015a ) to propose institutional design propositions for operating in a 
climate change world. As depicted in Fig.  9.1 though, institutions (as social tech-
nologies) must go hand in hand with praxis innovation. Institutionalisation fail-
ure needs to be separated from the failure of institutional innovation – the crafting 
or designing of new institutions (Ison  2014 ) that are more fi t for purpose, e.g. 
there is considerable research pointing to the value of voluntary organisations 
such as the Tweed Forum (on the English-Scottish border) aiding more systemic 
water governance (Collins et al.  2007 ; Cook et al.  2013 ; Rouillard et al.  2014 ). 
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 6.  Failure to understand theoretically how learning operates ,  or could operate ,  for 
collaborative governance and adaptive managing and how  feedback processes 
are central to ongoing praxis and institutional innovation (Blackmore  2007 ; 
Pollard et al.  2011 ). Pollard and Du Toit ( 2011 ) exemplify what is at issue. In a 
3-year study in six major catchments in the water-stressed north-east of South 
Africa, they examined factors constraining or enabling implementation of adap-
tive water management. They concluded “that self-organisation and responsive 
multi-scale feedback loops are essential for management in catchments under-
stood as complex systems as they provide the basis for learning and response to 
an evolving context”. Successful feedback processes included: “meeting the 
requirements of the law (the Reserve), the availability of benchmarks against 
which to monitor (the ‘[Environmental] Reserve’, albeit a static value), the pres-
ence of a ‘watchdog’, the responsiveness of the manager and users, communica-
tion and the ability to self-organise and self-regulate” (Pollard and Du Toit  2011 : 
4019). As identifi ed by these authors, too often feedback processes are fragile, 
often depending on single individuals, and thus are prone to breakdown. Also 
they may be confi ned “to a local scale and lack key supportive linkages to wider 
scales that would confer strength and resilience” (ibid). 
 7.  Failure to take the “ design turn ”  in doing and enabling governance and govern-
ing : We use the word “turn” here in a similar way to those who advocate taking 
a “critical turn” – i.e., a change in how we appreciate a situation and subse-
quently engage with it by incorporating a new (second-order) awareness. A 
“design turn” opens up a space in which we can refl ect on our engagement with 
a situation as a product of our own design; i.e. rather than adopting a precon-
ceived set of ideas or principles embodied in a given approach, such as project 
management, we start to appreciate the options we have available for engaging 
with a situation in different ways and start to adjust (design) our approach to the 
specifi c dynamics, requirements and constraints of the situation. However, it is 
not only practice (governing) that has to be developed and changed but the con-
text of practice (governance). Failure to consider both can place change efforts 
on a pathway to systemic failure. For example, Table  9.2 shows one of fi ve gen-
eral lessons and specifi c elements that Measham et al. ( 2009 ) derived from their 
research and engagement with the sparsely populated Lake Eyre Basin 
 community, in arid, central Australia. Each of the elements derives from experi-
ence and has meaning in the context of their generation, including amongst those 
who generated them. However, as expressed, they offer little to a would-be 
designer of an engagement process in another context because they are not 
expressed as design propositions nor linked to theories that enable them to be 
scaffolded into governance performances.
 Ryan et al. ( 2010 ), also from Australian experience, articulate ten principles 
for moving towards systemic NRM governance:
  1.  Continuity: For Australia to be sustainable, it needs an enduring, country-
wide NRM delivery infrastructure. 
  2.  Subsidiarity: Devolve decision-making to the lowest capable level. 
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  3.  Integrated goal setting: Base investments and governance mechanisms on 
coherent, nested and integrated goals. 
  4.  Holism: Plan to address whole systems. 
  5.  Systems approach: Match governance mechanisms to the nature of the 
linked social-ecological system. 
  6.  Relationship orientation: Recognise that relationships are as important as 
organisations. 
  7.  Resilience: Manage for resilience of ecosystems and communities. 
  8.  Knowledge and innovation: Equip the governance system with skills, capac-
ity and knowledge, and encourage innovation. 
  9.  Accountability: Base the case for investment and accountability on sound 
systems data and knowledge. 
 10.  Responsiveness and adaptability: Regularly review and adapt the whole 
Australian NRM governance system. 
 Material presented in this chapter has the potential to enhance and/or refi ne 
these design principles. 
 8.  Failure to invest in capacity and capability building and demand creation for the 
right skill sets : Attempts to articulate an agenda for skill, capability and thus 
capacity building for inclusive water governance have been made in the past (e.g. 
 Table 9.2  Some of the understandings and practices which contributed to successful natural 
resource management (NRM) community engagement in the Lake Eyre Basin, Australia 
 General lesson  Specifi c elements 
 Work strategically in the 
system 
 Successful NRM engagement relies on maintaining community trust 
whilst carefully navigating governance processes 
 Learn how the system works 
 Understand the rules and cultures and know-how and when to use 
them 
 Ask about the meaning between the lines when policy is ambiguous 
 Be strategic: Look for the right mix of regional independence and 
fi tting in with federal and state government priorities 
 Be adaptive 
 Recognise that over time community perspectives and priorities 
change 
 Adapt to changing governments and processes 
 Use partnerships effectively 
 Recognise the value of long-term collaborations 
 Link with agencies, research and industry 
 Meaningful inputs require meaningful outputs 
 Maintain transparency 
 Let the public know about decisions taken 
 Publicise outcomes effectively, e.g. online 
 Maintain necessary documentation 
 Keep people informed: Knowledge is power 
 Source: Measham et al. ( 2009 ) 
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SLIM  2004 ). However, it is not apparent that relevant curricula are widespread, 
or that investments are being made, to develop appropriate capabilities. 1 The 
challenge of governing water is complex, and thus the research needed to inquire 
into water governance situations necessarily comes from diverse disciplinary 
perspectives, as well as multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary research perspectives 
(Roux et al.  2010 ). Capabilities for doing transdisciplinary research needs to be 
built early in the careers of water researchers, as one group of early-career 
researchers claim in Patterson et al. ( 2013 ). This includes not only the abilities of 
the individual researchers but also the institutional settings in which research 
takes place, whilst the formation of self-organising communities of practice can 
help support cohorts of water researchers in achieving refl exive and inclusive 
research practice. 
 It is not only researcher understandings and practices that need to be enhanced; 
similar arguments apply to policy-makers and those involved in sector-wide profes-
sional practice. For example, Patterson et al. ( 2014 : 1) developed a framework for 
assessing “enabling capacities” for facilitating collective action in catchment man-
agement contexts, which included “prior experience and contingency, institutional 
arrangements, collaboration, engagement, vision and strategy, knowledge building 
and brokerage, resourcing, entrepreneurship and leadership, and refl ection and 
adaptation”. They found that the interplay between several of these identifi ed capac-
ities was important for the emergence of “practical action”. 
 Pollard and Du Toit ( 2011 ) found practice-based understanding of policy, the 
role of leadership and communication to be critical skill sets. Rouillard et al. ( 2014 : 
644) point to the need for fostering more in-depth refl ection and learning during 
policy implementation (to which we would add development) but acknowledge that 
this would require more fl exible policy and institutional arrangements that enable 
policy implementers “to work outside regulations and organisational targets, and 
build long-term relationships” with stakeholders. 
 The eight points made above cannot be considered in isolation – they fi rst have 
to be dealt with systemically (holistically) rather than systematically (in a linear, 
step-by-step manner). On the positive side, there is widespread ferment in water 
governance circles with many creative attempts to generate a new wave of gover-
nance reform, whether under the framings we have described here or others which 
have received less attention from us such as adaptive management, collaborative 
governance or collaborative co-governance. There is still much to be learnt about 
inclusivity from governance experiments now underway, whether in the Mekong 
Basin through M-Power (2012), the Limpopo River basin through RESILIM 2 , 
reforms of the Murray Darling Basin in Australia, implementation of the European 
Water Framework Directive, the currently stalled implementation of the innovative 
South Africa National Water Act 1998 or recent advances in transboundary water 
1  Innovative examples include  http://www.watercentre.org/news/education/programs/master-of-
integrated-water-management (Accessed 8th July 2014). 
2  http://award.org.za/project/resilience-in-the-limpopo-basin 
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governance as described by Armitage et al. ( 2015 ). The elements to create and sus-
tain effective inclusive, systemic governing performances are, we argue, already 
largely known, but yet to be embodied in the actions of practitioners and policy- 
makers within conducive and sustaining institutional arrangements. In the sense 
articulated by Whatmore and Landström ( 2011 : 606), based on their work in the 
catchment of Ryedale (UK), it is not only the transformation of professional prac-
tice that has to occur but at the same time “facilitate the emergence of new kinds of 
public” that are capable of producing through their emergence, the power to object 
to, and intervene in, matters that concern them. 
9.5.2  Inclusivity Through Systemic Governance 
 An inclusive, systemic approach to freshwater governance begins by making the 
distinction between situation and system; no one governance situation is the same 
so contextual design and application are needed even if some of the principles and 
practices employed are held in common across contexts. When individuals, groups, 
organisations and governments engage with freshwater situations, almost over-
whelmingly they bring their historical framing choices to the situation. Too often 
new terms are quickly adopted uncritically and used in ways that do not make clear 
the underlying conceptions held by different users of the language – in our research 
this applies to the concept “social ecological system”, “complex adaptive system” 
and the emerging discourse about natural capital, environmental assets or asset- 
based management (Coffey  2015 ). Language and concepts used unrefl exively 
undermine inclusivity by capturing a particular framing at the expense of others’ 
framings, or by undermining effective collaboration because people speak at crossed 
purposes. It is because of the importance of initial starting conditions in a given 
context, and the need to know what these are, as well as paying attention to what 
will help create an effective governance performance (Ison and Wallis  2011 ), that 
we have devoted considerable attention to framing issues and the role of language 
in this chapter. In achieving sustained systemic governance, these are important 
practical considerations, not unimportant theoretical musings! 
 As we noted at the beginning when citing Lakoff ( 2010 ), all metaphors bring 
forth an associated system. In other words, language precedes system; in fact the 
choice to see a freshwater river as a system is a framing choice – the system does 
not precede the choices that different actors make. In this chapter and in our research, 
we hope to have presented a narrative that supports our normative position – that it 
makes sense to see freshwater systems as coupled social-biophysical systems so 
that, in a human-induced climate change world, the relational dynamic between and 
within the social and biophysical will benefi t from moving towards forms of inclu-
sive, systemic governance. 
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 Chapter 10 
 Water Integrity: From Concept to Practice 
 Håkan  Tropp ,  Alejandro  Jiménez , and  Hélène  Le  Deunff 
 Abstract  The adherence of water stakeholders and institutions to integrity princi-
ples is critical to improve water governance and sustainable water development. 
Integrity is strongly manifested in water decision-making, and the level of integrity 
plays a critical role in deciding the outcomes of decision-making, that is, who gets 
what water, when and how. In many countries, fragmented institutions obstruct 
accountability in a sector with high investment and aid fl ows, making the water sec-
tor particularly vulnerable to corruption. Governance failures such as corruption can 
take place at multiple levels and traverse all water uses, incurring huge cost for 
societies, environment and human development. This chapter provides insights into 
the role of integrity to improve governance and suggests an apparent need to include 
integrity and anticorruption-related issues in the analysis of and policy responses to 
water crises. Accountability in water supply services is used as an example to out-
line challenges and opportunities for strengthening integrity. 
 Keywords  Integrity •  Accountability •  Governance •  Anti-Corruption •  Water 
•  Water Services 
10.1  Introduction: There Is an Elephant in the Room 
 Water crises are not primarily driven by water resource scarcity but by governance 
failures. Many factors can affect the overall effectiveness and effi ciency of the 
water sector, such as systemic institutional ineffi ciency, limited staff capacities, 
scarce fi nancial resources, inappropriately set planning priorities, inadequate and 
poorly maintained infrastructure and political instability. However, the roots, mag-
nitude and consequences of the lack of integrity in water governance are some of 
the very important but much less well-known and addressed aspects. Low integrity 
and high levels of corruption are strong indicators that something is wrong with the 
governance system. Although the lack of integrity is far from unique to the water 
sector, water management is vulnerable to corruption, and such practices have dire 
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consequences for sustainable, effi cient and equitable water use, access and alloca-
tion. It has contributed to severe limitations in water reform implementation where 
processes of decentralisation and privatisation sometimes rather have opened up for 
new groups to exploit the system, despite the fact that arguments of better transpar-
ency and accountability were used to institute such changes in the fi rst place. 
 The risks associated with low integrity, such as corruption within institutions at 
the forefront to reform water resource management and deal with the water crisis, 
have to date been little recognised or studied. There is an urgent need to provide 
support to these institutions, which, despite the genuine commitment and honesty of 
their efforts to prevent corruption, often suffer from being new and poorly capaci-
tated and working at new scales and under new policies and laws. Improved water 
integrity would go a long way to increase the institutional effi ciency and effective-
ness to make required water reform changes. Corruption is a challenge in many 
parts of the world. Importantly, many countries in so-called developing regions are 
doing much better than some European countries. For example, according to the 
Corruption Perception Index 2014, countries like Malaysia, Botswana, Namibia and 
Rwanda ranked higher than Bulgaria, Greece and Italy (Transparency International 
 2015 ). 
 Limited water-related integrity incurs huge costs for societies, in lives lost, stall-
ing growth and degraded water resources. Corruption fuels unfair distributions of 
costs and benefi ts among different user groups or completely excludes certain 
groups of a particular water use. It can also be a strong driver to falling groundwater 
tables and diminishing ecosystem services due to unaccounted-for-water withdraw-
als of lakes and rivers. It increases transaction costs and implies very high invest-
ment risks for both public and private investors. In sum, increased sustainability, 
equity and effi ciency of water resources and services allocation, access and use will 
in many places be very hard to come by, or attained at a much higher cost, without 
improving integrity. For example, it has been estimated that corruption in water and 
sanitation signifi cantly increases the costs of reaching international water supply 
and sanitation targets (Transparency International  2008 ). 
 It is important to gain a better understanding of the links between corruption and 
policy outcomes. Most of the time policies and laws are not lacking; the problem is 
that they are not implemented. Key issues are how water institutions can break out 
of this non-implementation mentality and what measures can be taken to incentivise 
better adherence to policies, rules and regulations. 
 It is long overdue to start to speak about the elephant in the room – the politically 
sensitive and unspoken drivers and consequences of corruption in the water sector – 
and above all to make systematic and coherent efforts to improve water integrity. 
This chapter points towards a need to strongly include integrity and anticorruption- 
related issues in the analysis of and policy responses to water crises. Not only is 
there a need for changed behaviour among public and private water decision- 
makers, service providers and users, but it is also high time for setting in place a 
strong research agenda to assess the impacts of corruption in water and to contextu-
alise policy responses and interventions to improve water integrity. Increased 
investments in integrity can reap high returns in improved revenues, effi ciency 
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gains, equitable water distribution, increased infrastructure investments and social 
and economic development. 
10.2  High Integrity Risks in the Water Sector 
 Governance failures such as corruption can take place in most facets of water man-
agement and traverse all water uses, such as irrigation, hydropower, infrastructure 
development, water supply and sanitation and water for environment. It can appear 
in many forms, from petty to grand-scale corruption – falsifi ed water metre read-
ings, skewed distribution of water use permits, illegal water connections and/or 
water outtakes (surface water and groundwater) for agriculture or households, pub-
lic sector procurement processes, infrastructure development, policy capture by 
elites and many more. It can involve two or more actors and can take place, for 
example, within the public sector when funds are leaking out of budgets, kickbacks 
between public and private sectors in procurements and between service providers 
and consumers when water fees are not paid to the water utility or when water is 
illegally tapped (Stålgren  2006 ). Corruption affects all sectors, from education, 
health and forestry to transportation and many more (see, e.g. Edgardo Campos and 
Pradhan  2007 ). A survey in South Asia pointed to law enforcement authorities 
(police and judiciary systems) as the most corrupt public institutions, followed by 
land administration (Transparency International  2002 ). Similarly, the construction 
sector is deemed high risk for bribery and corruption. It is apparent that corruption 
in other sectors impacts how water is used and allocated. For example, in most 
countries access to land and land rights is the pathway to also have access to water 
resources and the right to use it. Disputes over land and water are often settled by 
the court system. Construction of infrastructure is common in relation to water stor-
age, water distribution, urban and rural water services, hydropower, fl ood protection 
and wastewater treatment. As a result it is critical to consider water integrity in a 
broader context since it relates heavily to other sectors. 
 The water sector is vulnerable to corruption. For example, institutional 
 fragmentation makes decision-making authority for water extremely dispersed 
across political and administrative boundaries and agencies, which creates many 
loopholes to exploit. The provision of water services is monopolised and involves 
large fl ows of public funds in a noncompetitive way. Large water projects are 
capital- intensive and complex, which makes procurement lucrative, manipulation 
diffi cult to detect and corruption more likely to occur. When these factors appear in 
systems characterised by limited openness, transparency and accountability, patron-
age and discretionary decision-making, risks turn into practices of corruption and 
other forms of rent-seeking behaviour. 
 Many countries in Africa and Asia are stepping up their efforts signifi cantly to 
develop water-related infrastructure as a response to development needs and 
expected impacts of climate change. The Sustainable Development Solutions 
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Network (SDSN) estimates that USD 1–3 trillion is needed in infrastructure invest-
ments in developing countries in order to meet intergenerational development 
needs. It comes with high water integrity risks associated with procurement of ser-
vices, location and design that can threaten the very effectiveness of investments. 
The construction sector is ranked globally as one of the most vulnerable sectors to 
corruption (Transparency International  2005 ). The potential for large-scale corrup-
tion in infrastructure development can be so substantial that it skews policy-making 
towards the most “lucrative” investments and not those that are better for technical, 
social and economic reasons (Butterworth and de la Harpe  2009 ). Similar chal-
lenges have been identifi ed in climate proofi ng new or already existing water infra-
structure (Jacobson and Tropp  2010 ). 
10.3  The Consequences of Corruption 
 The impact of corruption in water can be severe and reaches far beyond water use 
and allocation and water supply services since it ultimately threatens or delays 
development and can make it more costly to achieve. Many times poor people are 
those worst affected since it hampers development of public services and skews 
natural resource allocation towards those with political clout and economic infl u-
ence. In cases where corruption is endemic, the system becomes almost self- 
perpetuating and puts people and organisations between a rock and a hard place. For 
a farmer, not paying a bribe for water access can be the difference between having 
food on the table and not. 
 The general research on corruption concludes that it lowers investments and 
hampers fair competition among businesses. It undermines the rule of law, spreads 
mistrust and undermines the legitimacy of government institutions. It cripples the 
public sector to provide acceptable services to the public, such as education, health 
and water supplies. It causes misallocation of public funds as well as natural 
resources to the detriment of social justice and economic growth. Corruption sys-
tematically undermines sustainable development since it weakens environmental 
protection and undermines efforts to reduce income inequality and poverty (see, e.g. 
Edgardo Campos and Pradhan  2007 ; Stålgren  2006 ). 
 The lack of integrity has dire consequences for water, its uses and allocations. 
The following examples are provided:
•  It undermines water reforms and their implementation. For example, it will be 
much harder to realise elements of integrated water resource management. In 
fact, if issues of transparency and accountability are not addressed, reforms such 
as decentralisation of decision-making can have perverse effects. 
•  It siphons off scarce monetary resources and diminishes a country’s prospects for 
providing water and sanitation for all or to improve water storage. It leads to 
ineffi cient and unequal allocation and distribution of water resources and related 
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services. It also contributes to increased water pollution and overabstraction of 
groundwater and surface water. 
 Various estimates of the costs of corruption are underestimations since they do 
not take into account secondary social and economic impacts or opportunity costs 
of corruption. For example, the costs in terms of health and loss of income-earning 
opportunities for poor people being locked out of certain water uses can be extremely 
high. It can result in loss of harvest or fewer educational opportunities for girls if 
they have to walk even longer distances to collect household water. While this can 
be observed at micro-level, it is diffi cult to aggregate the social and developmental 
impacts at macro-level. Costs of global corruption as calculated by, for example, the 
World Bank do not take into account opportunity costs of corruption to reduce pov-
erty and inequalities, such as through improved access to water services. Nor does 
it contain costs of health impacts, environmental degradation, poor construction, 
infl ated prices, etc. that can follow in the trail of corrupt behaviour. Kenny ( 2007 ) 
made use of indirect impacts to estimate the actual costs of kickbacks and cartels in 
some South Asian cities and found that it infl ated the price of a sustainable water 
connection by 25–45 %. 
 It is clear that lack of integrity in the form of corruption has many detrimental 
impacts on society and development. While there are many narratives on corruption 
and how it impacts micro-levels, there is a lack of more systematic macro-level 
data. Due to the nature of corruption, it is diffi cult to collect data on the micro- and 
macro-economic, social and opportunity costs of corruption. Favours are normally 
exchanged behind closed doors with the intent to leave as few traces as possible. 
Finding and interpreting data is often a matter of building trust and endless corrobo-
ration and triangulation of data. In many cases there can be high individual and 
professional risks to research corruption issues. 
10.4  Linking Governance and Integrity 
 Integrity has emerged as a new concept in the water sector, which is critical to 
address in order to improve water governance and achieve more sustainable water 
development. Integrity is often used as a euphemism for corruption. Water integrity 
is defi ned as the adherence of water stakeholders and institutions to governance 
principles of transparency, accountability and participation, based on core values of 
honesty, equity and professionalism. In a more practical sense, integrity can refer to 
how well governance regimes or systems adhere to the rule of law, predictability in 
decision-making procedures and outcomes, and whether decisions hold up to public 
scrutiny and to what extent they can withstand different types of vested interests and 
corrupt practices. Corruption in water is here used as a particular case to highlight 
issues of water integrity. Integrity aspects are very important for water use decision- 
making, and the level of integrity plays a critical role in the quality of governance 
that decides the outcomes of decision-making, that is, who gets what water, when 
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and how. Importantly, governance is a neutral concept, and in cases where corrup-
tion is widespread, it may actually be how that particular governance system 
functions. 
 Accountability in water supply services is here used as an example to outline 
some challenges and opportunities for strengthening integrity. Accountability must 
be part of the relationship among policy-makers, service providers and clients. As a 
result, increased emphasis has been placed on strengthening the ability of citizens, 
civil society organisations and other non-state actors to hold local governments 
accountable for their commitments to improve service delivery and make them 
more responsive to citizens’ needs. It is crucial to build capacity in local govern-
ments to not only deliver services effectively but to also enhance their ability to 
engage citizens by fostering dialogue and participation. 
10.5  Approaches to Water Integrity 
 The literature refl ects only slight growth in studies on water integrity-related issues, 
such as on analysing the dynamics of corruption, mismanagement and poor gover-
nance in the water sector. Many of the corruption risks are generically well known, 
but we know far less about how corruption plays out in certain contexts and what 
type of incentives through social pressures, policy and legal measures can be effec-
tively applied. 
 There are three main approaches to corruption and related anticorruption mea-
sures (see UNDP  2011 ).  The fi rst – and the most common view – is characterised as 
the “rotten-apple” perspective. Corruption is seen as the misbehaviour and moral 
misconduct of individual civil servants and less as something systematic or ingrained 
in the system. Well-functioning upward accountability systems and various checks 
and balances along with legal measures are considered going a long way towards 
minimising corruption.  The second view is related to rent-seeking behaviour of civil 
servants. Civil servants are considered opportunistic and self-serving which 
increases the risk of corruption. More controls and checks and balances are not 
primarily seen as solutions but rather changes such as privatising services or con-
tracting out more public services to the private sector. However, experience sug-
gests that there are big corruption risks in relation to processes of privatisation and 
contracting between public and private sectors. Consequently improved account-
ability and transparency are still important factors when the private sector is increas-
ingly engaged with, for example, water services provision.  The third approach 
considers corruption in light of complex and dynamic social, political and economic 
processes. Corruption is not only something that goes on between individuals but is 
embedded and institutionalised, and in some cases it is not an anomaly but how the 
system functions. Corruption is seen as power struggles between groups and a way 
of gaining control of and securing resources in society or policy capture. Some of 
the remedies suggested are, for example, improved social accountability that 
empowers civil society groups, such as water user or consumer groups to hold civil 
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servants and elected politicians to account. It also presupposes an improved fl ow of 
and better access to information in society and free media. 
 Here a particular view is not chosen since it can be context specifi c and many 
times it may be a mix of these three approaches. It is clear that improved account-
ability is important for all of them to work. To date, much of the work to improve 
water integrity has been to prevent it from happening in the fi rst place, that is, 
 proposed measures have focused on improving the system and strengthening insti-
tutional set-ups. 
 In his seminal work on corruption in irrigation in India, Wade ( 1982 ) described 
how irrigation engineers were able to illicit signifi cant revenues by controlling con-
tracts and the distribution of water to the farmers and that it was part of a larger 
system, redistributing parts of revenue to higher-ranking public offi cials and politi-
cians. Corruption was seen as a main reason for the poor performance of canal- 
irrigated agriculture. Similar studies have been undertaken in Pakistan (Rinaudo 
 2002 ) to show how corruption determines water allocation and that it entails not 
only the rich and infl uential farmers but also powerless small-scale farmers. Another 
study pointed to the role of patronage and clientelistic linkages in petty corruption 
in Kazakhstan and grand-scale political capture in Chile as determinants of how 
water resources are allocated within agriculture (Warner et al.  2009 ). Similar pat-
terns of patronage and clientelism linkages were found in urban water pollution and 
in the relations between NGOs and local authorities (Tropp  1998 ). Another study 
pointed to the high frequency of kickbacks to public offi cials and tampering with 
water fees in urban water supply in some major Indian cities, leading to big revenue 
losses (Davis  2004 ). 
 Principal-agent theory has been used to explore relational patterns between the 
“principal” (consumer or client) and the “agent” (the service provider) and the vari-
ous types of exchanges (money, favours, nepotism) that can take place. Problems 
with principal-agent relations are related to suboptimal contracts and agreements (if 
they exist in the fi rst place) between exchange partners, such as between local pub-
lic offi cials and farmers for release of water to irrigated farming or between the 
service provider of household water and the consumer. A major problem that can be 
exploited is that the providers of the service normally have better information and 
knowledge of the service provision value chain as compared to the consumers of the 
services. This is a case of asymmetric information, where the information advan-
tage by service providers can be misused for corruption and other rent-seeking 
behaviours, such as overpricing. In contexts where regulation enforcement is lax 
and where there is little transparency and openness to share information, the risks of 
corrupt behaviour will increase. The provision of water services is considered close 
to a natural monopoly; hence, there is very little scope for replacing the water ser-
vice provider with another one. This lack of competition will further increase risks 
of, for example, corruption and overpricing 1 (see, e.g. Huppert  2002 ). 
1  The informal water service sector contains many small-scale operators and can be competitive. 
However, there are many accounts where local providers divide up local markets, creating “water 
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 In the above cases, important features are patron-client-like relations and that 
information is tilted towards the advantage of government agencies. Many times 
public offi cials might be tempted to make power and information asymmetries work 
to their advantage to reap illicit incomes. Patronage and clientelism makes 
 decision- making discretionary and allows for personal motivations of public offi -
cials and politicians to seek out illicit income-earning opportunities. 
 The improvement of accountability would require that relevant information is 
accessible to the public and that stakeholders can take part in decision-making pro-
cesses. What makes the situation more complex is that civil society is often weakly 
organised. Politics can also slow, skew or stall these processes, as government 
departments and individuals try to prevent or impede actions that are seen to threaten 
their own power and authority. 
10.6  Horizontal and Vertical Governance Interface 
 While horizontal work on strengthening governance has been ongoing for many 
years in areas such as putting in place anticorruption commissions, special prosecu-
tors and ombudsman, the water sector itself has at large been turning a blind eye to 
integrity and anticorruption issues. It was not until 2005 that these issues started to 
receive international recognition and attention, and more systematic counterreac-
tions were being developed through initiatives such as the Water Integrity Network. 
 The experience of setting in place national anticorruption commissions, special 
anticorruption prosecutors and ombudsman has had very few benefi ts or even nega-
tive impacts (Heilbrunn  2004 ). The development of anticorruption commissions 
and other similar bodies has frequently been demanded by donors but not owned by 
policy-makers and implementing agencies. Moreover, in many cases the establish-
ment of such commissions has been used as an excuse to avoid and ignore needs for 
deeper reforms. A worst case scenario is that anticorruption institutions are misused 
in national power struggles to discredit political rivals. Anticorruption commissions 
have been plagued by lack of independence from the government, limited budgetary 
support and investigative powers and unclear procedures in forwarding cases to 
prosecution. 
 It is critical to continue to address corruption from a horizontal and holistic gov-
ernance angle, but ultimately any national corruption strategy needs to be imple-
mented within sectors. A targeted sector approach owned and driven by the sector 
can be more practical and realistic to actually make headway on anticorruption 
measures and improved governance. Successful sector work to improve integrity 
can thus have an important snowballing effect. 
 The long-term viability of a sector approach is thus supported by efforts that 
strengthen governance in the interfaces of horizontal and vertical governance. 
oligarchs”. There are also several accounts from many slum areas in cities where water services are 
controlled by local organised crime. 
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Improved water integrity also requires cross sector work and collaborations since 
water use cuts across many other sectors. 
10.7  Improving Accountability in Water Service Delivery 
 Integrity is about improving transparency, accountability and participation in the 
service delivery framework, which has signifi cant impacts on how services are 
delivered in practice. 
 In most countries, institutional arrangements for water service delivery are in 
place: policies, plans and institutions exist, yet performance remains poor. In this 
context, accountability, which is about improving the quality of relationships between 
the different stakeholders in service delivery arrangements, is a key element to make 
these institutional arrangements function as intended. Accountability is about coming 
to grips with institutional defi ciencies, through implementing the allocated mandates, 
roles and responsibilities as outlined in, for example, rules and regulations. Some 
evidence supports these statements. An evaluation report by the European Union of 23 
water supply and sanitation projects in sub-Saharan Africa found that although equip-
ment was generally installed as planned, fewer than half of the projects delivered 
results meeting the needs of benefi ciaries. It was suggested that a majority of these 
projects were potentially sustainable in the sense of using standard technologies and 
local materials, but governance aspects were the key weakness for continuous service 
(European Court of Auditors  2012 ). In another recent Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) research project focused on challenges to service delivery in the African con-
text, three main constraints for service delivery were identifi ed: incoherent policies, 
poor top-down disciplines and limited bottom-up accountability relationships, and 
limited scope for problem-solving and local collective action (Tavakoli et al.  2013 ). 
 Transparency and participation contribute to improved accountability. 
Transparency refers to openness of governance processes and free access to offi cial 
information. Increased access to information enables citizens to scrutinise the work 
of government, and more transparency can put pressure on government offi cials to 
be accountable, perform better and avoid corruption (González de Asís et al.  2009 ). 
Participation refers to the opportunity for citizens to provide informed, timely and 
meaningful input and infl uence decisions at various levels. It also refers to the 
mechanisms used by citizens to express themselves and to infl uence decisions and 
processes in the political, economic and social sphere. 
 Accountability have been identifi ed as a key enabling factor for improved gover-
nance of water, but the challenge remains to fi nd the best ways to strengthen 
accountability links in the water sector (Sohail and Cavill  2007 ). Acknowledging 
that institutional inertia is at the core of the problem, many external support agen-
cies (donors, international organisations, NGOs, etc.) have targeted their support to 
national accountability on strengthening relationships between actors. How can 
external support strengthen accountability links in a meaningful way without dis-
torting national accountability frameworks? This section discusses the potential 
roles and challenges of accountability support, based on experiences in the Water 
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Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector. The fi rst part attempts to defi ne account-
ability, before “unpacking” the key concepts into different objectives. The section 
ends with a discussion about the challenges encountered in the implementation of 
different accountability support interventions. 
10.7.1  Defi ning Accountability Among Service Delivery Actors 
 Accountability refers to sets of controls, counterweights and modes of supervision 
that make offi cials and institutions in the public and private sector answerable for 
their actions and ensures that sanctions are applied against poor performance, illegal 
acts and abuses of power. Well-functioning accountability mechanisms can help 
clarify the commitments of actors involved in water governance, lead to effi cient 
management of fi scal resources, protect water resources and increase control over 
the actions of public and private stakeholders and ensure minimum quality stan-
dards (UNDP and SIWI  2013 ). 
 A combination of mechanisms can be put in place to operationalise the account-
ability principle (see Fig.  10.1 ).  Horizontal accountability describes relationships 
where a state actor has the authority to demand explanations or impose penalties on 
another state actor. Horizontal oversight systems are thus based within the legal and 
justice system. They include mechanisms of internal oversight and checks and bal-
ances within an institution (internal control) or oversight and checks and balances 
of public institutions.  Vertical accountability links citizens directly to the govern-
ment. Vertical accountability exists when non-state actors such as the media, non- 
governmental organisations or individuals place pressure on state actors for 
improved services. Traditionally, elections and the use of informal processes are the 
direct way to channel citizens’ “voices” to exert pressure on policy-makers. Indirect 
forms of vertical channels include civic engagement, lobbying and mass mobilisa-
tion.  Transversal or  hybrid accountability refers to the participation of citizens and 
civil society (actors from the “vertical” accountability relationships) in horizontal 
(state-to-state) processes of accountability. This type of mechanism helps overcome 
the limited impact of traditional civil society methods, strengthens horizontal mech-
anisms of accountability and legitimises the inclusion of citizens in government 
oversight functions. The use of horizontal institutions by the public to improve 
accountability interactions between the state and water users can help develop civic 
engagement and foster the development of social accountability mechanisms. Social 
accountability describes mechanisms which involve civil society in holding duty 
bearers to account for the performance of service provision. Social accountability 
tools can be used both to hold public offi cials to account and to improve the account-
ability link between users and service providers. In addition, distinctions can be 
made between specifi c domains of accountability; in this sense, we talk about politi-
cal, administrative, legal and fi nancial accountability.
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10.7.2  Unpacking Accountability in Water Service Delivery 
 The analysis of accountability addresses a wide range of interactions between mul-
tiple service delivery actors occurring at different levels. The human rights frame-
work offers a useful way of understanding the accountability challenges by depicting 
the different dimensions of the accountability system into responsibility, answer-
ability and enforceability (OHCHR  2013 ). Adapting this framework to the water 
sector (UNDP WGF/UNICEF  2015 ), we defi ne three main levels of intervention:
 (A)  Defi ning the roles and enabling cooperation in service delivery . A precondition 
for accountability is that those in positions of authority (governments and ser-
vice providers) have clearly defi ned duties and performance standards, enabling 
their behaviour to be assessed in a transparent and objective way. At the same 
time, users need to know their rights and obligations. Moreover, effective coor-
dination mechanisms between different responsible parties need to be put in 
place. Promoting responsibility focuses on three different objectives: enhanc-
 Fig. 10.1  Vertical, horizontal and transversal dimensions of accountability (Source: Own elabora-
tion from UNIFEM  2008 ) 
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ing policy coherence, providing clarity in the defi nition of responsibilities and 
improving coordination in the sector. 
 (B)  Informing, consulting and including stakeholders in all stages of service deliv-
ery . The emphasis at this second level of intervention is that timely and accu-
rate information is made available about service provision, such as the current 
status of services, the performance of service providers or the decisions about 
fi nancial allocations. Spaces for interaction between users, services providers 
and government also need to be created to enable participants to explain, ques-
tion, discuss and/or justify decisions. The three main objectives of support to 
greater answerability in service provision will be to enhance the fl ow of infor-
mation and use of consumer feedback, to improve consumers’ access to infor-
mation and to create spaces for stakeholders’ participation. 
 (C)  Monitoring performance and supporting compliance and enforcement . The 
third level of intervention focuses on enforcing mechanisms, which aim to 
monitor and ensure compliance of public offi cials, service providers and insti-
tutions with established standards; to impose sanctions on offi cials and compa-
nies who do not comply; and to ensure that appropriate corrective and remedial 
actions are taken when required. Two main objectives can be identifi ed for 
improving enforceability, namely, to establish or support the regulatory func-
tion and to strengthen external and internal control mechanisms. 
10.7.3  Challenges and Success Factors 
 Accountability is not the responsibility of only one type of institution but involves 
all stakeholders of the water services, often in shifting roles (as duty bearers and 
rights holders), and it is infl uenced by a range of social and political factors. There 
are many possible entry points and approaches for promoting accountability in 
water service delivery, depending on the needs as well as the wider political and 
economic context in which accountability processes take place. However, research 
suggests that initiatives taken to support accountability relationships face a series of 
challenges suggesting that there is space for better fi tted approaches. Much effort 
has been dedicated in recent decades to support the defi nition of clear policy frame-
works and to enhance sector coordination in developing countries. The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD  2005 /2008) has also boosted this effort. 
More than one decade later, a few lessons can be learnt. Too often, policies pro-
moted and adopted have been based on international blueprints and have not taken 
into consideration the reality of the country, drawing a picture that is too far removed 
from actual practice and possibilities of the country (OECD  2013 ), leading to poor 
implementation. External support agencies have also supported coordination mech-
anisms in many countries. However, trickle-down effects have been limited, and on 
many occasions, increased coordination at the national level has not improved ben-
efi ts in terms of service delivery to citizens at the other end. Hence, policy processes 
cannot translate into improved responsibility unless authorities provide guidance 
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and clarifi cation on the general principles contained in policy documents by devel-
oping the necessary decrees, acts or laws. Moreover, information about policy and 
action needs to be made readily available to all stakeholders; in practice, policies 
often take years to be known at local levels of government or by end users. Finally, 
implementation of policies requires that public resources are allocated and that key 
actors have the necessary capacities to deliver. Very often, these conditions are not 
met. With regard to coordination among accountability actors in the water sector, 
the case of Uganda (SIWI/WIN/WSP  2012 ) offers important lessons in how these 
efforts have to be clearly linked to improved access to information, clear and mea-
surable indicators and the establishment of feasible commitments for annual 
improvement. 
 Engaging stakeholders and increasing the fl ow of information and participation 
have been mainly supported through a social accountability approach, focusing on 
strengthening citizens’ demand for improved transparency and performance. In cer-
tain cases, good short-term results have been announced with enthusiasm. However, 
in the long run, social accountability mechanisms need to be institutionalised and 
aligned with formal accountability mechanisms – and not compete with or under-
mine them. A typical example of this phenomenon can be found in the monitoring 
mechanisms of services based on users’ collaboration in data collection. To sustain 
citizen mobilisation in the long run, interaction is vital as well as visible impacts. 
Findings in East Africa (SIWI  2013 ) point to the need to complement this type of 
tools empowering users with a parallel development of the capacity of water service 
providers and government to act upon the information collected. Support to account-
ability in the water sector involves interactions with political actors and politicised 
processes. In actions aiming to engage the population in order to improve answer-
ability, a context-sensitive approach can entail addressing issues of privacy and 
security. In the same way, in certain contexts it might be necessary to invest time 
working to increase the political receptivity to citizens’ demands and criticism to 
avoid serious risks for people and institutions. When the objective of the interven-
tion is to build or improve the relationships across accountability actors, the main 
challenge is to link the stakeholder dialogue exercise with offi cial decision-making 
processes. Development partners need to ensure that adequate resources are allo-
cated for the completion of these dialogues, since they are often time and resource 
intensive, especially if inclusiveness is one of the objectives. Managing the expecta-
tions of dialogue participants is also crucial. 
 Opening up the political willingness for the establishment of regulatory func-
tions in water services has proved to be a long and diffi cult process. Acceptance and 
understanding of the regulatory process by the consumers and other stakeholders 
and broad institutional support for the regulatory body is a fi rst condition; once the 
institution is established, fi nancial autonomy is required. The inclusion of citizens 
in the regulatory function (as, e.g. Water Watch Groups that inform the regulator 
directly through mobile phones) is a very interesting development of transversal 
accountability. Evidence from Zambia (SIWI  2008 ) shows that this type of coopera-
tion can help raise the profi le and public knowledge about the regulator and is a 
cost-effective source of information on sector performance for the regulator. 
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Oversight institutions can also be general and not sector specifi c. Anticorruption 
agencies and other oversight institutions will require the presence of a strong 
 judiciary, i.e. courts to back up their constitutional authority when prosecuting 
cases; moreover it is essential that “whistle-blowers” and ordinary citizens are pro-
tected from retribution. 
10.8  Some Lessons Learnt 
 Accountability is a powerful entry point to improve water integrity and thus water 
governance. However, external support agencies face multiple challenges in their 
support to accountability. Experience shows that approaches fi nanced by external 
actors can run the risk of remaining externally owned at least in the short to medium 
term. A critical condition for effective aid-funded activities is to analyse the incen-
tive structures for accountability in order to identify and manage risks and opportu-
nities in the political and administrative landscape and understand the societal 
demands and work through or in close contact with reform-minded top public offi -
cials. Another major challenge is to avoid a situation where accountability interven-
tions substitute civil society initiatives to failing state capacity, which can lead to 
even more disorganisation of the service delivery framework. The support provided 
by external support agencies often tends to focus on participatory approaches. 
However, evidence confi rms that without the threat of effective sanctions (and 
resulting impacts), citizen mobilisation is diffi cult to sustain in the long run. 
Similarly, as noted by the general literature on anticorruption, anticorruption 
reforms should not only target law enforcement, but rather public offi cials should be 
part of broader changes on how they interact with the public (Rose-Ackerman and 
Carrington  2013 ). 
 For external support agencies to tackle these risks and to achieve sustainable 
results, there is a need to broaden the scope of efforts. One fi rst useful step is to 
ensure that support to accountability targets both social accountability mechanisms, 
aimed at increasing citizens’ voice, and traditional accountability mechanisms, such 
as investigations, inspections and audits which can impose formal sanctions. Civil 
society organisations play a key role in demanding accountability, but weaknesses 
of the NGO sector in many aid-dependent countries can constrain the effectiveness 
of external support agency interventions. Many NGOs rely on external assistance 
while at the same time they need to develop credibility, local legitimacy and inde-
pendence from the government. Donors will need to provide long-term support in a 
balanced way, without undermining the necessary commitment to local improve-
ment while aiming at developing self-sustainable organisations. 
 An associated challenge to these processes is the long-term need to see reforms 
make changes on the ground, for users but also for politicians who want re-election 
and for external support agents who need to show short-term results to their con-
stituencies. The next generation of accountability support will require a more politi-
cally informed understanding of the national context, more fl exibility and patience 
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from external support agencies, a capacity to work with the existing local fabric 
without making it overdependent on external actors and developing a long-term and 
open vision from national governments to increase the role of citizens in the public 
space. 
10.9  Conclusions 
 Limited integrity manifested in corruption is a concern for the whole water sector 
which disproportionately affects the development of the most vulnerable countries. 
The implementation of water policies and the sustainable use and development of 
water are at high risk. 
 Experience suggests that functioning accountability systems are one important 
element to improve water integrity. To increase its impacts, there is a need to use 
accountability measures in more integrative ways, such as developing mutually 
supportive measures to strengthen social accountability and horizontal accountabil-
ity between government agencies. Hence, if there are real risks of not only getting 
exposed but that exposure can also lead to legal actions, the likelihood of account-
ability measures gaining impacts is enhanced. This is clearly coupled with the need 
for a sector governance focus more strongly coupled with other national governance 
efforts to strengthen anticorruption commissions, procurement oversight agencies 
and judiciary systems. 
 Most research and development cooperation programming on water integrity 
and corruption thus far has focused on household water supply and irrigation. 
While, in general, there is an urgent need to intensify work in these areas, there is a 
sense of urgency to develop water integrity and anticorruption research and pro-
gramming across water users and institutional fragmentations. For example, the 
much required water infrastructure investments in many developing countries are at 
high risk of corruption, which can affect their effi ciency as well as potential inves-
tors backing out due to too high business risks. 
 Some are now starting to acknowledge  the elephant in the room . The challenges 
raised by limited integrity and corruption in water management have long been 
recognised as important. What is new, however, is the increased awareness of the 
issue at the international and national levels. This recognition has sparked debates 
on how to tackle the problems and challenges associated with it. While integrity is 
still a highly sensitive social and political topic in many contexts and for develop-
ment partners in particular, the use of water integrity and associated measures to 
promote transparency, accountability and participation can offer a constructive way 
forward to get around some of these sensitivities. 
 Improving integrity and reducing corruption is a means to an end. The objective 
of particular reforms and the characteristics of the political and socio-economic 
contexts in which they are implemented should guide the choice of the types of sup-
port measures put in place. It is critical to trace and assess the link between anticor-
ruption measures and their outcomes. This is a very challenging task since this type 
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of information is diffi cult to come by and information on costs and benefi ts of alter-
native options is frequently not available. 
 An urgent call is made for developing a strong research agenda on water integrity 
and anticorruption. In countries with malfunctioning governance systems, lack of 
integrity and high frequency of corrupt interactions is one of the single biggest gov-
ernance issues to be resolved. Very modest resources have so far been devoted in the 
water sector to explore corruption hotspots, impacts and consequences and the type 
of measures that should be applied. To date, we know fairly little about the measures 
that work and in what contexts. Importantly, such research agendas should also 
move beyond the narrow focus on institutions to include the role of social pressures 
in minimising corruption. 
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 Abstract  This chapter provides an overview and thus contributes to a better under-
standing of the world’s groundwater resources, their distinctiveness and their gover-
nance. It describes the principal elements of and key instruments employed in 
groundwater governance. To this end, the authors introduce several case studies 
from across the globe and offer some corresponding lessons learnt. In particular, 
this chapter presents an analysis of the role of monitoring and assessment in ground-
water governance, showcasing the example of The Netherlands. A global diagnostic 
of the current state of groundwater governance is provided, based on information 
from a set of commissioned thematic papers and the outcomes of fi ve subsequent 
regional consultations carried out within the framework of a GEF-supported project 
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on Global Groundwater Governance. It includes insights into some of the fi ndings 
of that project regarding the four main components of groundwater governance: 
actors, national legal frameworks, policies and information and knowledge. In addi-
tion, the authors address the issue of governance of transboundary groundwater 
resources and the relevant existing international legal frameworks. In conclusion, 
through a Global Vision for 2030, the chapter presents a way forward to govern 
groundwater and a Framework for Action to achieve good governance, formulated 
by the Groundwater Governance Project jointly implemented by UNESCO, FAO, 
World Bank and IAH. 
 Keywords  Groundwater governance •  Sustainable development •  Water policy/
water governance/water management •  Freshwater •  Groundwater monitoring • 
 Hydrogeology •  Transboundary aquifers 
11.1  Why Groundwater Governance? 
11.1.1  Background and Basic Concepts 
 Groundwater is an extremely important source of freshwater on earth: its global fl ux 
amounts to some 28 % of the total global freshwater fl ux, and even around 98 % of 
the world’s liquid freshwater reserves are stored underground, which makes ground-
water a unique buffer capable of bridging prolonged dry periods (Margat  2008 ; 
Margat and van der Gun  2013 ). Worldwide, 2.5 billion people depend solely on 
groundwater for their daily needs (UN WWDR  2015 ), and the volume of ground-
water abstractions is increasing between 1 and 3 % annually (Margat and van der 
Gun  2013 ; Wada et al.  2013 ). Simultaneously, contamination of groundwater is 
becoming a more widespread problem, and the negative effects of groundwater 
abstractions are increasing, for example, on groundwater-dependent ecosystems. 
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Climate change and variability are affecting the recharge of groundwater (Taylor 
et al.  2013 ) as well as the demand for groundwater, while population growth and 
improved well-drilling and development techniques also lead to increased demand. 
 Understanding the signifi cance of groundwater governance is a critical part of 
recent, non-technical, “soft” approaches to managing the “water crisis”, which 
some long-time observers have termed “mainly a crisis of governance” (Mukherji 
and Shah  2005 ). Principles of governance, if appropriately identifi ed and applied, 
can yield effective groundwater management policies, which can result in prac-
tices for “responsible groundwater use”, including attention to equity, sustainabil-
ity and effi ciency (Varady et al.  2013 ). The notion of (environmental) sustainability, 
accepted in the 1990s, features a number of corollary precepts, all of which are 
relevant to groundwater: “context matters” and one-size-fi ts-all solutions are illu-
sory (Ostrom  1990 ); integrating groundwater management within other aspects of 
socioeconomic development is indispensable (viz . IWRM or integrated water 
resource management), and to be most effective, expertise should be harnessed 
across a full spectrum of disciplinary approaches, including the social sciences 
and law; communities of practice (CoPs), such as those among government 
authorities, scientists and water users, are catalysts for effective management of 
resources, while the involvement in decision-making of non-state actors and 
diverse stakeholders, such as communities, is a component of most successful 
resource-management approaches; and fi nally, political motives such as power 
concentration, equity and ethics are key factors in national, international and 
transboundary matters. Beyond fi nancial and hydrological considerations, key 
obstacles to improved management include the lack of reliable information on 
groundwater resources, extensive institutional and territorial fragmentation in a 
sector with numerous stakeholders at different levels, and signifi cant spillover 
effects in other policy areas such as agriculture, spatial planning and energy. In 
addition, groundwater management is confronted by the invisibility of the resource 
and the persistent myths of its inexhaustibility, cheapness and universally high 
quality (Varady et al.  2013 ). Another distinct feature of groundwater is that its 
exploitation is extremely dispersed in space and predominantly in the hands of the 
private sector such as irrigation farmers, water supply companies or domestic 
well-owners. Therefore, to a large extent, managing groundwater quantity means 
infl uencing the decisions and behaviour of numerous individuals. This is in con-
trast with the exploitation of surface water quantity, in which relatively large engi-
neering infrastructure and the public sector often play a much more prominent 
role. All these peculiarities of groundwater make its governance and management 
rather different from surface water management and governance. 
11.1.2  Working Defi nitions: Governance, Policy, Management 
 Moving from the loftiest to the most functional notion, we offer working defi nitions of 
three related but fundamentally different terms: governance, policy and management. 
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 Governance  Governance is generally understood to imply a societal  process 
(Lautze et al.  2011 ). For the World Bank ( 1991 ), it is more specifi cally “the exercise 
of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s prob-
lems and affairs”. A useful corollary views governance as “the sum of the many 
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs” 
(Commission on Global Governance  1995 ). 
 The GEF-supported Groundwater Governance Project, implemented by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) jointly with the United Nations Educational, 
Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank and the 
International Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH), adopted the following defi ni-
tion of groundwater governance: “groundwater governance comprises the promo-
tion of responsible collective action to ensure control, protection and 
socially-sustainable utilisation of groundwater resources and aquifer systems for 
the benefi t of humankind and dependent ecosystems. This action is facilitated by an 
enabling framework and guiding principles” (Groundwater Governance Project 
 2016b ) . 
 Policy  While the concept of “policy” has become pervasive, working defi nitions 
remain elusive. The  Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2011) defi nes policy as “a defi -
nite course or method of action…to guide and determine present and future condi-
tions”. For the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO  2011 ), policy is “a 
set of decisions which are oriented towards a long term purpose or to a particular 
problem”. This simple and succinct defi nition captures the centrality of the vital 
term, “decision”. If we understand the policies to be made by all sectors of society 
with a stake in governance – not just government – then policy-making can be con-
sidered synonymous with decision-making. Once policies have been formulated, 
putting them in place requires instruments, tools, rules, protocols and other proce-
dures. These may include laws, sets of rights, registrations, permits and regulations 
(especially regulations that allow those regulated to choose among alternative ways 
of complying); economic incentives and disincentives such as subsidies, taxes, trad-
able pollution permits and pricing structures; and civil-society actions such as those 
that motivate voluntary actions or behavioural changes (Theesfeld  2008 ). 
 Management  The term “management” is perhaps easier to grasp intuitively than 
“governance”. Management can be thought of as the “nitty-gritty of day-to-day 
operations” that emphasises the results of decisions (Linton and Brooks  2011 ). 
Other similar notions are “approaches, models, principles, and information used to 
make decisions” (Bakker 2007, cited in Nowlan and Bakker  2010 ); “regimes based 
on institutions, laws, cultural factors, knowledge, and practices” (Solanes and 
Jouravlev  2006 ); or purposeful activities that enable the accomplishment of goals 
and objectives (Pahl-Wostl  2007 ). These defi nitions share a concern for routine, 
practical and effective ways to achieve predetermined objectives and proceed with 
a common caveat: recognition of confl icting interests (Wolf  2007 ). 
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11.1.3  Main Instruments of Groundwater Management 
 Experts agree that too little is known about the institutions and policies that govern 
the use of groundwater resources (Mukherji and Shah  2005 ). Nevertheless, espe-
cially recently, innovative approaches to groundwater management have emerged 
worldwide (de Gooijer et al.  2009 ) and feature a variety of instruments to manage 
groundwater (Theesfeld  2010 ), including:
•  Technical instruments (surveying, groundwater quantity and quality monitoring 
and modelling, other diagnostic analyses, sustainable aquifer yield estimations) 
•  Managerial and planning instruments (IWRM plans, land use and spatial plan-
ning, environmental impact assessment, groundwater protection zoning, clear 
defi nition of responsibilities and roles of various groundwater resource manage-
ment entities) 
•  Regulatory instruments (groundwater property and usufructuary rights, well 
licensing and registration, drilling accreditation, water legislation, groundwater 
caps, bans on hazardous human activities with risks of groundwater 
contamination) 
•  Economic instruments (groundwater pricing, environmental taxes, tradable 
rights and groundwater markets) and  behaviour-changing instruments (training, 
information sharing, awareness-raising). 
 Moench et al. ( 2003 ) argue that this relatively recent, instrument-based approach 
presumes extensive knowledge of the physical and social dimensions of the ground-
water system and suffi cient organisational capacity to implement changes in a 
planned and integrated manner. 
11.1.4  Existing Practices and Lessons Learnt 
 There are many examples of management and governance models, along with eval-
uations of their effectiveness and discussions of lessons learnt. We offer four 
selected cases: two contrasting models in developing countries, namely, western 
India and China, and two distinct approaches in more industrialised, though water- 
short societies, namely, Spain and Arizona (USA). 
 Western India  Some studies on groundwater management highlight  self- regulation 
as a governance model (Van Steenbergen and Shah  2003 ). For example, in the State 
of Gujarat, India, when government efforts failed to address the over-exploitation of 
groundwater and coastal groundwater salinisation, some local communities began 
to harvest excess rainwater during the monsoon for aquifer recharge. Based on 
informal rules, and inspired by a local spiritual Hindu leader, the grassroots move-
ment grew fast. The early adopters became agents of change, inspiring neighbour-
ing farmers in nearby villages and operating as an open and inclusive network. 
Although the initial focus was on increasing water supply, some demand-side 
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 practices, sanctioned by local religious practices, were also adopted. The movement 
received public recognition from the state government, resulting in a pluralistic 
coexistence of formal governmental groundwater legislation and informal move-
ment norms and rules. This case exemplifi es public-private partnership with coop-
eration between government departments, citizens, communities, religious-based 
organisations, NGOs, and the private sector. 
 China  Groundwater management strategies in India can be contrasted with those 
in China (Mukherji and Shah  2005 ). Since the 1950s, both countries facing high 
population density and embracing food self-suffi ciency and an agriculture-based 
economy have relied on groundwater irrigation for their massive agricultural pro-
duction (Siebert et al.  2010 ). In both countries, this practice has led to overexploita-
tion with consequent groundwater table declines in signifi cant parts of their 
territories. In contrast to India’s regionalised and even localised approach to ground-
water management, China’s approach has been much more centralised. Each 
Chinese village features a governmental agent paid from villagers’ taxes with the 
responsibility to plan and manage its irrigation. Such offi cials provide guidance for 
price-setting mechanisms in groundwater markets. Differences between the Indian 
and the Chinese experience illustrate the roles that both the macro-development 
path (Shah  2007 ) and the overarching political regime play in the shape and scope 
of groundwater governance. 
 Spain  Traditionally, with a strong governmental bias towards surface water infra-
structure, Spain offers an example of how past practices and policies infl uence and 
constrain present groundwater governance (Llamas  2003 ). Spain has one of the 
highest numbers of surface reservoirs per capita and large interbasin river water 
transfers. In large part, this is due to past failures associated with groundwater 
dependence for public water supplies. This experience has prompted a myth that 
assumes that groundwater use  always leads to the depletion of the source rendering 
it unreliable. The Spanish Water Code of 1985 placed groundwater resources within 
the public domain. However, because of the historic notion of groundwater as pri-
vate property, registration and licensure have been diffi cult to achieve. The 2001 
National Water Plan appears to challenge the old paradigm of surface water infra-
structure development. For the fi rst time, it has provisions that strongly support the 
management of groundwater resources, and it fosters the formation of groundwater- 
user communities and education of the public on groundwater. 
 Arizona, Southwestern USA  An interesting case study is that of the arid and 
strongly groundwater-dependent state of Arizona in the United States. Aside from 
drinking-water quality and discharge standards, which are established at the national 
level, the individual states retain the discretion to establish their own groundwater 
rights and management systems (Gerlak et al.  2013 ). Arizona’s 1980 Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA), along with its regulatory framework for aquifer recharge, 
has enabled the deployment of innovative approaches to managing groundwater in 
hydrologically mapped regions that had experienced signifi cant groundwater 
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 overdraft. Key to the GMA was the establishment of statutory management goals 
for a set of active management areas (groundwater management jurisdictions), as 
well as a programme of assured water supply, whereby new municipal develop-
ments are required to show they have legally, physically and continuously available 
water supplies for 100 years. The GMA also requires municipal, industrial and agri-
cultural conservation programmes. Despite this progressive management and gov-
ernance framework, groundwater management challenges remain. These include 
absence of consideration of environmental water uses and localised drawdown of 
aquifers (Megdal  2012 ; Megdal et al.  2015 ). 
11.2  The Role of Monitoring and Assessment 
in Groundwater Governance 
 One of the above-mentioned technical instruments in support of groundwater gov-
ernance is groundwater monitoring, the practice of observing changes in the state of 
groundwater resources. Observations about groundwater can include but are not 
limited to groundwater levels, quality and abstraction volumes. Measuring changes 
in the state of groundwater in a reliable and suffi ciently detailed way depends 
largely on well-designed and maintained networks of groundwater wells. 
Groundwater governance and monitoring are interdependent; good groundwater 
governance depends on a suitable understanding of the resource being governed, 
including processes affecting the resource such as the effects of human interaction 
and policies. Groundwater monitoring provides information to create this under-
standing. Assessment then uses this understanding to characterise the needs of the 
resource and its users to provide a sound basis for governance and management. 
Monitoring and periodic assessment allows relevant stakeholders to systematically 
improve resource management based on measured outcomes, i.e. adaptive manage-
ment. At the same time, it is the practice of good governance that needs to provide 
the right framework to put monitoring and data collection in place. 
11.2.1  Relevance of Groundwater Monitoring and Assessment 
in Relation to Governance 
 The importance of groundwater monitoring is gaining traction at the international 
level. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers (UNGA  2008 ) includes Article 13 which requires 
monitoring by states sharing an aquifer. Going further, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes has more elaborate provisions for groundwa-
ter monitoring and its objectives (UNECE  1992 ). The most descriptive is the 
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European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD), which states in Article 8 that 
monitoring programmes are required and provides technical design specifi cations in 
Appendix V (EC  2000 ). Further monitoring objectives specifi c to groundwater 
quality are described in the EU Groundwater Directive (EC  2006 ). 
 The increasing attention given to this practice at the international level is a refl ec-
tion of the broader importance of groundwater monitoring. Lack of monitoring and 
assessment of groundwater resources can limit the effectiveness of policy-making 
and groundwater management, two essential elements of groundwater governance. 
 To be effective, the development of groundwater policies and laws should take 
into account existing knowledge about groundwater systems, especially if they are 
designed for a specifi c aquifer. Groundwater monitoring contributes to this knowl-
edge by mainly measuring groundwater levels, groundwater abstractions, spring 
discharge and water quality (Vermooten and Kukurić  2009 ). Once these monitoring 
data are available, they can be assessed and used to evaluate whether particular 
policy objectives have been met or need adjusting (adaptive management). 
Therefore, gathering data about groundwater resources has a clear role in effective 
groundwater governance and assessment of groundwater resources. However, gaps 
and asymmetries in groundwater data pre-empt attempts at good groundwater gov-
ernance, comprehensive assessment or the fulfi llment of management objectives 
such as conservation and protection (Theesfeld  2010 ). 
11.2.2  Law and Policy: How to Make Monitoring 
and Assessment Happen 
 Development of groundwater laws and policies should include mechanisms that 
facilitate groundwater monitoring. In order to ensure that groundwater monitoring 
takes place, an effective national (ground)water law should, at a minimum, defi ne an 
obligation for groundwater monitoring and the overall objectives for the monitor-
ing. Additionally, it should describe funding mechanisms and how rights of access 
will be granted for monitoring, determine whether all or some groundwater abstrac-
tions must be monitored and reported, as well as details on how results of monitor-
ing will be made publicly available (IGRAC  2008 ). Administrative responsibility 
for the monitoring has to be assigned, and guidelines for reporting need to be pro-
vided. To be able to design a monitoring network, the objectives stated in the laws 
and policies need to be translated into technical objectives, which include, for 
example, determining groundwater fl ow directions, defi ning recharge and seepage 
areas, and characterising groundwater quality of the observed region and its suit-
ability for various types of use (Jousma and Roelofsen  2004 ). By elaborating these 
technical standards in a policy, a groundwater governance regime would have the 
technical foundation necessary to complete a comprehensive assessment of its 
groundwater resources. 
 Comprehensive assessment would not only entail analysis of the data provided 
by the groundwater monitoring network but also interpretation of those data for the 
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purposes of creating an overview of the physical characteristics of the resource 
(fl ow volumes and dynamics), the human uses (domestic, agricultural, industrial), 
threats of and vulnerabilities to contamination and the ecosystems connected to the 
groundwater resource. Such an assessment would also indicate how these various 
features might interact at different times of year or as a result of changes in related 
environmental resources or human activities. Proper assessment might even include 
predictions of how factors such as population growth and climatic variability would 
affect groundwater. With this type of assessment, those seeking to govern ground-
water would be better able to prioritise and to make strategic decisions about how to 
sustainably utilise the resource. 
11.2.3  Some Technical Considerations on Monitoring 
 Groundwater monitoring networks can be classifi ed as general reference primary 
networks or specifi c secondary networks based on their differences in geographic 
scale and their objectives.  Primary networks cover large areas, up to the entire coun-
tries. Selected wells are usually at relatively large distances from one another, but 
still suffi ciently close to provide an overall picture of the groundwater situation and 
to serve as a reference for specifi c and more detailed local studies. Routine observa-
tions of groundwater state variables (e.g. groundwater levels, hydrochemical con-
stituents and temperature) and are performed according to a predefi ned sampling 
frequency for an indefi nite period of time.  Secondary monitoring networks serve 
more specifi c purposes such as to locally monitor groundwater pollution or water- 
table declines around pumping well fi elds. Many of these local networks are created 
for temporary studies and are decommissioned when the investigations end (Jousma 
and Roelofsen  2004 ). 
 A key objective in designing the network is to provide the required information 
with as few new wells as possible to reduce costs. This is accomplished by minimis-
ing the number of observation wells and the sampling frequency using statistical 
optimisation techniques and making use of data from the primary monitoring net-
work when designing a secondary one (Zhou  1994 ; Jousma and Roelofsen  2004 ). 
Establishing a legal requirement to monitor groundwater can go a long way in terms 
of ensuring a properly funded and maintained network. Further, groundwater moni-
toring networks are ideally designed taking into consideration other relevant moni-
toring networks for surface water, meteorological data, vegetation and land cover, 
etc. 
 In countries without established groundwater monitoring networks, local knowl-
edge about groundwater from communities, businesses or academic institutions 
might be the most sophisticated. However, countries with the capacity to maintain 
robust groundwater monitoring networks often combine a wide-spaced regional 
network (primary) with denser networks (secondary) in areas of particular interest. 
These networks will be linked to different objectives, and the responsibility for 
monitoring (and its expenses) may be divided between governmental organisations, 
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responsible for overall water management, and organisations with specifi c tasks or 
interests (Jousma and Roelofsen  2004 ). 
11.2.4  Case Study: Groundwater Monitoring 
in the Netherlands 
 The example of groundwater monitoring in the Netherlands shows how the law can 
facilitate setting up such networks that observe the state of groundwater resources, 
inform the policy-making, enable adaptive management and thereby enhance gov-
ernance. It also shows how citizen participation and decentralised fi nancing mecha-
nisms can help ensure funding and cost-effective monitoring regimes. 
 The main legal framework for water governance in the Netherlands is the Water 
Law ( Waterwet ). This 2009 law has replaced eight water-related laws, like the 
Groundwater Law ( Grondwaterwet ), and it also implements the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) into Dutch National Law. The Environmental Law 
( Wet Milieubeheer ) provides an additional framework with respect to groundwater 
quality protection. 
 The Dutch national government is responsible for defi ning general water and 
environmental policies, which act as a framework for lower governmental levels. 
The national government maintains a national groundwater quality monitoring net-
work (primary network). Provinces are responsible for groundwater policies and 
management at the strategic and regional level. To this end, they maintain primary 
monitoring networks in which groundwater levels are measured in all relevant 
freshwater-bearing layers/aquifers. The networks allow for the analyses of long- 
term trends at the regional scale, but are not dense enough to map, for example, the 
highly variable shallow groundwater levels. In addition to the national groundwater 
quality network, provinces also monitor groundwater quality at yearly intervals in 
additional wells. A selection of the provincial monitoring wells is also used for 
monitoring obligations related to the WFD. Lastly, provinces maintain a register of 
groundwater abstraction rates from all licensed groundwater wells. 
 Municipalities have the fi rst responsibility when it comes to addressing problems 
with high or low groundwater tables in built-up areas. Many municipalities have 
implemented secondary monitoring networks of mostly very shallow monitoring 
wells often just limited to the problematic or risk areas. Since the enactment of the 
2009 Water Law, water boards are responsible for the licensing of most groundwa-
ter abstractions. Over recent years, the interaction between groundwater and the 
extremely dense and highly managed surface water systems has received more 
attention. Therefore, some water boards have started to implement groundwater 
monitoring as well, in addition to the provincial primary networks. 
 The national laws provide funding mechanisms by allowing provinces, water-
boards and municipalities to implement taxes to fund research and measures related 
to their specifi c (ground)water task including but not limited to monitoring net-
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works. To limit costs and involve stakeholders, groundwater levels of many wells in 
the primary groundwater network are being monitored by volunteers, despite man-
ual measurements recently being replaced by measurements from automatic data 
loggers allowing for higher monitoring frequencies. Historically, this is why 
groundwater level monitoring in the Netherlands has developed so massively, and it 
is an early example of stakeholder involvement in groundwater governance. 
Groundwater users and environmental organisations managing groundwater- 
dependent ecosystems (GDEs) also participate at different levels of governance by 
maintaining additional temporary or semi-permanent secondary groundwater moni-
toring networks. 
 All stakeholders are urged to provide their monitoring data to be included in the 
national groundwater database (DINOloket) which is maintained by TNO 
(Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientifi c Research), together with other 
subsurface-related data. The database is freely accessible and contains time series of 
groundwater levels and groundwater quality for approximately 70 000 monitoring 
wells containing 239 million groundwater levels and analyses of 136 000 ground-
water samples (Jellema  2014 ). The data are widely used by all stakeholders involved 
in Dutch groundwater management and policy development. 
 With these understandings in mind, it is important to note that turning the data 
collected from a monitoring system into information is what ultimately becomes 
important for governance. Firstly, interpreted results from the primary and second-
ary monitoring networks must feed back into an ongoing policy mechanism which 
will continually assess them. Secondly, if problems with depletion or contamination 
are detected, the governance framework will need mechanisms to cope with such 
issues. Thirdly, making monitoring data available also allows a range of stakehold-
ers including communities, businesses and academic institutions that have intimate 
knowledge of the groundwater resources to participate in these processes. In sum, 
effective groundwater governance should facilitate technically sound groundwater 
data that are obtained through in situ monitoring networks and should support pol-
icy development and implementation. 
11.3  A Global Diagnostic of the Current State 
of Groundwater Governance 
 Since the  groundwater governance concept emerged in water sector terminology, 
various interesting publications on this subject have appeared, but only a few of 
them (e.g. Sharma et al.  2007 ; Shah  2009 ; Garduño et al.  2011 ; Gerlak et al.  2013 ) 
explicitly intended to describe in some detail groundwater governance in a particu-
lar country or region. To the best of our knowledge, attempts at a global inventory 
and characterisation of the state of groundwater governance have not been made 
until recently, when such an initiative was included in the programme of activities 
of the GEF-supported Groundwater Governance Project, implemented by FAO 
jointly with UNESCO, the World Bank and IAH. Fundamental inputs from this 
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project to the global inventory were fi ve regional consultation meetings, attended by 
several hundred groundwater experts from across the world, followed by the draft-
ing of fi ve Regional Diagnostic Reports and one Global Diagnostic Report on 
groundwater governance. What follows below draws heavily on the outcomes of the 
Groundwater Governance Project (Al-Zubari  2013 ; Braune and Adams  2013 ; 
Kataoka and Shivakoti  2013 ; Tujchneider  2013 ; Chilton and Smidt  2014 ; 
Groundwater Governance Project  2016a ,  b ). These outcomes have enhanced the 
knowledge on the state and diversity of groundwater governance around the world 
in an unprecedented way, although the available information does not yet allow the 
presentation of an unbiased and comprehensive description of this state at the level 
of individual countries. 
 In order to structure the Global Groundwater Diagnostic, groundwater gover-
nance was assumed to consist of four main components: actors, legal frameworks, 
policies, and information and knowledge. Observed conditions related to each of 
these components need to be viewed against a reference framework that helps iden-
tify which of these conditions can be rated as good to satisfactory on the one hand 
and which critical gaps and fl aws exist on the other. Important elements of this ref-
erence framework are the area-specifi c setting, the locally adopted groundwater 
resource management goals or ambitions, and professional judgement on the gover-
nance requirements in relation to the goals to be achieved. 
11.3.1  Actors 
 The component “actors” is in principle quite heterogeneous and may include politi-
cians and other decision-makers, government agencies, scientists, planners, NGOs, 
industries, water-supply companies, drilling companies, the mining sector and other 
segments of the private sector, well-owners, groundwater users, water-user associa-
tions, groundwater polluters, international agencies and international bodies for 
regional cooperation, etc. According to current views,  good governance is not 
merely a matter of prudent government action but requires active participation of all 
relevant categories of stakeholders, with all actors cooperating harmoniously. For a 
diagnosis on this component, the following aspects are of particular importance 
(Groundwater Governance Project  2016a ):
•  Involvement and roles of the different actors 
 In general, governments have the primary mandate and responsibility for ground-
water management and governance. Government agencies are responsible for 
developing an enabling environment (legal framework, institutions, information 
systems, communication), preparing management plans and implementing them 
after they have been approved by decision-makers. The extent to which other 
actors are participating varies strongly from country to country. In some coun-
tries (e.g. China, Israel and countries of Latin America and Central Asia), 
groundwater governance is dominated by government agencies; in other coun-
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tries (e.g. India), important roles are being played by local communities and 
groundwater user groups, often assisted or led by NGOs. In many countries, the 
private sector provides water supply and sanitation services, but nevertheless it 
rarely participates in groundwater management. In the EU member countries, the 
European Union plays an important role through its Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) and Groundwater Daughter Directive on the protection of groundwater 
against pollution and deterioration. Although successful initiatives have been 
developed in several countries to enhance the involvement of groundwater users 
in groundwater governance, in many countries, stakeholder participation remains 
poorly developed or even non-existent. 
•  Sense of urgency for groundwater governance and management 
 Only relatively few people have a good understanding of the importance of 
groundwater for society and the risks of groundwater being “abandoned to 
chance”. As a result, groundwater is often overlooked by planners (even in water 
management planning), and political support for groundwater governance and 
management tends to be low in many countries, especially in relatively poor 
countries. This lack of understanding often translates into low budgets and low 
government priorities for groundwater governance. 
•  Mandate, capacity and motivation of the government agencies in charge 
 A broad, clear and undisputed mandate is one of the prerequisites for good per-
formance of any government agency in charge of groundwater governance. 
Unfortunately, mandates are not always clear, and fragmentation of tasks among 
different government agencies occurs in many countries, quite often accompa-
nied by institutional rivalries. Understaffi ng, insuffi cient budget and lack of 
motivation for proactive groundwater management provide even more serious 
constraints to effective functioning of government agencies related to groundwa-
ter. Such constraints are widespread, in particular in countries where the govern-
ment’s fi nancial resources are meagre. 
•  Capability and motivation of relevant stakeholders to participate effectively in 
the process 
 Many groundwater management measures are aimed at changing the behaviour of 
local stakeholders in one way or another (restricting abstractions, reducing pollu-
tion, etc.); therefore, it is essential to involve stakeholders in governing groundwa-
ter. However, this requires in the fi rst place that stakeholders be capable of 
participating (in particular, that they understand what is at stake, know how to get 
their voice heard and be fl exible enough to adapt) and that they be motivated to 
serve the public interest. To date these requirements are fulfi lled only rarely. 
•  Cooperation, partnerships and confl icts between actors 
 The huge number and diversity of stakeholders and potential actors in groundwa-
ter governance suggests that smooth and effective cooperation between them is 
far from easy. Rather, incompatible goals and diverging interests, lack of trust 
between different categories of actors and poor communication often lead to 
confl icts rather than to partnerships and effective cooperation. Finding and estab-
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lishing a mode of cooperation that fi ts local conditions and enhances groundwa-
ter governance is for most countries crucial and is decisive for failure or success 
of groundwater management. Herein lies one of the major challenges for improv-
ing groundwater governance. 
11.3.2  National Legal Frameworks 
 Many countries have legal frameworks addressing groundwater, and legal reforms 
have taken place in many countries in recent years to make the laws and regulations 
consistent with modern views on groundwater and its functions. Among others, new 
legislation has in many countries better defi ned groundwater ownership and user 
rights, or redefi ned these. While private groundwater ownership and user rights are 
predominant in customary law, in many countries, this status has been overruled in 
recent formal laws by defi ning groundwater as public property and, consequently, 
by granting governments the mandate to control groundwater abstraction and pro-
tect groundwater quality. The degree of actual government control varies consider-
ably around the world. For instance, constraints to private abstraction are relatively 
low in several states of the USA (in particular in Texas under the “rule of capture” 
doctrine), whereas groundwater abstraction is subject to strict regulation in coun-
tries like The Netherlands. Implementing the laws and regulations is often diffi cult 
or nearly impossible if they are not fully attuned to the realities on the ground, e.g. 
when “old” and “new” user rights coexist (Spain) or in countries where government 
agencies simply do not have the capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with 
the law and where a social culture of tolerating non-compliance has developed. In 
most countries, legal provisions and also institutional mandates for protecting 
groundwater quality are completely separate from those for managing groundwater 
quantity. Similarly, in the majority of countries, the legal frameworks for groundwa-
ter are not harmonised with those relating to land use and mining. Synergy can be 
achieved by better coordination or – where possible – integration. Harmonisation 
should also be considered in the case of transboundary aquifers expanding over the 
internal boundaries of a state (e.g. in the case of federal states), where synergy may 
be envisaged through interstate arrangements or infl uence of the federal state, while 
in the case of transboundary aquifers at the international level, domestic legal 
regimes will need to be made compatible with relevant rules of international law 
(Mechlem  2012 ). 
11.3.3  Policies 
 Not all countries have dedicated policies on groundwater, but those that do show a 
broad diversity in focus, scope, type, degree of detail and other characteristics. The 
origin of this diversity lies not only in different country-specifi c physical, cultural, 
M. de Chaisemartin et al.
219
socio-economic and political conditions but also in the differences in the stage of 
advancement of groundwater management and governance. Countries in a so-called 
pre-management stage typically do not have coordinated groundwater abstraction 
for local uses and lack a realistic notion of the need or desirability to manage and 
protect the groundwater resources. Groundwater-related policies in such countries 
usually focus on water supply and sanitation only, in response to short-term needs 
and without paying signifi cant attention to the broader water resource context. This 
is followed by the “initial management stage”, during which emerging problems 
trigger groundwater resource management – still single-issue oriented and only in a 
reactive mode (“crisis management”). The focus of policies in this stage shifts 
towards resource control and protection, and their scope becomes wider. In the third 
stage – the “advanced management stage” – groundwater policies are more compre-
hensive and adopt integrated approaches to exploitation, they control and protect the 
water resources, and they are linked to other policy domains. Typical of this stage is 
also a proactive attitude, manifested by the systematic development and implemen-
tation of periodically updated groundwater or water resource management plans. 
 There is a correlation between the stage of advancement of groundwater man-
agement and economic development in the countries concerned. Judgments on 
groundwater policies and attempts at their improvement should take this into 
account, but even when doing so, several types of inadequacies are widespread and 
need to be addressed. An excessively limited policy scope is one of the most fre-
quently observed fl aws: not only in policies of countries in the pre-management 
stage (where this is obvious), but even in those countries in an advanced manage-
ment stage, where inconsistencies with policies of related fi elds (such as agricul-
tural development, land use, mining, subsurface use, etc.) are often present. 
Insuffi cient knowledge is another common defi ciency – either caused by lack of 
data or by poor understanding of the relevant mechanisms of change – which may 
lead to an incorrect diagnosis of key issues and/or to promoting “wrong solutions”. 
Inadequate solutions are also promoted in many policies as a result of short- 
sightedness (short-term perspective of politicians), unrealistic goals, insuffi cient 
knowledge of human behaviour, and disregard of the role stakeholders could or 
should play. 
11.3.4  Information and Knowledge 
 Around the world, considerable progress has been made over decades with regard 
to area-specifi c information and knowledge on groundwater. Important contribu-
tions have been made by the systematic implementation of groundwater assessment 
and mapping programmes at different scales, the generally observed widening of 
focus from hydrogeology to a much broader interdisciplinary spectrum and the 
unprecedented development in data processing and information management, facil-
itated by information technology. In spite of all the efforts made, many groundwater 
systems around the world, especially aquifers at greater depth, still remain virtually 
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unexplored. Moreover, although data on time-dependent groundwater variables are 
crucial to guide groundwater resource management, such data collection and moni-
toring systems are often short-lived and fragmentary, covering only minor parts of 
countries and regions. Positive exceptions are countries with a long tradition in 
groundwater monitoring (e.g. India and The Netherlands) and regions where special 
programmes favour groundwater monitoring activities (such as EU countries under 
the WFD). 
 Where only half a century ago most data-owning public agencies and institutions 
used to be reluctant to share their data with other parties, nowadays a growing num-
ber provides online public access to their well-organised databases and information 
systems. Nevertheless, the data often are still scattered over many organisations, 
and sharing information is in many countries not yet a common practice or even 
constrained by major hurdles. Finally, groundwater data and information usually are 
presented in a digestible format for groundwater professionals. If politicians have to 
be persuaded to support groundwater governance and if stakeholders have to be 
motivated and empowered to actively participate, then relevant information should 
be available in tailor-made formats that suit the needs of these categories of actors. 
However, such groundwater information products are still extremely rare. 
11.4  Governance of Transboundary Groundwater Resources 
at the International Level 
11.4.1  The Situation Worldwide 
 To date, 592 transboundary aquifers have been identifi ed throughout the world, a 
fi gure that is sure to grow as reconnaissance and survey capabilities increase. Of 
these 592 transboundary aquifers, 72 are located in Africa, 73 in the Americas, 
129 in Asia and Oceania, and 318 in Europe, among which 226 are transboundary 
“groundwater bodies”, as defi ned in the EU Water Framework Directive (IGRAC 
and UNESCO-IHP  2015 ) (Fig.  11.1 ). Several previous inventories and assessments 
of transboundary aquifers at regional level were compiled by UNESCO’s 
Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management (ISARM) Programme (Puri 
and Aureli  2009 ).
 Managing transboundary aquifers coherently requires building trust and forging 
cooperation between countries, and despite progress reported in some regions, 
transboundary management instruments and approaches are generally wanting 
(Groundwater Governance Project  2016a ). Enabling frameworks dedicated to sup-
port cooperation over transboundary groundwater resources and to achieve good 
groundwater governance can take a variety of forms from informal settings to the 
setting up of a joint institution or treaty, and be initiated through different processes, 
including through externally funded technical projects as in the case of some of the 
current transboundary aquifer agreements. Such enabling frameworks can have a 
limited scope, and countries may decide to focus on aspects such as data exchange 
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and monitoring or cover the use and protection of the aquifer at large. When no 
specifi cally dedicated framework is required, cooperation can also be achieved 
through extending the scope of an existing basin institution or treaty to the aquifer 
(Mechlem  2012 ). 
 While hundreds of treaties have been negotiated over the use and protection of 
transboundary surface rivers and lakes, the number of similar instruments specifi -
cally dedicated to groundwater resources is extremely low – and where they exist, 
their impact may still be questionable (Sugg et al.  2015 ). Studies have shown that 
the likelihood of tension and confl ict within an international river basin is related to 
the interaction between rapid or extreme changes occurring within the basin and the 
presence and capacity of institutional mechanisms (treaty or institution) to mitigate 
such confl ict (Yoffe et al.  2003 ). While these results apply to surface waters, they 
can give some insight into the potential costs of inaction and challenges to be faced 
if more efforts are not made to develop and enhance cooperative governance frame-
works for transboundary groundwater resources. 
11.4.2  International Legal Frameworks 
 Legal frameworks are key in groundwater governance as they lay the foundations 
upon which to develop policies and translate the latter into rights and obligations 
(Mechlem  2012 ). At the international level, the main instrument is the 1997 
New York Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
 Fig. 11.1  Transboundary Aquifers of the World. Simplifi ed version of “The Map of Transboundary 
Aquifers of the World”. Edition 2015. Scale 1: 50 000 000 (IGRAC and UNESCO-IHP  2015 ) 
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Watercourses, which entered into force in 2014 and extends to “surface waters and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationships a unitary whole 
and normally fl owing into a common terminus”, thus only considering unconfi ned 
aquifers within its scope. Another global international water law instrument is the 
UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, which provides more detailed provisions about the former and 
includes in its scope both confi ned and unconfi ned transboundary aquifers. 
Originally a regional convention, it was signed in 1992, entered into force in 1996 
and its amendments opening it for accession to all UN Member States entered into 
force in 2013. In addition, non-binding instruments such as the 2008 Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers adopted by the UN International Law 
Commission (UN ILC) and annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 63/124 
(UNGA  2008 ) and Resolution 68/118 (UNGA  2013 ) which commends them to the 
attention of governments, as well as the UNECE ( 2012 ) Model Provisions on 
Transboundary Groundwaters and the 2000 Guidelines on Monitoring and 
Assessment of Transboundary Groundwaters (UNECE  2000 ), constitute valuable 
guidance tools specifi cally devoted to transboundary aquifers. These global instru-
ments provide states with a general framework for cooperation, which can serve as 
a basis for the development of appropriate arrangements for the use and protection 
of groundwater resources, tailored to a particular transboundary aquifer and to the 
local settings. 
 At the regional level, existing legal frameworks that deal with groundwater 
include the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses (SADC  2000 ) and the 
African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, as well 
as the EU Water Framework Directive which aims to achieve by 2015 “good status” 
for all domestic and transboundary waters of the region in terms of quantity and 
quality and its 2006 Daughter Directive on the protection of groundwater against 
pollution and deterioration (Mechlem  2012 ). 
 Groundwater resources are included within the scope of several bilateral or mul-
tilateral surface water arrangements; however, only six agreements to date are spe-
cifi cally dedicated to transboundary aquifers, namely, the Genevese Aquifer, the 
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer, the North-Western Sahara Aquifer, the Iullemeden 
Aquifer, the Guaraní Aquifer and the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Aquifer. Among those, some 
agreements may remain generic (Guaraní Aquifer), while others may cover only 
certain aspects of transboundary aquifer cooperation (North-Western Sahara Aquifer 
System, Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System) (Groundwater Governance Project 
 2016a ). Although only a few agreements exist at this stage, the number of trans-
boundary aquifer agreements will undoubtedly increase with better knowledge and 
understanding of the resource. While international water law instruments dealing 
with transboundary aquifers are still scarce, the provisions of a number of other inter-
national law instruments may also prove useful in terms of groundwater governance 
such as global environmental treaties on carbon capture and storage (Mechlem  2012 ). 
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11.5  The Way Forward 
11.5.1  A Shared Global Vision for 2030 
 Groundwater professionals of most countries are aware of the majority of the gaps 
and fl aws in groundwater governance as depicted above. This is substantiated by the 
numerous activities intended to improve groundwater governance in their countries, 
but in many cases, there is no or insuffi cient progress or actions not addressing those 
governance aspects that are locally most critical. The aforementioned Groundwater 
Governance Project has developed a Global Vision to encourage and guide the inter-
national community in the endeavours to improve groundwater governance. It 
intends to be “a Vision of the World in 2030 in which countries have taken appropri-
ate and effective action to govern their groundwater in order to reach globally shared 
goals of social and economic development and avoid irreversible degradation of 
groundwater resources and their aquifer systems” (Groundwater Governance 
Project  2016b ). This requires “good governance” with at its heart an effective legal 
system, capable government agencies, well-designed policies, a structured process 
for implementing groundwater management plans and mechanisms to facilitate 
effective participation of stakeholders. 
 The Vision underlines the important role of groundwater around the world, the 
dependency of humans and ecosystems on it and the existence of signifi cant threats 
to the groundwater resources. All these factors call for “good groundwater gover-
nance”, guided in particular by the following  working principles :
•  Groundwater should not be managed in isolation, but conjunctively as appropri-
ate with other water sources to improve water security and assure ecosystem 
health. 
•  Groundwater quality and resources should be co-managed, and therefore ground-
water management needs to be harmonised with land management. 
•  Effective groundwater governance requires co-governance of subsurface space. 
•  “Vertical integration” is required between national and local level in the elabora-
tion and implementation of groundwater management and protection plans. 
•  Coordination should be established with the macro-policies of other sectors – 
such as agriculture, energy, health, urban and industrial development, and the 
environment. 
11.5.2  A Framework for Action 
 To achieve the goals of the Shared Vision 2030, a Framework for Action has been 
developed (Groundwater Governance Project  2016c ). It describes the main steps to 
be taken, provides guidance on planning and prioritising actions and is an urgent 
call for action to all who can make a difference: national and local governments, 
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international organisations, private sector, civil society, media, educational institu-
tions and professional organisations – but also well-owners, groundwater users and 
concerned citizens everywhere. The main steps elaborated in the Framework for 
Action are:
•  Understanding the context 
•  Creating a basis for governance 
•  Building effective institutions (laws, regulations, institutions) 
•  Making essential linkages 
•  Redirecting fi nances 
•  Establishing a process of planning and management 
 Groundwater governance is highly context-specifi c and depends on the hydroge-
ology, level of development and specifi c challenges related to the aquifer, as well as 
on the political leadership capacity to deliver the overall governance and macro- 
economic interests (Groundwater Governance Project  2016c ). Action programmes 
for enhancing groundwater governance at the national and subnational levels there-
fore need to be optimally tuned to local conditions. The latter is a prerequisite for 
convincing decision-makers of the urgency of good groundwater governance and 
for creating among all relevant stakeholder groups the motivation and determination 
to participate. 
 The Shared Global Vision for Groundwater Governance 2030 and the Global 
Framework for Action to Achieve the Vision on Groundwater Governance call for 
strengthening groundwater governance. This call for action urges countries, dis-
tricts, communities, companies, organisations and individuals to safeguard the 
groundwater resource that is essential to meet their common future objectives and 
sustainable development goals. This Framework for Action is designed to set in 
place the groundwater governance arrangements that will achieve this Vision 
(Groundwater Governance Project  2016c ). 
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 Water Governance Futures in South Asia 
and Southern Africa: Déjà Vu All Over 
Again? 
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 Abstract  This chapter explores the likely trends and outcomes in water gover-
nance by about 2030 in two regions: South Asia and Southern Africa. It addresses 
the question: What are the prospects for developing governance arrangements in the 
two regions that will lead to more positive outcomes in terms of sustainably improv-
ing people’s livelihoods while conserving natural resources? It examines this ques-
tion through three “lenses”: (1) “beyond disciplines”, (2) “beyond scales” and (3) 
“beyond ‘institutional’ hardware to ‘human’ software”. The two regions are cur-
rently on different trajectories: the Southern African trajectory seems to be moving 
in a positive direction, in contrast with South Asia. The chapter discusses four fac-
tors that go far to explaining this divergence: (1) the contrasting roles of the hege-
monic countries, (2) the level of intercountry “trust” that has emerged in the two 
regions, (3) the roles of civil society and NGOs and (4) the roles of external facilita-
tors. The chapter emphasises the importance of developing the human software – 
the “soft skills” of communication and shared values complementing technical 
competence – as the most critical driver of successful water resource governance. 
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12.1  Introduction 
 In the waning years of the past century and the early years of this twenty-fi rst cen-
tury, there have been predictions that competition for increasingly scarce water sup-
plies will lead to famines, the breakdown of stressed societies, confl icts and even 
warfare among countries. Serious disagreements and threats are emerging over 
development of water resources. Water scarcity in North Africa and the Middle East 
threatens food security and economic growth 1 . Upstream countries on the Nile 
Basin want to replace water-sharing rules imposed by the colonial powers with new 
rules they deem more equitable – creating alarm and consternation in downstream 
countries for whom the Nile waters is critical (Swatuk  2012 ). In addition, the inter-
national consensus and drive behind the integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) paradigm is now fraying. IWRM has been the basis for considerable prog-
ress in increasing scientifi c knowledge and understanding of water resource issues, 
sharing this knowledge widely among stakeholders and building networks and insti-
tutions for managing water effectively (see, e.g.  www.cap-net.org ); but it has inhib-
ited investments, especially in underdeveloped river basins such as those in Africa 
(e.g. Giordano and Shah  2014 ). 
 On the other hand, partly as a result of the IWRM movement, there are important 
signs that sharing water resources can trigger cooperation among countries (Wirkus 
 2005 ). The idea of sharing the benefi ts of water resource development rather than 
seeking formulas for equitable sharing of the water resource itself offers an oppor-
tunity to achieve a higher net benefi t – but this requires a high degree of trust among 
the parties (Grey and Sadoff  2007 ; Sadoff and Grey  2002 ). This principle of “benefi t 
sharing” is the basis for the Nile Basin Initiative, the Mekong Commission and the 
SADC Protocol on water sharing, among others (Earle et al.  2010 ). Achieving a 
high level of trust and creating effective institutional arrangements to produce and 
share the benefi ts equitably is fundamentally an issue of water governance. This is 
proving extremely diffi cult to achieve. The decade of progress made in achieving 
cooperation among most of the Mekong countries is threatened by unilateral invest-
ments in dams by some upstream countries eager to achieve more rapid economic 
growth (Burton  2011 ; Grumbine et al.  2012 ; Houba et al.  2013 ). The progress made 
by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is threatened by disagreements over the funda-
mental rules for sharing water resources and by upstream countries hungry for rapid 
hydroelectric and agricultural development. 
1  See, e.g.  http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID = 47181#.Uw9h-aOYbIU (accessed 23 
April 2014). 
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 The water sector does not exist in isolation: for instance, the understanding of the 
water-energy-food-climate change nexus has grown recently (Bizikova et al.  2013 ; 
WEF  2011 ). This refl ects a growing recognition that the challenges posed within 
each of these “sectors” (for want of a better term) interact in complex and dynamic 
ways with the others. Further, governance and management arrangements for the 
water sectors are embedded in larger political and institutional contexts. Mobilising 
water for agricultural production and using it productively, particularly on rain-fed 
fi elds, will be critical for achieving future food security. However, mobilising water 
for hydroelectric and other uses is also critical in many regions – and both compete 
with the use of water for agriculture and support agricultural water by reducing 
energy costs of pumping. Climate change is affecting all major river basins in ways 
that are complex and not easily predicted. Making water available for drinking and 
household uses, ensuring adequate water fl ows for environmental services and 
improving the productivity of fi sheries are other critical challenges. 
 Given these interlinkages and interdependencies, what will water governance 
look like in the future? By “future” we mean approximately 2030, on the premise 
that crystal balls and forecasting models become totally opaque beyond a 15-year 
horizon. Defi ning “governance” is diffi cult: there are multiple competing formula-
tions. For the purpose of this chapter, we defi ne governance as referring to “all 
processes of governing [i.e. managing affairs], whether undertaken by a govern-
ment, market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organisa-
tion, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power, or language”. It relates 
to processes and decisions that seek to defi ne actions, grant power and verify perfor-
mance (Bevir  2013 : 1). Most of those writings about “water governance” use the 
defi nition of the Global Water Partnership: “the range of political, social, economic 
and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, 
and delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (Rogers and Hall  2003 ). 
Governance thus refers to the institutional systems and process through which deci-
sions are made and implemented. It constitutes the processes through which control 
and authority are exercised in the allocation of water resources. 
 This chapter explores the likely trends and outcomes in water governance with a 
particular focus on cooperation and confl ict over the management of water resources 
in two regions: South Asia and Southern Africa. In South Asia, the focus is on the 
governance of three very large-scale shared river basins, the Indus, Ganges and 
Brahmaputra, inhabited by nearly a billion mostly poor people. The Ganges and 
Indus basins are under growing stress in the context of a lack of appropriate water 
governance arrangements. South Asia has struggled to fi nd ways to co-manage 
water resources to benefi t everyone equitably in a context where there is much 
potential benefi t to be achieved. Southern Africa is considered an example of rela-
tive success in developing ways to cooperate – but implementation is incredibly 
complex in systems that are smaller in terms of size and population but more water 
scarce than the South Asian basins. So the critical question is:  what are the pros-
pects for developing governance arrangements in the two regions that will lead to 
more positive outcomes in terms of sustainably improving people’s livelihoods 
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while conserving natural resources than achieved so far versus further deteriora-
tion and rising confl ict? 
 We examine this question through three “lenses” which we characterise as 
“beyond disciplines”, “beyond scales” and “beyond ‘institutional’ hardware to 
‘human’ software”.  Beyond disciplines addresses the question of how to mobilise 
the diverse types of expertise productively to solve problems. It is based on the rec-
ognition that no single discipline is suffi cient to address the emerging challenges of 
water resource governance and management. Addressing the governance challenges 
facing the water sector requires a diverse range of scientifi c expertise combined 
with a wide spectrum of actors – represented by the state, civil society and the pri-
vate sector. Further, no amount of technical and scientifi c ingenuity is adequate if 
the solutions generated are not relevant to the specifi c socio-political and socio- 
economic contexts in which they are applied (Jacobs  2012 ). 
 Beyond scales examines how to defi ne the “space” for transboundary water 
resource governance and management. Traditionally, there has been a tendency to 
prioritise the hydrological basin as the primary unit of analysis in water governance 
and its management. Recently, this notion has been broadened to include other 
socio-political and socio-economic communities with a stake in the resources: 
thinking has evolved from the watershed to the “problemshed” to the virtual and 
social basin (Mollinga et al.  2007 ). There is therefore a changing defi nition of inter-
national river basins – encompassing not hydrological boundaries alone but “lived 
in” social spaces, i.e. the sum of social practices and discourses that exist within the 
biophysical space. 
 The third lens,  beyond institutional hardware to human software , enables us to 
examine the entry points to bring about a shift from institutional systems that favour 
the powerful at the expense of others, to more enlightened leadership and gover-
nance arrangements that can help achieve both greater social equity and environ-
mental sustainability. The main focus of interventions, based on disciplines such as 
foreign relations, policy sciences and institutional economics, has been on engineer-
ing structural changes in institutions that change incentives and therefore behaviour 
and outcomes (North  1995 ). This emphasis may have led to a failure to recognise 
the equally critical importance of individuals’ mindsets and “soft skills” in bringing 
about change: while training and capacity building has emphasised enhanced tech-
nical skills, less attention has gone to how to enable individuals to champion and 
lead in intangible areas like building trust and fostering norms that guide behaviour 
in more productive ways. This is not an either-or choice; rather it is a matter of get-
ting the balance right between building institutions and fostering the soft skills 
needed to make them work. 
 The next two sections discuss the water governance challenges and opportunities 
facing South Asia and Southern Africa. Section  12.4 draws on the discussion in 
these sections and tries to assess the prospects for alternative futures and their impli-
cations for the well-being of the people. The concluding section briefl y character-
ises the wider implications of these cases. 
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12.2  South Asia: A Glass (More Than) Half Empty? 
12.2.1  The Emerging Water Governance Context 
 Water governance in South Asia has changed dramatically in recent decades. The 
gap between governance and “government” has widened (Mathur  2009 ) as other 
actors have acquired stronger roles in the allocation of water resources. The locus of 
water policy-making has moved from the state to include other actors: partly through 
the dynamic of (formal and informal) markets, the private sector and civil society 
have created greater space for themselves (Narain et al. ( 2014 )). State authority has 
been diluted at all levels. On the one hand, donors and funders play an increasing 
role in infl uencing the direction and nature of reforms; on the other hand, civil soci-
ety organisations have also infl uenced water governance. 
 New discourses such as those of IWRM and neo-liberalism have penetrated the 
water sector. However, the regional relevance of the IWRM paradigm has been 
questioned, given both the apparent mismatch between the informal nature of the 
water economy and the emphasis on formal organisational structures envisaged 
under IWRM reforms and the lack of political edge in the way IWRM has been 
conceptualised (Kulkarni  2014 ; Mollinga et al.  2006 ; Shah and Van Koppen  2006 ). 
The neo-liberal paradigm has been criticised for its exclusion of the poor (Urs and 
Whittel  2009 ). The discourse on gender mainstreaming has gained prominence, 
even as the gap between rhetoric and practice has persisted (Kulkarni  2014 ; Joshi 
 2014 ; Ahmed  2008 ; Prakash et al.  2012 ). 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, disenchantment with the role of the state in the 
management of the region’s massive surface irrigation schemes led to demands for 
a greater involvement of users in irrigation management. In South Asia, this process 
is referred to as “participatory irrigation management” (PIM). However, several fac-
tors limited the effectiveness of the process, including limited attention to issues of 
design and technology in the handover of irrigation systems, reproduction of 
unequal power relations in the internal working of water users’ associations, limited 
attention to questions of rights and entitlements and powerful resistance within the 
bureaucracy (Narain  2008 ; Jairath  1999 ; Parthasarathy  1998 ). The debate on appro-
priate approaches to arrest groundwater depletion has continued, with “competitive 
deepening” identifi ed as a major issue in some locations and climate change being 
recognised as another stressor, compounding the effects of groundwater depletion 
(Shah  2009 ,  2013 ). Falling water tables are seen as a serious threat to food security 
(Saleth  1996 ; Shah  2009 ,  2013 ). 
 South Asian water resource scholarship has thus recently experienced an upsurge 
(Mollinga  2008 ). Multiple voices are emerging in the water discourse; it is therefore 
necessary to create a space for dialogue among government, civil society and citi-
zens (Lahiri-Dutt  2008 ; Narain et al. ( 2014 )). In examining the opportunities for 
improved water governance and management, two scales are important: the grow-
ing potential for confl icts and cooperation across rural and urban uses and trans-
boundary water confl icts, each of which is discussed below. 
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12.2.2  Rural–Urban Water Confl icts 
 Most of the rapidly growing South Asia cities have expanded by acquiring the land 
and water resources of peripheral regions, creating vast peri-urban zones (Narain 
et al.  2013 ). Since urban expansion is a gradual process of acquiring land and water 
from the peripheral regions, it has equity implications for those living at the periph-
ery of large cities, as it raises questions for their land and water security. The usurpa-
tion of peri-urban water sources in South Asian countries has taken many forms 
(Narain et al.  2013 ). First, there are physical fl ows of water from the peri-urban to 
urban locations, for instance, through water tankers or the construction of canals to 
divert water from rural to urban uses. Second is the acquisition of village common 
property water sources to build urban infrastructure. Third is the encroachment 
upon the village commons. The fourth is the pollution of peri-urban water sources 
by urban and industrial waste. 
 Several policy and institutional issues are responsible for this phenomenon. The 
fi rst is the linking of land and water rights. When access to water is tied to owner-
ship of land, the process of land acquisition that characterises urban expansion leads 
to loss of access to water sources as well (Narain  2014 ). The second is the frag-
mented nature of urban planning and rural development that presents rural and 
urban water supply as distinct planning entities. Urban planners and policy-makers 
focus on the expansion of urban water infrastructure, overlooking its implications 
for rural water security. There is growing confl ict around peri-urban water sources – 
both freshwater and wastewater (Gopakumar  2012 ; Narain  2014 ). The absence of 
appropriate forums or platforms for the integration of urban planning and rural 
development creates opportunities for confl icts over water, but there are also oppor-
tunities for cooperation. As urbanisation advances, the demand for platforms for 
negotiation and confl ict resolution across rural and urban water supplies will become 
more visible. 
 An important water governance challenge in the region in the coming years will, 
therefore, be to develop appropriate institutions to integrate water supply provisions 
for urban and rural uses. This could take various forms: the evolution of multiple 
stakeholder platforms across rural and urban uses and the evolution of platforms to 
bring peri-urban residents face to face in dialogue with service providers. Current 
and on-going research in the region is expected to throw new light on opportunities 
for reducing confl ict and encouraging cooperation in the management of peri-urban 
water insecurity. 
12.2.3  Confl ict and Cooperation in Transboundary Water 
Resource Management 
 The major transboundary rivers in South Asia are the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. 
These rivers originate in the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region and are connected to the 
Tibet Autonomous Region of China. The Indus Basin connects Afghanistan, China, 
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India and Pakistan. Approximately 300 million people live in the Indus Basin, 
which covers an estimated area of 1.12 million km 2 . The Indus is critical to the sur-
vival of Pakistan, one of the driest countries in the world (Briscoe et al.  2005 ). The 
huge Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) Basin system stretches across fi ve 
countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India and Nepal (Ahmad et al. ( 2001 )). 
While Bangladesh and India share all three basins, China shares only the 
Brahmaputra and Ganges, Nepal only the Ganges and Bhutan only the Brahmaputra. 
Nepal is located entirely in the Ganges Basin and Bhutan entirely in the Brahmaputra 
(Salehin et al.  2011 ). It is estimated that at least 630 million people live in the GBM 
river basin (Aquastat  2011 ) (see Fig.  12.1 ).
 Worldwide, studies have shown that in modern times, no wars have as yet been 
fought over water and over 145 water-related treaties have been signed on trans-
boundary rivers (Wolf  1998 ). Nevertheless, confl ict over water at local levels is 
common and the potential for interstate confl ict over water is real 2 . In South Asia, 
numerous challenges exist to managing the three major transboundary rivers 
(Prakash et al. ( 2013 )). These challenges can broadly be divided into two, namely, 
biophysical and socio-political. On the biophysical side, Lutz and Immerzeel ( 2013 ) 
summarise the challenges in terms of cryospheric response to a changing climate in 
the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region. In essence, they conclude that the Indus runoff 
may change somewhat by 2050 (though the direction of change is uncertain), but 
the GBM runoff will not show major changes. 
2  See:  http://pacinst.org/issues/water-and-confl ict/ and  http://www2.worldwater.org/confl ict/time-
line/ (accessed 8 September 2015). 
 Fig. 12.1  Map of the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers in South Asia ( Source: Lutz 
and Immerzeel  2013 ) 
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 The real challenges lie in the socio-political arena where confl icts are brewing. 
The Indus Water Treaty has often been held as a showcase where the two signato-
ries, India and Pakistan, had gone through two wars, but the Treaty has functioned 
reasonably well (Biswas  1992 ). This notion recently came into question when 
Pakistan objected to India’s Kishanganga project; Pakistan decided to go straight to 
arbitration without considering the other options available under the Indus Water 
Treaty (Chintan  2011 ). This issue illustrates the diffi culties with static water trea-
ties, since conditions change over time and the countries concerned fi nd that treaties 
become increasingly out of tune with the new conditions (Biswas  2011 ). Salehin 
et al. ( 2011 ) document the status of cooperation in the GBM basin. They conclude 
that the lack of mutual trust and confi dence among the co-riparian countries has 
played a major role in the long-standing disputes or confl icts surrounding trans-
boundary rivers. 
 A lack of trust between the countries combined with the absence of a shared 
vision has led to a pattern of non-cooperation in the region. As Biswas ( 2011 : 669) 
notes, “This pernicious mind-set has eroded goodwill and confi dence, and has gen-
erated mutual mistrust and suspicion. The situation is further compounded by the 
failure of the political leaders to create public opinion in favour of formulating and 
implementing a vision for regional cooperation and development”. Studies on trans-
boundary water confl ict and cooperation generally consider interstate relations over 
shared water resources without also considering intrastate relations. International 
water confl ict and cooperation may be infl uenced by domestic politics and vice 
versa (Giordano et al.  2002 ). For example, the failure of India and Bangladesh to 
reach an agreement on the proposed Teesta River Treaty in 2012 was a result of 
opposition by the state government of West Bengal. 
 The major problem lies in the lack of understanding or acceptance of mutual 
benefi ts in co-management of transboundary rivers. Sharing of water is based on 
parties who give and take water and therefore is largely understood a win-lose game. 
Promoting peaceful cooperation for environmental management, benefi t-sharing 
and sustainable use of transboundary freshwater resources is possible only if inno-
vative approaches are used that bring together all sectors and actors whose actions 
affect the transboundary water body at regional, national and local levels (Earle 
et al.  2010 ). The development of a science-based diagnostic analysis is essential to 
identify the threats to the transboundary ecosystem and to break down the issues 
into manageable parts with the aim of developing a strategic action programme. The 
sharing of benefi ts from water use – whether from hydropower, agriculture, fl ood 
control, navigation, trade, tourism or the preservation of healthy aquatic ecosys-
tems – is immense and therefore a mindset shift is needed. 
12.2.4  The Future of Water Governance in South Asia 
 The gap between the potential benefi ts of cooperating to develop and manage shared 
water resources and the reality of continuing poverty, food insecurity, energy inse-
curity and resource degradation is immense and growing. We offer a few suggested 
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changes in governance arrangements that could lead to a more positive outcome by 
2030. 
 First, the “space” for regional water management must be redefi ned. Discussions 
and agreements on river water (or benefi t) sharing must move from being bilateral 
to being multilateral: to date, most of the diplomatic initiatives on river water shar-
ing have been bilateral in nature. Multilateral discussions, including recognition of 
local competition for equitable access to water, could reduce the dominance of any 
single state leading to more equitable and legitimate agreements. Second, South 
Asian governance arrangements need to adopt a “co-management” and “benefi t- 
sharing” perspective, rather than only sharing water. There is a dire need for co- 
management of transboundary rivers for mutual benefi t, especially as climate 
change and human interventions affect water fl ows. This will require a more diverse 
range of expertise and inclusion of a wider set of actors to succeed. Third, hydro-
power and the creation of an integrated South Asian power grid offer a game- 
changing opportunity for regional prosperity and peaceful coexistence. The 
cooperation between Bhutan and India demonstrates the potential for such an inte-
grated approach. Achieving such regional win-win partnerships by 2030 will be 
diffi cult but is not impossible. Achieving this game-changing state of affairs will 
require mobilising diverse types of expertise and facilitating the active engagement 
of multiple actors (“beyond disciplines”); changing mindsets from a hydrological to 
a problemshed paradigm (“beyond scales”); and implementing effective institu-
tional arrangements while – most important – strengthening capacities for negotia-
tion, dialogue and communication as well as technical skills and identifying 
effective champions with a regional vision (“beyond institutional hardware to 
human software”). Organisations operate in the manner they do as a result the 
behaviour of people who work within them (Senge et al.  2008 ). These steps will 
need to be accompanied by a process to create the institutional frameworks critical 
for long-term success. 
12.3  Southern Africa: A Glass Half Full? 
12.3.1  The Regional Context 
 Water resources are highly varied across Southern Africa. The region receives most 
of its water during the wet summer season (October to April), when rain arrives 
from the Indian Ocean. The majority of this water falls within 400 km of the east 
coast of the continent. In general, the region is better watered in the north and east 
and much drier in the south and west, except along the southern coasts of South 
Africa. According to Conley ( 1996 : 17), “the Zambezi River carries more than ten 
times as much water, and the Zaire [Congo] River carries more than a hundred times 
as much water, as the Orange River in the south”. In addition, the region is prone to 
both drought and fl ood, sometimes occurring simultaneously (Chenje and Johnson 
 1996 : 2). While it is often said that Southern Africa is “water scarce”, it should be 
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noted that scarcity is driven primarily by human and economic factors more than it 
is in terms any “water endowment”. As shown in Fig.  12.2 , there are at least 15 
international watercourses in the SADC region (Swatuk  2002 ; Ashton  2002 ) 3 .
 No community, country or region anywhere in the world began with effective 
water governance. Governance structures evolve over time as a consequence of 
need and as a reaction to a set of conditions relative to water in social relations. 
Their institutionalisation emerges over time. Rare is the institution that emerges 
fully blown; rather, what we see is the gradual build-up of a governance system over 
time. Even where new states are created, such as South Sudan, with new  institutional 
arrangements, these will be infused with the pre-existing social norms, practices 
3  Ashton and Turton ( 2009 ) identify 21 basins. This is a debate we do not pursue here. 
 Fig. 12.2  Transboundary River Basins of SADC ( Source:  http://www.limpoporak.com/en/river/
geography/basins+of+southern+africa.aspx ) 
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and expectations that cannot be erased, but which may not be adequately acknowl-
edged in a state-building process. Thus, as Dovers ( 2001 ) points out, institutions 
better refl ect the past than anticipate the future. Given their histories, “[i]nstitutions 
are both barriers to and opportunities for ecologically sustainable human develop-
ment. Institutions can pervert or empower human potential” (Dovers  2001 : 215). 
Path dependency is real. 
12.3.2  Evolution of Regional Water Governance 
 It has been more than 20 years since the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) became the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). With regard to water resource governance and management, SADC mem-
ber states have been engaged in signifi cant institution building, at national and 
regional levels, over the past two decades. All member states have or have expressed 
their intention to revise their water laws, to reform their governance arrangements 
and to create new water management organisations. Most have attempted to bring 
their national laws, policies and procedures into line with fellow member states, all 
of which are informed by the Revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
(referred to as the “SADC Protocol” from here on), and dominant global discourses 
concerning integrated water resource management, water integrity and water effi -
ciency, to name only three of the many conceptual infl uences active in the region. 
These initiatives are supported by a seemingly never-ending fl ow of people, fi nance, 
technology and ideas from Europe and elsewhere in the world. It is a rather grand 
experiment with uneven results (Swatuk and Fatch  2013 ). 
 These mixed results are understandable. This is especially so when one considers 
the failure to factor into plans, policies and programmes the historical basis and 
contemporary manifestation of the politics of water resource access and use in post- 
colonial/post-apartheid Southern Africa. Put differently, Southern Africa comprises 
a set of unevenly developed states where access to water and land refl ects profound 
socio-economic inequalities. To shy away from these facts is to guarantee poor 
water governance. Thus, to say that a triple-E (social equity, economic effi ciency, 
environmental sustainability) bottom line is the aim of national/regional water gov-
ernance is simply not enough (SADC  2011 ,  2012 ). The region must move beyond 
high-minded platitudes to improve practices and achieve better outcomes. This 
requires asking diffi cult questions regarding the relationship between existing gov-
ernance structures and management practices and their role in, and relationship to, 
abiding conditions of widespread poverty and unequal access to and economically 
and environmentally unsustainable use of water. As with South Asia, demographic 
drivers – urban population growth, abiding rural poverty – and extensively shared 
international waters should concentrate the minds of decision-makers, particularly 
under the speculative cloud of the negative impacts of climate change. 
 Many good things have happened over the past two decades. The legal basis is 
mostly in place regarding fair and equitable use of the region’s resources, both 
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within states and among them. Most of the region’s shared basins have some sort of 
governing architecture in place. At the centre of regional cooperation is the SADC 
Protocol, without which many of the joint fact-fi nding and knowledge-building 
exercises in the region’s basins may not have been possible. Dramatic changes in 
South Africa’s political landscape since the early 1990s were initially accompanied 
by sweeping changes to that nation’s policies, laws and institutions. South Africa 
became a very active member of SADC, leading processes around issue areas such 
as devising national water policies, strategies and laws. South Africa’s water reform 
spurred the wave of reforms experienced in neighbouring countries post-1990 as 
well. 
 However, like many developing countries, SADC states struggle with imple-
menting many of their well-formed policies, laws and procedures. There are a wide 
variety of explanations regarding this relatively poor performance: human, fi nancial 
and technological shortages, “poor governance” embedded in unequal states, ten-
sions around the creation of new sources of authority such as catchment manage-
ment agencies or councils and water user associations, resource capture facilitated 
by neoliberal approaches to resource management and persistent global economic 
crises forcing resource-extracting economies to “stick to what they know”. Some 
critics have argued that rather than introduce a whole new set of structures, state 
actors should have worked with existing, already legitimate, forms of authority. Van 
Koppen et al. ( 2014 ) suggest that the nationalisation of water resources and the 
introduction of formal permit systems, while probably important in principle (par-
ticularly in highly unequal societies), have in fact facilitated further resource cap-
ture by the empowered and the undermining of local systems of governance. 
 Yet there are success stories: Namibia’s basin management committees, particu-
larly in the western-draining ephemeral Kuiseb river basin, show the real potential 
for ideal-typical IWRM-style systems to emerge (Manning and Seely  2005 ). Indeed, 
the role of Rand Water, South Africa’s largest water services provider in the Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, suggests that public-private partnerships can 
work given a particular set of parameters 4 . In the transboundary context, states have 
shown a willingness to cooperate, though not quite extending to striking what Litfi n 
( 1997 ) describes as “sovereignty bargains”, such as those that typify the European 
Union. New modalities of decision-making have been successfully introduced; 
numerous multidisciplinary, transnational research and knowledge-generating proj-
ects and programmes are underway; and the important 14-year-old regional water 
research and education programme, WaterNet 5 , has been building the region’s pro-
fessional capacity. WaterNet is recognised as the water capacity-building arm of 
SADC, and its implementation through a set of regional universities and training 
institutions has promoted mutual understanding – even friendships – among regional 
water professionals. To be sure, some of these activities are being pushed by exter-
nal actors, whose absence would quite possibly threaten the negotiation and bar-
gaining processes. Much of this feels like one step forward, one step backward, yet 
4  Rand Water is a government-owned entity that operates autonomously, largely like a private fi rm. 
5  http://www.waternetonline.org/ (accessed 8 September 2015). 
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if we are to realise the imagined sustainable water resource governance future of the 
region, it is important to see the glass as half full. 
12.3.3  How to Fill a Glass that Is Half Full 
 A sustainable water governance future will require a fi rm technical and legal/insti-
tutional foundation, i.e. institutional hardware. But having adequate amounts of 
money, physical infrastructure (pipes and so on) and the right systems of delivery 
and oversight will only go so far in the absence of what we are calling “appropriate 
human software”. In our view, one key element is leadership – at all levels. Even 
those who have advocated for the role of institutions above individuals have con-
ceded, as noted for South Asia, that the behaviour of individuals within organisa-
tions determines the outcomes. Indeed, the importance of individuals to the success 
or failure of effective water governance is under-researched despite being critically 
important (Kranz and Jacobs  2012 ). The role of the individual in relation to skills 
audits and occupational profi les needed for effective water management has been 
analysed in several disciplinary-specifi c analyses, particularly in education science. 
However, these have centred on human resource assessments of technical qualifi ca-
tions and their alignment with professional job descriptions in water and wastewater 
treatment. More research needs to be conducted on the role of the individual in 
actively addressing complex water-related challenges, in redefi ning how multiple 
sectors cooperate around these issues, and ultimately infl uencing socio-economic 
development at the regional level. 
 Part of the problem with water governance in the SADC and indeed SAARC 
regions is that political and economic power confers water security as a right upon 
the offi ce holder or private actor, and subsequently, those whom they deem worthy. 
In the days leading up to the end of colonial/apartheid rule and for several years 
thereafter, leaders in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa took decisions as if time 
was short and the needs of all citizens mattered. These countries are now many 
years into “independence” and the urgency – as well as most of the leaders – has 
evaporated. In the cases of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, a fundamental 
problem is that there has been little or no turnover at the top of the ladder, draining 
the life out of the system, particularly at the lowest levels of authority. Where will 
the vision and drive come from when the need for change is least apparent to those 
ostensibly responsible for the task? 
 One way to accelerate development from a water perspective is to train leaders 
that can speak different (technically specifi c) languages and who can convey and 
convince a critical mass of the appropriateness of a particular intervention. This 
speaks both to the role and need for individuals who are able to adopt a broader and 
more holistic mindset. But it may also include the identifi cation of particular occu-
pational or personality profi les for transboundary managers and policy-makers who 
are more predisposed to operate in this socially constructed landscape. 
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 To build the necessary human software and to inhabit the existing institutional 
hardware, education matters. Present and future generations of leaders must be 
made to see that water is not an ordinary good (Savenije  2002 ). Since water infuses 
all things and is fundamental to the functioning of all elements of society, it must be 
mainstreamed throughout the region’s information and educational systems. What 
should be avoided is the “crisis narrative” – though to be sure, there is a crisis and it 
is felt primarily by the poor – and what should be showcased is how everyone is 
downstream. Put differently, poor and misguided behaviour will eventually come 
back to haunt you. No matter how insulated political and economic leaders and their 
families feel, they are only one tweet away from ending up like Egypt’s Hosni 
Mubarak. The growing number and seriousness of social protests around water sup-
ply delivery in South Africa, which has also become an important political issue, is 
an indicator of the danger. 
 Trust – social capital – also matters. Good governance depends upon state-civil 
society relations wherein state action acts as a feedback loop to civil society expec-
tations. Every opportunity must be taken to draw political leaders into activities 
where political involvement is necessary to facilitate project or programme success. 
For example, in Botswana, President Ian Khama’s role as patron of the Kalahari 
Conservation Society ensures environmental issues a place of importance at the 
highest levels of decision-making. Of course, such interactions should also acknowl-
edge the existence of power relations, i.e. how individuals interact with each other 
and absorb information. If one actor is perceived to be powerful, other people in the 
conversation may feel too intimidated to speak. This dynamic needs to be carefully 
managed to foster fruitful dialogue. This point is particularly relevant for policy- 
makers operating at the regional level who have to contend with different levels of 
power purely as a result of where they come from, i.e. with some countries being 
more able to infl uence policy decisions because of socio-economic clout, military 
hegemony, human capacity and/or infl uential alliance. Where progressive systems 
are already in place, such as much of the SADC region, leadership and ethics must 
be one focus for fi lling a half-fi lled glass. 
 At the 2012 International Freshwater Conference, a question was asked in ple-
nary on whether the push for basin-scale governance structures wasn’t a mistake 
and that perhaps it made more sense to work from existing structures and imbue 
them with a “river basin sensibility”. The panel, comprising senior government offi -
cials and former members of the water administration, was uniformly in agreement: 
the basin is the way forward. If this is the case, then perhaps we can approach the 
question in the opposite way: with a river basin governance framework in place, is 
it not important to (i) embed this level of authority within existing levels of authority 
in meaningful ways and (ii) imbue the river basin authority with a sense that water 
itself is highly fl uid, moving in and out of the basin in a variety of forms (e.g. as 
virtual water) impacting a wide variety of actors, themselves external to the basin? 
What we are suggesting is a type of governance framework that emerges through a 
process Cleaver ( 2002 ,  2012 ) describes as  bricolage : building on existing structures 
rather than creating new ones that may be regarded as a threat to existing authorities 
(Jonker et al.  2010 ; Merrey and Cook  2012 ). It has been suggested that river basin 
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governance would be more effective if the higher level institutions incorporated 
basic values and processes characterising local indigenous governance (Merrey 
 2009 ). In any event, it is clear that the new basin management regimes within states 
have stalled for this very reason. Future water governance will have to be fl exible 
enough to draw in participants when needed; this will be a kind of networked gov-
ernance not solely dependent upon the physical geography of the river basin. 
 Lastly, we wish to highlight the value and importance of moving beyond the 
water sector and beyond the pride of place held by physical/environmental scien-
tists: engineers, hydrogeologists, biochemists and so on. Some years ago, Turton 
et al. ( 2007 ) described the importance of the government-science-society “trial-
ogue”. Sustainable, equitable and effi cient water governance will also require 
unpacking “science” to ensure that political, social and even philosophical/ethical 
dimensions are adequately captured. Most water problems are self-infl icted: they 
result from human interventions into natural processes, affecting the hydrological 
cycle among other ecosystem dynamics. People as groups and individuals are 
affected differently and therefore regard particular outcomes of these activities very 
differently. Decisions regarding use and management therefore are imbued with 
normative, ethical and subjective considerations. The questions asked, the problems 
addressed and the “experts” drawn upon refl ect the particular constellations of 
forces that exist within a society at any one time (Swatuk  2010 ). It is imperative, 
therefore, that future water governance arrangements make adequate space for con-
tested ideas and interests and the ways and means of accommodating these without 
violence. Many of the necessary elements are in place in the SADC region. The 
challenge, then, is to fi ll the glass, not draw down the fl uid that is already there. 
12.4  Conclusion: Prospective Futures of Water Resource 
Management 
 At present, governance structures, organised nationally and transnationally on a 
basin scale in both regions, presume that “stakeholders” can adequately represent 
themselves in formal settings where allocation, use and management decisions are 
taken. This is problematic in at least three ways. The fi rst is where rural areas are 
divided in terms of large-scale, cash crop producers and small-scale producers 
(Southern Africa) or in terms of wealthy expanding urban centres and small-scale 
producers (South Asia). The former are few but economically and politically power-
ful. The latter are many, but poorly empowered, especially where water and land 
allocation and use decisions are concerned. The former commandeer the vast major-
ity of blue water for irrigation or urban and industrial uses. The latter farm the worst 
land and depend heavily on the green water fl ow deriving directly from rainfall. The 
second is in urban areas divided between the rich few and the many poor. The for-
mer have in-house provision “on tap” and are able to supplement shortages in many 
ways. The latter often depend on on-plot or communal standpipes that may not be 
working or working only intermittently. The former have access to water-borne 
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sewerage systems that are well serviced. The latter make do with an array of often 
quite alarming “options”. Where resource-poor municipalities are forced to make 
choices, they have opted for privatising systems of delivery which too often rein-
force the existing inequalities, delivering too little of poor quality to the urban poor. 
And the third is that dominant narratives and framing concepts such as “climate 
change-induced scarcity” and “closed basins”, to name but two, reinforce path 
dependencies, as the “haves” aim to hold onto what they have and to extend their 
water “rights” where possible (e.g. with large farmers shifting into “biofuels” as a 
means of extending holdings and profi ts). Taken together, if left unattended, these 
three factors will not only reinforce social inequity, economic ineffi ciency and eco-
logical unsustainability; they also heighten the likelihood of confl ict among “stake-
holders” at a wide variety of scales: within the state, within the city, across the 
countryside and across state borders. 
 In other important ways, especially at the transnational level, South Asian and 
Southern African water governance arrangements are on what seem to be different 
trajectories. In South Asia, the governance glass is not only half empty but is not 
fi lling up. In Southern Africa, the governance glass is half full and there are pros-
pects – though no guarantee – it will be fuller by 2030. Both regions have a regional 
association to promote cooperative development, the South Asia Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and SADC. However, the SAARC website ( http://
saarc-sec.org/ 6 ) does not refer to cooperation in management of water resources, 
while SADC has provided a forum for its members to agree on governance arrange-
ments for shared water resources. In addition to the SADC Protocol, there are 
regional water strategies and plans as well as increasingly effective joint commis-
sions for managing each of the major shared river basins. Both regions are domi-
nated by countries with a British colonial past (though SADC has two Lusophone 
countries). While it is true that SADC’s scale in terms of area and population 
(approximately 250 million) is a fraction of South Asia’s, SADC does have more 
member countries (15); and although the river basins are smaller, there are more of 
them and most are “closed” – there is no more water to be allocated. Scale alone 
cannot explain their contrasting trajectories. 
 While more work would be needed for a full analysis of the roots of their differ-
ences, we suggest that their different histories – and not scale or ecology – explain 
their divergence. Here we discuss four factors: (1) the contrasting roles of the hege-
monic power, (2) the different levels of “trust”, (3) the roles of civil society and 
other NGOs and (4) the roles of external facilitators. 
 Until the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, South Africa was at odds politically 
with most of its neighbours and regional countries. It did strike bilateral agreements 
for management or development of specifi c river basins, using its overwhelming 
power to ensure it got a good deal. After 1994, South Africa adopted a policy of 
collaboration with other countries in the region. It plays a critical role in driving the 
process of increasing regional partnerships through SADC in a wide variety of sec-
tors, not only water. SADC can be seen as an example of expansion from a narrow 
6  Accessed 8 September 2015. 
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river basin focus to a broader shared social basin or “problemshed” perspective. 
Nevertheless, we cannot push this point too far: concerns about South Africa’s 
intentions have been one factor retarding the development of the Limpopo 
Watercourse Commission (LIMCOM). South Africa is not a riparian on the largest 
regional basins, the Congo and Zambezi, where cooperation remains problematic; 
however, it does have a strong interest in expanding their hydroelectric potential. 7 
Agreements on how best to manage the Zambezi water resources will be a defi ning 
factor for regional development by 2030 (Swain et al.  2011 ). 
 In South Asia, the long-standing confl ict between India and Pakistan overshad-
ows all efforts to promote regional cooperation. In addition, India has never tried to 
play the role of the “benign hegemon” that South Africa deliberately tries to play; 
its role is more analogous to that of apartheid South Africa. India fi nds it diffi cult to 
share data and to support efforts to create governance structures that would enable 
shared development and management of water resources for mutual benefi ts. These 
differing roles may in part be a product of how local (i.e. within-country) water 
issues affect transboundary cooperation in South Africa and India. In India, states 
have considerable constitutional and political power over water development – and 
the country has struggled to resolve interstate confl icts. As the Teesta river case 
shows, Indian states can even veto international agreements. This cannot happen in 
South Africa: water resources are constitutionally and politically a central govern-
ment subject; and the provinces are relatively weak entities. A critical determinant 
of the shape of water resource management by 2030 will be India’s role. 
 Related to this contrast in the role of the hegemon is the question of trust. Given 
the long history of apartheid in Southern Africa, it may seem surprising that the 
level of intercountry trust is higher than in South Asia. This is not universal – 
Mozambique is wary of the actions of its upstream neighbour South Africa, for 
example. Nevertheless, the seemingly interminable workshops and meetings at 
multiple levels, many facilitated by the regional Global Water Partnerships (GWP), 
have contributed greatly to creating a large degree of mutual understanding and 
strong personal relationships among civil servants, water professionals and civil 
society members 8 . Another major contributing factor is the role of WaterNet, a net-
work of over 65 universities and training and research institutions with capacities in 
water management training and research. Through its professional interdisciplinary 
M.Sc. course, regional professionals spend time in other regional countries and 
develop strong personal ties as they work and study together; and regional institu-
tions develop strong professional partnerships. The net result of the many regional 
workshops and joint training and research programmes is a cadre of professionals 
that combine “soft” skills with professional competence, linked into an effective 
personal network. These activities rest on a shared history of resistance to colonial 
rule and apartheid oppression. Put differently, the long history of warfare in the 
7  There are also speculative plans to divert Zambezi water south to South Africa, though this seems 
unlikely to happen. 
8  These are incidentally found at the highest level as well, as the leaders of some of the countries in 
the region had strongly supported the African National Congress when it was fi ghting apartheid. 
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region has helped strengthen interstate relations – an important foundation for fac-
ing shared current (e.g. drought/fl ood) and future (e.g. climate change-induced 
hydrological extreme variability) challenges. South Asia’s history is quite 
different. 
 In South Asia, long-standing unresolved confl icts continue to dominate. Pakistan 
was carved from the eastern and western wings of British India in bloodshed; 
Bangladesh was created in a bloody civil war that involved India; and India is con-
cerned about the infl uence of China on its neighbours. SAARC remains a weak 
entity, unable to overcome the mutual suspicions characterising relationships among 
the member countries. Civil society initiatives such as the SaciWATERS (South 
Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies) initiative called 
“Crossing Boundaries” have brought some researchers in South Asian universities 
together. However, there are far fewer regional workshops and meetings (including 
World Bank’s South Asia Water Initiative) than in Southern Africa – in part because 
of travel restrictions between Pakistan and India. The regional GWP is less effective 
than in Southern Africa; it lacks the convening power GWP-Southern Africa has 
earned. There is no equivalent of WaterNet. 
 This leads to the third signifi cant factor: the roles of civil society organisations 
and regional NGOs. While within South Asian countries (especially India, 
Bangladesh and Nepal) civil society organisations have strong voices in the water 
sector, there are no effective NGOs working on South Asian regional water issues 
outside the GWP, and its convening power is weak. In Southern Africa, there are a 
number of regional NGOs with strong convening power. Examples include not only 
GWP-Southern Africa, but also the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy 
Analysis Network (FANRPAN). These organisations have teamed up, for example, 
on the Limpopo Basin and have also drawn in some of the key national NGOs and 
civil society organisations. 
 Finally, the fourth factor is the role of outside facilitators – especially donors. In 
Southern Africa, a number of European donors have played key roles not only in 
facilitating communication and agreements but in fi nancing their implementation. 
This applies as well to WaterNet, FANRPAN and GWP. Indeed, these donors are so 
critical that they seem to have created a dependency on outside funding. If they 
 suddenly withdrew, it is not clear how sustainable the regional water governance 
institutions would be. Nevertheless, without their support Southern Africa would 
not have reached its current level of cooperation and partnership, which importantly 
includes streamlining water-specifi c legal and institutional frameworks across the 
region, as well as building local and national capacity for such things as improved 
urban water supply, rural (economic and household) water provision and environ-
mental management. 
 Donors have to date not been able to play such a signifi cant facilitating role in 
South Asia, perhaps in part because of Indian resistance. We argue that in regions 
with long histories of confl ict, having such an outside facilitator cum fi nancier in the 
initial stages is crucial. The Nile and Mekong river basins are cases in point. 
 However, in addition to creating dependency, the donors may have retarded 
infrastructural development in Southern Africa. The donors have at times made 
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IWRM an end in itself, at the expense of implementing practical solutions (Giordano 
and Shah  2014 ). With their emphasis on environmental conservation and high levels 
of consultation with all stakeholders – driven by internal constituencies – they have 
been reluctant to fi nance major infrastructural development in the water sector 
beyond local water-supply systems. 
 Will the water resource glasses be fuller by 2030 than they are now? Both regions 
could benefi t from regional cooperation based on sharing the benefi ts of water 
resource development, for example, through regional electricity networks. The 
prospects seem good in Southern Africa, if the countries can move from talking to 
investing and creating a more integrated regional economy based in part on shared 
management of water resources. The potential is great but prospects are less rosy in 
South Asia: there are growing challenges internally in providing water and power 
services. These could be addressed through effective regional cooperation. But 
without stronger regional networks, partnerships and institutions supported by 
external facilitators, South Asia may fail to take full advantage if its water resources 
to achieve better lives for its people by 2030. 
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